Resilience – effects multiplier in preparing counter-deception

Authors

  • George-Ion TOROI

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.53477/2284-9378-24-38

Keywords:

resilience;, deception;, counter-deception preparation;, critical thinking, adaptation.

Abstract

This article examines the critical role of resilience as an effect multiplier in the preparation and training of military personnel. By developing the ability to operate under uncertainty and take calculated risks, armed forces can reduce their vulnerability to manipulation and disinformation. The analysis focuses on ways to build resilience, emphasizing the importance of mental flexibility, adaptability, critical thinking, and thorough preparation for dynamic challenges. The study also highlights the need to integrate these skills into military training programs to produce leaders capable of making informed decisions even in the absence of all necessary information. The findings suggest that a resilience-based approach can significantly improve the ability to counter deception and thus contribute to the operational success of the armed forces.

References

Administrația Prezidențială. 2020. Strategia Națională de Apărare a Țării pentru perioada

-2024. București. https://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Documente/Strategia_Nationala_de_Aparare_a_Tarii_2020_2024.pdf.

AFM. 2018. Army Field Manual - Warfighting Tactics Part 1: The Fundamentals. UKMinistry of Defence.

AJP3.10.2. 2020. Allied Joint Doctrine for Operations Security and Deception, edition A,version 2. NATO Standardization Office. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6422d0ba60a35e00120caf09/20230327-AJP_3_10_2_Ops_and_Deception-O.pdf.

Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Nathan. 2023. Chinese Next-Generation Psychological Warfare.Santa Monica, California, 2023: RAND Corporation.

Bennett, Michael, and Edward Waltz. 2007. Counterdeception Principles and Applicationsfor National Security. London: Artech House.

Black, James, Alice Lynch, Kristian Gustafson, David Blagden, Pauline Paille, and FionaQuimbre. 2022. Multi-Domain Integration in Defence Conceptual Approaches andLessons from Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. Santa Monica, California: RANDCorporation.

Boswinkel, Lotje, Neill Bo Finlayson, John Michaelis, and Michel Rademaker. 2022.

Weapons of mass influence Shaping attitudes, perceptions, and behaviours in today’sinformation warfare. Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, Haga.Cambridge Dictionary. 2024. resilience. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/resilience.

Cliff, Roger. 2023. China’s Future Military Capabilities. US Army War College Press.

Creswell, John W., and J. David Creswell. 2023. Research design. Qualitative, Quantitative,and Mixed Methods Approaches. 6th Edition. Los Angeles: Sage Publications.

Daniel, Donald C., Katherine L. Herbig, William Reese, Richards J. Heuer, Theodore R.Sarbin, Paul H. Moose, and Ronald G. Sherwin. 1980. Multidisciplinary Perspectiveson Military Deception. Monterey, California: US Department of the Navy, UnitedStates Naval Postgraduate School. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA086194.pdf.

Dowd, Anna, and Cynthia Cook. 2022. Bolstering Collective Resilience in Europe. https://www.csis.org/analysis/bolstering-collective-resilience-europe.

E-ARC. 2024. NATO’s Resilience Concerns. 29 February. https://e-arc.ro/2024/02/29/natosresilience-concerns/.

FM 3-13.4. 2019. Army Support to Military Deception. Washington DC: US Department ofthe Army.

FM 6-22. 2022. Developing leaders. Washington: US Department of the Army. https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN36735-FM_6-22-000-WEB-1.pdf.

Freedman, Lawrence. 2014. Strategy: A History. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Friedman, B.A. 2017. On Tactics. A theory of victory in battle. Annapolis: Naval InstitutePress.

—. 2021. On operations. Operational art and military disciplines. Annapolis: Naval InstitutePress.

Harris, William R. 2013. “Counter-deception Planning.” In The Art and Science of MilitaryDeception, by Barton Whaley (ed.) Hy Rothstein. London: Artech House.

JCN 1/17. 2017. Joint Concept Note (JCN) 1/17 Future Force Concept. UK Ministry ofDefence. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/657c3bb80467eb001355f8e2/ARCHIVE_FFC_JCN1_17-O.pdf.

Joint Doctrine Publication 02. 2021. UK Operations: the Defence Contribution toResilience. 4th Edition. London: UK Ministry of Defence. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6384a153e90e0778a511ab69/20221128-JDP_02_Web.pdf.

Jones, Reginald Victor. 1989. Reflections on Intelligence. London: Mandarin Paperbacks.

JP 3-13.4. 2017. Military Deception. US Joint Chiefs of Staff. https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp3_13_4.pdf.

Kofman, Michael, Anya Fink, Dmitry Gorenburg, Mary Chesnut, Jeffrey Edmonds,and Julian Waller. 2021. Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and OperationalConcepts. Virginia: US Center for Naval Analysis.

Lieutenant Colonel Michael G. Hays. 2020. „Convergence of Military Deception in Supportof Multi-Domain Operations.” În Theater Army in Multi-Domain OperationsIntegrated Research Project, de Gregory L. Cantwell, 55-86. US Army War College.

MCDC. 2020. Future Leadership. Multinational Capability Development Campaign. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5fdccd0de90e07452ec36ee8/20201210-MCDC_Future_Leadership-web.pdf.

MCTP 3-32F. 2024. Deception. US Marine Corps. https://www.marines.mil/News/Publications/MCPEL/Electronic-Library-Display/Article/3815472/mctp-3-32f/.

NATO Headquarters. 2023. Russian War Against Ukraine. Lessons Learned Curriculum Guide. Bruxelles. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2023/12/pdf/231208-RusWar-Ukraine-Lessons-Curriculum.pdf.

NATO. 2022. Madrid Summit Declaration. 29 June. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_196951.htm.

Paul, Chistopher, James Dobbins, Scott W. Harold, Howard J. Shatz, Rand Waltzman, andLauren Skrabala. 2021. A Guide to Extreme Competition with China. Santa Monica,California: RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1378-1.html.

Pijpers, Peter B.M.J., and Paul A.L. Ducheine. 2023. Deception as the Way of Warfare.

Armed Forces, Influence Operations and the Cyberspace paradox,. Hague: TheHague Centre for Strategic Studies. https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/01-Ducheine_Pijpers_Deception-as-the-way-of-warfare.pdf.

Ryan, Mick. 2022. War Transformed. The Future of Twenty-First-Century Great PowerCompetition and Conflict. Annapolis, Maryland: US Naval Institute Press.

Strategia Militară a României. 2021. Capacitate defensivă credibilă, pentru o Româniesigură, într-o lume marcată de noi provocări. București: Ministerul Apărării Naționale.

TC 7-102. 2014. Training Circular No. 7-102 Operational Environment and Army learning.Washington DC: Headquarters Department of the Army. https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/TC/042214e84da40544fdc66cd82d41f941.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92. 2019. The Operational Environment and the ChangingCharacter of Warfare. Washington DC: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/pamphlets/TP525-92.pdf.

United States Army. 2024. Directorate of Prevention, Resilience and Readiness. https://www.armyresilience.army.mil/index.html.

Watling, Jack, Oleksandr V Danylyuk, and Nick Reynolds. 2024. Preliminary Lessons fromUkraine’s Offensive Operations, 2022–23. London: Royal United Services Institute.

Whaley, Barton. 2007. Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War. London: Artech House.

Whaley, Barton, and Jeffrey Busby. 2002. “Detecting deception: Practice, Practitioners, andTheory.” In Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge, byJames J. Wirtz, (ed), Roy Godson. Transaction Publishers.

Downloads

Published

2024-10-15

How to Cite

TOROI, G.-I. . (2024). Resilience – effects multiplier in preparing counter-deception. BULLETIN OF "CAROL I" NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY, 13(3), 178–192. https://doi.org/10.53477/2284-9378-24-38

Issue

Section

Articles