Governing International Private Security Companies: Conceptual Contours, Normative Debates, and Strategic Divergences

Abstract

The rise of international Private Security Companies (PSCs) has drawn scholarly attention in security studies. Academic inquiry has shifted from early debates on legality and implications to theoretical and empirical analyses of governance mechanisms. Comparative studies identify distinct governance typologies: stateintegrated, market-driven, and deficiency models. To explain this variation, this article proposes a bivariate framework based on governance capacity and willingness. States with high capacity and strong political intent impose strict governance; those with strong capacity but limited willingness pursue moderate approaches; while strong willingness but weak capacity often results in absent governance. Through case studies of the United States, China, and the selective Global South state, the analysis demonstrates considerable explanatory power. Theoretically, it links governance variation to structural determinants; empirically, it reveals how governance preferences stratify along lines of developmental disparities. Achieving effective international PSC governance requires synergistic efforts via acknowledging national regulatory comfort zones to identify common ground for shared norms, multilateral agreements, and binding international legal frameworks.