Critical Infrastructure through a Securitization Theory Lens

Abstract

Critical infrastructure has become a central focus of European security governance amid increasingly complex physical, digital, and hybrid threats. This article applies securitization theory, drawing on both the classical Copenhagen School and its sociological developments, to analyse how the EU constructs and governs critical infrastructure through the CER Directive and the NIS2 Directive. The comparison shows that these instruments articulate distinct, yet complementary, referent objects: the CER Directive securitizes the continuity of essential services in the physical and organisational domain, while the NIS2 Directive securitizes the security and reliability of network and information systems underpinning the internal market. Together, they reveal a dual securitization logic, physical operational continuity, and digital systemic integrity, embedded in a multi-level EU security architecture that operates through legal instruments, regulatory practices, and technical standards. By linking securitization theory with the material politics of infrastructure governance, the article demonstrates that critical infrastructure is not merely a technical domain, but a key arena through which contemporary European security is defined and enacted.