THE COMPLEXITY OF LAND FORCES ACTIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF AN INTEGRATED SECURITY SYSTEM

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Abstract: The extended nature of the actions conducted by land forces is given by the multitude and diversity of the missions, by the capabilities of the combat equipment, and not least by the legislative dimensions concerning the use of force. Regarding the current security environment, the ratio of combining military and non-military threats has become very dynamic, so that we can state that the state of danger has become an indicator of the daily cohabitation of peace and war conditions. The hybridization of the engagement means and methods in a conflict, directly or masked under the confusion of the identity of the parties involved, cannot be classified either in the international provisions of the armed conflict or in the customs of the war.

Hybrid actions against a state can be interpreted as actions with variable military geometry in the sense of combining the civilian and military parts so as to make it even more difficult to conduct countermeasures against them. In trying to identify a possible solution to the hybrid typology conflict, we have put in relation several concepts such as: event, state of security, action, effect and impact, resilience and consequence management. Depending on the degree of combination of the terms used to explain the conflict or the hybrid actions, we may assert the need for a military response, namely for the involvement of the land forces in the events.

Keywords: threat; state of danger; hybrid conflict; risk; operational design.

The multi-dimensional character of Armed Forces' actions

The complexity of the contemporary security environment is one of the most important features of everyday life under all the inter-institutional relations of the main stability-generating factors: political, social, military, economic, infrastructural, information-related or environmental. Due to the international context and to the events that characterize it, we consider that approaching security through the strictly limited prism of the military factor has become obsolete. This is mainly due to the shifts in the destructive action plan that have taken place in recent years, either in the form of terrorism or insurgency or other actions but with a strong destructive impact on everything related to the stability of the security indicators. The events in the US, on September 11, 2001, proved that a superpower can be vulnerable to an aggressor with insignificant combat power but a very high ingenuity. Otherwise, from a different perspective with regard to security in general, it can no longer be explained in strictly military terms. Contextually, we shall refer to an extension of the concept of security to other areas impacting the daily life, such as the social domain or that of critical infrastructures. To this end, we anticipate the development of a more comprehensive security approach in the sense of redefining the roles and the interdependence relationships of all security generating factors.

Over time, depending on the political regimes, it was not infrequent that the efforts of specialized institutions from a security area were directed to other collateral security domains. We refer here to the involvement of the armed forces in some sectors of the economy, in industry, agriculture, transport infrastructure, etc. or the interventions in disaster areas, namely natural disasters or environmental accidents, as the Chernobyl case. We attribute this to the historical transformations and the redefinition of the security concept based on the most significant events with a major impact on the social and economic life in general. Thus, the armed forces through their institutional importance,

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but also through the possibility of capitalizing the potential of involving in the efficient achievement of the national or regional stability, can be actively reconfigured at least at the level of the capabilities to relate to other institutions responsible for security[1]. In other words, we consider it is necessary to make an inter-institutional action correlation and to identify those areas in which the application of joint efforts increases the capacity to prevent and limit the effects of certain events with a strong destructive character such as: terrorist acts, natural disasters, ecological accidents and – why not? – hybrid war.

"The Hybrid War Theory" has become a reality, almost a permanent presence in the context of international security. The shift from a security state specific to a certain historical period of the "cold war" to another security state of "hybrid war" involves new conceptual approaches, and implicitly, resizing, role changing, inter-institutional connections and reconnections at national and even international level. The Crimean example shows how an enforcement of social changes could be replaced from outside by means of the classical war, with an "inner one" gradually built by the manifestation of actions specific to the hybrid war. This means that important changes in the decisive defeat of both military and security forces can be achieved from within the target state, by making its institutions and ideologies illegitimate. Turning from planning to implementing the hybrid-war specific actions has meant gradually discrediting the security institutions commissioned in the main sectors of power: political, economic, military, information or infrastructural, respectively environmental (in some cases) by gaining support from the population and finalizing the achievement of the goals set by the opponent in a given territory. Without the official declaration of the territory of a state as a war space, through the "hybridization of destructive actions" against it, we can observe a certain materialization of the multi-dimensional character of the "regional"-type conflict. "At peace time or in certain crisis situations[2], hybrid

actions approached legally are difficult to locate as compared to the potential moment of initiating open armed fight." Therefore, until the decree of the state of war, the competence of managing the actions to counter the hybrid aggression belongs to the public order and national security institutions. For this purpose, the armed forces can participate in the initiatives led by other state institutions and implicitly plan, direct, and take over the command of inter-institutional operations involved in the hybrid conflict.

A comprehensive inter-institutional approach to a potential hybrid conflict may be a starting point for the timely preparation of a hybrid threat response. Such a response requires some early coordination, namely cooperation and complementarity between institutions bearing responsibilities in the areas of defense, public order and national security, implicitly with those similar belonging to the NATO and/or EU member states[3]. At the level of the armed forces, gaining success by engaging them against irregular methods of action (terrorism, insurgency, organized crime, sabotage, subversion, guerrilla fighting, etc.) can be achieved by flexible, fast deployable structures with capabilities to conduct operations in complex environments. In this context, we notice the diversification of a state's aggression methods under the multidimensional aspect of all security factors. This involves the identification and the application of those military and especially non-military capabilities designed to resist the shock of hybrid violence and to prove the resilient potential.

To this end, the implementation of the operational art can be directed to gaining the decisive advantages and achieving integrated control of the multidimensional combat space (be it terrestrial, aerial, maritime, informational, cybernetic, cognitive, etc.) so as to ensure the timely countermeasures, respectively the decisive engagement of the opponent. The hybrid threat involves hostile action on multiple plans and sectors with security responsibilities where the role of armed forces is a decisive factor. The land forces, through the nature of their operations, can be actively integrated at the inter-institutional level to intervene in an expanded spectrum of hybrid threats, namely against the unpredictability of events with a negative impact on the population,

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[1] GO no. 271/2013 for the approval of the Cyber Security Strategy for Romania and the National Action Plan on the implementation of the National Cyber Security System, Official Gazette of Romania, no. 296, Bucharest, 2013.

[2] Tudorel Lehaci, Marian Stancu, *Gestionarea crizelor din perspectiva nivelului operativ de comandă şi control*, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare „Carol I", Bucureşti, 2010.

[3] *National Defense Strategy for 2015-2019,* Bucharest, 2015, p. 17.

like terrorist attacks but also natural calamities, industrial accidents, etc. Given the nature of a state's military-generating resources, we can observe the complexity of the cooperative relationships that the responsible institutions are subjected to, as pillars of security under a political, economic, social, infrastructural, informational and environmental aspect. Therefore, the lack of close connections of mutual support to the above mentioned security pillars can lead to a certain fragility which, combined with the "poverty and ignorance" factors, determines hybrid vulnerabilities to be exploited by a potential aggressor. Redefining the internal inter-institutional relations can be interpreted as a basis for strengthening the security system, which will lead to the re-instauration of the main actors as well as of the interdependencies between them. Thus, the impact of hybrid attacks on security sectors could be taken over by other structures adjacent to the affected security sector, leading to the increased resilience of the security system as a whole. For this, as an example, we will refer to the complexity of land forces operations in terms of the two action dimensions: to take over the impact of "hybrid attacks" on society and to plan the response from the perspective of consequences management.

Planning Land Forces Operations as a Coherent Sequence of Events to the Integrated Security System

The approach of land forces actions in the context of a hypothetical hybrid conflict can direct the military planner towards areas specific to armed conflict (offensive, defense, etc.) where he has to develop solutions to solve a security issue. The definition of the operational framework and the description of how institutional tasks are integrated into a unitary concept for countering hybrid threats can be initiated on the basis of the first estimates resulting from the establishment of the data bases. The degree of comprehensiveness and particularization of the data bases is directly proportional to the multitude of types of operations that land forces can perform. This results precisely in the multi-dimensional character of the land forces operations which except those belonging to the armed conflict, can also be: crisis response operations, countermeasures against a specific threat (counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency

or counter-crime operations), electromagnetic operations, Cyber space operations, military effort to peacekeeping or humanitarian operations, sanctions and embargoes, critical infrastructure protection, freedom of navigation and overflight, and so on.

A first observation on the multidimensional nature of the possible operations carried out by the land forces is that they cannot act independently, outside the operational framework of other institutions with responsibilities in the fields of security (political, economic, social, etc.). The fact that several actors with different interests can act on a potential conflict region or area, makes it of vital importance to have a description of the situation and the awareness concerning the role of each actor. In order to avoid surprise, a proactive approach is preferable to a reactive one. For this purpose we have identified the method of *correlating the action effort to the event*. We understand the event as the part of the reality that is in the process of sequential realization, where actions and counter-actions take place, and interactions between the parties involved and less involved in the event. The operationalization of the term *event* and its integration into the description of reality for a particular conflict area help us acquire situational awareness, understand the past and the present, and especially plan actions for the fulfillment of operations that will meet the objectives to the desired end state, which, as a peculiarity, is not the same as the initial state of normality.

A second observation is related to the way of describing the courses of action of a structure, respectively of developing the concept of the operation or a scenario based on the term of event. In practice, a number of indicators are nominated which help develop estimates and identify events, some of which presenting a high-risk status (weather phenomena, environmental pollution, terrorist actions, armed conflict, etc.) and leading to a certain state of danger. Also based on the notion of event, variants and ways of assessing an intervention/prevention under risk conditions are analyzed, no matter which the field of use we refer to might be. As an example, according to previous events, based on indicators and on the effects produced or expected in a given area, a series of interaction chains can be identified. Due to the specific capabilities, the military component

can be found as an action vector for influencing certain situations, as in Figure 01 of relationships between the subjects of several distinct events. On the analysis of these events, of the action-cause-effect relationships, the chains of interactions between the subjects participating in the events can be described. Depending on the share and the degree of involvement of the subjects in the event,

analysis of the tandem of threats and vulnerabilities can be made. The role of the analyst, respect, namely of the military planner, is to identify the best course of events likely to happen, so as to meet the objectives leading to the desired end state. Therefore, he will analyze one or more events and the dynamics of the relationships existing between them, based on the role of the actors involved in the


Fig. 1. Variant[4] of the relationship scheme between subjects participating in several related events, based on the action-cause-effect concept

the results can be estimated and the situations with high level of risk, respectively state of danger, can be described.

A third observation consists in applying the notion of *event* to the time scale, of what has happened, what is happening and what is going to happen. Building a scenario or a course of action, namely the concept of an operation, can be done relatively easily starting from the notion of event. Defining or characterizing a risk, an opportunity, is also performed through the notion of event, which may or may not come to happen at a given place and moment. States can be described by means of the events and certain actions of the actors or the enemy can be estimated. The occurrence of certain events estimated to take place confirms or denies certain hypotheses or theories about a region or an actor. Therefore, the actions of the land forces can be included "in the game of events" and a spectral

studied context.

Due to the existence of the numerous factors of influence of the analyzed situations, some events are difficult to characterize. For example, an opponent's actions in a military operation can be guessed and subsequently offensive or defensive responses can be developed. However, what cannot be known is given by the impact that some events may have on the situations of the analyzed structures. The unpredictability of the impact of certain events is directly proportional to the quantity and the nature of the effects. For this, any structure involved in a military operation[5] must raise the question whether or not it can survive the impact

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[4] Gheorghe Văduva, *Elemente de management al situaţiilor de urgenţă şi de risc extrem,* http://iss.ucdc.ro/studii-pdf/Management%20urgente.pdf, accessed on 30.04.2017.
[5] Martin Iulian, *Raţionament şi argumentare în planificarea operaţiilor*, "Carol I" National Defense University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2015.

of confronting the enemy or certain environmental conditions. In other words, in order to survive a particular negative event, the resilience conditions of either the structure in question or the action designed to be conducted by the analyzed structure must be implicitly formulated. The diversity and the interdependence of threats and vulnerabilities to forces involved in a conflict (regardless of its nature, classical or hybrid) highlights the complexity of the measures needed to combat and counteract the risks posed by the situation. For the relevance of the above, we will address some aspects of integrated crisis management. According to the valid documents, land forces have certain responsibilities and competencies in the field of integrated crisis management in the areas of defense, public order, counter-terrorism, cyber defense and civil emergencies. Thus, the dimensional character of the actions of the land forces becomes even more complex and the crisis management process in NATO concept can be structured in phases and sequences such as:

- Preventive options;
- Crisis response measures;
- Counter surprise;
- Counter aggression;
- Security alert statuses, etc.

Through the role that each institution plays[6] in the crisis response plan, it contributes to maintaining the security state according to its pre-designed competencies. The problem arises when those potential vulnerabilities have not been identified and, implicitly, no means have been established for countering aggression by surprise, respectively hazard states to which one or more security factors are exposed can be generated. The integrated security system can perform situation analysis through the contribution of each designated security element. Therefore, describing the security reality through the concept of event helps us to rapidly disseminate information about a potential imminent danger, as well as the timely engagement of counter-forces. The timely awareness and evaluation of the potential causes and the effects adjacent to each possible event may lead to a decrease in the level of risk or partial control of the risk through the appropriate intervention of the security factor in the affected area. According

to some security applications[7], the approach of the concept can be dual: in a *restrictive* sense, specific only to interventions of the militarized structures and in a *permissive* sense, involving the intervention or support of other non-militarized structures belonging to the field of justice or not legally recognized, as shown in Figure 02.

Whatever the way to address the security concept might be, effective crisis management should take into account the level and size of the main security factor intervention on the affected sector and the means to involve other factors for mitigating the impact and limiting the negative consequences. Every possible event can generate, in the dynamics of its manifestation, other events leading to the other security sectors. Therefore, the planning of land forces operations can be regarded as a coherent sequence of events towards an integrated security system. The integrated approach to the security system from a dual perspective will involve the actions of the land forces in a much wider area of responsibility than the militarized restrictive field. In other words, the actions of the land forces can also be involved in the permissive area, of the confrontations with the non-militarized or illegitimate structures (liberation armies, guerrilla units, etc.). Without a prior integration of all the actions of the actors involved in an event, whatever that might be, the outcome of the operations or phases of the land forces operations can be severely affected. Regarding this, the overall security situation will be more difficult to control due to overlapping tasks, confusion and lack of coherence in achieving the effects.

In the context of achieving an integrated security situation, the application of the concept of event or succession of events can be beneficial only if it is done based on timely prepared plans. To prevent and counteract the effects of dangerous situations, contingency plans must be written in a collaborative manner for all actors with security-generating potential. The difficulty of designing and implementing such plans resides in the intervention of numerous random factors, the impossibility of estimating all events with a destructive impact that create the situations of potential danger. Considering the explicit action capabilities of the land forces, in the context of the possibility of an event which can pose a security threat, we developed a series of

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[6] http://www.ipp.md/public/files/Proiecte/1-conceptul_securitate.pdf, accessed on 04.05.2017.

[7] *Ibidem,* p.3.

Actors and Systemic Approach			
Approach	Sector	State Oriented	People Oriented
Restrictive	Militarized structures	- Armed forces - Police - Gendarmes - Paramilitary forces - Presidential guards - Information services - Coastguard - Border police - Customs Police - Border Guards - Reserves	- Local security units (popular guards)
Permissive	Structures in the field of justice	- Judicial institutions - Criminal prosecution bodies (if they are demilitarized) - Courts of law and tribunals - Bailiffs	-Human rights committees - - Lawyers - - Public organizations
	Illegal structures		- Liberation armies - Guerilla units - Private security companies

Fig. 2. Variant of the dual approach to the concept of security

conclusions and recommendations directed mainly towards the decision-makers.

CONCLUSIONS

Throughout this article, we have put together a series of opinions on how to systematically interpret security through the possibility of an event or a sequence of events to happen, thus generating danger situations. We have shown the possibility of approaching the actions of land forces in the context of a hypothetical hybrid conflict, in which the major role of counteraction is played by the actor whose security sector is affected. Involvement of the land forces actions in the event of a hybrid conflict is gradual and depends directly on the extent and consistency of the data bases and the ways of relating the responsible factors for the security domains.

The surprise occurrence of events with a negative impact on security can be prevented and countered by appropriate plans and measures. For this purpose it is necessary to adopt specific methodologies that can include actions of all responsible actors, namely their orderly and efficient going into action. A first set of methods and methodologies can refer to identifying and analyzing hazards, threats, vulnerabilities and risks across the range of danger generating situations. For this, we distinguish several successive steps. The first step consists in drawing up lists of possible dangers, threats, vulnerabilities and risks (DTVR) for each security area. The second step can be to analyze each element in the first step and describe the possible relations between them. Next comes the step of examining each potential hazard, based on precedents, each threat, each vulnerability and the components of the resulting risk, assumed or just estimated (the analysis is done separately, but also in context, with the identification and assessment of the impact on each security domain, etc.). The step of determining the level of risk for each individual situation is based on the analysis and the evaluation of each category of dangers and threats correlated on vulnerability levels and depending on the involved factors of influence. Finally, to capitalize on the previous steps, estimates are made on the possibility of certain states generating events to

occur, with actual reference to the effects they can produce.

Another way to involve land forces actions in solving security threat situations is to plan operations and achieve the relation between estimated events, depending on the calculated level of danger and threat. For this we distinguish at least three components at the level of planning and engagement in the event. Preventive action planning is based on the level of danger and threat, elements deduced from the estimates for the most likely to happen events with negative impact and generating danger states. Here, we describe the actual conditions, the available forces and means, we establish the assigned resources and we develop sets of measures that are constantly updated. Depending on the time available, it is possible to develop exact interventions, on variants and levels of danger, for each type of threat and risk identified, depending on the policies, strategies, forces, means and resources specific to each designated security operator for each event. Similar to the response plans, reaction plans are also developed. In this context, the reaction is the action or actions strictly conditioned by the nature, structure, extent and manner of occurrence of the danger-generating event. In this respect, it is necessary to organize and plan not only the intervention but also the reactions implied by the event. We distinguish the intervention as being the action designed to solve a situation caused by a challenge, a danger, a threat, or to counter some vulnerability, while the reaction is an intervention determined by the on-going or already happened event.

By applying the concept of event in the case of possible hybrid actions against a state, the countermeasures can be expressed as a multitude of actions with variable military geometry in the sense of combining both the military and non-military parts, implying a high complexity of the involvement of the land forces actions.

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