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The loss of the Quadrilateral and the Romanian legal arguments

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Abstract: Dobrogea Nouă, Dobrogea de Sud or Cadrilater, these are the names under which the southern part of the territory between the Danube and the Black Sea was known, an area that has been, for centuries, at the crossroads of trade routes and the interests of neighboring powers. The province was characterized as an "appendage of Asia, transplanted to Southeast Europe, which opened the steppe gate, as described by Alberto Basciani (Basciani 2001)As noted by historian Cătălin Negoiță (Cătălin Negoiță 2008) from my student days, precisely because of the extremely fragmented information I had. The moment of the incorporation of this territory into the Romanian state was almost overlooked, as if our historians were embarrassed to mention this episode. Even the Balkan wars were not treated extensively before 1989, so the history textbooks were content to record succinctly: the name of Quadrilateral, became part of the Romanian state». Even more concise was the information about the loss of the province: "Following the signing, on September 7, 1940, of the Treaty of Craiova, Romania ceded to Bulgaria southern Dobrogea, known as the Quadrilateral. "All the more so, as if the historians were in a hurry to conclude a subject that did not honor Romania".

Keywords: Dobrogea; Quadrilater; 1940; Treaty of Craiova; Bulgarian revisionism.

On September 7, 1940, Greater Romania died. The largest administrative-political construction of the Romanian nation was shattered after only 20 years. Only two decades, if we take into account the legal regulations, more precisely the Treaty of Trianon of July 4, 1920 and not the Great National Assembly of Alba Iulia of December 1, 1918. Very little for a people. Or maybe I deserved it.

On September 7, 1940, on behalf of Romania, Alexandru Cretzianu and Henri-Georges Meitani signed the Treaty of Craiova with their Bulgarian counterparts, Svetoslav Pomenov and Teokhar Papazoff, in the palace of the Jean Mihail Palace (now the Art Museum). Romania ceded to Bulgaria South Dobrogea (Quadrilateral) a region of 7,412 square kilometers and 410,000 inhabitants. In addition, Romania accepted a humiliating treaty - and unique in our history - by which it accepted a population exchange. 80,000 Romanians, many of them colonized after 1913, were evacuated from the Quadrilater, while 65,000 Bulgarians were to leave Romanian territory.

George Ungureanu notes that the decision to cede the territory acquired in 1913 is reconfirmed almost unanimously by the Crown Council, meeting on August 23, 1940 (Ungureanu 2005). Nicolae Iorga and the Transylvanian representatives definitely decided to give up the Quadrilater (the latter believed, or wanted to believe, that such a decision would strengthen Romania's chances in the negotiations with Hungary). Alexandru Vaida-Voevod very suggestively expressed the feelings of the representatives of Transylvania: "The quadrilateral is only the little finger, beyond (in Transylvania - n.n.) Is the arm". Only Constantin Argetoianu and Victor Lamandi made an exception to the general opinion, who saw in the surrender without struggle of another territory a sign of weakness, totally inopportune (Manolescu 1991).

The ratification decree was signed by General Ion Antonescu, the new Romanian "Head of State", on September 10, 1940, and was published in two days in the "Official Gazette", together with the full text of the Treaty.
The Vienna Dictate – for some it was annulled, for others not!

The end of World War II inevitably led to the Great Powers’ attempt to establish a legal peace, to draw up treaties to end the war. Paris was re-elected as in 1919-1920. The Paris Peace Conference (July 29 - October 15, 1946) was naturally followed by the International Peace Treaty of Paris, signed on February 10, 1947, between the victorious Allies and the losing states of the United States. Axis, following World War II. Article 2 clearly stated that “The judgments of the Vienna Judgment of 30 August 1940 are declared null and void. The border between Romania and Hungary is re-established by this article as it existed on January 1, 1938. In other words, the Treaty of Paris annulled the provisions of the Vienna Dictate, by which Germany and Italy forced Romania to cede northern Transylvania to Hungary. But logically the Craiova Treaty also had to be annulled, which is nothing but a consequence of the Vienna Dictate. A clear example is found in the correspondence held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in custody at the Diplomatic Archives).

Vienna, 30 August 1940

Excellency, On the occasion of the Hungarian-Romanian Arbitration Decision, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that my Government and the Bulgarian Royal Government have already agreed in principle on the issue of the surrender of South Dobrogea in the spirit of the Regal Român will do its utmost to reach the conclusion of this agreement as soon as possible and formally. Please accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

MANOILESCU

His Excellency the Minister of the Reich for Foreign Affairs, Mr. JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP

Vienna, 30 August 1940

Excellency, I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of today’s date informing me that your Government and the Royal Government of Bulgaria have agreed in principle on matters relating to the surrender of South Dobrogea to in the spirit of the recommendation of the Führer and the Duke, and that the Royal Government will do its utmost to carry out this agreement formally and as soon as possible. I have read this communication with satisfaction. Receive Excellency and on this occasion entrust the entrustment of my special
A similar letter will be sent to Manoilescu and Ciano, who will be happy to respond:

Vienna, August 30, 1940 Excellency, I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter, with today's date by which you communicate to me, on the occasion of the Arbitration Decision regarding the Hungarian-Romanian border, that your Government, and the Royal Government of Bulgaria agreed in principle on matters relating to the surrender of South Dobrogea in the spirit of the recommendation of the Duke and Führer and that the Royal Government will do its utmost to implement this agreement formally as soon as possible. . I have read this communication with satisfaction. Receive, Excellency, the entrustment of my highest consideration. CIANO

It is undeniable that the surrender of the Quadrilateral was made under German-Italian pressure, to which was added the Soviet pressure. However, the Great Allied Powers decided in Paris that only Transylvania should be returned to Romania, not the Quadrilateral! The great historian Gheorghe Zbuchea wrote that “in the tragic summer of 1940, when a large part of Romania became a prey to the surrounding revisionist countries, under the combined pressure of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, the surrender of the Quadrilateral was imposed, enshrined in the Romanian Treaty. Bulgarian from Craiova, signed on September 7, 1940. Our country lost 7,142 km2 with 440,000 inhabitants. “Subsequently, contrary to the rules of international law invoked at the end of World War II, due to Moscow, the issue of the Quadrilateral was no longer, as would have been normal, even formal, the subject of discussion and possible new regulations” (Zbuchea 1999) the assertion of the late teacher, perhaps less so; "It seems to us fully justified the absence of this land between the Danube and the Sea in future plans related to the possible reconstitution of the Romanian state within the borders of Greater Romania, as such only with Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, so without Quadrilateral." However, there were voices that challenged the exaggerated claims of the Bulgarians that Mihail Manoilescu (b. December 9, 1891, Tecuci - d. December 30, 1950, Sighet Prison), former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Romania in the summer of 1940, during the Ion Gigurtu government. During our research in the Diplomatic Archives (M.A.F. Archive, fund 71, Bulgaria, 1920–1940) we discovered many unpublished documents. Documents that were not included in the now famous Manoilescu Memoirs, “The Vienna Dictate. Memoirs: July-August 1940, Valeriu Dinu edition, Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1991”.

The reaction of Mihail Manoilescu, signatory of the Vienna Dictate

Letter addressed
Mr. Niculescu-Buzești,
Foreign Minister

Breaza, August 29, 1944

Dear Minister,
At the moment when unofficial information is talking about the return from Bulgaria of all territories acquired with the help of the Axis Powers, I think it is my duty to point out to you that on the occasion of the Vienna Arbitration, canceled today, I was obliged to sign two letters. (the text of which can also be found at the Ministry and about the assistance of which I mentioned in my telegram No. 10 of 30 August 1940 from Vienna in point 3), one to Italy and another to Germany, letters by which I recognized for the first time the transfer of Dobrogea from South, "in the sense of the decision of the Duke and the Führer."
This essential fact shows that the formal surrender of the Quadrilateral (which the Treaty of Craiova only enshrined in a solemn act) was actually and even legally consumed on August 30, 1940 in Viena, and we were imposed at the same time by the same people and under the same pressure as the Vienna arbitration, by an indivisible connected act, even included as a mere annexation of the same arbitration act.

In fact, all the diplomatic documents prior to or related to the Craiova negotiations confirm the forced character of the surrender of the Quadrilateral, in its entirety.

In this regard, my memoirs of 6 August to Berlin and Rome, my telegram of 13 August to the Minister to Sofia Filotti (in which I related the statements made by Prime Minister Gigurtu and myself to the Minister of Bulgaria Tchomakov) and especially the memorandum "Aide mémoire du 16 Août "which Minister Filotti handed over to Foreign Minister Popov on the evening of 17 August.

In all these acts, it is pointed out that Bulgaria is pursuing a "unilateral and rigid" solution, and not a "bilateral and friendly" one like ours, which we demanded to keep Balchik with the coast and an absolutely minimal territory of 1000 km. p.

Moreover, in the statements of the Prime Minister and mine to Minister Tchormakov (reported in the August 13 telegram to Mr Filotti), we told him: a conjuncture can one day "change the situation."

In the same way, in the Aide mémmoire of August 16, I resumed the same theme of the conjuncture, stating categorically that Bulgaria "refuses the pledge of friendship demanded by the Romanian people" and that consists in Bulgaria's renunciation of claiming Balchik with the coast and with the afferent territory of 1000 Km.p.

The same attitude was maintained by the head of the Romanian delegation in Craiova, Minister Cretzianu, who declared in his own opening speech that the solution of the Bulgarians can only be seen "with the deepest dissatisfaction with our public opinion".

I considered it useful, dear Minister, to highlight these data and circumstances, which of course you will use in the interest of our country, just at the moment when a new conjuncture is occurring for Bulgaria, as I had predicted would happen. one day.

Receive, etc.

Mihail Manoilescu

Legal arguments of the former foreign minister

Except from the personal notes of Mr. Mihail Manoilescu from July-August 1940

I. Hitler's "decision" of July 31.
After the U.R.S.S. ultimatum from June 26, 1940 and following the shaking of Romania's political position, the Romanian governments had been forced by the Axis Powers to accept in principle the obligation to deal with the Bulgarians and the Hungarians, on July 26 and 27, Prime Minister Gigurtu and I were forced to give result Hitler and Mussolini's guests to discuss this obligation directly with them.

As for the talks to be held with the two neighboring countries, it has been established then, in Berchtesgarden and Rome, that the Romanian government would deal directly without any intervention of any kind from the Axis Powers, Hitler declaring to us personally and solemnly that he did not intend to take any role in this regard to avoid arousing dissatisfaction with any of the contracting parties.

With all these categorical statements, on our return to the country, on the 31st of July at 12 o'clock, the Minister of Germany, Fabricius, presented himself to me and handed me a piece of paper with seven lines typed on it, lines that meant nothing but opinion. final statement of the Führer in the matter of the Quadrilateral, expressed in the form of a document.

I give it in Romanian translation:
"The Führer considers the return of South Dobrogea to the 1913 border, including Silistra and Balchik, as an extraordinarily fair solution that must simply be accepted (ohne weiteres)."

Fabricius added that Hitler had advised the delegates of Bulgaria who had visited him after our departure not to demand more, (!) Not to enter into a bargaining system with Romania.

How I reacted to this communication can be seen from the conversation note from July 31 filed in the Ministry's Archives:
"It simply came to our notice then that we were in for a treat. I told him that I considered this the saddest news he could bring me, because it puts into question the whole system of thinking and the whole conception of the regulation of our relations with the Hungarians and Bulgarians, discussed in Salzburg and Rome. " days before!"

I first showed him what this "opinion" of Hitler means for the issue itself, and then I added that this unexpected approach is of great concern to me from the second point of view, as it shows us what may be the way to proceed. in the future regarding the second, much more important issue of Transylvania.
I reminded him that it was agreed with Hitler that we would be allowed to deal directly with the neighbors, without any intervention from the Axis Powers. Now, we have the "opinion" of Hitler, who, because of his great authority, has a real character of arbitral award. And this is how much - which Fabricius did not deny - it is almost certain that the Bulgarians also took note of this communication.

"I spoke to Minister Fabricius with an energy and indignation which were only very natural, and he told me that he would communicate in Berlin the great emotion which this communication had caused me."

This serious episode clearly proves the fact, which must be kept in mind for the future with all its consequences, that the surrender of the Quadrilateral in its integrity was not a voluntary act of ours but an imposed act, having in fact the same character of forced arbitration - only without name and forms of arbitration - as well as the Vienna Act of 30 August, with which it is otherwise connected and legal (see next chapter).

"I surrendered the entire Quadrilateral only forced, threatened and under terrible pressure"

II. Treaty with the Bulgarians before Craiova. 3–17 August

Like the claims of the Hungarians, the claims of the Bulgarians also took on an acute character, also the day after the loss of Basabia.

As early as July 11, the Foreign Minister of Bulgaria, Popov, receiving on leave leave our Legation Adviser Krupenski, personally told him, as a friend, that Bulgaria's relations with Romania could become very tight, only on the condition that Romania cede Bulgaria to South Dobrogea (see the telegram of Minister Filotti of July 11). At the same time, Bulgaria can offer Romania a population exchange between Bulgarians in northern Dobrogea and Romanians in the Quadrilateral.

This sudden exit, in an inadmissible form, led me to telegraph on July 15 to Minister Filotti, pointing out that we could not be allowed to speak in the manner spoken to Legacy Adviser Krupenski and giving instructions as members of our legation, to no longer tolerate such unusual manifestations.

It is no less true that Bulgarians have since been confident that they will get the Quadrilateral from us, according to Foreign Minister Yugoslavia's Foreign Minister Sofia, saying that "Bulgaria will get the surrender of South Dobrogea only under the pressure of the Axis" (see Minister Filotti's telegram of July 16).

The German minister in Sofia categorically supported "the return of the Quadrilateral, over which Romania has no right" and then insisted that the cutting of this abscess should not be postponed, because "the situation becomes critical and requires solutions as soon as possible."

On July 17, the day after Prime Minister Gigurtu and I visited Berchtesgarden, Hitler also received Prime Minister Filov and Bulgarian Foreign Minister Popov in Berchtesgarden. All Bulgarian statesmen demanded the restitution (see August 27 telegram from Minister Filotti) except for former Prime Minister Georgiev, who believed that it was wrong to seek a settlement of disputes in Germany, instead of a harmonious treatment without the German government.

The Bulgarian delegation, which returned to Sofia on July 30, was able to announce that the issue

The quadrilateral has been resolved (come the telegram from the Sofia Legation, signed by Căpitâneanu, from July 30)

Indeed, as I reported above, on July 31, Minister Fabricius communicated to me the "opinion" of the Führer to cede the entire Quadrilateral, including Silistra and Balchik.

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On August 1, we instructed our Ambassador to Belgrade, Fall (see telegram), to go on an unofficial mission to Sofia to enter into discreet negotiations with the Bulgarian Government.

Our thesis was to convince the bukgari that it is in their own interest to give a character of free understanding to the act that would be concluded between us, so that “its moral value, which results from this free consent, constitutes at the same time and its political sustainability."

“The Bulgarian people must understand that only what is achieved in this way with the absolute voluntary feeling of the Romanian Government and people, is sustainable and is a guarantee for eternity. To use the transient circumstance to obtain a result greater than the right and legitimate one is the same as to obtain results thanks to a transient factor, which can be annulled by an exact inverse situation.”

From this point of view, we remained firm until the end of the negotiations.

On August 3, Ambassador Cădere had an agreement with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Popov and with the Prime Minister Filov, in which he pleaded extensively in our thesis.

We demanded that we remain in Silistra's possession - without which there would be no communication on the highway between Bucharest and Constanța - and that we would remain in the Cadrilatee, which was 14,000 km long, square an area of only 2,000 km. squares comprising the Balchik and the seashore.

Minister Popov asked the Fall Ambassador not to open the conference I proposed for Craiovo, before it was finally established that we accept the full restitution of the Quadrilateral. On August 10, we communicated through our Legation in Sofia to Minister Popov that he would like to meet with him on the Danube, a proposal to which I received the insult of some refusal because (see the August 10 telegram of Minister Filotti) "he does not want to go to a meeting that would give the impression that he would be willing to discuss territorial issues, which he considers crucial "(through Hitler's" opinion ").

Bulgaria was so strong on Hitler's unconditional support that he could even afford this serious indecency!

I note in passing that (later) this Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister Mihail Antoneseu had a lack of Romanian dignity and pride, to accept him as the representative of Bulgaria in Bucharest.

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This fact, however, as well as all that followed deserves to be recorded because - on another historical occasion - to know exactly that we surrendered the whole Quadrilateral only forced, threatened and under terrible pressure and that the Bulgarians behaved unimaginably rudely with us (see also their methods during the negotiations), in Craiova and especially the acts of brutality to which they devoted themselves to the evacuation of the Quadrilateral).

On August 6, we made a supreme attempt to change Hitler's decision by sending Minister Ribbentrop and Count Ciano, through our Ministers in Berlin and Rome, a memorandum on the issue of the Quadrilateral. We show in these that the ethnic rights of the Bulgarians in the Quadrilateral, which they pay so much attention to, are equal to the Romanians, because, as Mincov's map shows, in 1878 there were almost no Bulgarians in the Quadrilateral, so all Bulgarian ethnic rights are those of a 35-year-old colonization, so they are by no means superior to the rights of the Romanians. ethnicities of the Romanians as they also result from a colonization of 27 years.

Moreover, I tried to create a doctrine of the annexation of the Quadrilateral, which unfortunately had never existed, namely I argued that the annexation of the Quadrilateral was
made to create a living space for Macedonian Romanians who in 1913 passed under the Turkish regime under the regime so that this annexation, far from being determined by strategic motives or the theory of compensation - which no one could dare to argue today - was justified by the idea of population exchange, which we I applied it long before Germany.

Unfortunately, the proceedings of the Bucharest conference (which I had to correct) did not contain any trace of such a conception.

I am convinced that if we, during the 27 years of possession of the Quadrilateral, had created such a doctrine and spread it in the European Chancelleries, justifying the possession of the Quadrilateral as a reserve of colonization for Macedonians, the situation would have been completely different. our moment when we gave the diplomatic fight for Quadrilateral ...

I do not repeat the basis of our thesis in the matter of Silistra, whose annexation to Romania had nothing to do with the peace of Bucharest in 1913, and which was given to us at the conference of the Ambassadors in Petersburg in 1912. I do not repeat the arguments in favor. the maintenance of the Balcic with the seashore, which proved that it represented for Bulgaria the absolute minimum sacrifice of a 2,000 km patch of land, square, very poor and sparsely populated, with an insignificant population of 37,500, of whom 14,500 were Bulgarians.

In fact, in its address of August 22, the General Staff itself draws attention to the fact that, if we cede the coast to Balchik, Romania will have only 60 km. off the coast, while Bulgaria will have more than 200 km. of firm shore, with strategic and economic value.

My memorandum - written in German and Italian - and my maps were sent to Berlin and Rome.

In Berlin, however, the extremely embarrassing fact that must be recorded (see the exchange of telegrams with Minister Romalo) took place that the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Chief of Protocol did not even want to receive the memorandum, to pass it on to Minister Ribbentrop. It would be completely against Romania's interests if we tried to persevere in this matter, in which Hitler spoke his word (!) and that this would disadvantage us in the much more important negotiations we have with Hungary.

Thus, the official attitude of Germany confirmed the arbitral award of the Führer's communication of 31 July.

In the face of this situation, we sought, with more energy, to obtain directly from the Bulgarians their renunciation of the claim of Silistra and the seaside, as far as Balchik.

On August 12, the Prime Minister and I summoned the Bulgarian Minister Tchomakov (see my August 13 telegram to Minister Filotti) to show him ways "We consider the Quadrilateral at this time, following the quasi-arbitration recommendation of the Führer, as it has already been returned to Bulgaria and we formulate the problem in reverse, namely, if the Bulgarians agree to give a pledge of friendship to us, leaving us a portion of the Quadrilateral (Silistra and Coast including Balchik), pointing out that our preference goes unchecked to the Baltic coast."

This fact, however, as well as all that followed deserves to be recorded because – on another historical occasion – to know exactly that we surrendered the whole Quadrilateral only forced, threatened and under terrible pressure and that the Bulgarians behaved unimaginably rudely with us (see also their methods during the negotiations), in Craiova and especially the acts of brutality to which they devoted themselves to the evacuation of the Quadrilateral).

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III. Craiova negotiations. (August 19 – September 7)

The Craiova conference opened on August 19, with Romanian delegates: Minister Cretzeanu and former Undersecretary of State Horia Grigorescu, and Bulgarian delegates: Minister Pomenov and lawyer Papazov.

I will not recount here all the adventures of this embarrassing conference. (I call it embarrassing because the Bulgarians conducted the negotiations as in an oriental bazaar, without taking into account that they were the beneficiaries without a fight and without sacrifices, of the agreement that was to be concluded).

Minister Cretzeanu's speech was - according to my instructions - icy, and the first discussions followed on the friendship clause that the Bulgarians wanted to insert in the treaty (forever Cretzeanu's telegram of August 19).

Minister Cretzeanu replied to Minister Pomenov that a friendship clause could be conceived a month ago. "It simply came to our notice then. It is not our fault. the territorial issue. The Romanian public opinion would, of course, consider it almost a mockery to talk about friendship in such moments."

At this, Minister Pomenov asked: "But then you reject the Bulgarian annihilation?"

Minister Cretzeanu replied: "You are the ones who reject the Romanian friendship, showing your intransigence and insisting on solutions that can only be seen as the deepest dissatisfaction with our public opinion."

These words deserve to be recorded in history, because they perfectly embody the conditions under which the "voluntary" surrender of the Quadrilateral was made.

The negotiations followed in a spirit of constant harassment, ill-will and harassment pettiness on the part of the Bulgarians.

On August 20, we telegraphed to Minister Cretzeanu "We are afraid that, after we have given up everything, they will end up offending us by behaving towards the Romanian population." Unfortunately, I was absolutely right. Not only did the Bulgarians not make the slightest gesture to us, not to mention that they did not agree to grant us extraterritoriality for the Royal Castle of Balchik (when in 1913 King Carol I refused to extend our border further south, for to leave to Tsar Ferdinand I the possession of his Castle at Euxinograd), not only did they not consent to grant us exteriority for the Romanian Cemetery at Pleven - which had no practical value, but only a symbolic one - but, above all, provoked the worst savagery and brutality against the Romanians at the time of the evacuation of the Quadrilateral. Suffice it to say that, in their impatience, they stormed one night the Romanians from Turturcaia who had secular settlements there, forcing them to leave immediately and move to Oltenita with their families, frightened by this barbarism!

In the evacuation clauses, as well as in the economic and financial ones, the Bulgarians showed exactly the same spirit. Until the end, they refused any guarantees regarding the regime of Romanian minorities in Bulgaria, although (see my August 26 telegram to Minister Cretzeanu) we threatened to break off negotiations: "It seems to me that between the last limits when with the immense sacrifice made by us, I dare say that he would not receive even a hint in the treaty of such a regime."

That is why I said in the same telegram: "We have no reason to make any concessions
to the Bulgarians, which are being ignored."

In the face of the assurances given to us that the Romanians from the Quadrilatere will be able to evacuate undisturbed, even after the Quadrilatere will take possession of Bulgaria, we communicate to Minister Cretzeanu: when, after not showing us the slightest condescension in the territorial question, they do not even keep their word to us, when they have previously accepted the four points "(these were the four points, formulated by us in advance, as a condition of the opening of the conference from Craiova and from which they derogated from the beginning).

That is why I could conclude: "In general, I am outraged by the spirit in which I understand the Bulgarians to lead the negotiations and to want to be told in the most energetic way that we do not understand why they do not realize that in this way they will not it gained a lasting friendship from Romania ".

Unfortunately, the situation was such that on August 27, in the run-up to the Vienna arbitration, I had to telegraph to Minister Cretzeanu: break. "

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IV. Formal assignment of the Quadrilateral imposed in the Vienna Arbitration

One fact, however, the importance of which could not be sufficiently emphasized, is the connection not only real but also formal between the surrender of the Quadrilateral and the "arbitration" of Vienna.

Indeed, when the arbitration of Vienna against the Hungarians was imposed on us, it was imposed on us in the same place, at the same time, by the same people, representing the same Axis Powers, and the formal surrender of the Quadrilateral by two signed letters. by me and by which I showed that in the sense of the judgment of the Führer and the Duke the agreement was reached regarding the cession of the South Dobrogea (the text of the letters can be found at the Ministry, and the mention of them is made in my telegram from Vienna ).

Therefore, although the Treaty of Craiova bears the subsequent date of September 7, 1940, it remains well established that the territory of the Quadrilateral was formally ceded on August 30 in Vienna. with "arbitration" and under the same pressure. Its surrender thus remains indivisibly linked in origin and fate to the surrender of Northern Transylvania.

For not only from a political and moral point of view, but even from a legal point of view, the act of forced renunciation of the Quadrilatere remains definitively connected with the arbitrary act of Vienna.

Moreover, after the "arbitration" in Vienna and in the face of the terrible situation in which Romania was then, the Bulgarian Government has the misfortune to return to the date agreed in the Craiova negotiations for the evacuation of the Quadrilateral and to demand that the deadline not pass, a case decided in Vienna for the evacuation of Transylvania (see the telegram of Minister Cretzeanu of August 30).

In view of this attitude, Minister Cretzeanu together with Mr. Horia Grigorescu and General Potopeanu, rightly, of the opinion that "in such conditions, we have no interest in giving the treaty that would an act of good understanding and free consent "and that it would be better to send to Craiova" another delegation with instructions to conclude a simple
agreement to transfer the Quadrilateral, reserving all other matters to joint commissions ".

Minister Cretzeanu, exhausted by these embarrassing negotiations, asked on August 31 to appoint another plenipotentiary in his place.

On September 1, the day after the Vienna arbitration, the Bulgarian press unanimously expressed its satisfaction with this just decision! All the newspapers took part in the joy of the Hungarian people, for now Hungary had become "the most important state in Central Europe" (see the telegram of Minister Filotti from 1 September). Foreign Minister Popov told a diplomat that the Vicenza ruling was fair because it applied the ethnic principle (Filotti’s telegram from September 2 came). An ignoble article in the newspaper "Utro" showed that Hungary was dissatisfied with the arbitration and will use the first opportunity to release the 600,000 Hungarians left in Romania! (See Minister Filotti’s telegram of 4 September)

Finally, after the negotiations outlined above, so offensive to the Romanian pride, the agreement in Craiova is signed on September 7th.

On September 10, the treaty is ratified by General Antonescu, who has meanwhile become the Head of State. (Arhiva M.A.F., fond 71, Bulgaria, 1920–1940 n.d.)"

Bibliography