A LESSON IN MILITARY DOCTRINAL AND OPERATIONAL FAILURES: THE BATTLE OF HOSTOMEL AND THE RUSSIAN MILITARY’S FAILURE TO CAPTURE KYIV.
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.53477/2784-2487-24-14Keywords:
Battle of Hostomel; Russo-Ukrainian War; Putin; Leadership; Doctrines; operational warfare.Abstract
Abstract: This paper will examine the underlying doctrinal and operational factors that led to the failure of the Russian military to capture Kyiv, and its subsequent military implications that led to its (re)assessment of military strategy. Firstly, this paper will examine the historical lead-up to the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War, detailing the relative political and strategic factors that impacted upon President Putin’s decision to launch the ‘Special Military Operation’. Secondly, this paper will go into detail into the relative military and tactical landscape of Russia’s attempt to capture Kyiv, in particular, its failure to seize Hostomel airport, thereby leading to strategic failure. Thirdly, this paper will contend that the failure to capture Hostomel was based in part on operational factors but also upon the inability of Russian military planners to fully predict the Ukrainian resolve, as well as the limitations found in its doctrinal approach to warfare.
References
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