The attack of the Russian Federation on Ukraine – Approach regarding the land logistics support of military actions

Authors

  • Robert-Cristian TRIF Regimentul 46 Sprijin, Sibiu

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.53477/2284-9378-23-12

Keywords:

invasion; ., military actions;, logistical support;, NATO;, logistics; n, special military operation

Abstract

The current conflict on Romania’s border is a genuine threat to national and European security, but above all to world security, given that one of the two belligerents possesses nuclear weapons and has always taken a hostile stance towards democratic circles. The Russian Federation’s unprovoked and totally unjustified invasion of Ukraine will radically change the entire geopolitical and security environment both nationally and on NATO’s eastern flank. Although the conflict is still ongoing, Russian logistical support to the war in Ukraine requires further approaches and is a critical area of research for several reasons. First, a thorough understanding of Russian logistical support can help develop effective strategies to counter Russian aggression in Ukraine. Second, an understanding of Russian logistical support can help policymakers assess the effectiveness of economic sanctions and other measures aimed at reducing Russian involvement in the conflict. Third, understanding Russian logistical support can provide insights into Russia’s broader geopolitical strategy in the region, which could help to resolve the conflict diplomatically and promote stability in the region

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Published

2023-04-11

How to Cite

TRIF, R.-C. . (2023). The attack of the Russian Federation on Ukraine – Approach regarding the land logistics support of military actions. BULLETIN OF "CAROL I" NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY, 12(1), 143–153. https://doi.org/10.53477/2284-9378-23-12

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