DETERRENCE STRATEGIES FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED STATES ON NATO’S EASTERN FLANK: THE CASE OF ROMANIA IN THE NEW SECURITY CONTEXT

Abstract

The war in Ukraine has rewritten the parameters of international security and put military deterrence back at the heart of the European security architecture. Donald Trump’s recent statements reflect an ambivalent approach to deterrence, combining pressure for increased defence spending by NATO allies and linking US political commitment to the Alliance’s fundamental principles. All of this may increase the risk of misperceptions and strategic exploitation of internal fractures by a potential adversary.
This paper analyses the mechanisms by which a state in the proximity of the conflict – the case of Romania, can build a credible strategic deterrence posture in an environment marked by uncertainties regarding the cohesion of alliances and power asymmetries. Using a comparative methodology (MSSD) and the TOWS matrix, the study proposes the transition from norm-based deterrence to deterrence through denial, supported by societal resilience and advanced technological capabilities.
The conclusions of the paper argue the reality that Romania cannot compete symmetrically with a nuclear and cyber power (e.g. Russia). Nevertheless, Romania can attain a level of effective deterrence by combining internal defence development measures and the consolidation of political-military alliances (NATO, EU). These findings may represent relevant operational recommendations for the formulation of European security policy.