The Asymmetries Generated by New Weapon Systems and Their Role in Achieving Success on the Battlefield. The Impact of HIMARS on the Conflict in Ukraine
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.53477/2284-9378-24-34Keywords:
contemporary battlefield;, new weapon systems, tactical and operational asymmetries;, position of advantage;, HIMARS., directions of expansion;Abstract
The advent of new weapon systems, which integrate the latest technologies, is transforming the battlefield and redefining the character of contemporary modern warfare. The recent armed conflicts in Syria, Yemen, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Ukraine, by their complexity, serve to illustrate the diversification of threats and the adaptation of military capabilities to counter them. Regardless of the type of conflict, success on the battlefield depends on the ability to gain an advantage over the enemy and exploit it. Such an advantage may be derived from the realization of asymmetries on the battlefield, which may be generated at all levels of military operations. The equipping of the Ukrainian forces with the HIMARS system in the summer of 2022 has given them a significant position of advantage, creating a number of tactical and operational asymmetries. In this context, the objective of this research is to identify the asymmetries generated by the HIMARS system and to determine how they contributed to the battlefield success. The key findings are of significant value due to the fact that most NATO member states, including Romania, are making efforts to strengthen their HIMARS capabilities.
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