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CHALLENGES TO EDUCATION AT "CAROL I" NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY IN THE THREE DECADES OF THE POST-COMMUNIST PERIOD. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

Colonel Professor Ion PURICEL, PhD*

"In a world of misinformation, the university has to highlight the pass to information without forgetting its formative mission."

Starting from the special challenges to the current operational situation and the legitimate requirements of the beneficiary, some obvious questions will arise related to the programs of study to which the university has to answer: What should a graduate know and do? How long does it take to prepare him/her according to the requirements of the beneficiary? Which should be the percentage of technical subjects in the education plans? What subjects will best cover the requirements of the beneficiary? How can practical training be performed and how often? How can competent teachers and instructors from the field be selected and promoted?

Keywords: Superior War School; military education; reform; National Education Law; Bologna Process; international environment; shape of modern war; values.

The evolution and the characteristics of the Superior War School from its foundation to the end of the communist period

The Superior War School was founded in 1889 by King Carol I, being the sixth general staff school from Europe after the ones from Berlin, Paris, Torino and Brussels. This was one of the most important moments on the way to the modernization of the Army and of the country, a trend that had begun with ruler Alexandru Ioan Cuza and marked the evolution of the Romanian Armed Forces and, through the waggod wars and guarantee of peace, of Romania itself.

I can state this because, from its foundation until today, the Superior War School, regardless of the name it bore over the years, has preserved its profile and mission as the most important institution of superior military education responsible for the formation of the most important commanders of the Armed Forces.

The features of the education process performed here have permanently focused on the study of war, as a complex social and political phenomenon, and was tightly linked to the ruling and the state

policy thus influencing most of the political events experienced by the country and its Army. We can identify in this respect, four distinct periods in the evolution of the Superior War School: 1889 – the end of the First World War; the period between the wars – the end of the Second World War; the communist period; the post-communist period.

These periods can also be divided into sub-periods, which suffered different external influences – the French, the German, the Soviet, the USA (NATO) or, on the contrary, refused the exterior models like in the case of the communist-nationalist period from the Ceausescu Age.

All these political contexts in which the Romanian Armed Forces had to function, together with the invention of new weapons and the advance in military technology had direct and normal consequences on the education at the Superior War School, on **what** and **how** students learned; they began to study the use in combat of different tactical, operative and strategic contexts, inter-arms or joint echelons contexts, and different national and international (alliance or coalition) ones. They also studied the preparation and support of operations and war through logistics and mobilization and also the need for operational and technical interoperability and its particularities related to weapons' and forces' structures in war operations or, lately, in military operations other

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than the war (stability).

Challenges to education from „Carol I” National Defence University in the last 30 years after the communist era

Getting closer to our time, in the “Post-Cold War” period, we should highlight the fact that the disappearance of communism in Europe and the dissolving of the USSR, followed by the problems of the former Soviet subjects now in search of their own identity, allowed Romania to exit the political and military arrangements that tied it to the USSR and to the other former communist countries (Warsaw Pact) and later to the Russian sphere of influence, and later embrace the European and Euro-Atlantic values, a clear policy of getting closer to the Western Countries and to the organizations and political and economic institutions that define them.

The pro-western fundamental option of the Romanian state has not changed in the past 30 years and was strengthened at political and military level thought the signing in 1997 of the Partnership for Peace (PfP), followed in 2004 by joining NATO and the European Union in 2007.

From the historic point of view, this was the situation in terms of national and regional security in which our country has evolved in the last 30 years. Because of the ample and frequent changes undertaken by the military institution, this situation had an impact on the educational trends from the Superior War School, which was required to keep abreast to the changes and reforms.

We should also state that after the toppling of Ceausescu’s Regime, Romania found itself after 45 years of communism and isolation, under the umbrella of the Soviet Union, in the real world, in the conditions offered by a new society, the capitalist one with its liberties, opportunities and associated challenges, marked by globalization and information technology.

The changes in the social and political paradigm had an impact on all levels of Romanian society, the educational and military ones being also reformed. In this way, from the point of view of state and educational structures, officers’ schools became institutes and then academies, while the Superior War School, at the beginning of this analysis, the Military Academy, became “Carol I” National Defence University, following a period of 12 years in which it was the Academy

of High Military Studies (1991-2003) and the National Defense University (2003-2005).

In addition, in the analysis of the challenges to military education from the Superior War School we cannot omit the fact that it followed the changes from the national and European higher education by adopting the requirements of the Bologna Process that referred to the academic studies – BA, master’s and doctoral ones – in 1999.

As a result, military higher education has changed, too easily according to some, without applying specific filters and regulations that were specific to the civilian field and to the new condition and challenges that appeared after the adoption of the National Law of Education in 2011. The consequence of this enterprise is that today we can talk about the academic studies in the military system, including the Superior War School, only in the parameters imposed by the civilian law, particularizing it to the military field through plans and programs designed by each academic institution based on the principle of academic autonomy.

In this period, according to the profound changes in the Armed Forces, with the inherent problems that consumed resources due to the implementation of reform, some subjects were included or disappeared from the curricula such as: the study of different tactical and strategical-operative echelons (Joined Forces, division, aviation regiment, air base, aviation group/ army corps, aviation corps and air defense, aviation fleet, aviation group/division, brigade, joint forces, etc.) while the planning process was changed and become more flexible according to the NATO (British and American) model of interoperability.

Teachers, in turn, had to get through the tribulations of the new changes and adapt or not to the new situation; some left, probably too soon, and the others became academic teaching staff, completing their doctoral studies and obeying the regulations imposed to the whole academic education system in Romania.

Could the education from the Superior War School have performed better in this period of profound changes, in terms of fulfilling their fundamental mission? I consider that this question has to be addressed not only to the military institution, but also to the whole Romanian society and the answer cannot be other than YES, with a number of explanations...



It is true that the major changes in the military education that evolved over a century in a pyramidal logics had a profound impact on the symbol-institution of the Romanian Armed Forces – “Carol I” National Defense University (“Carol I” NDU). So, the transformation of military schools into military institutions – academies – with their own academic development, recognized by the Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (RAQAHE)/Ministry of National Education had a major impact on the education basis from the university, on the military BA programs, because it was now related to the Bologna Process and Law of National Education by offering officers career opportunities through the recognition of alternative academic studies in other civilian academies and universities.

Under these circumstances, “Carol I” NDU, built around the Combined Arms Faculty/Command and Staff Faculty, has evolved trying to preserve its identity and live up to the heritage of the Superior War School by accomplishing its entrusted mission.

“Carol I” National Defence University, nowadays Superior War School, functions with two faculties - Command and Staff Faculty and the Security and Defense Faculty, having the mission to generate and transfer knowledge in order to:

- Train, specialize and improve at academic and post-graduate level the commanders, the staff officers and the military and civilian experts in order to build their command expertise in the field of “military science, information and public order”;

- Organize and perform scientific academic research in the field of “military science, intelligence and public order”;

- Ensure the professional training of human resources from the Ministry of National Defence, from the national defence and security system, from other institutions and public organizations in the country and abroad.

As seen above, “Carol I” National Defence University will ensure even in the current situation the need for training required by the beneficiary – Defence Staff/Ministry of National Defence and by the labor market in the field of security and national defence.

The mutations in the dynamics of international environment and the features of modern armed combat

The new conditions refer to both the legal aspects I have already mentioned and the international environment marked by information advancement and multidimensional globalization.

What comes as a real novelty is the fact that the effects of information advancement and multidimensional globalization do not affect only the international actors, but all individuals, having an impact that is hard to quantify on the whole human civilization; we witness the movement of capital, of goods and people or the cultural leveling, but they seem to be hard to control. Smartphones, internet, airplane, at the same time cause and effect of this process, did not make the world smaller, but incredibly smaller, transforming it into a “global village”, and resulting in building more virtual borders.

At the same time, the dynamics of international security is very high, experiencing movements whose consequences are difficult to anticipate and control. This results in more international state and non-state actors who question the international status-quo, while great powers are literally racing to disobey the agreements and treaties they have negotiated for years, thus making use of a broken logic and taking into account the mutual potential for destruction and the examples offered by others who followed their own egotistic security interests.

This would be theoretically the security environment in which “Carol I” NDU has to ensure the best education of commanders/leaders and specialists in the field of security and defense so that they will serve the interests of the country and of the security institutions we have joined.

In my opinion, the academic studies offered by both faculties and the independent departments have to achieve unity in diversity, according to their missions and the requirements of the programs of study at the same time underlining the unicity and purpose of the university in order to provide the beneficiary with the desired product.

So, the students from the programs of study that address officers from both faculties need to be well prepared and trained as leaders for the leading positions in the new conditions offered by the modern war. Some of these spectacular changes

have already been mentioned above, but among them, I would mention the following:

- The demassification of combat and discontinuity of the frontline;
- The extraordinary impact of technology and modern systems of weapons on combat (greater precision and firepower; the command – execution cycle, in real time) and new contents for old concepts: defense-attack, defensive – offensive;
- The increased importance of Special Forces/ reaching the operational and strategic objectives by the combat entities at tactical level;
- The information advancement and the problem of achieving supremacy of electromagnetic environment;
- The shift of airspace control to the air-cosmic one;
- The permanent information and cybernetic actions associated with different types of threats: hybrid, conventional or both;
- The wide use of unmanned vehicles (drones) and especially of those that operate in the airspace - UAV^{1/}UCAV^{2/};
- The change in the use of the nuclear weapons and the multiplication of actors and platforms that transport them to the target;
- The presence of mass media and the pressure put by public opinion.

It is evident that all the changes mentioned before, which altered the image of armed combat, should deserve an exhaustive paper, but this was not the purpose of the present endeavor.

All these changes are important and it is difficult to build a hierarchy as far as their importance is concerned with the exception of possession and use of nuclear weapons.

Still, I would draw the attention to the fact that, due to the scope, the rhythm and the access to the technological program, drones (UAV /UCAV) have started to be widely used around the world both in the civilian and military field, and this situation will have dramatically impacted the way in which the human civilization will live and wage war on this planet³.

At the current rate of technology advancement and due to its availability, could we imagine what the daily life will be like in a world of drones, more or less controlled by minidrones and microdrones? What about the war? If we add to drones the artificial intelligence – AI⁴ – we will have the

complete picture of the framework in which we will need to operate.

What is to be done? Conclusions

The fact that the equipment in this technical and operational framework, which, most certainly, has already shaped the image of contemporary combat, is not present as it should be part of the endowment of the Romanian Armed Forces does not mean that we should not study it more at theoretical and conceptual level by including related subjects in the plans of instruction of different programs.

At the same time, students from the programs that prepare civilian specialists in the field of security and defense, according to the programs of study, need to learn the particularities of modern armed combat; however, their education should also be based permanently on this reality and the consequences that shape the phenomenology of contemporary war.

In this dynamic and complex operational environment, the requirements of the beneficiary for military and civilian leaders, in terms of desired abilities, could be organized after the model of other Armed Forces⁵ as follows:

- The ability to understand the current environment of action and the effect of all the instruments of national power;
- The ability to anticipate and adapt to surprise and uncertainty;
- The ability to recognize change and lead transition;
- The ability to take decisive action through trust, delegation of authority and understanding;
- The ability to make ethical decisions based on the values of military profession;
- The ability to use critical and strategic thinking in applying the principles and concepts of war in joint operations.

The multiple faces of operational reality presented before and correlated with beneficiary's requirements will represent the challenges to the education from "Carol I" NDU. They will have to be addressed differently in the programs of study by designing flexible and updated plans, respectively by deepening the scientific knowledge ensured by the content of the programs.

Starting from these specific challenges brought by the current operational situation and the legitimate requirements of the beneficiary, there

are some questions that might arise related to the programs of study to which the University should have an answer: What should a graduate know and do? How long does it take to prepare him/her according to the requirements of the beneficiary? Which should be the percentage of technical subjects in the curricula? What subjects will best cover the requirements of the beneficiary? How and how often should practical training be performed? How could the competent teachers and instructors from the field be selected and promoted? Etc.

In order to meet these challenges, regardless of the beneficiary and university's obligations, the decision-makers involved should encourage and preserve the proactive and prospective attitude of all the teaching staff and students who should possess not only high academic standards but also those related to their belonging to a military institution.

The guaranty of these standards and, in my opinion, the unifying element, according to the University Charter, are represented by the values of "Carol I" NDU which should lead the mindset and action of all the academic community on long term – *academic excellence, academic freedom, permanent development of knowledge, integration, collaboration and patriotism.*

NOTES:

1 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle – Vehicul aerian nepilotat.

2 Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle – Vehicul

aerian de luptă nepilotat.

3 At the time this article was being written, an unidentified attack, possibly involving drones, against Saudi Arabia, destroyed half of its capacity of refining oil, despite the fact that the kingdom has a powerful air defense system (Patriot missiles).

4 Artificial Intelligence – Inteligență artificială.

5 American Army – *Desired Leader Attributes for Joint Force 2020.*

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ROMANIA'S ROLE IN ACHIEVING REGIONAL ORDER IN THE BLACK SEA AREA

*Radm. (LH) Eng. Fleet Commander Mihai PANAIT, PhD**
*Captain Professor (N) Professor Ioan CRĂCIUN, PhD***

Romania as a European maritime state, a member of the most important organizations in the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO and the European Union, is now asserting itself, as a state-recognized in terms of its status, in a period with challenges but also with multiple opportunities. The role of Romania in the realization of the regional order in the Black Sea area is important and it is achieved by intensifying the political, economic or diplomatic measures, but also by intensifying the efforts to strengthen the interoperability at NATO or EU level, in support of the efficiency of the Allied deterrence and defense mechanisms. 15 years after Romania's accession to NATO, it is in a favorable position to strengthen the national defense capacity, which includes the realization of the capabilities necessary to make our response to symmetrical and asymmetrical threats more efficient. Thus, starting with 2017, Romania has fulfilled its commitment to NATO regarding the allocation of 2% of GDP for defense, in order to continue the transformation and modernization process.

Keywords: regional order; security; cooperation; military dimension; risks and threats; the Black Sea region.

Introduction

Broadly speaking, security, prosperity, and peace are concepts of value to the citizens of any state. The Romanian Constitution, the National Security Strategy of Romania, and the National Defense Strategy of the country define the concepts, principles, and benchmarks of the security and stability of the Romanian state in a systemic and comprehensive approach, in the context of European construction and Euro-Atlantic cooperation.

From the historic perspective, but also from the present and future challenges at global and regional level, the transformations of the strategic environment, when the international systems have become much more complex, characterized by a persistent instability, the need to develop, transform and size the political, economic, military relations, social and environmental at domestic level and with a close international relationship or interdependence is obvious.

In the context of the contemporary evolution of the security environment in the Black Sea region, the military power of a state is a factor of

vital importance, and the military dimension is one of the main pillars of the state's stability.

It is well-known that, as a major player, the state must have alongside political and economic structures also a credible and well-structured military force, with a combative power to the extent of its responsibilities.

The Eastern border of Romania, land (summing 273.8 km – land border with Ukraine), river (amounting to a total of 856.8 km – of which 680.6 km with the Republic of Moldova and 176.2 km with Ukraine), and maritime 9199, 4 km (of which 30.2 km with Ukraine)¹ also, represent the external border of NATO and the EU.

From this point of view, but also from the point of view of being a member of these organizations, Romania is part of a common area of security and defense. Also, the efforts that must be made by both, Romania and the neighboring states require time and patience with a solid construction based on the principles of universal democracy.

In other words, as well-known analysts Ayse Gunes - Ayata, Ayca Ergun and Isil Celimli analyze the situation in the Black Sea region with much pragmatism: "*Nowhere has the weakening of the state itself paved the way for the reinforcement of either the market or civil society. It would then be absurd to expect this to happen automatically in the Black Sea region.*"²

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Developing and strengthening Romania's capacity to ensure Euro-Atlantic security and stability

The ethno-genesis of Romania was a complex process, which led to the emergence of a Neo-Latin people, the sole heir of the Eastern Romans. With the completion of this process, at the end of the eighth century, the indigenous population became the Romanian people.

Romania has a history and national identity for over 2000 years³. The Romanian state was formed in 1859 and gained its independence in 1877. In 1918, Romania, through the Great Union with Transylvania, Bukovina, and Bessarabia, achieved the dream of a nation. Between 1881-1947, Romania was a constitutional monarchy, and from 1947 became a republic. After the Second World War, part of the Romanian territory was occupied by the URSS and Romania became a communist state and a member of the Warsaw Treaty⁴. After the December 1989 Revolution, Romania implemented economic and political reforms, joined NATO on March 29th, 2004, became a member of the European Union in 2007 and signed the Strategic Partnership with the United States of America⁵. Romania, as a European maritime state, a member of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, has acquired, in the geopolitical space of the Black Sea, a well-recognized role according to its status, benefiting from the natural advantage of its hydrographic network and wide openness towards the horizon of the Mediterranean and Atlantic worlds.

Romania, with an area of 237,500 square kilometers and a population of 21,413,815, is a coastal state on the Black Sea, along with Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Turkey and Georgia. With a length of 245 km of the maritime coast, Romania occupies an important place in the countries bordering the Black Sea, due to the size of the land with sea exit⁶.

The Black Sea had its special importance since ancient times both for the Romans, "*Byzantine lake, during the Roman Empire*"⁷, but also for Greeks or Athenians as they appear in the writings of the well-known classical Greek historian, Plutarch: "*Pericles also sailed into the Black Sea with a large and splendidly equipped fleet, and there he treated the Greek cities considerably and secured by negotiation the various local arrangements*

which they desired"⁸.

Currently, Romania has a growing economy, a free market and a good presence in the region, representing, without false modesty, a pillar of stability for Euro-Atlantic security and cooperation. For Romania in this context, the Black Sea and the Danube remain the basis, the foundation on which the independence and the binder for further development have been achieved. The stability and cooperation process in the Black Sea area is one of the main strategic directions in the security policy for the coming years. Leaders in this region should be sufficiently balanced and strong enough to discourage and manage potential risks and threats to Euro-Atlantic and regional security and stability, as there are many challenges for all nations in the region.

The successful participation of the Romanian Army with Euro-Atlantic partners in the campaigns in Iraq, the Balkans and Afghanistan or participation in major naval operations in the theatres of operations in the Mediterranean, Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean, in the fight against terrorism in the war in Libya or in the anti-piracy fight, demonstrates the professionalism of the political and military structures and the fact that Romania has embarked on this path of continuous modernization and transformation, in order to be able to face the present and future challenges. By extrapolating, at European and regional scale we can consider that more can be built, viable solutions for the European future can be identified.

Romania's contribution to Euro-Atlantic and regional organizations so as to maintain regional balance and order in the Black Sea area

The security system, at the state level, is characterized by its five dimensions: political, military, economic, social and environmental. The military dimension or military security represents the capacity of the state to respond in the face of risks, threats, aggressions, to analyze and eliminate vulnerabilities and risks to the security of the state.

Ensuring the stability of the state is implicitly achieved through this military dimension and one of the first identified path of achievement, refers mainly to the transformation, modernization or development of military structures. This must be

continuous, with a high degree of flexibility and adaptability, so that the interconnection with the global system is constantly realized.

Starting from the current demands of the modern world, the military dimension that we design and modernize, in fact must meet the criteria of efficient management, with a balanced structure of interoperable forces and with an appropriate infrastructure. The military dimension of state security should be sufficiently balanced and strong enough to discourage and manage potential risks and threats to state security and stability.

Developing a structure of forces to be able to act in the complex environment of modern type warfare is, in my opinion, one of the most effective ways in this analysis. The emergence of new concepts, such as: collective security, common security or security through cooperation, imposed, at the level of the European Union and NATO, structures of which Romania is part of the need to identify concrete solutions for the future of common defence.

On a different note, increasing the operational efficiency of battle groups, scheduling the stand by periods and revising the concept of the rapid military response of the European Union is a very high concern in the current Ukrainian crisis context. The idea of a small military structure, with high mobility and combat capacity, ready to intervene in a short time in crisis situations for the security interests of the European Union is transposed in practice, also internally, according to the Concept of restoring the fighting capacity, for the Romanian Army, for the period 2019-2026, by setting up TF (Task Force) or TG (Task Groups⁹).

The European concepts, together with the NATO ones, can be the basis for the necessary transformations, for the modernization and interconnection of the military dimension and its contribution to ensuring the stability of the state. At the state level, all these concepts must be transposed into action policies to make the role of the military dimension more efficient.

Another way is to determine the security-strategy-forces ratio and its organization or optimization. This is achieved by analyzing the synchronization matrix and determining the optimal solutions based on the elements presented above, the effects of the use of forces on tangible elements (equipment, quantity

of forces, their quality, capabilities, mobility, logistics, reserve of forces, organization of forces, the fighting power) and intangibles (morale, discipline, training, leadership, doctrine, the desire to fight, public support, alliances and coalitions).

Still, the best solution that a state can adopt to ensure the stability of the state, from the point of view of the use of the military dimension of security, is to respect the commitments made and to participate with forces and means in the theaters of operations with Euro-Atlantic partners. Thus, starting with 2017 Romania has fulfilled its commitment to NATO regarding the allocation of 2% of GDP for the defense to continue the process of transformation, modernization and endowment of the armed forces.

As a result of this fact, Romania is currently in a favorable position to strengthen the national defense capacity, which will include the realization of the capabilities necessary to make our response to symmetric and asymmetric threats more efficient. Also, Romania has stepped up its efforts to strengthen interoperability with the NATO allies in support of streamlining the allied deterrence and defense mechanisms, such as those corresponding to the NATO Immediate Response Plan¹⁰.

The successful participation of the Romanian Army with Euro-Atlantic partners in the campaigns in Iraq, the Balkans and Afghanistan or participation in major naval operations in the theaters of operations in the Mediterranean, Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean in the fight against terrorism, in the war in Libya or in the fight anti-piracy demonstrates the role and importance of the military dimension of security in the Black Sea region.

The participation of Romania and the prospects for the coming years need to be highlighted in this context. Romania participated in the operationalization of EU Battle Groups in EU or UN missions, and of these, the most important are Romania's participation in Operation ATALANTA to fight piracy with King Ferdinand Frigate in 2012, for a period of 60 days or participation starting with this year with an aviation contingent of four helicopters and over 100 servicemen in the UN mission in Mali.

Participation with senior staff in EU or NATO HQ, along with the participation since 2017 in the NATO Sea Guardian operation or the continuation

of participation with an important contingent in Afghanistan, within the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), shows clearly that Romania is consistently committed to the Euro-Atlantic effort of realization of the regional order in the Black Sea basin.

Recent developments and short- medium- and long-term perspectives, refer to the EUMS's concerns regarding the elaboration of the documents and the standardization of the training activities of the Battle Groups (BGs)¹¹. It is considered that although the preparation of the BGs is the responsibility of the contributing Member States, there are different approaches that require a standardization of the training of the BGs.

The already predictable success of the most important operation conducted by the European Union, Operation ATALANTA, which has been in operation since 2008 or Operation EUNAVFOR Sophia shows that a military force of the European Union is being built seriously and intelligently for the present and the future. The EU Naval Task Group has been operating in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin since 2008 and comprises ships, aviation and special forces with a strength that has reached around 1500 military personnel.

Displacement of the national contingent of the Marine Infantry Regiment in the Afghanistan theatre of operations under Operation "Resolute Support", participation in the VJTF¹² of the NATO Rapid Reaction Forces package for a period of six months with King Ferdinand Frigate or participation in Operation SEA GUARDIAN in the Mediterranean Sea. These are only three elements that support the contribution of the Romanian Naval Forces to the joint effort of the Romanian Army within the Alliance and EU, to maintain stability in this extended region of the Black Sea.

Also, the participation with ships and senior staff in NATO naval Task Groups during their deployment in the Black Sea or the development of multinational or bilateral exercises to maintain interoperability but also to develop cooperation or to maintain a balance of power in the region are other noteworthy elements. The Romanian Naval Forces have made an important premiere, in the last years, in the participation to the operations of Active Endeavor, Unified Protector, Atalanta, Sea Guardian or national, multinational and international exercises such as: the integration of the organic helicopter; the integration of special operations

forces (FOS) and EOD groups onboard ships; achieving a flexible structure at the organization level; the deployment of marine infantry in theatres of operations in Afghanistan or the Baltic Sea.

The role of Romania in achieving the regional order in the Black Sea area as well as its role in the process of regionalization of the Black Sea is also important to be used as an opportunity. We can say that this role has importance and consistency also due to the fact that within the international relations, Romania proves having principles and character, as the famous American professor Milan Vego shows in his book "Joint Operational Warfare, Theory and practice": "Successful Leaders at any level of command possess certain character traits and professional knowledge and experience that distinguish them from less capable commanders."¹³

It is evident, however, that the use of the resources of all five dimensions of security is by far the most effective way to achieve and maintain the stability of the states and, implicitly, of the Black Sea region. The comprehensive approach of security policies and external strategies as well as defence strategies remain of interest both to the state's leadership and to its citizens, also. From this perspective, Romania should also do more to identify major, medium, and long-term objectives and to assume the role intended by geopolitical and geostrategic positioning, to continue the policy of maintaining a stable balance of power in the Black Sea region and its extended region.

Consequently, maintaining the balance of the role of the political, economic, military, social and environmental dimensions is the optimal way, the most effective solution, for ensuring the stability and security, not only of the state but also of the regional one, if we talk about the Black Sea region.

Conclusions

Starting from the current requirements, the specificity of the structures we design must meet the following criteria: efficient command and control, balanced structure of forces, interoperability and appropriate infrastructure, all to bring the forces under the Romanian Defence Staff close to the requirements of the modern joint war, at sea, on land and air. In the context of the integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures and the modernization

of the Armed Forces through the acquisition of equipment or systems compatible and interoperable with those of our partners, the elaboration of the strategic documents was imposed as one of the top priorities.

As a Black Sea riparian state, located near the insecurity zone in the Balkans and at the entrance of the main river transport axis between the Middle East and Western Europe, Romania must have a credible and well-structured naval force, with a combative power over the measure of the responsibilities of the sea and the Danube river. In the context of the contemporary evolution of the security environment, the country's maritime power is a factor of vital importance, and the Romanian Naval Forces is its main pillar.

Successful participation of the Romanian Army with Euro-Atlantic partners in the campaigns in Iraq, the Balkans and Afghanistan or participation in major naval operations in the theaters of operations in the Mediterranean, Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean in the fight against terrorism, in the war in Libya or in the fight anti-piracy, demonstrates the role and importance of the military security dimension.

Security, stability, and prosperity in this region depend largely on regional and international actors: the European Union, NATO, Russia, the USA, Turkey, and, not least, China. However, probably the most important are the relations among the US, the European Union and Russia.

Romania is one of the main actors in the geopolitical scene of the Black Sea region. Democracy, respect for the fundamental rights of citizens, and good governance are solid, fundamental principles of the European Union. The main objective of the European Union is to promote democracy within the European Union but also in its vicinity. It is a priority for the European Union that the projection of a medium and long-term vision be applied with adequate consistency.

In the region of the European Union, a significant number of states have a population consisting of different ethnic categories and still religious, cultural or social differences are difficult to deal with. However, there are no obstacles to overcome. Cultural and religious differences are by far the ones that can be easily overcome. Leaders can resolve these divergences through positive creativity. From this point of view, Romania is a

very good example. The 18 minorities living in harmony on the territory of our country are an example and an opportunity for leaders in the wider Black Sea area¹⁴.

Important actors as US, NATO, the European Union, Russia and China are the ones who need to expand the dialogue and extend it to the whole area. When we do these things, it is necessary to bring into this equation the role of the Danube because, as Mihail Kogălniceanu said, "*The Danube Way to the Black Sea is the key to our salvation*".

The geopolitical foundations of the Black Sea region, the regional potential of the Black Sea, the dynamics of the regionalization process as well as the regionalization process from Romania's perspective are key elements in establishing a clear vision. The conceptual bases of the regional order, political identity and regional order in the Black Sea are analyzed and clarified in terms of comprehensiveness.

Romania is constantly adapting to the Euro-Atlantic framework also by elaborating quality programmatic documents, from the National Defence Strategy to the Security Strategy for the Black Sea, with the adoption of a new Doctrine of the Naval Forces, edition 2018, a fundamental document for the deployment of the Romanian Naval Forces actions, a document that essentially contains a sum of principles, a set of rules and, at the same time, a sum of "*teachings*", lessons identified or learned, transformed into standardized operating procedures at the level of the Naval Forces structure, with a vision for modernization. These programmatic documents include the principles and priority directions of development and modernization of the Armed Forces of Romania, in the medium and long-term, and have a real contribution to the development of regional order in the Black Sea.

The development of a maritime consciousness of the citizens of Romania, of the Romanian people, is the foremost desideratum of this doctrine, along with the other basic documents of the Romanian Naval Forces Staff. It is equally important for us, but especially for future generations to understand that the development of a maritime consciousness as the visionary Mihai Kogălniceanu did is essential. The development of a maritime consciousness could continue from this point and can be developed throughout the extended region of the course of the

Danube to the Black Sea, supported on the strategic pillars of the Romanian Naval Forces. Starting from the current demands of the modern world, the new doctrines, specific to the structure of the forces that we design, which we modernize in fact, must meet the criteria of efficient management, as a balanced structure of interoperable forces and with appropriate infrastructure.

After 15 years since Romania's accession to NATO, achieving compatibility, interoperability among the armed forces of NATO members is also required by correlating and harmonizing the legislative framework, both horizontally and vertically, in all fields of activity. The lessons identified and the lessons learned after participating in operations and missions, at international and multinational exercises, brought important gains and feedback, needed for the development and transformation of all operational related activities. The transformation of the Romanian Army and implicitly of the Romanian Naval Forces for the last 15 years is obvious, but this does not mean that it is completed. The process must be understood as a continuous one, involving all the mechanisms and forces that contribute to this development.

At the end of 2019, Romania as a European maritime state, a member of the most important organizations in the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO and the European Union, is now reinforcing its character and position as a state-recognized according to its status for the first time in history at the leadership of the Council of the European Union, a period with challenges but also with multiple opportunities.

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THE USE OF RADARS ONBOARD THE AEROSTATS IN AIR SURVEILLANCE MISSIONS

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The military conflicts of the last century revealed the importance of information in the conduct of air force missions regarding the neutralization of objectives that were important for the enemy's war effort. The need to ensure information support for the decision-making processes resulted in the design of air surveillance systems, capable of providing the information required by the structures that specialized in countering of the air force threats. The quality of information provided was influenced by the passive or active air surveillance sensors, due to their superior power of detection over long distances and low altitudes.

Keywords: air surveillance; radar; sensors; threats; air surveillance systems.

The beginning of the 21st century confirmed the fact that the stable security environment is the result of cooperation within the international community through the promotion of institutional dialogue and through the important role played by the international organizations in defining and maintaining it. Therefore, an ongoing process started being conducted within the international community to the purpose of identifying and implementing solutions to maintain the climate of peace and stability necessary to build and preserve the security architecture of the new global society.

A consequence of this transformation was the new risks and threats to security that resulted in new hotbed of crises and tensions that represented the seeds of new types of asymmetric threats. Adapting military actions to the new threats and challenges involves the identification and implementation of alternate ways to use military structures to counteract them in an efficient way. In this respect, we can state that information can be a common thread in reducing the impact of risks and threats to the security environment, which amplifies the actions taken against state or non-state actors. Obtaining, analyzing and using information in a proper way will result in building the real-time image of the area of interest and will assist in identifying current and future risks, threats and dangers by ensuring the support for the necessary

actions meant to counteract and diminish them.

The lack of information about the enemy and enemy's intentions will generate uncertainty to such a degree that it will have an impact on the complexity of the environment where crises and conflicts arise. The history of military art has demonstrated, a situation also conformed without any doubt by later conflicts, that "war is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action is based are enveloped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty."¹ The uncertainty of the modern battlefield and of the confrontational environment will increase the potential of state or non-state actors to conduct asymmetric actions. This increased ability of using asymmetric actions by the actors involved in crisis or conflict will be influenced in a direct proportion by the uncertainty from the area where conflict or crisis appears and evolves, resulting in an increased effect of surprise at strategic, operative and tactical level.

By reducing the level of uncertainty, we can state that the risks will be diminished in areas where asymmetric threats can appear due to the actors present there. This end can be met thorough information superiority on a potential enemy by knowing the real-time situation and by determining possible evolutions of crisis and conflict based on the analysis of information in-hand. Information superiority on the enemy is "a state on imbalance in one's favor (relative advantage) in the information domain that is achieved by being able to get the right information to the right people at the right time in the right form by denying an adversary the ability to do the same."²

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The control of information from the area of interest will take into account not only the protection of the organic sources of information, but also the denial of enemy's access to important information and specific technologies used to process it. The result will reside in influencing the decision-making processes, and, at the same time, the way in which actions are planned and conducted. The information in-hand will allow organic forces to maintain control over the battlefield and retain their high potential to influence and modify in the desired way the decisions made by the enemy at all levels of military command.

The basis of information superiority is represented by sensors, which collect and transmit the data necessary for drafting the image of the area of interest, ensuring the identification of threats and obtaining the sound reaction, so that the impact on organic forces and actions will be diminished. In this respect, networks of sensors have been scattered over a larger area in order to obtain the permanent surveillance of the areas of interest and the early identification of instability elements or the outburst of threats to the security environment. The information support ensured by this type of sensors will contribute to obtaining the flux of information about the situation of own forces and of those of the enemy's. In addition, other information will be important such as that related to the need for support, the need or allocation of resources, the mission, about the area of confrontation, the hydro-meteorological situation corresponding to the combat area, the evaluation of actions performed by own forces as well as about the way in which the combat environment will evolve³.

Conflicts undertaken in the latest decades have stressed the importance of the air force in conducting military operations. They thus demonstrated that mission success and reaching the established objectives are based on the synergetic action of all military structures by using a large variety of weapons systems, placed on aerial platforms that had a great impact on the battlefield and on the military actions, conducted by organic forces. These conflicts have confirmed the importance of networks of sensors in surveilling the area of operations, stressing the need to provide the networks with more complex systems capable of ensuring the rapid identification of enemy's objectives and the strikes necessary

to neutralize or destroy them. In the case of the armed forces, it is important that an air surveillance system be organized and developed to include sensors meant for air surveillance. This system is capable of ensuring permanent air surveillance and early warning regarding the threats to the air medium in order to defend the area of operations and the suzerainty of a state in its airspace. The importance of this system stems from its use not only as provider of information about current threats in the airspace, but also from its contribution to the information processes in the air force in order to achieve airspace control. In our opinion, the air surveillance system is a crucial factor in achieving the air power of a state as it contributes through the information provided to reaching and maintaining a proper level of national security.

The recent advancement in science and technology has brought about air surveillance systems that are extremely complex due to the more qualitative and quantitative sensor networks capable of conducting air surveillance and reconnaissance missions, according to the requirements of the modern battlefield. The improvement of air surveillance systems is closely related to the evolution in air means technology; this qualitative leapfrog will lead in a short period to the necessity to identify and develop sensor networks meant to detect the new air means and ensure at the same time the neutralization of their technological advantage. These systems of sensors use passive and active principles and methods for detection, their detection power being dependent upon their technical and tactical characteristics, upon their capacity to focus on objectives according to the situation from the surveilled area, upon the transmission speed of data and information, and in addition, upon the independent technological elements such as the characteristics of the terrain and the type of platform which holds the sensors.

Having a complex image of the area of interest involves placing the sensors at a higher ground in order to detect the elements of the landscape as well as the means present in the air, on land and on sea. Systems of sensors are placed at a higher altitude with the help of air and space platforms such as satellites, aircraft, helicopters, unmanned air means and, in some cases, aerostats. These platforms also play the role of movement vectors and place these sensors above or near the area of interest in

order to obtain the best position for the collection, processing and shaping of the operational image of the area. Next, we will analyze their impact on the security level of states, which use them both for military actions, as well as on missions, for the protection of frontiers and counteraction of cross-border crime.

Helium aerostats are air platforms for surveillance systems of sensors, which due to their reduced costs are a viable alternative to other types of air platforms. These aerostats are anchored to the ground using a tethered cable that ensures altitudes of at least 3,000 meters, being capable to support systems of sensors, for military and civilian missions. The helium aerostat is made of the following components: helium-base floating platform, mooring platform with sensors, attached to the aerostat, remote control system of the sensors, communication equipment for the transmission of data, power generator and tethered system with cable.

A system designed for the advanced warning and control of airspace is the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defence Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS), which detects manned or unmanned aircraft, ground vehicles and light maritime vessels (boats) as well as other threats to the security of a state.

JLENS has two aerostats, which are used at an altitude of at least 3000 meters, being able to stay afloat for up to 30 days. Each aerostat has a radar system for different missions respectively one for surveillance and one with X band for fire control, meant to provide precise information regarding the strikes on detected threats. Beside the two radar systems, JLENS benefits from communication equipment for data transmission, tethered cables, tethered systems and powering stations.

The main parameters of JLENS⁴ are the following: "Number of aerostats: 2

- destination: air surveillance;
- length: 74 m;
- length of tethered cable: 3,000 m;
- payload capacity: 3,175 kg;
- Radar range: 550 km."⁵

The data provided by JLENS are processed and used to complete a wide variety of military and civilian missions among which we could mention border surveillance, migration routes, drug trafficking routes, ammunitions, etc. JLENS can

be integrated with defence systems which are used by U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force, such as the one for the defense against Patriot PAC -3, Standard Missile 3 (SM-3), engaged by Aegis BMD, as well as other defensive and command and control means, which provide support for the defence against fixed or rotary-wing aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned aircraft, ballistic missiles, ground moving targets, etc.

The possibility to place on the platform multispectral, passive, electro-optic and infrared detection sensors will improve the detection ability under difficult conditions (smoke, fog, etc.) making the surveillance radar highly integrated with this system of sensors.

Currently, due to budgetary shortcomings the JLENS program has come to a halt.

Another air surveillance system that uses the aerostat as a platform, used by the USA, is the Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS), built by Lockheed Martin. The radar system used on this platform can discover, track and identify the air targets up to 400 km, including aircraft that fly on low altitudes.

The main parameters of TARS⁶ are the following:

- Purpose: air surveillance;
- Volume: 275,000 and 420,000 cubic feet (12,000 m³);
- diameter: 19 m (275K), 21 m (420K);
- length: 56.6 m (275K), 63.55 (420K);
- tether length: 25,000 feet (7.600 m);
- payload: 550 kg (275K), 1,000 Kg (420K);
- maximum detection range: 200 nautical miles (400 km).

The USA used TARS for civilian and military missions. TARS is used on civilian missions for the surveillance of the border with Mexico and of the adjacent maritime area of the Florida Peninsula with the purpose of preventing drug trafficking in the area. The military missions consist of transiting to NORAD the data from the surveillance radar mounted on this platform and using them to sketch up the recognized air picture and ensuring air supremacy.

The USA uses the following operational sites of the TARS system: Yuma and Fort Huachuca in Arizona; Deming in New Mexico; Marfa, Eagle Pass and Rio Grande City in Texas; Cudjoe Key in Florida; Lajas in Puerto Rico; Morgan City in

Louisiana and Matagorda in Texas⁷.

TARS is the only permanent airspace and maritime surveillance system designed especially for performing border security missions and is superior to the other surveillance systems placed on airplanes, helicopters and unmanned systems. The use of these platforms to place the air surveillance, radars and sensors at an altitude increases their detection capacity and assists in discovering the light aircraft used in drug trafficking on the border area. Moreover, the physical visibility of the aerostat is a deterring factor to illegal activities performed in the air, at sea and on land due to the increased detection capacity of sensors and of the great reaction capacity of authorities for countering and neutralizing the detected threats.

Another class of aerostats, mainly used by the military, is the tactical one. Tactical aerostats are used by the Armed Forces in surveillance missions being constructively similar to TARS. Tactical aerostats include three models that are used for detecting threats from the area of interest, for the permanent surveillance of ground forces and means, early detection of threats to military objectives and forces, being considered complementary surveillance systems with unmanned air systems. The smallest model can be placed rapidly in the area of interest due to the portable tethered systems being, used for air surveillance of small areas. These aerostats are elevated at an altitudes varying between 150 and 1,500 meters having onboard radars, infrared and electro-optic cameras as well as communication equipment for the data collected or for retransmission of signals from inaccessible areas.

The transfer from the USA Army of this technology to structures that guard the frontiers is the first step in the civilian use of this category of aerostats. Tactical aerostats will be information sources meant to supplement the information obtained by TARS and, with the assistance of electro-optic and infrared sensors, they will provide precise, real-time information to the structures, involved in border protection.

Sensor systems placed on aerostats combine the advantages offered by air platforms (greater range, no limitations imposed by the terrain, possibility of aircraft detection at low altitudes) with the advantages provided by these platforms among which the low costs, representing 15-20%

of the cost of using fixed aircraft and the ability to keep the area of interest under surveillance, day and night, including under difficult weather conditions. The disadvantages of using these platforms are the fixed location and their vulnerability when it comes to severe weather conditions.

The data obtained by the sensors, placed on aerostats, are extremely valuable due to their excellent quality, thus contributing to sketching a clear picture of the area of interest, ensuring the identification of threats and the information used to neutralize them. In this respect, the continuous evaluation of risks and threats will determine their evolution trends and will contribute to the identification of solutions that are adapted to the particular situation from the area of interest, which will lead to the neutralization of the effects they generate.

From military perspective, the sensors placed on platforms will contribute to obtaining the real image of the area of interest and will ensure the information support for the decision-making process at structures with special missions, which will contribute to increased efficiency of organic forces.

In conclusion, sensor systems placed on aerostats, through their capacity to permanently observe the area of interest, can detect a large range of aircraft that fly at low altitudes thus ensuring the improvement of parameters in the surveilled areas and providing early warning. The information provided will contribute to creating a complete and real air picture of the surveilled area in order to ensure the information support for conducting a variety of military and civilian missions. The reduced costs, their permanent availability and the advantages offered by altitude surveillance recommend sensors mounted on aerostats as a competitive system that, together with the other sensor systems, will contribute to the identification and neutralization of threats, thus ensuring increased state security.

NOTES:

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2 David S. Alberts, John Gartska, Richard Hayes, David Signori, *Understanding Information Age Warfare*, CCR Publications, August 2001.

3 E. Bădălan, coordonator, *Concepte strategice și*



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4 <https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/jlens.htm>, accessed on 13.08.2019 at 18.00.

5 <http://raytheon.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=2386>, accessed on 13.08.2019 at 18.00.

6 <https://www.cbp.gov/document/fact-sheets/tethered-aerostat-radar-system>, accessed on 14.08.2019 at 18.00

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THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES

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International peace and security is one of the goals of the United Nations for which the entities that take part in international relations have to ensure permanent cooperative resources for the peaceful settlement of any dispute.

Knowing the fact that without solutions through the means of peaceful settlement of disputes, there is no other option than the escalation of conflict and the use of force, the United Nations has given a special attention particularly to the promotion of the principles of international law that provide enough flexibility to overcome any deadlock.

A principle of major importance is the principle of the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. The permanent appeal of this principle in many resolutions and statements offered throughout time, not only by the United Nations, but also by other regional organizations, has the unique purpose of the strengthening international order based on the prohibition of force and coercion in the international relations. In this context, there is only one exception – the right to self-defense, a situation in which the use of force is allowed but without denying or neglecting the obligations to respect international law and justice.

The purpose of this article is to identify and present the most important official documents, resolutions and statements of the United Nations and other regional organizations that operate with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes, and to highlight its connection with the other principles of international law as the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force in international relations, the principle of non-intervention in internal or external affairs of States, the principle of sovereign equality of States, and the principle of good faith in international relations, which all together sustain the goal of not endangering of international peace, security and justice.

Keywords: dispute; international law; principle; United Nations; resolution; peaceful settlement.

Introduction

The rule-based international political order, as it has been developed for more than seven decades of the existence of the United Nations (UN), has had to face many crises and challenges during the tumultuous period of the Cold War, but also in the Post-Cold War period, characterized by greater stability which favored the construction of peace and prosperity especially in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Nowadays, upon the 30th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the international security, based on an international legal order of liberal inspiration, is in an arduous process of adaptation and consolidation that could generate a deep and extended attachment, from the part of all actors involved in international relations to the principles of freedom, democracy and respect for human

rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the rule of law.

Threats to nowadays world, such as: terrorism, organized crime, refugee flows, ethnic and religious fundamentalism, nuclear proliferation, global warming, environmental degradation, desertification, natural disasters, create many problems of a cross-border nature that are difficult, if not even impossible to be managed by sole state actors. In contrast, the multilateral framework of the international organizations which provides multifold dialogue, cooperation and action, remains a valuable tool for the states under the pressure of concurrent threats to find out a suitable response. However, it is more provocative compared to the one provided by each state and weaker in terms of speed of response to the challenges of today's peace and security issues.

In this volatile and unpredictable security environment in which the rules of international society are questioned at least from the perspective of what the entities that create rules of public international law and customary law are, as well as what subjects of international law are still obeying the rules, there is a strong need to recall

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the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes and to emphasize the huge effort made by the international community to strengthen its meaning and increase its relevance. There are at least two arguments in this regard. Firstly, in the absence of the peaceful settlement of disputes that consolidate the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, there is only one solution – the application of the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations – which consist either of political and diplomatic sanctions or actions by air, sea, or land forces, situations that have lately proved increasingly unproductive in the steps of restoring international peace and security in a world of accelerated interdependencies. Secondly, since the Millennium Declaration and, later, the 2030 Agenda Declaration of the United Nations which have been concentrated the international public interests to peace, security, justice and sustainable development, the principles of non-violent action in international relations have been placed in undeserved shadow.

The United Nations Millennium Declaration¹, adopted by the General Assembly on September 8, 2000, aimed to build a new framework for multinational cooperation that would renew universal aspirations for international unity and solidarity. The Millennium Development Goals for the year 2015 laid the foundation of an international cooperation focused on 8 concrete goals: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/Aids, malaria and other diseases; ensure environment sustainability and global partnership for development. Those goals were set with the aim to improve peace and security, human rights and governance, economic and social conditions.

Then, through the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the United Nations militates for a world in which justice, equality in rights, equity and social inclusion are built, developed and strengthened together. In fact, the 2030 Agenda² is a universal call to action to protect the planet and ensure peace and prosperity for all people, pursuing no less than 17 Sustainable Development Goals: no poverty; zero hunger; good health and well-being; quality education; gender equality; clean water and sanitation; affordable and clean energy; decent

work and economic growth; industry, innovation and infrastructure; reduced inequalities; sustainable cities and communities; responsible consumption and production; climate action; under-water life; life on land; peace, justice and strong institutions; partnerships for the goals.

Within this framework of sustainable international development, the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes finds its most important conceptual emphasis before the period of the Third Millennium, in the content of the UN Charter, in some declarations and resolutions of the UN General Assembly, as well as in a few other associated principles which were stated also by other regional organizations in their foundation treaties such as Pact of the League of Arab States (Cairo, 1945), American Treaty on Pacific Settlement ("Pact of Bogota", 1948), European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (1957) and Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act³ (Helsinki, 1975).

Charter of the United Nations

The Charter of the United Nations of June 26th 1945, provides in Article 1, paragraph 1 the most important argument for respecting the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes, by presenting one of the purposes of the United Nations, that of taking "*effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace*".⁴

Also, the peaceful settlement of international disputes is strengthened in the next article which states that the Organization and its Members shall settle "*their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered*"⁵, and the possibilities of peaceful settlement are presented in Chapter VI (Peaceful settlement of disputes): negotiation, enquiry (fact-finding), mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or by any other peaceful means that may be chosen by the parties to settle a dispute.

From the aforementioned provisions, one could express the opinion that only states would have the obligation to settle disputes peacefully because other entities participating in the relations that are developed within the international society do not have this obligation expressly included in the Charter. However, the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes is not limited only to states, but it is also applicable to those disputes involving other entities participating in international relations, including for example international organizations, national liberation movements within the colonial context, and by the virtue of the right to self-determination.

Therefore, States and entities involved in a dispute must implement the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in full accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, with the principles of international law, so that, in their actions, they may refrain from any susceptible act, which could aggravate the situation that would endanger peace, international security and justice.

Resolutions and declarations of the General Assembly of the United Nations

The principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes has been reaffirmed in a significant number of resolutions of the UN General Assembly, among which we mention: Resolution 2627 (XXV) of October 24, 1970 with the Occasion of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations, Resolution 2734 (XXV) of December 16, 1970 on the Strengthening of International Security and Resolution 40/9 of November 8, 1985 on the Solemn Appeal to States in conflict to cease armed action forthwith and to settle disputes between them through negotiations, and to States Members of the United Nations to undertake to solve situations of tension and conflict and existing disputes by political means and to refrain from the threat or use of force and from any intervention in the internal affairs of other States.

In Resolution 2627 (XXV), the General Assembly affirms its readiness to make sustained efforts for the development of relations between states based in particular on the principle of sovereign equality of States, the principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,

the principle that they shall settle their disputes by peaceful means, the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, the duty of States to cooperate with one another in accordance with the Charter, and the principle that States shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter.⁶

Resolution 2734 (XXV) urges states to make maximum use of the means and methods offered by the United Nations Charter for the peaceful settlement of any dispute or situation that could endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.⁷ This resolution encourages any initiative or contribution that can bring improvements to the ways of implementing peaceful means of dispute resolution.

In Resolution 40/9⁸, the General Assembly reaffirms its conviction that resorting to the threat or the use of force in conflicts between States can only aggravate the international situation and make the solution of problems even more difficult, as well as the interest of the Organization to encourage States to exert maximum efforts in applying the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes as the only viable solution to the long-term peaceful settlement of any dispute.

Also, the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes is affirmed in a series of very important declarations that have contributed more broadly to the consolidation of the principles of the public international law: Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970)⁹, Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes (1981)¹⁰, Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten International Peace and Security and on the Role of the United Nations in This Field (1988)¹¹, Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations in the Field of the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (1991)¹².

In all these declarations, the UN General Assembly was focused on reorienting international disputes away from aggression and unilateralism toward partnership and multilateral cooperation by underlining the value of the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes between States in the context of general effort not to jeopardize international peace, security and justice.

Also, this principle is of great interest at the level of the United Nations, not only from the perspective of avoiding escalation of armed violence or a bloody armed conflict, but also from the perspective of the need to counter extremist ideologies which generate security threats and challenges on a global scale such as terrorism and hate.

By invoking and repeating this principle of peaceful settlement in numerous resolutions and declaration of the General Assembly, the UN indirectly seeks to strengthen a world order in which the foreign policy of states and other international entities is not exercised on the basis of coercion and use of force, with only one exception – the acts in accordance with the right to self-defense. But we do not have to forget that even in these exceptional situations of legitimate self-defense that justify the use of the armed forces there is no statement which negates the fundamental obligation of any State or any other entity to carry on in good will the obligation to refrain in its actions from the use force.

Related links of the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes

Applying the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in international relations is closely linked to the valorization of other principles of action in international affairs, among which we mention: the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force in international relations, the principle of non-intervention in internal or external affairs of States, the principle of sovereign equality of States and the principle of good faith in international relations.

Principle of refraining from the threat or use of force in international relations

The link between the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes and the principle of non-use of force in international relations is highlighted in the Manila Declaration, for two times, both in the preamble and in the content of the solemn declaration, where it is declared that “neither the existence of a dispute nor the failure of a procedure of peaceful settlement of disputes shall permit the use of force or threat of force by any of the States parties to the dispute”¹³, in the Pact of the League of Arab States, in which it is affirmed that “the recourse to force for the settlement of disputes

between two of more member States shall not be allowed”¹⁴, in the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, which testifies that the contracting parties “agree to refrain from the threat or the use of force, or from any other means of coercion for the settlement of their controversies, and to have recourse at all times to pacific procedures”¹⁵, as well as in the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe¹⁶ whereby the participating states commit themselves to refraining in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the present Declaration. No consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this principle”¹⁷.

Principle of non-intervention in internal or external affairs of States

The interrelation between this principle and the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes is recognized in article 5 of “Pact of Bogota”, and reiterated in paragraph 5 of the preamble of the Manila Declaration and in the Helsinki Final Act, point 6, section I, where it is specified: “The participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless of their mutual relations. They will accordingly refrain from any form of armed intervention or threat of such intervention against another participating State. They will likewise in all circumstances refrain from any other act of military, or of political, economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another participating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind. Accordingly, they will, inter alia, refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities, or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating State.”¹⁸.

Principle of sovereign equality of States

The links between this principle and the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes is highlighted in the Manila Declaration, in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, which proclaims that States have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the international community, "notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political or other nature"¹⁹, as well as in the Helsinki Final Act where we find an even wider interpretation: "The participating States will respect each other's sovereign equality and individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence. They will also respect each other's right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations."²⁰

Principle of good faith in international relations

Good faith and cooperation are two essential attributes that must guide the behavior of states in international relations. Good faith is a state of mind, adopted by an international actor both in the exercise of rights and freedoms within the international society, and in the process of the accomplishment of international obligations, that express honest and fair approach in international affairs. Cooperation consists of actions undertaken voluntarily by a state, together with one or more states participating in international relations, in order to achieve common goals.

The Manila Declaration refers to the duty of states to "act in good faith"²¹ in accordance with the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, the need to "seek in good faith"²² an early and equitable settlement of international disputes, the need to "implement in good faith"²³ the provisions of the agreements obtained by the means of peaceful settlement of disputes, the need to "fulfill in good faith"²⁴ the obligations assumed in conformity with the Charter, and to observe and promote in good faith the provisions of Manila Declaration.

Good faith is also found in the Helsinki Final Act, and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, where there is a clear statement on the obligation for every State to fulfill in good faith: "the obligations assumed by it in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. [...] its obligation under the generally recognized principles and rules of international law. [...] its obligations under international agreements valid under the generally recognized principles and rules of international law"²⁵.

Conclusions

The principle of peaceful settlement builds the most important international institutional framework that enables States and international entities to find solutions to their disputes and carry on the fundamental purpose of the United Nations – preserving international peace and security.

The right function of the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in international affairs cannot have lasting and constructive effects without taking into account the role of other principles of international law, such as the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force in international relations, the principle of non-intervention in internal or external affairs of States, the principle of sovereign equality of States, and the principle of good faith in international relations.

Conflict prevention, being a fundamental activity of the United Nations in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter, is accomplished to great extent through the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes, which cultivates a shifting paradigm of the foreign policy of States from unilateralism and aggression towards a policy of cooperation, good faith and multilateralism. What is more, this principle acts as an inhibitor of violence that could lead to an international armed conflict, but also as an obstacle for spreading of extremist ideologies, terrorism, hatred and other related activities.

By invoking and repeating this principle in its many resolutions and declarations, the UN seeks to encourage states and other international entities to actively participate in promoting and applying the principles of international law in order to strengthen an order in international society based



on the prohibition of force and coercion, as well as to guarantee the fundamental rights and freedoms, including here the right to individual and collective self-defence.

NOTES:

- 1 ***The General Assembly, 52/2. *United Nations Millennium Declaration*, September 8, 2000, available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Millennium.aspx>, accessed September 20, 2019.
- 2 ***The General Assembly, 70/1 *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, 25 September 2015, p. 14/35, available at: https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_70_1_E.pdf, accessed September 20, 2019.
- 3 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), held from 1972 to 1975, led to the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act. Subsequently, with the adoption of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (November 21, 1990), CSCE marks the beginning of the change that led to Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) - January 1, 1995, based on the Statement of Budapest Summit (December 6, 1994). Currently, OSCE is an international organization that provides the formal framework and working platform needed to manifest the political dialogue of a number of 57 participating States on three continents (North America, Europe and Asia), and works for the better of more than one billion people in the areas of stability, peace and democracy.
- 4 ***The United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, San Francisco, June 26, 1945, Article 1, Paragraph 1, available at: <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html>, accessed September 24, 2019.
- 5 ***The United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, San Francisco, June 26, 1945, Article 2, Paragraph 3.
- 6 ***The General Assembly, 2627 (XXV). *Declaration on the Occasion of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations*, 24 October 1970, paragraph 3, available at: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/201690>, accessed on September 25, 2019.
- 7 ***The General Assembly, 2734 (XXV). *Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security*, 16 December 1970, p. 22, available at: [https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/2734\(XXV\)](https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/2734(XXV)), accessed on September 25, 2019.
- 8 ***The General Assembly, 40/9. *Solemn appeal to States in conflict to cease armed action forthwith and to settle disputes between them through negotiations, and to States Members of the United Nations to undertake to solve situations of tension and conflict and existing disputes by political means and to refrain from the threat or use of force and from any intervention in the internal affairs of the States*, 8 November 1985, p. 20, available at: <http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/UNGA/1985/9.pdf>, accessed on September 25, 2019.
- 9 ***The General Assembly, 2625(XXV). *Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations*, 24.10.1970, available at: [https://www.undocs.org/A/RES/2625\(XXV\)](https://www.undocs.org/A/RES/2625(XXV)), accessed on September 26, 2019.
- 10 ***The General Assembly, 37/10. *Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes*, 15.11.1982, available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GARES_ManilaDeclaration_ARES3710%28english%29.pdf, accessed on September 26, 2019.
- 11 ***The General Assembly, 43/51. *Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten International Peace and Security and on the Role of the United Nations in This Field*, 5.12.1988, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f2274b.html>, accessed on September 24, 2019.
- 12 ***The General Assembly, 46/59. *Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations in the Field of the Maintenance of International Peace and Security*, 9.12.1991, available at: <https://undocs.org/A/RES/46/59>, accessed on September 26, 2019.
- 13 ***The General Assembly, *Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes*, 15 November 1982, Section I, Paragraph 13, available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GARES_ManilaDeclaration_ARES3710%28english%29.pdf, accessed on September 26, 2019.
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- 15 ***The Organization of American States, *American Treaty on Pacific Settlement "Pact of Bogota"*, 30 Aprilie 1948, Articol 1, available at: https://www.oas.org/sap/peacefund/resolutions/Pact_of_Bogot%20C3%A1.pdf, accessed on September 26, 2019.
- 16 Helsinki Final Act presents, in its first part, the principles that guide the relations between participating States: 1. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; 2. Refraining from the threat or use of force; 3. Inviolability of frontiers; 4. Territorial integrity of States; 5. Peaceful settlement of disputes; 6. Non-intervention in internal affairs; 7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief; 8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples; 9. Cooperation among States; 10. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.
- 17 ***OSCE, *Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act*, Section (a) Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, II. Refraining from the threat or use of force, paragraful 1, Helsinki, August 1, 1975, available at: <https://www.osce.org/helsinki-final-act?download=true/>, accessed on September 26, 2019.
- 18 ***OSCE, *Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act*, ...VI. Non-intervention in internal affairs.
- 19 ***The General Assembly, *Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations*, 24.10.1970, The principle of sovereign

equality of States.

20 ***OSCE, *Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act ...* I. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty.

21 ***The General Assembly, *Manila Declaration ...*, Section I, Paragraph 1.

22 ***The General Assembly, *Manila Declaration ...*, Section I, Paragraph 5.

23 ***The General Assembly, *Manila Declaration ...*, Section I, Paragraph 11.

24 ***The General Assembly, *Manila Declaration ...*, Section II, Paragraph 2.

25 ***The General Assembly, *Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations*, 24.10.1970, The principle that States shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed in accordance with the Charter.

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THE EVOLUTION OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY FROM 2001 TO THE PRESENT

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The conflict begun in Afghanistan in October 2001 has not ended, and the current context of negotiating a peace agreement between the United States and the Taliban group does not guarantee the cessation of hostilities in this hot-zone of the world. This aspect coupled with the statements of the U.S. President regarding the withdrawal of the US Armed Forces from Afghanistan entitles us to state that a vital role in the evolution of the security environment in the Afghan space is played by the security institutions of this state, in particular the army and the police. The army, in fact the entire state apparatus, is going through a long process of reformation. The process of transformation of this institution has been very difficult, and the challenges and obstacles that have arisen over time have determined the slowing down of the optimistic pace triggered by the plans of reform and development of the Afghan national army.

Keywords: security environment; Afghan National Army; reform; Taliban; international coalition; Afghanistan.

Introduction

After the defeat of the Taliban regime, in the fall of 2001, the Afghan interim government assumed the task of reforming all institutions in order to build a rule of law in which respect for the laws would be the basic principle. Within this broad movement, security institutions play a vital role as threats from terrorist groups, operating on the territory of this state, have manifested, themselves permanently, in the most violent forms. The Afghan authorities have been supported during this process of transformation by leading nations that contributed by means of financial resources, materials and specialized advisers in the assumed fields. Thus, the U.S. pledged to support the reform of the army, Germany took over the responsibility of coordinating the police transformation process, the U.K. assumed the role of nation leader in counter-narcotics, Italy undertook to advise the Afghan government in the reconstruction of justice, and Japan was involved in the disarmament process, the cessation of arms, trafficking and the reintegration of insurgent group members back into society.

The army reform was and still is a process that has undergone numerous changes of strategy based

on the effects and consequences of the measures applied by the Afghan authorities as a result of the recommendations and suggestions received from international partners. In the following paragraphs, we intend to make a brief analysis of the reform process and identify the issues that have prevented the development of this sector at the estimated pace at the start of the actions.

The actions of the international coalition to trigger the process of reforming the Afghan national army

The initial proposal by the Afghan government authorities was to set up a large army to be led by those involved in defeating the Taliban and removing the latter from power. Subsequently, according to the Afghan Defense Minister's plan, the number of troops was to be reduced to about 60,000 soldiers to form a supple army capable of annihilating possible actions triggered by the military forces of the neighboring state, Pakistan, considered, at that time, the main external threat. As it can be seen, terrorist organizations, in particular Al Qaeda and the Taliban, were moved to the background as an opportunity to threaten the activities of government authorities, but history has shown that this was the first mistake in the strategy proposed by the Afghan interim government.

On the other hand, the U.S., as a leading nation for the reform of the army, proposed the establishment of a small security force that would take over from the international forces the responsibility of ensuring a stable security

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environment in the shortest time. The intention of the American side was to consume as little time, resources and energy as possible until the new army was operationalized and to leave the Afghan space within a maximum of three years. In the U.S. view, the main threat to the realization of this strategy was represented by the struggle between the internal factions that had emerged after the fall of the Taliban regime and which wanted to occupy as many leadership positions as possible within the established institutions. After a more in-depth analysis, U.S. experts reviewed the initial plan and proposed the establishment of an army corps deployable in any part of the country, capable of resolving domestic conflicts. This armed force was to implement security measures during the presidential elections scheduled for 2004.

As time went by and a further analysis of the situation in Afghanistan was developed, U.S. representatives realized that the initial estimate was unrealistic and that the proposed deadlines were not feasible. The first disadvantages were that at that time, at the level of the U.S. Department of Defense, there was no doctrine applicable to the situation in the Afghan space, just as there was no specialized structure at the level of the U.S. military to manage a reform and development process of foreign security forces.

The first major measure imposed by the U.S. advisers to the Afghan authorities had to do with the appointment of a civilian as Defence Minister. This decision was very hard to accept by the Afghan side familiar with the Soviet model, and the compromise solution was to appoint a leader of a local military group who renounced his military status.

The actual training of the Afghan Armed Forces began in the spring of 2002 and it was implemented by members of the U.S. special operations forces structures. At the same time, other nations contributing personnel to the multinational force deployed to Afghanistan expressed their willingness to support the army's development effort. Thus, the United Kingdom and France have assumed responsibility for the military education field, more precisely, they have set up institutions to train the corps of non-commissioned officers and officers. Turkey joined U.S. efforts to train professional military recruits from the civilian population¹. Given that Afghanistan is characterized by the

presence of several ethnic groups (Pashtu, Tadjik, Hazara, Uzbek, etc.), and the relations among them are a very sensitive topic, the international coalition decided to adopt the principle of proportionality on an ethnic basis when recruiting staff for all categories of military.

The equipment of Soviet origin from the Afghan army provided the first major obstacle in the training process, and the solution to this problem was the co-operation of instructors and advisers from countries that had the same types of equipment: Romania, Bulgaria and Mongolia². At the same time, the leading nation in the process of reforming the armed forces, the U.S., realized that the members of the special operations forces are not the best fit for a mission of advising and training regular forces and decided to displace a brigade from a mountain division³. The main task of this unit was to focus its efforts on the tactical level structures, from the level of the Army Corps down, the strategic level being allocated to a specialized civilian structure from the USA. The brigade-level structure was relocated to the theater of operations in Iraq with the outbreak of conflict in this country and replaced with members of the National Guard.

The deficient U.S. approach combined with other unforeseen factors (lack of infrastructure and military equipment, low recruitment base, high level of illiteracy, lack of a communication network and lack of a banking network to support the payment of wages) led to huge consumption of energy, time and financial resources. Therefore, the yield of the actions of the members of the international coalition was very low, and the progress in the process of transformation and development of the army was almost non-significant. Other negative aspects from the Afghan authorities were added to these failures. The Defence Minister made appointments in the key positions based on loyalty to the party which he was a part of, thus managing to almost completely manipulate the process of reforming the military institution. All this was added the emergence of the corruption phenomenon at the level of the leaders who managed the financial resources according to personal interests.

The established Army Corps was forced to act in the battlefield earlier than the deadline for achieving full operational capability due to the fact that meanwhile, insurgent groups in this area of the



world, of which Al Qaeda and the Taliban were the most important, began to carry out violent armed actions on the military facilities and personnel who were part of the security structures. At the same time, terrorist attacks had begun to be carried out throughout Afghanistan trying to prove to the public the inefficiency of public authorities in their efforts to reform the state. These actions were planned and conducted from the training camps set up in safe havens located on the territory of neighboring Pakistan, along the Afghan-Pakistani border.

At the level of the international coalition that acted under the aegis of the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), it was decided to establish four other army corps located throughout the territory. This measure was adopted following the conclusions of the reports prepared by the international experts according to whom the mobility level of the large unit initially set up was very low due to the lack of means of transport and roads.

In the context of a poor evolution of the process of transformation and development of the armed forces and of the deterioration of the security environment increasingly marked by the actions of the insurgent groups, the U.S. changed the strategy of support and assistance of the Afghan governmental authorities and adopted the principle of conditionality in regarding the fulfillment of the main stages of the reform plan. Thus, the important phases were considered completed when several conditions considered decisive were completed. However, a deadline was set for the complete withdrawal of international forces and the surrender of responsibility to the Afghan government no later than 2012. The evolution of the situation showed that this term was totally unrealistic, and the reform of the Afghan army was not completed at this date either.

The failures of the government authorities were due to system weaknesses and the development of corruption. Because of this, the confidence level of the population in the state institutions began to decline. Moreover, the inability of the security forces to annihilate the actions of the insurgent groups increased the influence of the leaders of these organizations on the territories especially in the rural areas. Under these conditions, the Afghan Minister of Defence proposed to increase the army's staff, and the coalition partners involved in

the development of the armed forces set up regional training centers to train the recruited personnel.

In 2007, the necessity of establishing air forces and equipping them with transport aircraft was discussed. Even though the Afghan authorities called for the establishment of air combat structures, the leading nation had drawn up a plan for the development of air transport units which were joined by several states that had been committed to providing aircraft and helicopters. During the same period, the first battalion of special operations forces was operationally certified. The members of this unit, selected from the best trained military, were the beneficiaries of special training programs, and the efficiency demonstrated in the battlefield determined the members of the coalition to establish several similar structures.

In parallel with the structural development of the Afghan security forces, the process of advising, training and evaluating them by the military belonging to the international coalition nations was carried out. A major impediment to these efforts was the fact that the training of advisers for the mission did not cover all the aspects required to perform such a function, especially in a demanding environment such as Afghanistan. They acted in programs developed by the U.S., Embedded Training Team (ETT), on the one hand, and NATO, Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT), on the other. The members of these teams also had the task of evaluating the progress of the armed structures at the tactical level, participating with them in the operations carried out against the insurgent groups⁴.

Providing essential equipment was a major challenge for the international community. The first measure in this area was the donation of technical means, communications, weapons, ammunition, uniforms by the participating nations in the conflict, but this practice led to problems related to technical compatibility. Moreover, the donated materials were very old, and the poor endowment level affected the morale of the troops, which led to mass desertions by Afghan soldiers and their enrollment among insurgent groups. Following the reporting of these issues, the U.S. decided to purchase and equip the Afghan army with new Western equipment. This decision led to other obstacles created by the lack of specialists in the fields of logistics, and their preparation was another

major challenge for the coalition. Their theoretical gluing involved consulting the instructions for using the equipment, but the lack of knowledge of the English language and the low level of education of the Afghan population were real obstacles in the development of the logistics field, as stated by an officer participating in this process in an interview with a U.S. military publication⁵.

2. The transformation and development of the Afghan national army in the context of changing the strategy of the leading nation

The takeover of the ISAF mission command by U.S. General Stanley McChrystal in 2009 involved a change of strategy in the theater of operations in Afghanistan. The new ISAF commander proposed a significant increase in the number of international coalition and Afghan security forces that would allow a counterinsurgency campaign, take over control of all areas, complete the operationalization of the army and gradually surrender to the armed forces the responsibility of ensuring a stable environment. This proposal was agreed by all participants at the 2010 NATO Lisbon conference.

The increase in the number of personnel also occurred among the international military advisers, and the effect of this increase was to be seen in the acceleration of the process of transformation and development of the armed forces. Based on the new approach, more funds were allocated for the acquisition of communications assets, functions were set up for advising the ministerial level in the fields of human resources, financially, logistically and with international experts, but the expected results were not due to the reluctance, the lack of concern and the delayed reaction manifested by the authorities. Another effect of the new strategy was the rapid increase of the number of military recruits, but the pace of employment far exceeded the rate of the position of instructors assumed by the international community. Under these conditions, the need to prioritize the support and assistance of the armed structures appeared, a phenomenon that led to the concentration of the counseling effort on certain units that had progressed to the detriment of others who had stagnated or regressed.

A report issued by the U.S. Department of Defense in 2013⁶ emphasized that if in 2008 the number of military personnel in the Afghan army

was below 80,000, in 2013 their number had reached 185,000 with possibilities of growth. If from a quantitative point of view the situation was presented at a satisfactory level, from a qualitative point of view, the level was very low, especially in the areas in which developed computer systems were used. During this period, the number of joint operations carried out by the international coalition members and members of the local security forces greatly increased, but with the remarkable results obtained in the counterinsurgency fight, a dependence was created on the support provided by the international coalition, especially in the field of air support. This has led to the neglect by the Afghan authorities of air force development programs, especially since during this period the issue of budgeting of military-specific actions from the Afghan government fund was discussed. Joint military actions carried out throughout Afghanistan had the effect of taking over the doctrines, techniques and procedures used by members of the international coalition and implementing them by Afghan security forces.

In 2011-2014 the special operations forces developed at a very alert rate and gave a special performance in the counterinsurgency fight. Unfortunately, after the complete transfer of responsibility to the Afghan authorities, many dignitaries, politicians with influence in the state apparatus misunderstood the purpose of creating these structures and set them as tasks of guarding institutions or, more importantly, personal property.

A permanent obstacle in the effort to advise the leaders of the Afghan structures was the beliefs and skills of Soviet sources acquired during their formation in the military educational institutions of the former Soviet Union. In order to change the mentality and the easier understanding of the Western methods, some of the young officers were sent to leadership courses in the West. Afterwards, following the proposals of the international advisers, they were promoted on functions in which to exploit the accumulated knowledge and skills.

The ongoing discussions and advisory actions prompted Afghan army leaders to focus in a very serious manner on the development of the air forces that had come under the direct command of the General Staff. The U.S. involvement in this area consisted of providing transportation



aircraft and financing a program through which Afghan pilots received training and courses in U.S. military educational institutions. As in the case of special operations forces, Afghan leaders used air transport for their personal purposes, issues that were uncomfortable in the coalition-Afghan military relationship. With the passing of time, through sustained efforts of international advisers and trainers, the air force succeeded in reaching the proposed level: performing the air missions independently, under the full command and control of the Afghan authorities with security responsibilities.

The beginning of 2015 was the moment when the main objective of the coalition was achieved - the transfer of responsibilities in the field of ensuring the security environment, in full, to the Afghan armed forces. Under these conditions, the number of countries participating in the Afghanistan conflict was substantially reduced, and the sole task of the coalition, under the aegis of the Resolute Support mission became to train, advise and assist security structures until they are able to carry out actions of planning, organization, execution and objective evaluation in all areas: human resources management, intelligence, operations, logistics, communications, training, financial, medical etc. At this moment, the mission of the international coalition is exercised on three levels. In the first case, we refer to the counseling of the personnel who fit structures at tactical level (from army corps level down), activity that is carried out daily with the purpose of assessing the implementation of the measures established in the joint agreements concluded between the representatives of the international community and the leaders of Afghan security institutions. The second type of counseling that is performed with a lower frequency is aimed at the personnel who hold key functions at the level of the Defense Ministry and the General Staff. The last type of counseling has an expeditionary character and is carried out at the express request of structures located in any area of the country. The duration of this action is approximately two weeks and is aimed at all fields of activity.

The initial operations plan of the Resolute Support mission stated that by the end of 2016, all international armed forces would leave Afghanistan. The evolution of the events, however, forced the coalition to review the plan and extend the terms

initially proposed. The causes of non-fulfillment of the obligations assumed by the Afghan side are related to the poor leadership, the misuse of funds, the extension of the corruption, the lack of transparency, the alarming increase of the number of fratricide events, superficiality in organizing counterinsurgency operations. Under these circumstances, the coalition leaders were forced to extend their presence in the theater of operations in order not to hinder all the efforts made by the international community over the last eighteen years in the process of reconstruction of the rule of law in Afghanistan, of reform and development of the institutions that govern this state of Central Asia.

Conclusions

The process of reforming the Afghan national army has been going on for a very long time, and at this time the international community is not optimistic about the term of completion of this process. An objective analysis of the actions and measures adopted over time reveals a number of issues that have made it difficult to carry out the activities according to the plans. We can say that there were many mistakes made by the international coalition, and assuming them stands as identified lessons that could improve the development of a similar potential in the future. My participation, as a staff officer in the multinational headquarters of the Resolute Support mission, in 2017, gave me the opportunity to come into direct contact with this process of reforming the Afghan security forces. There are two key elements, essential from my point of view, which could have accelerated and improved the development of the steps in this area: the deeper knowledge of the culture, traditions, customs, level of education, political, ethnic and religious situation, of the behavior of the population by the international advisors, which would probably have involved other working methods or a gradual imposition of Western methods and procedures and the early establishment of specialized structures for counseling and training among the international armed forces participating in the conflict. Only in 2017, following the lessons learned, did the U.S. set up Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB), which began to be rotated in the theater of operations in Afghanistan starting 2018.

At the beginning of 2017, at the level of the

Afghan presidential administration, a multiannual strategy was launched. It regarded the evolution of security institutions, which stated that the reform of the Afghan national defense security forces in the shortest time is the essence of the entire process of reforming and developing the state. The analysis of the degree of implementation of the measures established by the new strategy leads us to state that, unfortunately, not even this time can we be optimistic regarding the compliance of the terms related to the completion of the reform of the Afghan security structures and this situation, most likely, will extend the presence of the international community on the territory of the Afghan state.

NOTES:

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AIR DEFENCE RESPONSE IN THE LAND FORCES OPERATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE TECHNICAL UPGRADE OF GIS IN THE MODERN BATTLE SPACE

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The complexity of the contemporary operational environment specific to military actions is one of the major challenges of the decision-making factor. This fact is mainly determined by the mutations that occur in the field of military technologies with direct implications on the multidimensionality of the modern battlefield. In this context, the aerial area of responsibility corresponding to an area of operations represents the acting dimension of the missile and anti-aircraft artillery structures of the land forces. Due to the speed, range and capabilities of the modern aircraft's munitions, air defence response in the land forces operations is on the list of priorities for solving the issue of air threat and aggression. The solution of such a problem consists in the joint approach of four courses of action: knowing the air defence artillery and missiles equipment, preparing and executing air defence fire, planning and applying the specialized tactics and general tactics elements. In this article we shall mainly refer to the issues related to the two dimensions of the air defence response: the operational environment and the air operational framework, in the context of GIS (Geographical Information Systems). The physical peculiarities of the land and aerial area of responsibility are directly conditioned by the technical and tactical capabilities of the aircraft, which implies a series of conceptual transformations based on the technical upgrading of the modern battle space.

Keywords: air threat and air aggression; air defense response; GIS; thematic maps; operational planning.

GIS Technological Dimension of the Modern Battle Space

The impressive development of the technological – industrial sector characteristic to modern societies has led to important changes in all the fields of activity. From a military point of view, this fact draws attention on the need to reconsider the power factors and their behavior in a possible confrontation between two or more adversaries. The multidimensionality of the modern battle space requires that a military structure should be able to respond to the new types of threats. Transposing the information about the battle space, respectively about the capabilities of their own forces and of the opponent in the digital environment is accessing a new dimension of the military confrontation. In this context we can talk about re-defining the operational environment, in technological coordinates – a situation specific to the 21st century. The main argument for making this

statement is that the physical space: land, air and sea, has undergone major transformations from an information point of view due to the development of the geographical information systems (GIS). Although GIS technologies have emerged as a peaceful solution to the complex operations of geographical space analysis to support the military and civilian fields, they have definitely transformed the characteristics of any possible modern military conflict. At this point, it is unthinkable to plan and carry out any military actions without GIS technologies. The processing and the analysis of the spatial data from conventional sources (maps, plans, etc.) or other sources involving advanced technologies (aerial and satellite imaging, remote sensing, GPS) are based on GIS systems and they facilitate the immediate and efficient use of the terrain resources and beyond. In military acceptance, GIS systems integrate databases containing real-time, computerized coordinates for locating all the operational and logistic facilities to support military actions. The fundamental value of such databases in GIS format consists in their applicability in a different range of types of exploration of the confrontation space, on geographical and analytical criteria. The analytical aspect of GIS is given by the informational combination of the states of a military structure with the information

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support generated by the space operators that act on the spatial databases to generate a great variety of real geographical information. A GIS data model is fundamental for any military action because it

the attributes associated with these elements (for example for a road or highway: length, width, number of lanes, construction material, technical facilities, etc.).





Figure 1 Variant of representation of GIS spatial data through superposed thematic layers

integrates graphical data (maps) with tabulated data (attributes or descriptive elements) resulting in *thematic maps*. Based on these thematic maps, a complex GIS can be used to simulate extremely complicated real-life situations and events. This fact requires that the GIS model is able to perfectly reproduce the events and the phenomena in reality, on which the military planning and the decision-making can be conducted.

Since it is based on the science of geography, the GIS integrates several types of data obtained by superposing the spatial locations on the attributes of the entities thus spatially positioned, obtaining "layers of information" in thematic views through the use of maps and 3D scenes. Having this capability, the GIS reveals a deeper understanding of the operational environment by storing data and integrating two types of information: the graphic information that indicates the spatial distribution of the studied elements and the database for storing

Without going into the technical specifications of GIS, the graphic information can be of two types: *raster* and *vector*. The military significance of the two types of information results from their content. *The raster graphics* is a way of representing images in software applications in the form of pixel matrix, while *the vector graphics* is a method of representing images using classical geometric symbols (points, segments, polygons), expressed by mathematical equations, thus obtaining the georeference of the analyzed object or subject. Therefore, an entity or an object (represented by an image or a vector) is represented in a unique position in the GIS corresponding to the geographical position in the real world. An example in this regard may be the planning and execution of a march of a mechanized brigade, a situation in which the air defense artillery and missile formations fight the aerial enemy. In GIS and by means of the GPS navigation system (Global Positioning System), the most favorable

route according to the road map is evaluated². In this way, the georeferenced position, namely the exact location of the vehicle at a given moment, is obtained in the vector form. Route planning is actually a thematic map obtained from a spatial inquiry combined with an inquiry of the database associated with the roads in the electronic map so that a series of conditions are met. In addition, depending on the situation, a series of additional data/tasks can be identified and planned, such as: the firing areas for different variants of response to the land or air attacks; marking the contaminated areas; sources of water, electricity, etc.

Based on GIS, the multi-spectral imaging can provide topographic and hydrographic data which are fundamental to the military actions that would be otherwise inaccessible by using conventional methods. Moving imaging (video) and MTI (moving target indicator) technologies have added a new dimension of spatial data, one in which movement and position change can be instantly recorded³. The development of the thematic maps in GIS technology integrates the activity of the different types of sensors into the IT and thus facilitates the work of the military analyst to overcome certain problems generated by bad weather, poor lighting conditions or targets identified in the tactical field. The information integration of the sensors allows us, in GIS technology, to obtain a clear image of the target, both in daylight by means of the optical-electronic sensors, and during the night or under bad weather conditions by means of the synthetic aperture radar systems (SAR). As a purpose, GIS in the military context develops more than a description of the spatial relationships between objects or entities located in space (proximity, interconnection, continuity, incidence, etc.). The system helps us to understand situations; it facilitates analysis and decision making. The thematic maps contain: the complex of graphical data in digital maps and the information about the enemy in tabulated data on attributes or descriptive elements, resulting in a realistic interpretation of the situation and of the most likely course of action of the enemy. Identifying the adversary's probable actions based on the GIS reference data, by correlating the terrain features, the weather condition, the economic and social potential of the area of responsibility, the situation of the friendly forces, etc. brings the operational planning process into a new reality of the modern battle space⁴.

Air Defense Response of the Land Forces in the Context of GIS Technological Upgrade

The complexity of the contemporary operational environment specific to the land forces operations is one of the major challenges of the decision-making factor. Due to the speed, range, and capabilities of the modern aircraft's munitions, the formations specific to the land forces are vulnerable targets facing a hypothetical air enemy that can act by surprise at low and very low altitudes. In identifying the most probable course of action of the air enemy and achieving an effective air defense response, a decisive part is played by the actions of the air defense artillery and missiles structures, planned and designed on situation awareness and after the information preparation of the battlefield⁵.

The information preparation of the battlefield in terms of air defense requires a specific approach of the enemy's air actions. The specificity of such air actions consists in the fact that the aircraft have the possibility to act at low and very low altitudes which implies using the terrain to establish the avenues of approaching the objective, the stationary firing positions or the organization of the helicopter ambushes. Defining the air environment for the land forces operations involves evaluating the typology of the aircraft: fixed or rotary-wing aircraft, ground-based air defence systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise missiles and some ballistic missile or anti-missile systems.⁶ The assessment of the terrain to identify the most likely air enemy course of action contains a series of elements, such as: the protection against the air defence systems, the existence of the linear planimetric features, roads, railways and rivers, which provide assistance in navigation at high speeds and low altitudes, masking possibilities against ground observation or radar detection, direct access to the target area and terrain obstacles for the flight⁷. Therefore, the reference layers generated in the GIS are essential in the elaboration of the probable enemy courses of action. This involves accessing "the electronic terrain" and the meaningful data on channeling the enemy forces such as "drawing" the avenues of approach for the helicopters or fighter-bombers to hit a target. Due to the electronically stored data and the possibilities of the vector graphics of the terrain, including buildings and vegetation, repetitive simulations for the flight of an aircraft at

different altitudes can be performed using graphic representations as in Figure 2.

In order to explain the situation regarding the

the air enemy fight and avoiding the technological collapse due to the particularities of the confrontation environment. Another aspect of conducting the




Figure 2 Variant of superposing the reference layers in GIS spatial data to develop the likely enemy courses of action⁸

possibilities to informatively integrate the data stored in the GIS regarding the flight path of an aircraft aiming to attack a specific objective of the land forces, we have considered the projection of its trajectory in two plans: vertical and horizontal. Solving such a problem consists in the joint approach of four courses of action of the air defense artillery and missiles structures of the land forces: knowing the air defence artillery and missiles equipment, preparing and executing air defense fire, applying the specialized tactics and general tactics elements.

In terms of the air defense operational framework, knowing the air defense artillery and missiles equipment implies the possible use of their maximum combative potential according to the environmental characteristics, which is achieved by superposing the reference layers in GIS. This implies the possibility of sequentially planning

air defense response under the influence of the incompatibilities of the confrontation environment with the possibilities of the combat equipment is given by the topographic and geodesic survey of the combat systems, respectively of the air defense cannons such as the air defense weapon systems OERLIKON and KUB. The topographic survey in fighting the air threats is necessary for combining the air defense effort of all the components in achieving the algorithm on important sequences as follows: airspace reconnaissance (in visible, infrared and electromagnetic spectrum), searching and classification of the aerial target, tracking the aerial target, establishing its belonging (electronic/safe and procedural control), engagement and destruction of the hostile aircraft (executing air defense fire), assessment of the firing effects, ceasing or resuming sequences depending on the situation.

Another aspect of the air defense response covered by the specialized structures of the land forces in the GIS context is given by the preparation and execution of the air defense fire. In the literature in the field, two stages of preparation of the air defense fire are known: *the preliminary preparation* and *the immediate preparation*. Due to the high speeds of the aircraft and the very low and high altitudes for attacking ground targets, the air defense artillery systems fight the air enemy within a time frame counted in seconds and tens of seconds. Maneuvering in land forces operations generates periodic change of the firing positions, which implies changing the current location data for the air defence firings. In other words, activating the GIS database for the air defense firing positions substantially reduces the assessment time and the advantage over the complexity of the current air situation. Due to the possibilities of interpreting the terrain in GIS format, it is possible to obtain the essential elements for planning the maneuvers of the air defense artillery structures, this being possible based on the thematic maps. The thematic maps for the air defense structures automatically generate the most optimal solutions for the positions of the air defense artillery systems that take into account the following: the freedom of movement in the tactical space, size of sight angles (visibility)

and the maneuver of air defended objective, as in Figure 3.

Another aspect regarding the conduct of the air defense response is supported by the application of the specialized tactics and general tactics elements. The specialized tactics refers to the achievement of the air defense combat formation according to the probability of the air enemy's actions, during the important moments of the fight and depending on the evolution of the tactical situation of the air defended objective. The specialized tactics issues include the maneuver of the forces and assets in the tactical field, namely the measures that are undertaken to achieve the air defense response sequences. Mainly, the visualization of the airspace of responsibility is maintained by applying the protection measures against jamming, respectively maintaining the functionality of the centralized notification network for aerial image awareness in order to make immediate decisions. The elements of general tactics support the accomplishment of the maneuver of forces and weapon systems in the development of the operation and constitute the final end for obtaining or maintaining the local or general air superiority in an area of operations. The GIS facilities in this case contribute to optimizing the planning and conducting of combat actions by the land forces structures through spatial integration




Figure 3 Variant of thematic maps in GIS space data for conducting air defence response while maneuvering in land forces operations

of all the reference layers based on the thematic maps. It should be mentioned that according to the thematic maps made during the information preparation of the battlefield, certain projections are obtained on the probable course of the military confrontation, respectively a forecast on the best variants of achieving success.

Due to the above-mentioned GIS facilities, the conduct of the air defence response in the land forces is only one component of a complex situation generated by the multitude of actors involved in a potential crisis or military conflict. The final result of the informational preparation of the battlefield in terms of air defense consists in obtaining the air threat and aggression plans for the objectives defended against them according to the operation (NAI situation - named area of interest). Based on these overlays, the models of air defense response are developed, respectively the tactical moments

number of users, and of actors involved in solving the crisis or the military conflict. The thematic maps are the result of applying the data obtained by means of sensors placed on the ground but also of designing capabilities during the combat, such as designing the logistical supply routes. Another aspect is related to the informational support provided to the land forces structures by the GIS, in the stages prior to the development of a crisis or military conflict situation. This is due to the "activation" of some indicators or to recording those values of certain data that are directly related to the forms of manifestation of a possible hybrid war. The argument in this case is given by the fact that, based on the thematic maps, not only the objectives with military potential are kept under observation, but also other elements of interest such as those specific to the field of critical infrastructures (for example in the case of cyber attacks)⁹. Obtaining




Figure 4 Variant of integrative overlay obtained by superposing the air threat layer to the air defense response layer

when the air defence effort is concentrated. (TAI – target area of interest).

In the case of planning and conducting a joint operation, the information about the facilities of the operations area proportionally increase due to the

the technological results of the GIS applications in the area of civil activities such as the GPS for planning a march and other aspects tackled from an air defense perspective has highlighted the benefits of these applications. The results of the GIS in

the field of operational planning, respectively of the information preparation of the battlefield, show that in the manner of processing these data, the probable courses of action of the enemy are obtained, and the concept can be taken to the civil domains, by making thematic maps with elements generating crisis situations. (NAI situation - named area of interest). This way we can talk about opening up new perspectives on the possibilities of understanding the concept of hybrid warfare, which could be a possible topic of a future article.

Instead of Conclusions

Engaging a hostile aircraft in the airspace of responsibility of the land forces is the deliberate act of the air defense artillery and missiles structures. Essentially, the fight with the air enemy is caused by solving the problem of the projectile or the missile meeting the aerial target. This implies the positioning in the tactical field of the air defense systems, respectively the cannons, so that the aerial target can be engaged at the maximum range. Planning the firing positions according to the enemy's probable course of action is made based on the cartographic projections or the modeling of the three-dimensional space (in x, y, z coordinates). From a technological point of view, the problem of the air defence artillery firing was solved by improving the calculation devices, in the case of the air defense artillery the mechanical adjuster, and respectively the firing calculators, and in the case of the air defense missile systems different methods of guiding. There is a change in the flight parameters of the aircraft due to the technological superiority and the possibility of using them in actions against the land forces, which has generated a new spectrum of threats and possibilities of aggression from the air. In another aspect of the military confrontation, the land forces are called upon to carry out increasingly complex missions, so that the concept of multidimensional actions has been developed.

The new combination of factors that define the operational environment specific to the actions of the land forces in the modern battle space requires maneuvers and the integration of the most advanced geographic information systems (GIS). In arguing the views formulated regarding the design and implementation of the air defense response of the land forces, we have highlighted the role of the

thematic maps. Due to the specificity of the air defense combat in the three-dimensional space (projectile or missile trajectories) in addition to the longitude and latitude geographical coordinates, the computing devices also process the altitude coordinate. Therefore, the natural takeover of the possibilities of GIS applications through the vertical component, paved the way to a new dimension of military operations planning. By processing the variable "Z" in the GIS, the altitude component was processed and with it a series of attributes related to the land point identified through georeferencing. Taking into account that a ground map is a mathematical representation, by informational adjustment of the reference point in space, this is identified with additional information according to a chosen theme, which means that this map is practically a new means of transmitting knowledge about a certain situation (Figure 1. Alternative representation of the GIS spatial data of the superposed thematic layers).

Another observation related to conducting the air defence response by the land forces is the employment of the GIS technologies in an integrated aspect. This fact implies the shift from the use of the topographic maps to the use of the thematic maps, resulting in an important advantage through the upgraded decoding of the reality of the technological operational environment. The thematic maps take into account the spatial distribution of the qualitative variables related to the terrestrial surface, showing the distribution of the basic nominal data in different non-hierarchically classified, denominated and differential results. From a quantitative point of view, the thematic maps show the distances, the distribution of vegetation, the soil types, the precipitation types, etc. which are essential in decoding the respective battle space, in order to identify the most likely course of action. The quantitative thematic maps are more complex because they aim at locating ordinal data, intervals and reports. The analysis of the methods of executing air defense firings shows that the range of detecting an aerial target is the direct firing range processed in the computing device. As a result of the GIS possibilities applied to the air defense response systems, it turns out that their topographical survey represents the starting point for formulating a new concept of fighting the air enemy.

Upon covering the air defence response in the land forces operations in the context of the technical upgrade of the GIS technology of the modern battle space, we can assert that new perspectives are being opened for conceptualizing the employment of the air defense artillery structures. Depending on the source of the thematic maps and on the manner of their informational exploitation, we can anticipate the development of new concepts regarding the informational preparation of the operational environment, respectively of redesigning the operational framework specific to the land forces actions.

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INFORMATION WAR. CASE STUDY: THE ROLE OF *RUSSIA TODAY* FOR COVERAGE OF THE MISSION CONDUCTED BY RUSSIA IN EAST UKRAINE - MAY 2014 - FEBRUARY 2015

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Disinformation and propaganda activities are a basic element in the successful conduct of the hybrid war in the acceptance of the Russian Federation. Considering the technological and, especially economic, gap between Russia and the other world powers (USA or China) Russian military strategists have concluded that the full exploitation of the advantages offered by the skillful use of the information power tool, may lead to the elimination of the disadvantages of the insufficient economic development of the country or of the deficient endowment of the Armed Forces with military technology of last generation in serial production. In the following pages we analyzed the most important aspects of the information war carried out by the Russian Federation, using the well-known media (*Russia Today*), during the conflict in Ukraine, focusing on the themes and contents specific to each of them.

Keywords: *Russia Today*; information war; battlefield; hybrid war; propaganda; manipulation; disinformation.

Introduction

In the last decade, the information war waged by the Russian Federation developed much more efficiently than expected by analysts and military experts. However, in terms of its content, the new procedures are not at all new in terms of information aggression, especially as Moscow's new propaganda preserves some fundamental landmarks of Soviet disinformation techniques. Authors of Russian propaganda and disinformation learned from their own failures in the democratic revolutions of Georgia (2003 – "Rose Revolution"), Ukraine (2004 – "Orange Revolution") and Kyrgyzstan (2005 – "Tulips Revolution"), adapting to the new information technological challenges of the 21st century, especially through the use of cyber space.

Ukraine is the example which showed that the information environment constituted the battlefield of the hybrid war, skillfully modeled by the Russian Federation, through disinformation, manipulation and propaganda. The hybrid war in Ukraine has been strengthened by the efficiency of the information war, a concept that has proven to

be rather late understood by the West. My opinion regarding hybrid warfare is that it is conducted against conventional military forces, paramilitary forces, terrorist and insurgent groups whose tactics, techniques and procedures are specific to the entire range of power instruments of a state: political, economic, military and informational. The concept of "information warfare" developed by the Russian Federation represents a method of manifesting hybrid warfare through deliberate disinformation campaigns, supported by intelligence agencies, in order to defeat the enemy and obtain strategic advantages at a minimal cost. Given its hybrid nature, the information war is extremely difficult to detect, given its purpose - to confuse the enemy and neutral observers. Thus, the West needed time to understand that the Russian Federation uses information warfare techniques to reach its regional interests, namely the federalization of Ukraine or obtaining concessions from Kiev on the legal status of the ethnically controlled separatist provinces controlled by the pro-Russians from eastern Ukraine.

We may say that the modern information war developed by Moscow continues to basically use the elements of Soviet propaganda, such as: *informational intoxication, physiological exhaustion of the enemy, inoculation of trust in leaders, enhancement of the dissensions among*

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social classes, enemy incrimination, spread of threats and reflexive control. This is defined as "the action of transmitting, to a partner or an opponent, a piece of information to cause the enemy to make a predetermined decision, in the sense desired by the initiator of the action"¹. However, there are also differences from Soviet propaganda. Thus, the new type of propaganda used by the Russian Federation, especially that conveyed outside the borders of the country through the internet (social networks, news sites, etc.), displays all the characteristics specific to a shrewd information warfare, whose end-state does not necessarily aim persuading the opponent, but rather inducing a state of confusion with the purpose of destabilizing this opponent and, at the same time, inducing disagreements between allies.

The key elements of the reflexive control techniques orchestrated by the Russian Federation in Ukraine were the following:

- actions to deny and deceive Western public opinion in order to hide the presence of Russian armed forces in Ukraine;

- concealment of the real objectives of Moscow, an aspect which, on the one hand, generated fear in some societal circles, while others "convinced themselves" that Kremlin's interference is limited and ultimately acceptable;

- expressing the legality of Moscow's actions by virtue of its recognition, by the international community, as part of the conflict and not as a belligerent part, invoking similar precedents generated by the West, such as the independence of Kosovo or the invasion of Iraq, in 2003;

- actions to intimidate the West by using various methods, such as executing strategic military flights in the airspace of NATO states and some non-NATO states or exaggerated media statements about the success and performance of its armed forces;

- undertaking a complex effort at global level, through different media channels, to influence public opinion on the conflict in Ukraine.

Also, analyzing Gherasimov's doctrine², Mark Galeotti brings significant insights into how the information war is conceptualized in the new strategy of the Russian Federation. The need for the development of this form of war was determined by the fact that Moscow understood its inferiority position from the military point of view towards

the US and even towards China, which is in full progress of the army- technological development, avoiding in this way any direct confrontations with anyone between the two actors³. Thus, the Russian Federation has chosen to compensate the relative weakness of its army with subtle and indirect strategies that seek to confuse opponents in identifying its true objectives. Also, the financial and economic power of the Russian Federation is inferior to many global actors, and the Kremlin has countered this by developing disinformation strategies and non-military ways of conducting armed combat, as a much more cost-effective alternative. Last but not least, unlike the classic military operations, the information war does not seek to resolve the conflict sharply, but to extend it by supporting the belligerent party that gives the Russian Federation the possibility to influence the permanent conflict or even to cause a change in the political regime.

Information warfare, through all its elements (disinformation, propaganda and manipulation) has a destructive potential for the stability and integrity of a state, being able to alter the local public opinion, thus affecting the strategic interests that define foreign policy and significantly influencing the internal politics decision-makers by damaging the government institutions and diminishing the degree of confidence of the population in the structures of the national defense system and in their ability to protect the territory of the country. Thus, information warfare has all the necessary components to be perceived as one of the most serious threats to the national security of a state, especially for states with a young democracy, precarious institutions, eroded by corruption, a population lacking national ideals, democratic values and civic attitude. This category also comprises the states in the sphere of influence of the Russian Federation, as is the case of Ukraine, where the Russian mass media has considerable coverage⁴.

Russia's disinformation and propaganda activities conducted against Ukrainian society began long before the Euromaidan demonstrations, annexation of Crimea and the Donbass conflict. Indeed, immediately after the Orange Revolution of 2004, the main Russian media channels tried to discredit the Kiev authorities and their intentions to adhere to Euro-Atlantic structures. The Russian

media used to function without restrictions in the Ukrainian information space, an aspect that facilitated the broadcast of information on various issues to the Ukrainian population. In 2013, when the protests at Euromaidan began, the number of obviously anti-Ukrainian messages increased dramatically. According to studies conducted by members of the Internews organization, 71% of the residents of Donetsk region were watching Russian TV channels at the beginning of the conflict. Given that they were some of the most popular sources of information, Russian media channels used propaganda and fake news as the essential tool for influencing the Ukrainian population and central authorities. Having the clear purpose of discrediting the European Union and popularizing the ideas emanated from the leaders in Kremlin, the Russian Federation was able to gain the support of the population of Crimea and Donbass, a decisive aspect which led to the Kiev government losing control over these regions.

In order to protect the information space and to stop the spread of separatist feelings, Kiev leaders took some measures to ban the Russian media on the territory of Ukraine. Thus, by adopting laws 159/19 and 3359, they prohibited the broadcasting of films and serials which contained elements of propaganda of the Russian authorities. At the same time, the Ukrainian Audiovisual Council adopted a series of decrees prohibiting the broadcasting of Russian channels on the territory of Ukraine. Also, some non-governmental organizations, such as "Detektor Media", monitor the Ukrainian media space to detect Russian propaganda materials, and others, such as "Stop-Fake", focus on identifying false messages spread by the Russian media.

One of the most debated decisions of the Kiev government was the establishment of the Ministry of Information, considered by the European partners as a kind of *ministry of truth* or *ministry of censorship*. Moreover, some projects conducted by this structure include carrying out counter-propaganda activities. "The Ministry of Information set up the *Ukrainian Information Forces*, a project that aims to involve social media users in distributing credible information about Ukraine and the fight against Russian propaganda"⁵.

However, the broadcasting of Ukrainian stations in Crimea and Donbass was not possible during the period analyzed. Meanwhile, Russian

channels such as "Zvezda" and "Russia Today" and the separatists' media posts, such as "Novorossiya TV" or "First Republican Channel" were present in the information space of the occupied territories. It is even more striking that the soldiers of the Ukrainian army, located in the areas close to the state border with Russia, did not have access to local TV channels and had to watch the Russian or separatist channels. To solve the problem, Kiev approved of a plan for building TV towers in the region and blocking the broadcasts of the Russian or separatist stations.

Finally, it can be said that the outcome of the information war orchestrated by the Russian Federation was uncertain for long time. Moscow managed to avoid the involvement of the West in Ukraine, thus gaining time to strengthen its military intervention in the conflict. It also sparked differing opinions and attitudes within the North Atlantic Alliance regarding the situation in the region, creating confusion over the potential forms of response from the Allies. However, information warfare managed to change fundamentally neither the popular attitude nor the elites' attitude towards Russian actions in Ukraine and did not create a favorable information environment of Moscow. Moreover, the Russian Federation was not able to transpose its strategic objectives, identified and exploited by the hybrid war strategy, into consistent and sustainable success on the ground. As originally estimated, the success of the Russian Federation was reduced gradually as Moscow continued the same information strategy based largely on disinformation and propaganda fabricated and false news. This strategy was successful in the early stages of the conflict, when the vast majority of the directly affected population and public opinion in the region were more sensitive to the media challenges launched by Moscow. It can be seen that the same scenario was used in the conflict in Syria, where the information war orchestrated by the Kremlin which was, at a certain time, the upward trend, had the same outcome after popular attitudes in the region gave up digesting Russian information machinations.

In order to analyze the propaganda arranged by the Russian Federation for the preparation of the Ukrainian intervention, we chose to build the basis for the case study by presenting the role played by *Russia Today* in covering the mission

in eastern Ukraine. This TV channel is the main instrument used by the government in Kremlin in order to convey its own vision upon the major events worldwide. The articles in *Russia Today* selected for analysis were issued in the period May 2014 - February 12, 2015 (Peace Summit in Minsk - Ukraine, Russia, France, Germany).

During the mentioned period, *Russia Today* website published about 3,000 articles in which it presented, debated or referred to the crisis in Ukraine. Of all these, we tried to select the most representative that aim to discredit state authority, personalities and leaders with a special status. There were published a lot of materials in this regard, such as:

- 1) Dehumanizing the opponent;
- 2) Exacerbating the stakes involved in a fight or war;
- 3) Carrying out actions of national treason;
- 4) Practicing onerous actions;
- 5) Indifference to the sufferings of the people.

The rest of the article will be dedicated to presenting the manner in which RT activities discredited state authority, personalities and leaders with a special status.

Discrediting state authority, personalities and leaders with a special status Dehumanizing the opponent

The Kiev government forces used cluster munitions in civilian areas. "While it was not possible to conclusively determine responsibility for many of the attacks, the evidence points to Ukrainian government forces' responsibility for several cluster munition attacks on Donetsk [Donetsk Region, Eastern Ukraine]"⁶. Andrey Lysenko, spokesman for the National Security Council of Ukraine said that HRW (Human Rights Watch) observers received manipulated information aimed at influencing international public opinion and blaming Ukraine.

Residents of Odessa gathered to commemorate those killed as a result of the violence on May 2, 2014, in the Chamber of Commerce area⁷. The confrontations from that time resulted in 46 dead and 200 injured. Witnesses say that those who managed to escape the flames were hanged or beaten to death by radicals. A total of 42 of those killed were identified by the locals or the media. The Odessa news portal published an unofficial list

of the causes that led to the death of those people - fire, poison by gas, shooting, hanging, physical violence. Pro-Kiev forces killed at least seven police officers and injured dozens, including civilians, in clashes in Donetsk region. Some members of the pro-Kiev forces tried to desert and flee the national guard, but were killed by their comrades⁸. The local population, including children, went to beg them not to shoot their own comrades, but without success. The soldiers wanted to desert as a result of the decision not to listen to the orders to shoot the militia and the civilian population.

Although thousands of civilians remained without drinking water for more than a week, the UN said that in eastern Ukraine there is still no humanitarian crisis.

Eastern Ukraine was the theater of anti-terrorist operations, with massive artillery attacks, targeting hospitals and civilian homes. At least 365 people, including 257 civilians and 14 children, had died since the beginning of these actions. Moscow held information that the humanitarian convoy destined for the population of Luhansk will be attacked by pro-Kiev forces. Sergey Lavrov told for *Russia Today* (RT) that "We draw attention to the sharp intensification of military actions by Ukrainian forces with the obvious goal to block the route, agreed upon with Kiev, of the humanitarian convoy from the Russia-Ukraine border to Lugansk"⁹.

Representatives of the RT spoke to international organizations, including the UN, UNESCO and OSCE, in order to act to protect the rights and dignity of journalists working in Ukraine against the illegal actions of the Kiev authorities¹⁰. "[Journalists] are being watched, their phone conversations wiretapped. There were cases when journalists were forced to get down on their knees, beaten during detention and illegally deported from Ukraine"¹¹.

Exacerbating the stakes involved in a fight or war

About 400 mercenaries from the well-known American security company Academy Blackwater took part in Ukraine's military operations in Slaviansk against anti-government protesters¹².

The German newspaper *Bild am Sonntag* wrote that, on April 29, 2014, the BND (German Intelligence Service) informed Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, about the participation of

mercenaries in military actions in Ukraine. There are no data on the subordination of troops in this mission. Sergei Lavrov said that Ukraine is using foreign military forces to suppress civilian protests. "Among the candidates for the role of gendarme is the Barbados-registered company Greystone Limited, which is integrated with the Academy corporation."¹³ Its members were repeatedly accused of violating human rights. The American security company Blackwater gained worldwide reputation for its role in the Iraq war. It changed its name twice, in Xe Services in 2009 and in Academy in 2011.

Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, Valery Geletey said that NATO member states were supplying weapons to Ukraine. "Leading countries of the world, those that can help us, and they heard us. We have the supply of arms under way."¹⁴ Petro Poroshenko, the president of Ukraine, said he had directly negotiated with some NATO member states (USA, France, Italy, Poland and Norway). However, shortly after this statement, US, Norway, Italy and Poland denied information that they had supplied or intended to supply lethal or non-lethal weapons to Ukraine.

Carrying out actions of national treason

In an interview with RT, talking about Western states attitude towards Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that "I am sure that if such a position was taken, there would be neither civil war in Ukraine, nor the multitude of victims. Our colleagues [in the West] took another position"¹⁵. Putin said that Moscow is ready to mediate between Kiev and the anti-government forces. If Ukraine wants peace, then it should stop the attacks. Also, Vladimir Putin expressed regret for the failure to exchange prisoners between Kiev and the anti-government forces, stating that it was the fault of the Kiev authorities for this failure – "Yesterday [Wednesday] there was an agreement to exchange 30 people. The representatives of self-defense troops arrived at the place of prisoners' exchange; an official from Kiev authorities appeared and said, 'No. We won't exchange [the prisoners] until the Minsk talks."¹⁶ Putin pleaded that Russian citizens fighting for anti-government forces in eastern Ukraine are not mercenaries paid by the Russian Federation – "All those people who fulfill their duty or voluntarily take part in some military actions,

including those in Ukraine's southeast, are not mercenaries, as they don't get money for that."¹⁷

In a statement to RT, Sergei Lavrov accused European politicians and institutions of "refusing to admit that all responsibility for the actions of radical forces in Ukraine rests with the opposition. The Russian side is demanding the leaders on the streets to stop the violence in their country and immediately resume dialogue with the lawful government without threats and ultimatums"¹⁸.

Three members of the special anti-terror unit Alpha of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) were arrested while on an undercover mission in the city of Gorlovka in Donetsk region¹⁹. Their mission was to kidnap the leader of the group that controlled the local police, Igor Bezler. The prisoners were taken to Slaviansk for questioning and being presented in front of the press.

They did not say who authorized the operation and who was in charge, but acknowledged that they belong to a group of seven, not to mention where the other four are. They also did not specify how many such groups are located in the area. The prisoners said they were afraid of their families, now that the Ukrainian authorities had learned that they had failed in their mission.

The Slaviansk defense forces captured eight other military observers whom they considered "NATO spies". They had cards valid for all checkpoints, which means they were undercover, protected by their status as OSCE members.

Battalions of pro-Kiev volunteers prevented the distribution of humanitarian aid to the population of eastern Ukraine. The members of such battalions did not hide their Nazi beliefs and were involved in crimes, blackmail, kidnappings, etc. "As winter sets in, the already desperate situation in eastern Ukraine is being made even worse by the volunteer battalions preventing food aid and medicine from reaching those in need. It is no secret that the region is facing a humanitarian disaster with many already at risk of starvation. These battalions often act like renegade gangs and urgently need to be brought under control. Denying food to people caught up in a conflict is against international law and the perpetrators must be held to account."²⁰, declared Denis Krivosheev, the Director of Europe and Central Asia for Amnesty International for RT.

Oliver Stone, the famous American director, in an interview for RT, said that the "The armed

coup in Kiev is painfully like CIA operations to oust unwanted foreign leaders in Iran, Chile and Venezuela. Details to follow in the documentary, but it seems clear that the so-called 'shooters' who killed 14 policemen, wounded some 85, and killed 45 protesting civilians, were outside third-party agitators. Many witnesses, including Yanukovich and police officials, believe these foreign elements were introduced by pro-Western factions – with CIA fingerprints on it."²¹ He viewed the collapse of the Ukrainian government and the imposition of another, just like other actions in other states, something that he calls - American soft power techniques, regime change.

Conducting onerous actions

Officials of the Donetsk People's Republic (DPRK) said they had clear evidence that the Kiev government was planning provocative actions in the days before the Munich Security Conference, intending to bomb a bus with civilians in the Debaltsevo area²². This information came from one of the Ukrainian officers who were part of the group that was to carry out the mission, Lt. Aleksandr Marchenko, who surrendered to the rebels. The action was aimed at discrediting RPD and considering it, in international public opinion, a terrorist organization.

Meantime, in the middle of the intensified military campaign, Donetsk was under siege. A city hospital was bombed, resulting in 15 people dying. In a separate incident, other 6 people died and 28 were injured. On the whole, there were 26 attacks on the respective place, most of them being against hospitals or schools. Human Rights Watch (HRW) said that the Kiev authorities had failed in finding the culprits for attacking the civilian population in their own army – "Yatsenyuk and many others like him must find it impossible that the laws and customs of war could be objectively applied to both sides... Rather than denying reports of abuses by its military, Kiev should recognize the obvious facts and stop conducting erratic combat operations"²³. HRW has published more evidence showing that Ukraine refuses to make differences between military targets and the civilian population, as required by international war laws.

The Ukrainian military started an operation against pro-autonomy activists in Mariupol and Konstantinovka. An eyewitness interviewed by a

reporter from RT says – "I am in the center of the city, there are a lot of ambulances outside the local administration building, gunfire is being heard, armored vehicles have entered the city and are moving towards the center. People are going there as well, to prevent the soldiers from shooting. We are hoping they won't shoot at civilians, though from what we've seen before, we are not sure anymore."²⁴

RT made a documentary to show how the lives of people in the area changed after the conflict began, titled *South East Ukraine: The Diary of a Crisis*. "We are not separatists; we are not radicals. I live in Kharkov and I am 61 and want to understand what country I live in. When are they going to stop calling us separatists? We get up each morning and start greeting each other, 'hello I'm a separatist', 'hello, I'm a terrorist'. Our home is Russia. How is it possible to listen to that so-called government from Kiev who gave orders today to kill their own people in Slavyansk"²⁵ – that's how the documentary began.

It shows how difficult it has become for Russian-speaking Ukrainians to live in the region. People were beaten on the street or arrested for carrying the St. George Cross, to commemorate those who died in World War II. – "There is no difference between us, except we don't speak Ukrainian. Why do they hate their own people so much? Where does all this bitterness and hatred come from?"²⁶

A gift from an elderly Ukrainian citizen turned out to be a weapon that killed one soldier and injured three others. The incident happened at Stanicya Luhanska checkpoint in eastern Ukraine. An elderly citizen, who claimed to be a local, came to the checkpoint at 2:00 p.m. local time and gave the soldiers three jars of honey, thanking them for their service. When the soldiers wanted to taste honey, the jars exploded (there were explosive devices inside). The governor of Luhansk region, Gennady Moskal, said that only people who were especially trained in this regard can make such devices. The purpose of these actions was to kill or injure the soldiers, but also to create distrust between the military and the locals.

Indifference to the sufferings of the people

In an interview for RT, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that "Unfortunately,

President Poroshenko has made the decision to resume military actions, and we – meaning myself and my colleagues in Europe – could not convince him that the way to reliable, firm and long-term peace can't lie through war. A reliable mechanism for monitoring compliance with it and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] should play an active role."²⁷

The result of the delay in signing the ceasefire agreement was exploited by the Russian Federation in the sense that many Ukrainians were killed or left homeless. Russia's UN Ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, declared at a conference "What do we have today? Today Kiev and Brussels have returned to the position, which they needed to start with: suspend the association talks with the EU, which is exactly what the toppled President Viktor Yanukovich wanted. Due to a year of decisions, thousands of people have died, almost a million have been left homeless, and we are facing a civil war and the destruction of the economy. We are in the middle of a civil war and the destruction of the economy. Nothing has changed under the old or new Ukrainian elite. There has been no dialogue and there have been no constitutional reforms."²⁸

Residents on the eastern border of Ukraine have been living in fear since the conflict began. In Gorlovka, Donetsk region, six people died and another 12 were injured only in the week of January 25-29, 2015. Local statistics showed 115 losses of human lives among civilians, of which 17 children. One of the locals declared "I am 63 years old, and have always worked for my country," a woman tells RT. "But now I feel like I've been discarded like a worn-out glove. I used to be happy about life, but now there's nothing to be happy about."²⁹ Another local, Vladimir Bobrishev, led RT reporters to the ruins of his house and told them what happened. The bombings hit his house. His wife was injured in the leg, and the younger child was killed instantly. When he got home, the older boy, Misha, was also hurt, having suffered a serious head injury. He wrapped his head in his vest and took him to the cellar as the bombing continued. There he found his wife covered with earth. He got her out of there. He looked for the little boy and he didn't breathe anymore"³⁰.

Conclusions

From the analysis presented in the case study it turned out that the Russian Federation used *Russia Today* to cover Russian actions in eastern Ukraine. Through this news site, Russian propaganda implemented a coherent strategic communication plan, developed at the level of the Russian authorities. The propaganda had an offensive character, with an aggressive and rapid information flow that did not allow for the opponents' time to react, so that the unidirectional messages transmitted reached the recipients, providing them with an unperturbed Russian point of view. This is characterized by generating very strong emotions, aggression and detachment from reality. *Russia Today* creates an increasingly complicated, unpredictable reality, "it generates fear, leading people to the limit of chaos and panic"³¹.

The propaganda targets were diversified, starting with the local population, local authorities, rebel forces, government forces and the international community. The propaganda was conducted on several levels of audience and targets. The population has been bombarded with the most diversified media products, starting with short news as "breaking news", simple news, with high emotional load and few identifying elements, up to extensive analyses that quoted independent studies, reports from different international organizations, but presenting only elements out of context and turning them into favorable media products, extremely difficult to counter.

Propaganda took the most diversified forms, from distorted presentation of facts, creating reports in which elements of interest are inserted, taking from reports and information provided by the international community favorable elements and setting up new media products favorable to Russia or unfavorable to the Ukrainian authorities. The propaganda had several components depending on the objectives set, as follows: the provision of products that manipulate the local population, the supply of media products that mislead the Ukrainian government authorities and influence international public opinion, as well as messages aimed at the population from the Federation.

The main axes of propaganda were built on a few major themes, namely fascism and the nationalism of the new Ukrainian authorities (based on the anti-fascist sensibilities of the populations

of the former USSR), their lack of legitimacy, the difference between the Ukrainian people (brothers to the Russians) and government, support and the interest of the West in the Ukrainian crisis, the humanitarian crisis, the suffering of the population in the area affected by the conflict and the crimes produced by both the government forces and the pro-Ukrainian paramilitary structures that acted in the area, the imminent collapse of Ukraine as a state and the moral support that it has to grants Russia to the local population, denial of Russia's direct involvement in eastern Ukraine and the legitimacy of annexing Crimea presented as a reparation for a great historical injustice.

Propaganda was constructed in such a way as to ensure, on the one hand, favorable attitudes from the population, and on the other, elements that created a long-term behavior and mentality according to the new Eurasian and anti-Western ideologies. Russia Today provided a favorable image for Russia and denigrated both Ukrainian authorities and the international community, which opposed the view and actions of Russia.

In February 2016, Russian television channels could be watched all over Ukraine. As some surveys pointed out, for the residents of eastern Ukraine, the Russian press was an important source of information. "Russian TV stations started talking about the break-up of Ukraine long before the events in Maidan and the emergence of conflicts in the east of the country"³².

In fact, many people in eastern Ukraine watched the revolution from Kiev through the "lenses" of Russian television stations, which claimed that the revolution was orchestrated by the West and carried out by Ukrainian ultra-nationalists.

The Ukrainian government realized this danger, but Kiev authorities' reaction was much belated. The pro-Russian separatists quickly interrupted the broadcast of Ukrainian television channels and started the broadcast of Russian ones. When the separatists conquered the last television towers, many observers knew that Ukraine's media influence in the region would be almost non-existent.

Up until approximately a decade ago, Russian propaganda had stated that Ukraine was a sister country, the Ukrainian people are brotherly people, and the Russians and the Ukrainians claim to come from Kiev Russia, being East Slavic, speaking a

Slavic language, being of Orthodox religion, and embracing the traditions of Byzantium and the values of Eurasian civilization. All these aspects are determining factors placing them in a position of only being able to conceive their future together, side by side. However, after the Orange Revolution, the Russians understood that the Ukrainian brothers can have a different perspective than Moscow, regarding their own political evolution, with a strong pro-Western character³³.

As a result of the crisis in Ukraine, *Russia Today* presented the protesters on the Maidan as fascists, nationalists, right-wing extremists, perpetrators of a coup orchestrated by the CIA, but they maintained a difference between the Ukrainian people and the radicalistic elements.

As the fighting spread in Donbass, Kremlin's propaganda became more and more aggressive. Reporters presented mutilated children, raped girls, humiliated elders, dozens of bloodied bodies, burning houses. Overwhelming sequences that develop strong feelings. Yet, the images that accompanied the stories proved to be from other wars. The bleeding boy presented to be from Slaviansk is not actually from this area, but from the Syrian hospital Alhurria. Also, from Syria is the 3-year-old boy, shown at Pervii Kanal, in July 2014. The state agency, Ria Novosti, presented a material about the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine in which it talked about hundreds of bodies found on a field, but the picture accompanying it was from Chechnya. Another Moscow television reported about the existence of a so-called prisoner camp in Ukraine, using a photograph from Bosnia in 1995.

A large news-report was presented on the main public television channel, about 140,000 Ukrainians fleeing to Russia, for fear of the fascist government installed in Kiev. The following evening, the reporter spoke about 600,000 people fleeing the country. There was broadcast footage filmed with hundreds of thousands of cars in a hurry to leave the country through the customs of Sheghini. However, one little detail was ignored: the customs point Sheghini is in the Lviv region, on the border with Poland, so it does not lead into Russia, but into Poland.

The combination of denial and indirect action, the mix of lethality, coercion and intimidation, as well as the use of cyber-actions blurred the distinction between war and peace by helping the

aggressor to hide and deny real intentions, creating delays in the adoption of decisions by Ukraine leaders and allies.

In this sense, the major risk is generated by the possibility that the national authorities will not be able to identify hybrid actions, on time and on the basis of concrete evidence, to be presented to the allies in a coherent and convincing way.

NOTES:

1 Florin Popescu, „Propaganda rusă – între tradiție și viitor”, SINTEZA #22, November 2015, p. 94.

2 Mark Galeotti, „The Gherasimov Doctrine And Russian Non-Linear War”, 6 July 2014, online at <https://Inmoscowshadows.Wordpress.Com/2014/07/06/The-Gherasimov-Doctrine-And-Russian-Non-Linear-War/>, accessed on 03 May 2019.

3 *Ibidem*.

4 According to <http://larics.ro/ucraina-republica-moldova-si-belarus-confruntarea-cu-razboiul-informational-rus-masuriadoptate-si-pasi-viitori/>, accessed on 14 March 2019.

5 *Ibidem*.

6 According to <http://rt.com/news/197692-ukraine-cluster-munition-watchdog/>, accessed on 9 April 2019.

7 According to <http://rt.com/news/158124-odessa-fire-memorial-radicals/>, accessed on 21 March 2019.

8 According to <http://rt.com/news/160908-ukraine-lugansk-fire-soldiers/>, accessed on 14 March 2019.

9 According to <http://rt.com/news/180664-ukraine-russian-humanitarian-convoy/>, accessed on 4 April 2019.

10 According to <http://rt.com/news/155000-russian-media-press-protection/>, accessed on 4 April 2019.

11 *Ibidem*.

12 According to <http://rt.com/news/158212-academi-blackwater-ukraine-military/>, accessed on 10 April 2019.

13 *Ibidem*.

14 According to <http://rt.com/news/187688-nato-weapons-supply-ukraine/>, accessed on 23 March 2019.

15 According to <http://rt.com/news/215575-putin-ukraine-eu-russia/>, accessed on 28 March 2019.

16 *Ibidem*.

17 *Ibidem*.

18 According to <http://rt.com/news/ukraine-deadly-clashes-reactions-652/>, accessed on 14 March 2019.

19 According to <http://rt.com/news/155136-agents-captured-donetsk-ukraine/>, accessed on 5 March 2019.

20 According to <http://rt.com/news/217279-ukraine-aid-battalions-blockade/>, accessed on 24 May 2019.

21 According to <http://rt.com/news/218899-stone-kiev-massacre-cia/>, accessed on 16 May 2019.

22 According to <http://rt.com/news/229411-donetsk-accuse-kiev-provocation/>, accessed on 23 March 2019.

23 *Ibidem*.

24 According to <http://rt.com/news/156644-mariupol-konstantinovka-special-operation/>, accessed on 22 March 2019.

25 According to <http://rt.com/news/156604-ukraine-southeast-crisis-diary/>, accessed on 23 March 2019.

26 *Ibidem*.

27 According to <http://rt.com/news/169628-putin-ukraine-west-barracks/>, accessed on 22 March 2019.

28 According to <http://rt.com/news/199068-churkin-un-russia-ukraine/>, accessed on 22 March 2019.

29 According to <http://rt.com/news/227283-ukraine-conflict-civilians-shelling/>, accessed on 12 March 2019.

30 According to <http://rt.com/news/229903-donetsk-family-fighting-children/>, accessed on 7 May 2019.

31 According to „*Psihologhiia manipuleatora – eto psihologhiia ubiiŃ*“, 25 December 2014, interview with Elena Sokolova, accessed at novayagazeta.livejournal.com on 23 March 2019.

32 According to the statement made for Deutsche Welle by the chairperson of non-governmental organization Telekrytyka from Kiev, Diana Duzyk, available at <http://www.dw.de/r%C4%83zboiul-pierdut-al-kievului/a-18271091>, accessed on 23 March 2019.

33 According to <http://dilemaveche.ro/sectiune/tema-saptamanii/articol/propaganda-manipulare-strategia-militara-rusiei>, accessed on 3 April 2019.

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CURRENT CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN

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Currently, the insurgency as a fact is most present in the country that seems to live in an endless conflict - Afghanistan. Insurgent groups are very active in this area of the world, and nothing seems to stop them. As a natural reaction to this phenomenon, the Afghan authorities are responding with actions that fall more or less in the counterinsurgency category. At the level of the international military coalition that acts in support of the Afghan security forces, were mentioned the main causes that contribute to the perpetuation of this conflict. From the latest analysis, Western specialists say the main cause of the failure of counterinsurgency action is the support given to insurgent groups by Afghanistan's neighbors by providing those safe areas within their territory where members of the organizations are sheltering the actions taken by the Afghan security forces.

Keywords: insurgent groups; insurgency; counterinsurgency; taliban; international coalition; Afghanistan.

Introduction

"Insurgency, in the simplest definition, is a struggle for control and influence, generally, from a position of relative weakness, against existing state institutions. Insurgency fight may exist without or before, during or after a conventional conflict. When a population or groups of a population are willing to fight to change the existing social and political conditions in their favor, using both violent and non-violent means to affect a change in the dominant authority, they unleash an insurgency. Insurgency represents the organized use of subversion and violence to cancel and take over the political control of a region."¹

"Counter insurgency is a civilian and military effort that is designed to defeat and control the insurgency and address its causes. War remains a clash of interests and will between organized groups characterized by the use of force. In conventional war there are determined factors of victory. However, getting a victory for an insurgent group may depend less on the defeat of an armed adversary and more on the group's ability to gain support for its political interests (often based

on ideology) and to generate enough violence to achieve political consequences."²

Starting from these general considerations mentioned in the publication of the United States Army, we will try to examine the characteristics and aspects of the insurgency struggle and the measures against it in one of the hottest places in the world, Afghanistan.

Actors of insurgency and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

The main actors in this theater of operations are terrorist organizations conducting insurgent actions in Afghanistan and Afghan public authorities trying to prevent and combat, through actions specific to counterinsurgency, the causes and effects of this phenomenon. An important role in this equation is played by two other important actors: the international military coalition conducting Afghan security forces advisory activities and neighbors of the state, which, through active or passive measures, influence the results of the Afghan authorities in fight against insurgents.

From the latest conclusions drawn by international coalition specialists working under the shield of the Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan, after insurgency analysis as a phenomenon since the beginning of the Afghan conflict, it follows that the main reason for the failure of the insurgency actions is the tacit aid granted by

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the neighboring state, Pakistan, to the insurgent organizations³. Although this idea has been veiled in the international environment for many years, it seems that lately the United States has formally accused Pakistan of the lack of measures against insurgent organizations holding true safe heavens on the territory of that state, across the border.

Since the end of 2001, when Taliban leaders like Mullah Omar crossed the Afghan-Pakistani border to flee the international coalition, they have found safe areas on Pakistani territory, in the proximity of the Afghanistan border where they organized training camps and where they planned and led the majority of attacks on international and Afghan security forces over the years. Although financial aid offered by the United States of America to Pakistan, from the beginning of the conflict to the present, was about 33 billion dollars, the situation is almost unchanged, with no major progress being made in the fight against insurgency. That is why US President Donald Trump ceased the financial support to the Pakistani state⁴.

While it is recognized that the long duration of this conflict in Afghanistan is due to several factors, among which we list the failures of the governments that have succeeded in leading the country, mistakes made by NATO and the international coalition, it seems, however, that the main cause of failure in the fight against insurgency is the existence of these safe haven areas in Pakistani territory where the leaders of these groups are refugees. In these places have held meetings of the most important commanders called in local language "shura", in which they discuss strategies and are established action plans that are submitted through the chain to the leaders at different levels for implementation resulting in insurgent and terrorist attacks on Afghan security forces, the civilian population, public authorities, and international coalition staff.

The continuance of this situation, the existence of these Taliban safe heavens and the Haqqani Network in Pakistan, will negatively influence the coalition's ability to achieve its main current common goal in Afghanistan – the negotiation and peace-making process. A historical retrospective of insurgency fight has shown a worrying aspect. Groups of insurgents who have had these secure areas in their neighboring countries, especially a safe haven for their leaders, have won insurgency battles or successfully led them over the years.

These conclusions require a change of coalition strategy that has to reorient the main effort into pressure on the Taliban leadership in Pakistan. The Taliban are now probably convinced that they are the winners of this conflict. An overview of past peace talks suggests that insurgent groups usually negotiate an agreement when they think they cannot win on the battlefield. Under current conditions, the probability of ending the conflict by coalition on the battlefield is reduced, so until the Taliban leaders in Pakistan begin to feel direct pressure on them, the war will persist.

The war in Afghanistan is one of the countless insurgency battles after the World War II. Insurgent groups such as the Taliban and the Haqqani Network, the main organizations on the territory of Afghanistan, operate in the areas it controls over the civilian population by charging taxes, setting up a system of its own justice, mobilizing the local population to provide new members for insurgent organizations, providing information and logistical support, and imposing the status of legitimate entity. This creates a parallel government that imposes its will in areas where representatives of Afghan public authorities cannot fight the influence of the actions of insurgent groups. Based on the need for both sides, the so-called Taliban government and the Afghan government, to mobilize the local population and govern the territory, there are several indicators that give us today the results of the actions and measures of these two actors throughout this war.


The main characteristics of insurgency in Afghanistan

The first indicator would be the changes over time regarding control or influence on the population. Data on the control of the territory is less relevant because the surface of Afghanistan is divided into unpopulated mountainous or desert areas and heavily populated urban areas. As shown in figure 1 below, there has been a slight increase in control or insurgency influence on the Afghan population - from 7% in November 2015 to around 12% in October 2018. This means that there are about 4 million Afghans under the control or influence of the Taliban. There was also a slight decrease in Afghan government control over the civilian population - from 72% in November 2015 to 54% in October 2018. This percentage represents

about 17 million people under the control or influence of the Afghan government. In addition, just over a quarter of the population, 11 million Afghans, live in areas where none of the parties has control or significant influence (contested areas).

by Asia Foundation shows that sympathy for the Taliban has declined since 2009⁶. In 2016, the Taliban were enjoying stronger support in parts of the south, east and western Afghanistan, in provinces such as Nuristan, Zabul and Wardak⁷.

HISTORICAL DISTRICT CONTROL OR INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN



Note: Component numbers may not add to 100 due to rounding. Afghan government and insurgent figures include control and influence.
 Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 11/27/2015, 1/29/2016, 5/28/2016, 8/28/2016, 11/15/2016, 2/20/2017, 5/15/2017, 8/28/2017, 10/15/2017, 3/22/2018, 6/22/2018, 9/19/2018, and 12/20/2018; RS, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/16/2018.

Figure 1 Control or influence over the population during 2015-2018³

However, the data show that Taliban influence has mostly increased in rural areas of the country, where they have the support of locals disappointed with the actions of the Afghan government. The Taliban do not control major urban areas - at least not yet. While in Iraq in 2014, the Islamic State captured key cities such as Mosul, Fallujah and Ramadi, the Taliban failed to apply this tactic in Afghanistan.⁵

A second set of indicators includes analyzing the local support granted over time to the two entities. Both the Afghan government and the Taliban need tolerance and strong support from the people to expand their influence and control. The Taliban ideology, which is based on radical Islam, is generally accepted by those who live in the conservative rural areas of the south and east. On the other hand, this ideology is no longer successful among Afghans who adhere to a much less conservative form of Islam, which allows access to the most modern technology, encourages the practice of sports, provide the right to choose leaders and some rights for women. Data provided

Another indicator could be the level of violence. We can admit that regions where the number of incidents is very low are under the control of one of the two actors, the Afghan government or the Taliban, while the areas characterized by a high number of violent events could be considered disputed areas, in which they are trying to gain influence. Generally speaking, current trends show a decrease in violence, and their level is growing in the eastern part of the territory, close to the border with Pakistan.

If we use sport language, the Afghan war seems to be a draw between the two camps at this time. The Afghan Government has control or influence on the majority of the population, but the percentage of Taliban influence has increased. The level of support that the Taliban receive from the local people is still considerable, although it appears to have decreased somewhat since 2009. Though the levels of violence are declining, the Taliban are capable of performing complex attacks in urban areas – including in the capital of Kabul (see the last major attacks in September 2019) -



and threatening large cities such as Kunduz and Ghazni, controlling or influencing the population in nearby rural areas.

However, there are many reasons for failures to try to defeat the insurgent groups on the battlefield or to reach negotiations with them. We can mention issues such as the failure of the Taliban integration in Afghan society after their overthrow in 2001, when Taliban leaders were hunted instead of attempting a reintegration program; poor and inefficient Afghan governance, along with a significant level of corruption; wrong concentration of the U.S. and the Western powers that instead of adopting the idea of building a top-down governing system, rather preferred to focus on the basis of the administrative system and to support local communities and tribes; another debatable issue is the decision to try to win the Afghan war by deploying a large number of Western military forces. But the most important factor for these failures is perhaps the external support for insurgent groups and, in particular, the tolerance of the secured areas on the territories of the neighboring countries.

The history of insurgency fight demonstrates that safe external areas can be extremely beneficial to insurgent groups. In these areas, members of organizations can recruit and train followers, organize and plan violent actions, contact supporters from all over the world, raise funds and supplies, and perhaps most importantly, enjoy rest without worrying about being caught. These locations allow tactical members in the battlefield to escape the constant stress resulting from the need to constantly hide in underground areas (tunnels, caves, caverns). Ideally, a safe area should be located in a foreign territory, outside the influence of government forces, but quite close, such as in a neighboring country, so that the movement is relatively easy to accomplish. In addition, some research suggests that the existence of these safe heavens increases the probability of a long and fierce conflict that causes more victims. In a specialty literature⁸, the authors point out that out-of-state support can help raise the probability of insurgents' victory or allow groups to survive until a peace agreement is reached.

The existence of these safe areas of the Taliban and the Haqqani Network in Pakistan as well as the support given by certain institutions and organizations on its territory were essential for their

war effort and the failure to eliminate these refugees may be the most important mistake of The US and the coalition over the 18 years of conflict. In order to conduct political and military action, the Taliban have set up a centralized, well organized hierarchical management system. The supreme governing body is shura of the Taliban commanders, including financial, military operations, logistics, propaganda, religious issues and other tasks. Similar to other insurgency actions, the Taliban's decision-making body is rather a political one than a military one. Below this level there are some regional leadership organizations – such as Peshawar, North Waziristan and Quetta (all in Pakistan) – which have the task of coordinating operations in the nearby Afghan provinces. At the next level, descending on the hierarchical scale, the Taliban call a governor and military commander for the Afghan provinces and districts that run, community activities, alongside government institutions. They are called shadow leaders, and in areas where they are tolerated by the local population take decisions instead of the leaders set by the Afghan government.

Former and current officials of the Pakistani government have repeatedly argued that Pakistan does not provide assistance to insurgent groups, but several Western officials have said Pakistani aid is money, information, logistics, military advice, medical support, and hosting of major leaders Taliban and the Haqqani Network. This support also includes allowing the establishment of these safe areas for insurgent networks in Pakistani territory. It seems that Pakistan has an interest in the situation in Afghanistan not being stable, thus exploiting all the economic opportunities in the region.

Conclusions

Experience has shown that this conflict cannot be completed by military means. This currently has the role of controlling the existing situation and avoiding its escalation in favor of insurgents given that the Afghan security forces have not yet reached the level of organization and training needed to manage the events occurring in the security field. It is increasingly evident that the negotiations between insurgent groups and the Afghan government would be the optimal solution to end this conflict. All we have to do is keep track of the progress of the diplomatic talks and actions

between the international community and Pakistan to understand how close or distant the end of this conflict is in the Afghan territory.

Negotiations within the conditions required by the international community will not be accepted by insurgent organizations as long as they can implement their established plans and the key leaders are not threatened. As a result, the next step to be taken, in my view, is to put pressure on the Pakistani state by the international community to take effective measures to create a state of discomfort and uncertainty for Taliban leaders and the Haqqani Network deployed in the Pakistan territory. This can be achieved either by the exclusive effort of the Pakistani security forces or by their joint actions with the international security forces present in the region.

NOTES:

1 U.S. Department of the Army *FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5 Insurgencies and countering insurgencies*, 2014, pp. 1-1.

2 *Ibidem*, pp. 1-2.

3 Department of Defense - USA, *Enhancing Security and stability in Afghanistan – June 2018*, p. 20, downloaded from <https://media.defense.gov/2018/Jul/03/2001938620/-1/-1/1/1225-REPORT-JUNE-2018-FINAL-UNCLASS-BASE.PDF>, accessed on November 27, 2019,

4 *** *Won't pay Pakistan as it has done nothing for US* available at <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/wont-pay-pakistan-as-it-has-done-nothing-for-us-trump/articleshow/66728650.cms?from=mdr>, accessed on November 27, 2019.

5 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress* (Washington, DC: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, January 30, 2019), p. 70, available at sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/, accessed on October 05, 2019.

6 Asia Foundation, *A Survey of the Afghan People: Afghanistan in 2017* (Kabul: Asia Foundation, 2017), p. 58, available at https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/2017_AfghanSurvey_report.pdf. accessed on September 13, 2019.

7 *Ibidem*, p. 59.

8 Ben Connable, Martin C. Libicki, *How Insurgencies End* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), p. 62,

available at <https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG965.html>, accessed on September 24, 2019.

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A HUNDRED YEARS OF HIGHER ECONOMIC EDUCATION IN THE LOGISTICS OF THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES

*Colonel Professor Gheorghe MINCULETE, PhD**
*Colonel (ret.) Professor Benone ANDRONIC, PhD***

The article is the result of scientific research regarding the emergence and evolution of the higher economic education in the Logistics of the Romanian Military.

The article contains the documentary sources that support the emergence and evolution of this type of education and the testimonies of those who carried out the historical acts of its foundation and evolutionary transformation.

Keywords: historic source; military tradition; higher economic education; administration; logistics; evolution; decisive role.

The higher economic education in the logistics of the Romanian military has a distinct place in the panoply of military education, today marking one hundred years of existence.

The sources of this type of education are considered:

• *The High Order No. 29 of February 1, 1861 (n.n. - published in the Monitor of the Military No. 11 of February 16 of the same year), the year in which the Military Intendance Corps is organized and not the Military Intendance, as it is often wrongly stated, which had already appeared in the Military of Moldavia by „Order 24 of the Moldovan Shaman of April 27, 1857¹.*

• *The High Decree no. 202 of October 9, 1862, decree regulating the organization of the new Ministry of War in Romania. According to that decree, the reorganization of the ministry provided for the Military Administration as a new structure having the composition of a “Directorate 2, general administration”².*

In November 1862, the recruitment of combatants and administration officers from the Romanian military of those who wanted to join the

Military Intendance Corps and who had to take an admission exam began. Once admitted to the corps they needed thorough economic training, according to the requirements of a modern army³.

Taking into account the new requirements in the field of defense and taking the necessary lessons from the 1916-1918 campaign of the Great War and the establishment of the Romanian National Unitarian State, in 1918 the Superior War School was reorganized, and within its framework, one year later, through the High Decree no. 4729 of November 10, 1919, published in the Official Gazette no. 167/1919, a Section of Intendance was set up⁴.

The Minister of War⁵ of that time, in his report to the Sovereign, motivated the project as follows: “*In order to be able to prepare in the future a corps of officers with broader general knowledge and special military knowledge, well assimilated to the body of General Staff, there was a need to set up a Department of Intendance under the aegis of the Superior War School.*”⁶

In the Royal Decree establishing the Intendance Section, it was stated, “*In order to prepare for the future an officer corps of intendance with the widest general knowledge and with solid specialized knowledge, the need to establish an intendance department near the Superior War School was felt.*”⁷

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The duration of the education was of two years having as subjects of study: *“accounting; financial mathematics; commercial law with notions of civil and administrative law; political and national economy; finance; statistics; operations; industrial and food chemistry; legislation and military administration in the smallest details; subsistence service in the campaign; general overview of the military history with special education revealed in the supply of armies and the functioning of the subsistence service; special course of organization; economic and political geography; special General Staff course; notions of topography; Universal History and History of Romanians; Romanian literature and logic; special course in applied sciences in the military; international public law.”*⁸

On the basis of the afore mentioned Royal Decree, on the 20th of December of the same year, the first entrance examination was held in the newly established section, with 22 candidates admitted out of 33 who had signed in.

In the Journal of the Intendance and Administration of the Military no. 6 of 1923, the Intendant General Leonte State wrote: *“For the way we conducted our services in war, the acts and the history of the campaign will show in time our truth and our daily efforts, that the martyrs of the motherland will have given their lives, especially in that corner of Moldova where millions of Romanian souls, soldiers and citizens, old people and children were saved – I can say – by the work of the administration and the intendance, invested with all the moral credit and with all the power by the most appropriate of governments, which was the government of the nation itself.”*⁹

Yet, as the division general Ion Stângaciu wrote in the Journal of the Intendance and Administration of the Military no. 1 of 1925, the decision to establish the Section of Intendance of the Superior War School was a huge step towards improving the status of the officers in the administrative body of the military¹⁰.

And if the purpose of the Superior War School was to spread higher military knowledge in the military and to provide officers of all branches with a training base for command of the large units and for the selection of General Staff officers, the same goals were for the establishment of the basis of the *Intendance Section in 1919* within the Superior

War School, whose regulation was only to appear in 1931, after in 1928 *this Intendance Section was transformed into a Higher School of Intendance*¹⁰.

The Regulations of the *Higher School of Intendance*¹² of 1931 showed that the purposes of education were:

a) *the training of the administration officers and combatants who wanted to pass into the Corps of Intendance Officers;*

b) *the ensuring of an adequate training base for the management and control of the Army Administrative Services;*

c) *the election of the officers necessary to the command of the army, in order to lead and control its administrative services.*

However, it should be made clear that the establishment of the *Intendance Section at the Superior War School* was not accomplished because the officers did not show a good preparation during the Great War, but for a better preparation according to those times.

Thus, it can be observed that, 12 years later, the regulation provided for a better adequacy of the study materials to the requirements of those times.

The courses taught were: *“general tactics and General Staff on the functioning of services, information and transport; Intendance service; subsistence service; economic geography; general Accounting; military administration; industrial and food chemistry; military history with lessons related to the military supply and the operation of the Intendance service; topography; administrative law; commercial law; organization; mobilization; finance; business mathematics; political economy; weapons and ammunition; health service; legislation (especially stock exchanges); war fabrication; civil law; international law; riding; fencing; driving the car and motorcycle.”*¹²

Admission to the school was made by competition, which took place every year in April, and the administrator lieutenants and captains, as well as the lieutenants and the combatant captains, who wished to pass to this area, had to fulfill the following conditions:

a) for lieutenant and captain administrators:

- have the “well done” assessment in the yearly evaluation made by all commanding officers;

- have at least 6 years of service as an officer on July 1st of the year in which he / she took the admission exam and a 3-year internship in the

corps where he / she had performed the position of accountant in money and goods (fund and material manager) ending with at least one management position;

- be a graduate of the Special School of Administration;

- not be over the age of 31 on April 1st of the year in which the exam takes place;

- be completely healthy;

- not have financial debts other than those legally admitted.

b) for lieutenants and combatant captains:

The same conditions as the lieutenant and captain administrators, with the exception that they should have had 3 years of actual service in the branch, of which one year in the capacity of accountant in money or assets (manager of money or material funds) having occupied a management position and having completed the courses of the Special School of the respective branch.

The admission contest was held in Bucharest and consisted of: medical examination; written tests; oral exams; riding. The exam was eliminatory.

The written exams were sealed and they consisted of:

- a paper of military administrative knowledge, lasting 6 hours, from the legislation and military administration, the organization and functioning of the subsistence service, applied in a war situation, as well as the drafting of orders, instructions and reports regarding the supply;

- a work of general knowledge, lasting 5 hours, which consisted of dealing with topics provided in the analytical program of the knowledge necessary to enter the school;

The oral exams consisted of:

- discussions in front of the examination committee on some topics included in the analytical syllabus of the knowledge needed to enter the school;

- knowledge of a foreign language (French or German).

The riding test was given in front of the examination committee and the riding teacher of the school.

However, what prompted the establishment of the Academy of Intendance immediately after the end of the war, in 1919, was the ascertaining and affirming of the overwhelming importance of the Intendance Service for the war, the only one of all

the Military Services that enjoyed this greatness.

Therefore, the establishment of the *Intendance Section* is considered to be the beginning of the higher economic education in the logistics of the Romanian Military¹⁴.

On the value itself of the Section of Intendance and then of the Higher School of Intendance, we will quote the opinion of a well-known military writer, int. Lt. col. Alexandru Havrileț, who wrote:

"The Department of Intendance from the Superior War School as well as the Superior School of Intendance into which the Section was transformed, was and is one of the leading institutions of the military.

The officers, well noted by their superiors, who succeeded in the entrance contest, received, during the two years of studies, superior military and specialized knowledge".

The faculty, military and civilian Faculty of the School, in particular, was and is at the height of its mission.

The management of the School has been entrusted from the beginning and up to now, to those leading elements of the military that have led and are still leading the Superior War School, both schools being under the directive and control of the Grand Military General Staff.

With such leadership and a highly valued faculty, this school, after graduation by the officers who attended it, can be considered a "military administrative doctorate"¹⁵.

In order to be admitted both to the Preparatory School of Officers with a duration of 3 years and to the Special School with a duration of 1-2 years, each candidate, combatant or administrative officer had to enter the competition, mandatory having the internships and at least 8 years in the career of officer. Therefore, there was the possibility that the candidate officer who was present at the admission contest at the Higher School of Intendance, with 4-5 years of studies at the other military schools, might have his studies become equivalent to a bachelor's degree, as well as the graduation of the 2 years of the Higher Stewardship School. Thus one can deduce the role and importance of the studies of the mentioned officers, with the possibility of their equivalence in the field of administrative law or economic sciences.

Yet, the School, no matter how many years of studies it would have and as much knowledge as

it would give to its students, they never came to consider that the recipient of the graduation diploma would no longer need a continuous cultural, general and professional training.

Concerning the continuous training of the intendants officers, the well-known military educator, Int. Lt. Col. Voinescu Ioan said to the students of the Higher School of Intendance: *"As a luminous proof that today we live more than ever under the primacy, under the sign of the most solid culture, ... how will you fulfill this imperious command of today's times?"*

First and foremost, it is a duty of honor, for each of you in such situation, to complete your studies included in a whole cycle of the state school programs. Otherwise you will feel all your life a situation of embarrassment, a state of inferiority, which will press upon you as a shadow in the midst of the general activity in which you will be framed.

The prestige of a conscious Faculty is made, but especially maintained, by the prestige of each individual member. Well, this prestige is acquired only when everything is supported by culture.

And now the problem I am facing takes on another aspect.

*You do not owe anything to anyone but to yourself. You have a larger debt, that of the Faculty which you belong to. It is a higher law that unites individuals and generations in a tradition and mission and in which the individual is only what he is according to the spiritual process to which he participates in the group he belongs to. Hence the huge value of tradition for each Faculty formed. Because you have to know that you have no right to spoil anything of the prestige of the Faculty to which so many generations of comrades of all ages added."*¹⁶

From the same conference the following words are worth keeping:

"I would like to remind you of these things in order to go forward with all the enthusiasm and deepest conviction, knowing that this Faculty has its traditions of glory and merit, which only ignorant people and people of bad faith can disregard.

This Faculty was represented, even from the very beginning of our young army, by illustrious chiefs, to name some of the ones who passed away such as: int. General Bengescu Dabija member of the Romanian Academy, int. general Stanciovi S.,

int. General Ursacky C. G. and others."

If all of them were prominent organizers, if they were superior spirits, true glories of the Intendance and the Military, then you should know that all, without exception, were exemplary with an uncommon level of general culture.

Thus, the quoted generals trained many generations with the light of their science, either at the War School or in the practical exercises conducted by the troops.

*The numerous works to be found in libraries illustrate this better than anything else."*¹⁷

After the Second World War, given the dismantling (destruction) of the Royal Army of Romania, the logistics education experienced changes due to the shortage of officers, the purges that followed after 1947, on political considerations, including upon administrative and intendants officers.

The Communist Party was moving towards democratizing the Romanian military and creating the new army of the people, by applying the Soviet military doctrine without discrimination and pursuing the direct control of the military.

The new forms of organization in education were politicized and intended to confer upon the graduate the status of military specialist and activist of the Communist Party, *"devoted to the party and the working people."*¹⁸

In 1948, as a result of the transformations that occurred in the network of military higher education, by Decree no. 1803 of August 29th, the Superior War School¹⁹ was abolished and the Military Academy was established, and by Decree no. 261 of September 25, 1948, the Superior School of Intendance of the Military Academy was abolished and the Superior School of Military Administration was set up within the same institution.

One year later, through the diversification of education, based on Decree no. 371 / 14.09.1949, the Superior School of Military Administration was abolished and the Academy of the Rear Armed Forces Support was established, organized on two basic profiles, corresponding to the two faculties: General Faculty of the Rear Support, having as objective the training of command officers and the Economic-Financial Faculty for training of intendants and finance officers.

According to the new organization, the higher economic education of the military's logistics



underwent major transformations, a special emphasis being placed on the politico-ideological preparation of its faculty.

The course subjects studied were: *“the history of the labor movement in Romania and the international one; problems specific to party work in Romania; the methodology of party work in the military; elements of military strategy; elements of operational art; provision of services; services tactics; intendance; technical-material insurance; transport; organization and mobilization; financial insurance; material liability; philosophy; political economy; topography; Russian; physical education and sport”*²⁰.

On September 12, 1953, by Decree no. 368, the Academy of the Rear Support was abolished, its personnel being taken over by the Military Academy. The two faculties of the Rear Academy took on a new form, becoming the *Faculty of the Rear Support and Military Supply* and the *Military Financial Faculty*, both with the duration of schooling of 3 years, following a higher training of service personnel (logisticians). The change was not only a change of name but also one of substance. A new content was given to the education and a distinct specialization of the officers was desired, corresponding to the supply and financial insurance compartments from all the levels.

In 1956, due to the increase of the degree of endowment and diversification of the units and the big units and with the technique of armored vehicles, tractors and vehicles, within the *Faculty of the Rear Support and Military Supply*, a new subject was added: fuel-lubricants. At the same time, in order to increase professional competence, new disciplines were introduced to all specialties: mathematics, chemistry, food technology and materials of intendance.

In 1959, by Decree 214 of January 13, the Military Academy merged with the Technical Military Academy (where the production logistics and technical assurance, namely, maintenance management was taught), under the name of the *General Military Academy*, and the *Faculty of Military Rear and Supply* changed its name in the *Faculty of Arms and Services*.

Giving due importance to all branches of the logistics of the military, in 1964, as a result of the constantly increasing needs for military transports at peace and in wartime, a new specialized profile

with the rank of section was established within the faculty: *railways and transports*. Also in the context of the improvement of the training of the specialized staff, during this period, higher academic courses of management services, intendance and finances were set up. The faculty thus worked with 5 sections (profiles) and a post-academic course.

In 1969, as an effect of the *Law on Education and Decree no. 1037/01.11.1968* regarding the organization and functioning of military educational institutions, the General Military Academy was reorganized so as to become the *Military Academy*.

Within the tactical-operative sector, four faculties were created, among which the *Faculty of Services (through the removal of the Faculty of Arms) with the profiles: service management, intendance, military transport and finance and two departments: the tactics of military services and transport department and the finance department*, and the duration of the courses was reduced from 3 to 2 years.

Starting with 1973, as a result of the structural norms for educational institutions, the Faculty of Services was transformed into the *Services Section, comprising 3 profiles: service management, intendance and finance and 2 departments: services tactics department and intendance and finance department*. The profile of *military transport* was included in the *Faculty of Combined Arms and Tanks*. The courses in the *fuels* profile were interrupted, these being resumed for several series, in 1979. Under that organizational form the specialized military higher education worked until 1989.

After the events of December 1989, in accordance with the transformations that took place within the entire society, including the higher education, which, in turn, included the military one, starting with 1990 in the Military Academy, as education itself started to be reorganized in the perspective of the development of the military according to new doctrinal principles, improving its functional structure and equipping it with modern technique and materials, the *Technical Military Academy* was separated from the *Military Academy*, while the *Services Section*, through the *Government Decision no. 550, art. 14, from May 17, 1990*, was transformed into the *Faculty of Logistics*. The new organizational form that corresponded to

the traditional university structures of our country and of the military, in addition to conferring a correspondent on the whole education system and assuming all the prerogatives that belonged to such an institution recognized in the country and in the world, also meant profound changes still requiring efforts so as to fully acquire the role and attributes of training staff in all technical-material, medical and financial insurance domains, arising from the purpose and concept of logistics adopted by most militaries of developed countries in the world.

In this respect, from an organizational point of view, the *Faculty of Logistics* returned to the traditional profiles, having foreseen distinct sections for the specializations: logistics management, intendance, fuel-lubricants and finance and three departments: *services tactics, intendance and finance*. Also, for the improvement of the training of the specialized staff, the faculty was able to organize and conduct post-academic courses of all the profiles. Starting with September 17th, 1990, the *Faculty of Logistics* organized and carried out a doctorate in the branch of military science, the "logistic profile" and had all the rights of verification and certification for granting the respective scientific title.

In 1991 according to *H.G. no. 305 of April 23, the Military Academy* changed its name to the *Academy of Higher Military Studies*.

A few years later, in 1995, the Academy of Higher Military Studies went through a series of transformations, establishing the Combined Arms Faculty. At the same time, the Faculty of Logistics was abated, becoming the Logistics Department within the mentioned faculty.

As 28th of August 2003 through *H.G. no. 1027, the Academy of Higher Military Studies* changed its name to the *National Defence University*, within which the *Combined Arms Faculty* comprised the *Logistics, Finances and Accounting Department* being set around two profiles: *Department of Logistics Management* and *Department of Economic-Financial Management*.

Between November 2003 and September 2004, structural changes and transformations took place in the National Defence University, the *Command Arms Faculty* changed its name to *Command and Staff Faculty*, and the two departments merged into the *Logistics, Finance and Accounting Department*.

In 2005 the *National Defence University, through H.G. no. 969 of August 25* changed its name to "Carol I" National Defence University.

In 2011-2012, the *Department of Logistics, Finance and Accounting* changed its name in the *Department of Logistics, Finance and Accounting within the Command and Staff Faculty*²¹.

The courses taught nowadays here are: "general tactics; military art; history of military art; military logistics; the history of military logistics; mobilization logistics; the tactics of logistic support structures; logistics management; supply management; public management; the methodology of designing and simulating logistic actions; financial insurance; public administration in the field of security and defense; accounting; political economy; public law; administrative law; commercial law; internal public audit; economic and financial mathematics; economic statistics; currency and credit; internal control and governance; material liability; military topography; military geography; ethics and morals; philosophy; modern languages (English, French, German, Greek, Russian, Arabic); military physical education.

From the beginnings to the present day, the evolution of the higher economic education in logistics of the Romanian Military was in accordance with the measures of continuous development and improvement of the Romanian military branches and with the need for continuous improvement of the logistics officers' training, in order to ensure the material conditions necessary for the personnel to gain victories on the battlefields, to live and to be trained.

This is why, today, we owe everlasting gratitude to our forerunners for the way how they showed their ability to use the resources they had available, which were often insufficient; their endeavors to train the logistics officers capable of planning and ensuring our military personnel the conditions necessary for living and fighting, for their sacrifice on the field of honor; for how they did their duty to the country and to the nation.

NOTES:

1 „*Ordinul de Zi 24 al Căimăcămiei Moldovei din 27 Aprilie 1857*, apărut în *Hrisovul Căimăcăniei Moldovei, nr. 31 din 30 aprilie 1857*, din *Registrul Istoric al Academiei Militare*, dosar 1, fila 7-8.



2 Veronica Bondar, *Buletinul Arhivelor Militare Române, Studii/documente*, București, 2015, www.arhivelenationale.ro/.../lista.

3 Major in administration Anastasie Tomița Răzășul, *Gospodăria militară la români de la Dacia Traiană la România Reîntregită*, Tipografia Viața Literară, București, 1942.

4 Arhiva Ministerului Apărării Naționale, fond SSR, dosar nr.12, fila 2.

5 Ioan Rășcanu, The Minister of War between 1919-1921, in the government led by General Artur Vătoianu.

6 *Istoricul Școalei Superioare de Războiu 1889- 1939*, București, 1939, p. 299.

7 *Idem*.

8 *Idem*, pp. 299-300

9 Archive of the Ministry of National Defence, SSR Fund, File No 12, Tab 3.

10 *Revista Intendenței și Administrației Armatei nr. 1 din 1925*, p. 28.

11 Intd. Lt.- col.Gheorghiu Nicolae, Intd. Cpt. Vasilescu Constantin, *Străduinți*, appeared in the commemorative volume, *Întreținerea Armatei Române dealungul timpurilor; apărută cu prilejul restabilirii destinului istoric al gospodăriei Oștirii Române și al aniversării a opt-zeci și cinci de ani dela introducerea intendenței în viața noastră militară și națională*, General Staff Printing House, Bucharest, 1942, p. 547.

12 *Regulamentul Școalei Superioare de Intendență din Istoricul Școalei Superioare de Războiu 1889- 1939*, București, 1939, pp. 362.

13 *Idem*, pp. 363 - 367.

14 In our opinion, Military Logistics is the continuation of the *Military Administration* that appeared in the Romanian Military after the Unification of the Romanian Principalities under the command of Colonel Alexandru Ioan Cuza.

15 Int. Lt.- col. Alexandru Havrilet, *Intendența în Franța și România*, Editura Lumina, București, 1931, p. 127.

16 Intd. Lt.- col. Gheorghiu Nicolae, Intd. Cpt. Vasilescu Constantin, *op. cit.*, p. 549.

17 *Ibidem*, pp.549-550.

18 Arhiva Academiei Militare, fond Registrul Istoric, dosar nr. 1, fila 8.

19 In the explanatory memorandum to the Decree, Emil Bodnăraș stated that the Superior War School was “*an obsolete institution, outdated by the progress of events*”.

20 Arhiva Ministerului Apărării Naționale, fond, 5440, dosar 1959, fila 17.

21 For the history of logistics education from 1948 to 2012, the data were obtained through documentation, from the *Historical Register* of “Carol I” National Defence University.

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Arhiva Ministerului Apărării Naționale, fond SSR, dosar nr.12, fila 2.

Arhiva Ministerului Apărării Naționale, fond SSR, dosar nr.12, fila 3.

Arhiva Ministerului Apărării Naționale, fond, 5440, dosar 1959.

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS REGARDING THE MANAGEMENT OF COMBAT AND LOGISTIC TACTICAL STRUCTURES

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Nowadays, significant problems and difficulties can be seen in the field of human resources. These induce major restrictions in the management of tactical logistic structures. The lack of personnel, the need of carrying out multiple jobs, the technological development, as well as the multiple changes of rules which are taken in the financial, human resources, and logistics domains make the decision process a very difficult one. Regarding all these areas, if you want to be capable to work in an organization you have to master the management theory, to be able to use different methods of motivating employees, and also to have considerable professional knowledge. We consider that as a logistics leader you should never stop learning and improving your skills. Getting the first rank and becoming a logistics officer are just the first steps in personal development.

Keywords: logistics; leader; management.

Introduction

The management theory draws remarkable conclusions from the research carried out so far. In this context, we wanted to know if the military domain influenced the beginning of the management theory, and also the measure in which the theory and art of leading troops had some positive influence on the science and art of management. We noticed that books like *The art of war* written by Sun Tzu, *The art of war* written by Niccolo Machiavelli, like *The art of war* written by Antoine Henri Jomini, *On war* written by Carl von Clausewitz, *Strategy: a history* written by Lawrence Freedman presented almost no connection with any management principles. The books speak about the planning and organizing troops giving different geometrical or mathematical models. All of these are presented in a conflictual context where the cunning behavior, surprise, deception and violence have a major role. The notions about the war found in the mentioned books refer to destructive aspects and therefore they hardly brought any contribution to the first elements of management science. Nevertheless, scientific

management is essential in the training of combat troops and in logistic structures' process of learning and acting. There are many similarities between the military logistic structures and companies producing goods and services.

The most basic facts of management theory were written by Adam Smith. He used observation as a research method and he discovered the need of specialized personnel in manufacture departments. Yet, the significant steps taken in the evolution of management theory were made by Taylor, Frank Gilbreth and Lillian Gilbreth. They were the ones who developed **scientific management**. Taylor was a foreman in Midvale Steel Company and he was in charge of a group of workers. He saw that the building workers had strict working rules and they did not use their entire capacities to do the jobs. He also noticed that if the workers were motivated the productivity increased. Furthermore, as a consultant for different companies, he studied and implemented many efficient methods for improving productivity and motivating personnel. In this manner, he found the ideas from which scientific management was developed. In the same period of time, Frank and Lillian Gilbreth studied the masons work, the way they built with stones. They seemed to have found an optimal positioning of bricks, mortar, and workers. Using that combination, they succeeded in increasing the productivity with 200%. Starting from this study, they streamlined the productivity in other domains.

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The next step in the development of management is represented by administrative management. It was discovered by Henri Fayol, a French industrialist who became famous by writing *General and Industrial Management*. He was the first one who wrote about the management functions and he is still considered a management theory representative. One of his successors was Lyndall Urwick, also an entrepreneur and consultant in the field of management. Max Webber was the German sociologist who wrote the bureaucratic theory. The main difference between the scientific management and the administrative management is that the former focuses on the way personnel work is organised and the later concentrates on the way the entire organisation is led.

The behavioral approach to management came with a new idea: the importance of the psychology in industry. Its promoter was Hugo Munsterberg. His research was initially published in *Psychology and Industrial Efficiency* and was used when employing and motivating personnel. Moreover, Mary Parker Follet was the one who discovered that the employees' behavior had a significant role in productivity. Between 1927 and 1932, he conducted significant research regarding the behavioral approach to management at Western Electric's Hawthorne Company. He wrote about the group's behavior and underlined the connections between members of a group and the group.

Abraham Maslow and Douglas McGregor were two of the best-known contributors who helped advance **the human relations movement**. They stated that the manager's safeguarding and care for his/her workers had positive effects such as the growing feeling of satisfaction, the improving of motivation, and the increase in productivity. Abraham Maslow was the one who wrote the pyramid of needs theory and Douglas McGregor developed X Theory and Y Theory, regarding two extreme perceptions of managers upon their employees and the results that behavior associated to these perceptions have in the work productivity.

Nowadays, scientific management theories admit that the organizations and their members have a complex behavior. Taking the psychological, social, anthropological and economical implication into consideration, many authors theorize about organizational behavior. Approaches about leading

the organization like a system of systems, the one about contingency, the quantitative management, and the operational management have no connection with the military area. Despite this, many principles from the military domain were transferred and successfully used in management. Notions like tactics, strategy, strategic position, strategic alliance, leadership, strategic planning, combat maneuvers and many other examples from military history are used in management. All of them make the explaining process much easier and help us understand different methods and technics from management. Moreover, the utility and the essential contribution of military tradition to the development of management art and theory are demonstrated. On the other hand, the vital role played by the application of management theory in military leadership was confirmed by Hervé Couteau-Bégarie, a French historian and political scientist who wrote that „*in strategy, like in any other human activity, execution must be planed beforehand. This is the assertion which proves that management is a primordial domain*”.¹

A comparison of missions conducted by different structures at the tactical level

Each great unit, combat unit or combat support unit simultaneously comprises logistic and combat elements. Even if its main purpose is to support the troops, logistics has to work in a hostile field. In many cases, this field represents the main enemy target and, in this case, logistics has to be able to fight. It has light infantry weapons, some reconnaissance equipment and some heavy guns. Broadly speaking, we want to know if a logistician manager should be a charismatic leader, an excellent conductor, a talented leader or a great logistician. We believe that a logistician should have features from each type of personalities mentioned before. All of them: the personality, the behavior, the attitude, they all make up the picture of an ideal leader, a person who does not accept failure, but at the same time a person who cannot be easily found.

We consider that the management must be adapted to the type of the military structure. Yet, the management for the logistic structures must be different from the management used for the combat troops. The one which is used for the combat support units should be different, too. To prove the fact that

we need different types of management, we chose to describe a few tactical units which have different branches. We are going to try to underline some features of their missions.

The mechanized brigade (infantry) has special fighting vehicles equipped with light weapons. It has joint companies and it is designated to fight in different operational areas in spite of the weather conditions. At peace time, this great unit trains in order to be capable to fight at tactical level, to be able to move as quickly as possible and fight as part of a division. The mechanized brigade has as the main mission to destroy, to capture and to annihilate the enemy. However, this military structure gets offensive and defensive missions and it is also involved in other security operations. It is a mobile structure and it generates task-force elements which have precise, isolated missions.

To accomplish its mission, the mechanized brigade must prove mobility and lethality and it has to be able to do many things. The commander should know how to synchronize all the forces, how to use the subordinates' abilities even if they are stressed and tired. We believe that a leader should be able to manage efficiently the entire organization. Furthermore, we consider that the leader skills, the capacity to motivate his subordinates and fulfill the operational tasks and battle duties, as well as the clear vision on the battle stages, regardless of the form, are essential to effectively lead the entire organization. Although the person in charge with logistic management within the brigade is coordinated, task-wise, by the higher echelon, he/she strictly receives orders from his/her commander. He/she augments his/her commander's abilities by making sure that his/her comrades/colleagues know the capabilities of their equipment and armament, as well as fulfilling all logistic tasks from all functional areas.

The mountain troops brigade has armored support combat vehicles equipped with light weapons and it has joint companies designated to fight in mountains, individually or in cooperation with other structures, even if the weather is fine or not. In peace time, the great unit trains in order to be capable to fight at tactical level, to be able to move as quickly as possible as part of an infantry division. It should be capable to defense mountain locations, crossing points and to gain openings or another significant asset. Yet, it should destroy,

capture and annihilate the enemy. The mountain brigade gets offensive and defensive missions and it is also involved in other security operations. We believe that the mountain brigade commander and also the mechanized brigade commander should be also leaders and managers.

The tank units represent the main striking force and have the capacity to hit the enemy on the weak points. Yet, they have heavy armored vehicles which provide protection for the crew, the weapons attached to the vehicles, and the propulsion systems which at the same time provide operational mobility and generate a significant maneuver capacity. Tanks are capable to move over the rugged terrain and in adverse conditions such as mud (and be positioned on the battlefield in advantageous locations). It is true that tanks maintenance is expensive and logistics should put a lot effort in work. Yet, the standard fighting procedures must imply safety conditions and the fight should be integrated and coordinated. Moreover, the synchronizing between vehicle teams and troops has to be done in a proper way. The efficiency in communication, the logistic support, the unit's moves, and the efficiency in fire depends on the leader's competence. They should be highly educated and well trained. Leaders should also know how to manage personnel problems and how to discipline them. The increase of the units' equipment level implies a very well-trained manager for life-cycle cost. The life-cycle cost field is integrated in the logistic domain.

The artillery regiment is a combat support unit and is designated to annihilate the main objectives established by the superiors, irrespective of whether the objectives are just near the troops or near the enemy. The artillery regiments have heavy, highly technologized weapons, which are carried by specialized vehicle. They have to manage a lot of ammunition which lies in the area and which is very dangerous. The artillery commander must know the entire conception of the superiors. He must synchronize the fire of the heavy weapons with the maneuvers of the combat troops and he also has to avoid enemy strikes. The artillery regiments support the tactical great units and they fight together with the aviation against the aerial enemy. They have heavy and sophisticated weapons which help them defend the designated airspace. The air defense artillery becomes greater in value at the same time with the development of the hitting power.



The artillery and air-defense artillery are key branches in joint military defense system. Moreover, the defence of the air space is directly connected with them.

The ISR Regiment (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) is an infantry division structure specialized in intelligence (ACINT, HUMINT, IMINT, MASINT, OSINT, RADINT, SIGINT and TECHINT). They use special methods and developed technology to collect, process, and disseminate data in support of military operations. Moreover, ISR Regiment conducts in depth operations in order to surprise the enemy and to destroy its main assets. They fight in different zones, they use methods like parachuting, airdropping and penetration, and they frequently change their positions. They sometimes fight without using the communication system and the situation is frequently unsecure. Therefore, to lead an ISR Regiment is an extreme challenge. We believe that the importance of the logistic management increases with the technological level.

Together with the advanced knowledge specific for the army branches presented above, as well as military art and tactics, the regiment's command group must pay thorough attention to logistics, which is responsible for projecting the self-sustainment and maintaining fighting capabilities, during peace time as well as war time.

The logistic base is the most complex tactical structure and it is designated to support the units and the great units with products and services. It subordinates specialized great units and units which provide services for themselves and for the division's troops: some maintenance units which subordinate a few military equipment departments, a transportation battalion, some military storage facilities, an accommodation center, a support company and a medical facility. We can see that the logistics base has a complex structure.

The command group of the combat service support units is confronted with a double challenge. It does not have to create warfighting scenarios, it does not have to create CONOPs (Concept of Operations), but it has to understand the environment and the way the combat units and logistic units conduct training activities and receive support. On the other hand, regardless of the supported units' type, the command of the logistic units must be experienced in each own functional

area, in order to identify the best way of providing the necessary logistic support.

We can notice that the combat troops and the combat support troops have a destructive mission. All of them should be very well trained and they should know how to work together. They should have great fire power and the principles of military art should be very well used. Logistics is totally different: the logistic structures' missions have similar features with goods and services procurement.

On the one hand, we can say that the logistic structures are like goods and services companies which have the combat troops as clients. The satisfaction level of the logistic support determines the accomplishment of the mission.

The combat troops have to train continuously, to play different scenarios and to use their equipment in order to know better how to use it. Moreover, they should collaborate and cooperate with the other troops and logistics should support all the necessary flows. Logistics should deeply know the fighting troops tactics. Nevertheless, logistics has its own tactics which is different from the others. The combat troops use concepts like enemy, adverse forces, while logistics has concepts like support, sustain, supply and ensure.

In order to complete the mission, the supported units and great units should stay connected to the goods and services' source. A high logistic support does not guarantee the success of the mission but the lack of logistics is a guarantee of failure. *"The competitiveness and the performance of an organization depend on an efficient and effective supply-send flow in which we find a synergy generated by the partner's common objectives and strategies."*²² All in all, the integrated planification and the continuous cooperation among the combat troops, the combat support units and logistics must be ensured.

On the other hand, every combat unit or combat support unit has logistics elements and every logistic unit includes fighting troops. Notwithstanding its productive character, logistics works in a hostile area and it is sometimes the enemy's main target. That is why it has light weapons, reconnaissance elements, and some pieces of heavy weapons and it is capable of fighting/able to fight.

On mature reflection, we have a doubt: which is the most relevant feature for a logistician? The

best logistician should be a charismatic leader, an excellent manager or a talented and admirable leader? In our opinion, a person who has all the mentioned features could be a perfect leader for logistics. A person like this never accepts failure but a perfect leader is almost impossible to find.

Manager and leader

Over time, the dialectics of the leader and his/her place in an organization generated many theories and controversies. The article is not intended to be exhaustive or to give radical solutions. Our intention is to write some lines about the manager-leader relationship and about the leader's place in conducting a logistics structure.

The commander is the military formal authority who should command a structure. He/she gets this position when he/she has the right qualification, some notable achievements and enough experience. The commander should have many abilities and he/she should know how to lead all the subordinated departments conjunctively, as an item. He/she has to accomplish the missions of the unit and to gain all the objectives of the structures. Moreover, *"the management is active, not theoretical. It is about changing behaviors and making things happen. It is also about motivating people, working with them, achieving objectives and gaining results. All the researches about managers show that they act on the spot, they are always involved in doing things and making them happen."*³

The commander should always work harder than his/her subordinates. He/she should be educated, well trained and he/she should exercise continuously his/her knowledge of military science and art. The commander should abide by the rules. Studies⁴ show that the manager uses his/her time in a divided manner. He/she cannot concentrate on one single activity for more than an hour. The reasons that the commander is obliged to switch the activities are: the large span of control and the multiple domains and branches (human resources, operations, instruction, exercises, logistics, communications, IT, classified documents, social media, operational medicine, finance, accommodation, etc.) he/she is in control of. Other studies⁵ stress the fact that planning is informal and there are only few times when planning is medium or strategic. This process is usually incomplete and too general.

Features like self-confidence, emotional maturity, power and independence improve a leader's personality. Education and specialization are essential, too. *"The leader is a charismatic person with natural features who has the ability to think ahead, to work together with the subordinates using his vision."*⁶ Moreover, a leader should have a high level of energy and a strong personality, to be resilient, honest, selfless, and loyal. Observing the results of the successful military academies, we realize that many features of a successful leader can be thought and a complete and complex educational system can help in forming leaders. Learning and training give steadiness and charisma to a leader. *"There is convincing evidence of the combination between genetic features and learned skills in a leader character. (Bouchard, Lykken, McGue, Segal & Tellegen, 1990; Zhang, Ilies, & Arvey, 2009). Probably, learning has a stronger influence on some character features (social needs) than genetics. Other features like temperament or psychological needs are defined by genetics"*⁷. Yukl divided the leaders' behaviours placing them in three classes: leaders concentrated on relations, leaders concentrated on tasks and leaders concentrated on change. The research underlined the fact that the leaders who gave more attention to the accomplishment of the tasks than to the improvement of the relations were more efficient. Moreover, *"the negative behavior impact (inadequate behavior, inappropriate action or failure) had, in general, greater effects than a positive one. Sometimes, the inadequate behaviors initiate a negative winding shape of actions and reactions between leaders and subordinates with negative consequences in accomplishing the projects."*⁸ About the leader behavior concentrated on change, on observing the environment modifications, on finding new perspectives, on encouraging the new ideas, we can say that it is a proper behavior for a good commander.

Powerful and honest leaders are meant to be great commanders. They need to have charisma and to be capable to prove themselves trustworthy, so that people would look up to them. All domains (goods and services, logistics support, recruiting people for military actions) should be led by real leaders. Moreover, direct conflicts must be properly guided. We believe that strong education, extensive experience, and a continuous study on military art

and science help the commander become a real leader. Besides, he will act in a strong manner and thus will be capable of making better decisions and of becoming a reliable person.

Opinions regarding the management systems of combat military structures and logistics structures

The complexity of managerial science and the military phenomenon have a common feature: both can be considered as pertaining to science and art. The manner in which the manager applies military science is influenced by his/her personal features, by the capacity of synthesis and abstraction. Moreover, his/her leading is determined by the capacity of innovating and finding solutions. Acting like a real leader needs a lot of work, learning, training and preparation. In peacetime, the commander should adapt training to the structure level: he/she should start with the soldiers' instruction and finish with the unit or great units' instruction.

The necessity of enforcing military discipline, for thoroughly executing orders during peace time, during training activities, as well as during war time, requires different approaches from the commanders of the combat troops as compared to the commanders of the logistic support units.

Besides the thorough knowledge of the military equipment, their technical characteristics and their inherent limitations, the commander of the combat troops and combat support troops must rely on suitable personal skills development, knowing their troops and having a strong cohesion within subunits. Likewise, seamless synchronization and the high stake requirements towards lower management regarding the control of their subordinates, own physical and military training, the concern towards their equipment, exigence in commanding the subunits, generate, with high probability, leadership styles that are rather authoritarian and the adoption of principles stated in the Douglas McGregor's *X Management Theory*, according to which motivation must be connected especially to physiological aspects and individual security. We make out a case for the current statement through the high level of danger generated by the military actions conducted by untrained personnel, by the possibility that soldiers could lose their lives or jeopardise the safety of their colleagues, having in mind the operating equipment. Likewise, using the

Expectations Theory by Lyman W. Porter, Edward E. Lawler and later on, Victor H. Vroom, differs for the fighting combat troops as compared to the ones involved in the production process. Different rewards, generated by the exhausting effort on the battlefield, ignite the willingness of continuing the effort at high performance levels for receiving new rewards. We agree that participative management, which has a multidimensional character, sequential (based on the repetiveness of the activities), integrative and institutional, can be applied with significant restrictions regarding the tactical level combat structures. The commander's will regarding military action must be kept secret and disseminated at the right moment to a certain category of personnel.

Fighting procedures have to be standardized and they cannot be modified according to the group or the platoon. The procedures were created by using the troops' experience in different conflicts. Also, the weapons had been adapted to accomplish the tactical demands. Not using the procedures can cause major problems between the structures.

We cannot say the same thing about the logistic structures. The specificity of the logistics activity forces top management to use a large variety of experts in different logistic functional domains.

The legal framework, the settlements about the products, the payloads, the supply roots, the purchase contracts, the technical solutions for maintenance and evacuation, the laws about prevention, the necessity of optimizing work obligate the logistic structure commander increase the subordinates' work, be active and ask the managers to train continually. *"Moreover, as a logistic management function, leadership has to take into consideration two aspects: the manner logistic managers work and the fact that they must provide a democratic leading and, at the same time, they have to motivate their subordinates to accomplish the established goals"*⁹.

We do not try to find a management general solution suitable for all military structures. We consider that the management guidance lines differ one from another: the tactical logistic structures must not have the same guidance as the fighting troops. While the logistic structure commander has to provide supplies, goods and services continuously, the combat troops' commander should lead military actions which imply fighting

the enemy, losses, captures and annihilations. If you want to be sure that the combat troops act in safety conditions you have to be firm and you should impose a framework, some established procedures, good training and some high standards of discipline. All of the above mentioned measures have to be applied to the logistic structures, as well. We have to admit that the logistic structures could sometimes be found in the same spot with the fighting troops. Moreover, the multidisciplinary logistic domain imposes hard study, adopting innovative solutions, regulated work, responsibility in working with expensive goods, an intense collaboration between structures in order to support them, etc. *"Logistics and logistic management have been continuously growing and evolving. Ever since it acquired a scientific dimension responsible for the efficient functioning of any social system, logistics has also acquired global dimensions, propagating like a religion, undoubtedly serving political institutions"*¹⁰. Likewise, the combat troops' commander or the support unit's commander leads the same type of specialized personnel, the logistic structure's commander leads different types of specialized personnel and he/she has to direct them in order to accomplish the established missions.

Speaking about the necessity of being a leader, we believe that a short and direct answer is not enough. As we mentioned before, not being a leader can be a cause of the lack of education or of the lack of experience. For a manager, being a leader means a lot of training, involvement and learning. In our opinion, the logistics activity has to be led by a well-informed leader who knows how to adapt quickly to his/her subordinates. Logistic support cannot be given in extremely hard conditions when the commanders are guided just by accomplishing the objectives without using the theoretical management. Even if management is considered a science or an art, it gives methods of growing as a real leader. It helps you to improve your leading skills, giving you the chance to become successful. Moreover, the subordinates have the chance to become experienced, well-regarded and appreciated.

Conclusions

Logistics means continuous activities and periodic processes. In peacetime, activities happen all the time, without interruptions. There is also a

constant flow between the making of the decision and the end of the operations of transition. Many complex missions are assigned to the logistic structure commanders. To obtain success in such a mission you should lead very well trained troops. Furthermore, the personnel must be educated and trained at high standards and they must also have tactical and logistic knowledge. Various types of dangers can affect the integrity of the organisation if education is not performed without any interruption. Moreover, for better results we should properly use the lessons learned. In Desert Shield and Desert Storm operations, more than a half of the casualties belonged to logistics; *"the most common cause of death were the accidents. The same thing happened in the supplying process in Iraq"*¹¹. All in all, many problems are caused by management mistakes. To avoid them we should learn how to lead the troops from the front.

NOTES:

1 Hervé Couteau-Béganie, *„Tratat de Strategie"*, vol.I, Editura UNAp „Carol I", București, 2006, p. 352

2 Gheorghe Minculete, *„Abordări moderne ale managementului logistic"*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I", București, 2015, p. 35.

3 Stuart Crainer, *„Key Management Ideas: Thinkers That Changed the Management World"*, third edition, Financial Times Prentice Hall, 1998, p. XI.

4 Henry Mintzberg, *„The nature of managerial work"*, Harper&Row, New York, 1973.

5 John Paul Kotter, *„The general managers"*, Free Press, New York, 1982 apud Gary Yukl, *„Leadership in Organizations"*, eight edition, Pearson, 2013, p. 28.

6 Gheorghe Minculete, *„Abordări moderne ale managementului logistic"*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I", București, 2015, p. 35.

7 Gary Yukl, *„Leadership in Organizations"*, eight edition, Pearson, 2013, p. 136.

8 *Ibidem*, p. 54.

9 Gheorghe Minculete, *„Elemente de management al sprijinului logistic"*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, București, 2005, p. 69.

10 Col.prof.univ.dr. Gheorghe Minculete, lector univ. dr. Diana Țuțuianu, *„Logistics management determinations related to economic constraints and operational requirements"*, Buletinul Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I", București, martie, 2014.

11 Col.prof.univ.dr. Gheorghe Minculete, lector univ. dr. Diana Țuțuianu, *„Logistics management determinations related to economic constraints and operational requirements"*, Buletinul Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I", București, martie 2014, p. 63.

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THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A HERALD OF INSTITUTIONALISM

*Lisa-Maria ACHIMESCU, PhD**

Institutionalism, a doctrine that stems from the theory of the institution, formulated by the Maurice Hauriou¹ at the beginning of the century, remains particularly stimulating for a theoretical analysis of the law, as an understanding of its social dimension and an incursion in the emergence and development of the institutional construct of the European Union². The article attempts to analyze all the facets of institutionalism, at least, from a theoretical point of view and create the link between the European architecture and institutionalism as a doctrine. Like all significant concepts that contributed to the creation of the European architectural design, institutionalism has a genesis and evolution that can be traced back to legal doctrine. Therefore, viewing institutional idealism from a critical standpoint, and taking into account the contribution of institutionalism analyses, outside the sphere of the legal doctrine, we deconstruct the interest prompted by critical reflection on the theory and doctrine of institutionalism, as well as, its use.

Keywords: institution; institutionalism; European Union; doctrine; norms; European architecture; analysis; theory.

Introduction

Institutionalism, as a doctrine, which is positioned at the heart of this research posture, has contributed significantly to emphasizing and shaping the idea according to which "the organization of political life is important"³ and "bureaucratic agencies, legislative committees an courts of justice are arenas for confrontational social forces, but they also represent collections of standard procedures and structures that define and defend values, norms, interests, identities and beliefs"⁴. This brings a new approach to power politics as an expression of institutional, rather than state, confrontation to the forefront of international relations. Our current research focuses on the manner and circumstances in which, over the last years, a growing number of European integration specialists have appropriated institutionalism and neo-institutionalism approaches to construct their goals, problematize their research and create a foundation for future structural and developmental research.

Institutionalism as a doctrine in abstracto

The institutionalism and neo-institutionalism doctrines analysis has the great merit of attacking

head-on the thorny issue of the so-called "European problem" by showing that its emergence can be more often explained by the long and often risky conception and evolution period it has undergone over the decades. According to institutionalism, studying the processes of institutionalization implies, therefore, a targeted research on several *strata of development*, out of which the most important are: the gradual emergence of cooperation and social conflicts that constitute the basis of transnational regulation preferences on issues of great interest to all member states; the importance of European Union law and the construction of formal institutions as a process which makes it difficult to *re-nationalize* certain problems; and, last but not least, the role played by the institutions of the European Union, in particular the Commission and the European Court of Justice⁵, as vectors in the creation and consolidation of European decision-making bodies. *In nuce*, this approach emphasizes that institutionalization takes place over a long period of time and involves a whole range of actors seldom scrutinized by intergovernmental analysis.

Institutional analysis represents, first and foremost, an epistemological position, which can be presented simply by Hauriou's famous phrase: "A little sociology distances from the law, bringing back much more"⁶. It is thus the search for an intellectual construction that goes beyond description in an attempt to constitute an

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explanatory model to be applied, in particular, to the state and the law. This construction is based on two crucial elements: the connection between all the theory and knowledge pertaining to the law and the assignment of a rightful place of the law, as a norm construct, within the social structure.

Because it is rooted in this explanatory model, unlike the classic theories surrounding legal systems, institutionalism tends to take into account the social dimensions of the state and the law, thusly, acknowledging the concept of power intrinsic to both. Therefore, in order to build a *theory of law* that examines it from a different perspective, other than that of the classical legal theory, one should take into account the social dimension of the law, which represents the scaffolding of a comprehensive legal theory, allowing true interdisciplinary, adding just a sprinkling of non-legal elements on the analysis of the law, which has lead us to the “academic kleptomania”⁷ of multidisciplinary in analyzing institutional and stat behavior.

A theory cannot appear *ex nihilo*; it has to be inspired by a set of previous theories and doctrines that were in public discussion, provoked reactions and aroused interest. The diversity of these sources of inspiration, alongside the need for a reaction from specialists, largely explains why it took a significant amount of time to go from the first sketch of the concept of *institution* to an elaborate theory, *id est* institutionalism.

Initially, institutionalism was a specifically American school of thought, contemporary with the structuring of capitalism that emerged at the end of the 19th century in the United States. Thus, institutionalism, as a dissident doctrine of the epoch’s orthodoxy, was marked by an obvious heterogeneity where the will of social control was opposed to the society’s radical desire for transformation and evolution.

The institutionalism’s emergence was closely linked to concepts as rules, norms, behaviors, practices, organization and order. Due to the plethora of meanings given to the concept of *institution* it proves difficult to reach a general conceptual core.

Considering the connotations and denotations of the term “institution”, one has to bring into focus the ontological question related to the existence of institutions and the epistemological ones corresponding to our knowledge about

institutions.

The place of institutions in social and political life can be compared to a game of chess, where we have a clear set of rules about how to move the chess pieces; institutionalism as well as a game of chess takes into account the behavior of each actor involved with regard to the said rules.⁸ Each actor uses strategy in order to maximize their winning potential, thus using institutionalized practices and rules.⁹ *Ergo*, institutions are like chess pieces placed on a competitive basis on the great chess board of the international society, requiring the organization of international competition.¹⁰ It is also true that the relative power of each pion is merely a component of game play, while strategy is the key component in maximizing outcomes, which can also be said in reference to institutions; it is our ability to use instruments and positions within institutions that translates towards then *power*, extending the area of political confrontation into a seemingly neutral ground.

Hans Kelsen¹¹ considers that there is a “one-to-one” relationship between an act of will and a norm. A standard is valid only if it is laid down by the will of an authority empowered to do so. This does not exclude that legal actors, when elaborating norms of law, are rarely content with a pure and simple *fat lex* - “let there be law”. The fact that each legal actor faces other actors and that different actors interact with each other under constraint of justification of their normative powers and the use they make of them, constitutes in this case a very relevant description of Kelsen’s theory. Rather than starkly claiming that this represents their will and pleasure, the actors involved try to justify their decision by means of argumentation. One of the essential objectives of these discourses is to diminish the degree of free choice – and therefore the exercise of free will – that is offered to them in the norms of law creation. We can therefore draw the conclusion that voluntarism in the act of norm creation, represents, in fact, solidarity with an unspoken *anti-voluntarism* in the argumentation, which result from the means employed by actors to justify certain actions on the basis of their chosen doctrine.¹² Institutionalism offers a particularly illuminating reading grid for the functioning of the rationale demonstration intended to mask the will of the legal actors and, thus, to offer justification to normative powers.

The institutionalist thesis constitutes a general theory of collective phenomena, being therefore possible to update it, on the basis of this reasoning, within relatively numerous legal arguments.

Whether it is expressly formulated or that it is only possible to rationalize implicit or fragmentary reasoning by means of this theory, institutionalist argumentation presents itself as a real system designed to capture all aspects of normative power that can be summarized as follows: "by virtue of their institutional nature, these institutions implement their own competence that is not transferred by the public authorities. They develop spontaneously a particular legal life which is expressed by statutory and disciplinary powers that govern the functioning of the institution. In essence, the institution produces authority and command phenomena. Thus, it generates a real legal order"¹³.

The strength of institutionalist argumentation in order to justify the attribution or the existence of the normative power of a given legal actor is primarily self-sufficiency. To do this, it does not need to rely on a pre-existing enabling standard, and therefore on a pre-existing act of will. In particular, it does not need to rely on the elements of other standards of accreditation to increase their scope or field of regulation. It thus justifies not only the extension of a pre-existing authority in this domain, but also its initial existence.

However, the institutionalist justification is particularly powerful in that, strictly speaking, the authority standard does not result from any human decision. It is presented as "classified"¹⁴ by a complex of social phenomena, so much so that "one can see the law from inception"¹⁵. That is why the very idea of "conferring" power seem superfluous to the institutionalist doctrine.

From the point of view of the dynamics of the relationships that are formed within the legal system between different actors, institutionalist argumentation has an important property. Indeed, it is often the responsibility of the supervisory bodies to decide on the validity of norms created by other actors. The normative production of the *regulator-actors* is aimed at the normative production of the *regulated-actors*. The extent of the empowerment to control is therefore commensurate with the activity of the supervised actors, so that if possible for the regulator-actor to control the empowerment of the regulated-actor, they would be able to indirectly

determine their own power.

Institutionalism, therefore, is not content to punctually offer, to such or such actor, a particularly powerful justification of the norms creation and development process by presenting them as strictly independent of any form of will, but proposes a general *legal ideology*¹⁶.

The European Union versus Institutionalism

Commencing with the Coal and Steel Community, established in 1951, followed by the Treaty of Paris, and continuing our analysis with the emblematic Treaties like Maastricht, Rome or Lisbon that demonstrate how the general norms adopted by the heads of government shape the institutional capacities of the state-actors, the policy sub-system formed around the regulation of the accession process was configured.¹⁷ This evolution makes it possible to compare the effects on the Commission's power over the drafting of the treaties, whose objectives were precise (e.g. the case of the Treaty of Paris) with the inter-state agreements which took form of a *constitutional framework* seeking to limit the area of intervention of the Community institutions (e.g. the case of the Maastricht Treaty).

Less focused on the genesis of Community policies, institutionalist analysis focuses more on Union law as an active framework of the competences of each institutional actor involved, unlike the formalism of "old" institutionalism.

However, researchers point out that Union law takes effect not only as a constraint or a sanction, but because it delineates the *appropriate behavior* of actors in such areas as public intervention.¹⁸

According to the intergovernmental approach, the power of national governments and the Council of Ministers produces two weaknesses in the other European Union institutions. First, they are condemned to simply implementing inter-state agreements and furthermore they can only "tinker" at the margins of the big projects of European integration.

Another contribution of the institutionalist and neo-institutionalist approach consists in showing the simplicity of this thesis without denying the considerable resources still possessed by governments and the Council. This demonstration was carried out with the help of in-depth studies of the more subtle resources available

to the Commission and the Court of Justice. As summarized by M. Pollack, this thesis promoted the understanding that the European institutions “oblige the governments of the member states to take into account the actions of supranational agents that the governments control only imperfectly”¹⁹.

The European Commission sometimes acts as a “process manager” managing its “assets”, particularly on the question of when to propose potentially controversial legislation to the Council.²⁰ As for the European Court of Justice, A. Stone Sweet and J. Caporaso have exposed how the jurisprudence of this body frequently generates a self-sustaining dynamic. This leads, on the one hand, to a gradual deepening of European integration in a specific sector and, on the other hand, to the effects of “contagion” on other areas of public intervention.²¹ More precisely, these authors have closely studied the “constitutionalisation” of the Court since the 1960s through the aggregation and consolidation of its decisions and case studies.

This approach allowed Stone Sweet and Caporaso to identify a “causal link” between the preferences of economic and political agents (firms, employers’ federations, ministries *etc.*) and a form of *de-regulation* (*de-normativization*) consisting, *exempli gratia*, in barriers reduction to trade within, henceforth, a new comprehensive European economy.

The institutional construction of Europe and the originality of its institutions, mainly due to their transnational nature, led to the enrichment of the issues raised by the activity of the member-states parliaments. The establishment of a Common Assembly in 1952, and of the Parliament in 1979, revealed an institution fully capable to coexist with its national counterparts. For many authors, the European Parliament, by reducing the involvement of national parliaments in Community affairs, does not constitute the ideal legislative space for citizens. If the studies on the Parliament find their justification by being compared to those of the American Congress, the so-called “legislative studies”, this is certainly due to the seniority of the latter compared to the European Assembly. But another important reason is that the European Parliament is aligned with the general theoretical institutional frameworks, especially in relation to the Commission. In Europe, parliaments, within the typologies of the European political

regimes, have long been studied by jurists. Their research, vastly influenced by political science, approached parliaments in a more concrete aspect: between the parliaments of the same regime (*e.g.* parliamentary regime, presidential regime, semi-presidential regime), the differences in functioning are important, calling into question the specific qualifications and differences of the respective assemblies. Parliamentarian typologies become less legal-oriented: the analysis of parliaments focuses on the internal structure, such as the informal relations with the executive, for example. The European Union represents an “original” model: a regime that is qualified as *semi-parliamentary* or even *post-parliamentary*²² because of the role of other modes of regulation and legitimization than parliamentary life: the European political system has sometimes been characterized as being regulator and normative.²³ Legislative power is exercised under the first pillar by the Council of Ministers and the Parliament, elected for 5 years, most often under the *co-decision procedure*. Decisions of the 2nd and 3rd pillars, of intergovernmental nature, are the sole responsibility of the Council. The Commission alone retains the right of initiative for the first pillar, which it shares with the Member States for the 2nd and 3rd pillars. The functioning of the European Parliament has long been studied according to four main theories of European integration. The federalists define it as a national classical parliament. The functionalist current considers that within the European Parliament a unique parliamentary culture would be developed, without specifying in detail the exact character of its nature. Intergovernmental theory gives the Assembly a secondary position in rapport to the executive; Andrew Moravcsik shows that the powers of the parliamentary institution are granted by governments either for ideological reasons or due to the underestimation of possible consequences.²⁴ Lastly, historical institutionalism synthesizes intergovernmental and neo-functionalist currents by recognizing governments as a major player in institutional decisions, but also admitting that institutions escape them. One of our objectives was to define the nature and measure, as well as, the importance of parliamentarism within the framework of the European Union. The contribution of the European Parliament to the functioning of the Union, following a detailed examination of

its internal organizations, proves to be of utmost importance to the European institutional construct.

In particular, the evolution of the European Parliament towards a federal assembly might be sought, by comparison to the analysis of the American case. Some authors have even analyzed the text of the European Constitutional Treaty in the light of the Philadelphia Convention suggesting the importance of the American model on the institutional construction of Europe²⁵.

All in all, these contributions of institutionalism applied to European integration and institutional construction show that "membership matters": the European institutions are much more than participants at the negotiation table; state-actors cannot simply walk away from community compromises that they do not like.²⁶ Community integration and the Union's architecture generate *institutional constraints* that force actors to change their behavior and preferences. While institutionalism and neo-institutionalism has certainly revitalized the theoretical debate on European integration, there are still shortcomings.

The first empirical problem of the institutionalism approach constitutes the fact that it can lead to an oversizing of the role played by European Union rules and norms by minimizing their degree of elasticity, a noteworthy characteristic feature of their action. The obligation to consult social partners, which constitutes part of the regulations of the European Structural Funds and of many other EU policies, represents a significant example in this direction. Since European legislation does not define either a social partner or the substance of the verb "to consult", it is hardly surprising that the implementation of the consultation norms led, on the one hand, to politico-administrative practices very different from one country to another and, on the other hand, to the fact that the Commission's agencies are largely powerless to involve the actors they consider to be more credible.

In short, the institutionalist analysis of the effects on the European Union norms and regulations remains incomplete, without taking into account the relative capacity of the Commission to impose sanctions on the actors who interpret the rules unilaterally.²⁷

Indeed, paradoxically, the institutional approach studies institutions essentially by isolating them for the sole purpose of better understanding

the EU decision-making process. The configuration of relations between institutions revealed by such studies, and especially the problems they pose for the social legitimacy of the European Union, are rarely discussed. Indeed, the institutionalist analysis stops at the same question as their intergovernmental opponents, "which institutions matter?"²⁸: "Behind their favorite theories lies a rationalist foundation that takes these researchers, like inter-governmentalists, to conceptualize institutions into superficial terms ("thin")²⁹. Therefore, "if the institutionalists are less interested on the impact of institutions on national interests, they are still interested in the strategies adopted by the Member States to pursue the interests that they are attributed."³⁰ Worse, by losing interest in the depth of the European institutions, the institutionalist and neo-institutionalist analysis overlooks the double question of legitimacy and domination, thereby condemning itself to pursue a purely academic modeling of European integration which is structurally limited and limiting. As acknowledged, "The literature on European integration is always more comfortable explaining and describing the processes of governance than the root causes of European integration (...) After more than four decades from her debut, we still have a better picture of how the top spins than we do of the forces that drive it across the table"³¹.

Rather than reflect on the overall shape of institutions from a theoretical point of view, most researchers working in this field either prefer to engage in speculative exercises³² or to dwell on the emergence of "supranational" institutions (*n.n.* the rhetorical stratagem maintained by neo-institutionalists). Therefore, political science studies with paucity the European integration process that raises legitimacy issues because it re-commissions not only the models and norms of public action, but also the balance of institutional order and the action models that are their counterparts. As researchers point-out, *inter-institutional transaction* models last only when they fit into "patterned disorders"³³ considered as politically and socially legitimate. In order to tackle this problematic issues, which is not only complex, but fraught with methodological difficulties, let us ask a question that, while simple, is imbued with analytical consequences: what is the dichotomous relationship government-society in a space as multicultural as the European Union?

In order to answer this question, it would be useful to *borrow* the distinction between *consensus* and *legitimate regime*.³⁴

Taking into account the mainstream opinions, one has to conceive that the "legitimization as a set of processes that make the existence of a specialized coercive power tolerable if not desirable, that is to say to perceive it as a social necessity or even a blessing"³⁵. This definition leads to a distinction between legitimacy and consensus which is enlightening in the case of the European Union. According to these standpoints, *consensus* comes from a utilitarian evaluation of the political system benefits and actions. Legitimacy, on the other hand, "implies a belief in the social value of institutions"³⁶. In the case of European integration and of the EU's institutional construction, the problem of legitimacy engenders two strong hypotheses.

The first stems from the idea that, insofar, the dominant social representation of Union integration and of the EU's institutional construct constitutes that of a *consensus regime* as its efficiency in international security and economic competitiveness has been emphasized. If, for example, the Commission lacks legitimacy, it is not simply because member states may challenge its ability to regulate the crucial problems their respective societies face. This happens because, beyond this functional obstacle, there is also a profound reluctance to recognize and identify the entirety of the Union's system norms and values and to regard them as socially desirable.

The second hypothesis emanates from the issue identified by researchers that take into consideration the concerns regarding political representation on a European scale. As highlighted by the literature on public policy analysis, integration has undoubtedly been accompanied by important changes in the practice of politicians, especially in the nature of their interactions, which was modified, an aspect that is easily observable in negotiation forms, consultation requirements, evaluation constraints etc. With rare exceptions, the basic political space remains the nation state and/or the sub-national constituencies. Thusly, the deficit of legitimacy of the European Union must also be filtered through the difficulties experienced by its political representatives – Commissioners and European parliamentarians and by national deputies and

local elected representatives. Moreover, these difficulties are not limited to the challenge of interpreting the European integration and the EU institutional architecture; they also refer to the thorny nature of its staging. By generating these hypotheses, a link *via* political theory is created emphasizing that the study of the transactions institutionalization proposed by the institutionalist and neo-institutionalist authors, remains incomplete if it does not consider the social reception of this process and that of European Union's integration as a whole.³⁷

At the heart of all research on the European institutions lies a, more or less explicit, question, on the degree of political change caused by forms of *community intervention*, especially at local level. In our opinion, however, this questioning stops too often at the level of public action rather than analyzing the effects of the displacement of ideas and practices on the character and balance of institutional orders as a whole. The theoretical reasoning developed above allows us to conclude on the reasons why the standards and resources disseminated by the European Union change the particular configuration of practices and expectations that composes each institutional order. Accordingly problematized, political science research becomes capable of overcoming the commonplace findings of a convergence of public policies in the EU and to question the effects of community action on the legitimacy of the European Union and of politics in general.

Another important issue constitutes the intervention in the Union's policies of transversal *actors* such as the Presidents of Regional and General Councils, prefects, national and European parliamentarians. To use a distinction developed in this sense³⁸, it is necessary to analyze their intervention both in terms of *position* and *role*. "Approached in terms of rank in the institution"³⁹, the position of a *transversal actor* can be studied through a leveling of resources and constraints. On the other hand, *the concept of role* represents "the set of behaviors that are linked to the position one occupies and which makes it possible to make this position exist, to consolidate it and, above all, to make it sensitive to others"⁴⁰.

By questioning the impact of European policies, within an analytical framework that is rooted in researching how they affect the relationship

between *position* and *role*, we have a powerful instrument to address this specific issue, on the one hand, taking into account the concrete effects of European integration and institutional architecture on the symbolic dimension of institutional order and, on the other hand, the difficult emergence of an institutional order at the Union's level.⁴¹

Peter A. Hall⁴², at a seminar of European Union experts, prefaced a paper with an ironic statement according to which "we're all institutionalists and neo-institutionalists now!" At first glance he is certainly not wrong: an increasing number of researchers share the assumptions we presented.

The challenge for the future constitutes the development of these approaches to institutions in order to better understand the diverse trajectories of the institutionalization of the European Union as well as the coherence and contradictions it does not fail to raise. Another important challenge is represented by the demystification of the methodological problems while also demystifying European policies. If a good method can never do without a well problematized object, it is equally clear that it is not only in Brussels and Strasbourg that Europe takes on a palpable form. On the other hand, we have seen that another fundamental challenge for political science consists in arranging so-called public policy and political sociology approaches, thus, addressing the study of European institutionalism in the light of the fundamental theoretical controversies of political science and *vice versa*.

Conclusions

A comprehensive analysis of institutionalism cannot be realized in the confines of this article. This represents just the premise of a judicious start.

The strength as well as the weakness of the institutional analysis lies in the fact that it constitutes both the object and the means of the study. By viewing the institution through the clarifying lenses of the law, we sized the appropriate tool of research: the institutional analysis.

To believe that the institutional analysis will allow a researcher to understand everything would be proof of an unforgivable naïveté. On the other hand, it is equally undeniable that this analysis makes it possible to develop another point of view on the law, which reveals things that conventional

analysis does not grasp.

This research does not result only from the complex political strategies and compromises in favor of the promotion of the European institutionalism or the development of new institutional policies, it results more from the realization or the materialization of the important European bodies and institutions, battling between two models of *universalism* in competition: one linked to the definition of a state and general interest embodied in its sovereign powers, independent of markets and member states and basing their competence on building an Europe based on the norms of law, expertise and control over the institutional pillars; the other, being rather in reference to the harmonization with the new international elites and not particularly embodying the *common European values* and, even less, the concept of state (*n.n.* sovereignty).

The relationships established or not among the European institutions, because that is where the weak link of the institutional analysis lies, constitutes the passage from the static analysis of an institution to the dynamics of the process of institutionalization and institutionalism. It is here that the dialectics of the analysis appears and the fact that each individual is not seized by one institution, but by several (family, state, enterprise, Union, *etc.*), an aspect which can give rise to contradictions. However, these very contradictions tend to have a major role in the reconstruction and reshaping of the legal status of European institutions and relations.

NOTES:

1 Maurice Hauriou, *A French jurist and sociologist whose writings shaped French administrative law in the late 19th and early 20th century, taught public law at the University of Toulouse since 1888, and constitutional law since 1920. He was the creator of the institution theory.*

2 European Union hereinafter "EU".

3 J. March and J. Olsen, "*Rediscovering Institutions: the organizational basis of politics*", New York, The Free Press, 1989; S. Steinmo, K. Thelen, K. Longstreth, (eds.), *Structuring politics. Historical institutionalism in comparative analysis*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992.

4 March and Olsen, *op. cit.*, 1989, p. 1 & p. 17.

5 European Court of Justice hereinafter "ECJ".

6 M. Hauriou, *La science sociale traditionnelle*, Paris, Larose, 1896, p. 98; (*n.n.* the translation is realized by the author of the article).

7 See J., Chevallier & D. Loschak, *Science administrative*,

Paris, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1978.

8 Jan-Erick Lane, Lane Ersson Staff, Svante O. Ersson, *The New Institutional Politics: Performance & Outcomes*, Taylor & Francis Group, Routledge, London & New York, 2000, pp. 26-28.

9 *Ibidem*.

10 *Ibidem*.

11 See Hans Kelsen, *Théorie générale des normes*, French translation by O. Beaud, F. Malkani, Paris, P.U.F., Léviathan Collection, 1996.

12 *Ibidem*.

13 I. Muller, "La normativité corporative reconnue", in M. Hecquard-Théron, *Le groupement et le droit: corporatisme, néo-corporatisme*, Toulouse, Presses de l'Université des sciences sociales de Toulouse, 1996, p. 32; (*n.n.* the translation is realized by the author of the article).

14 M. Hauriou, *Principes de droit public*, 2nd ed., Paris, Sirey, 1916, pp. vii-xx.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 78.

16 P. Lokiec, *Contract and Power. Essay on the transformations of Private Law and Contractual Relations*, A. Lyon-Caen, Paris, L.G.D.J., Private Law Library collection, 2004, p. 408.

17 See S. Bulmer, "Institutions and policy change in the European Communities: the case of merger control", *Public Administration*, vol. 72, 1994.

18 The notion of *appropriateness* is at the heart of the institutionalist and neo-institutionalist approach: "The central notion is that life is organized around sets of meanings and shared practices which become self-evident ideas." March J. Ūlsen, *Democracy & Governance*, Macmillan, 1995, p. 30; (*n.n.* the translation is realized by the author of the article).

19 M. Pollack, "The new institutionalism and EC Governance: the promise and limits of institutional analysis", *Governance*, vol. 9 (4), 1996, p. 445; (*n.n.* the translation is realized by the author of the article).

20 *Ibid.*, p. 133.

21 See A. Stone Sweet, J. Caporaso, "La Cour de Justice et l'intégration européenne", *Revue française de science politique*, Vol. 48 (2), April 1998.

22 See Svein S. Andersen and Tom R. Burns, "The European Union and the Erosion of Parliamentary Democracy: a study of Post-parliamentary Governance", in *The European Union: How Democratic is It?* London, Sage, 1996.

23 See Giandomenico Majone, *Regulating Europe*, London, Routledge, 1996.

24 Andrew Moravcsik, "In Defence of the Democratic Deficit: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 40, no. 4, 2002, pp. 603-624.

25 See Florence Deloche-Gaudez, "Bruxelles-Philadelphie, D'une Convention à l'autre", *Critique internationale*, no. 21, Presses de Sciences Politique, 2003.

26 *Ibid.*, p. 407 and p. 411.

27 See A. Smith, "The European Commission and the Structural Funds: towards a new model of action?", *French Review of Political Science*, 46 (3), June 1996.

28 J. Checkel, "Social construction, institutional analysis and the study of European integration", *Communication at*

the European Consortium for Political Research Congress, Warwick, March 1998, pp. 4-5; (*n.n.* the translation is realized by the author of the article).

29 *Ibidem*; (*n.n.* the translation is realized by the author of the article).

30 *Ibidem*; (*n.n.* the translation is realized by the author of the article).

31 M. Pollack, *op. cit.*, p 454.

32 The view is embraced, for example, by Ph. Schmitter in "Some alternatives for the future European political system and their implications for European public policies", in Meny, Y., Muller, P. and Quermonne, J.-L., *Les Politiques publiques en Europe*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1995.

33 The expression is used by K. Orren and S. Skowronek, two so-called "historical institutionalists" who do not exactly study European integration but arrive at a salutary conclusion for this field of research: "Layers rather than systems; dissonance rather than sounding; conjunctures rather than regularities: these are the entry points for a genuinely new institutionalism.", in the paper "Order and time in institutional study", in Farr, J., Dryzek, J., Leonard, S. (eds.), "Political science in history", *Research programs and political Traditions*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 317; (*n.n.* the translation is realized by the author of the article).

34 J. Lagroye, "Legitimation", in M. Grawitz & J. Leca, (eds.), *Political Science Treaty*, pp. 399-402.

35 *Ibid.*, p. 402 (*n.n.* the translation is realized by the author of the article).

36 *Ibid.*, pp. 399-400; (*n.n.* the translation is realized by the author of the article).

37 Yannis Papadopoulos pointed out that "the purely self-referential legitimacy of the (public action) systems is not enough. Their justification speeches are also addressed to external audiences, having to conform to what each system thinks their expectations are", in "Social Complexity and Public Policy", Paris, Montchrétien, 1995, p. 49; (*n.n.* the translation is realized by the author of the article).

38 J. Lagroye, "On ne subit pas son rôle", *Politix*, no. 38, 1997, p. 8.

39 *Ibidem* (*n.n.* the translation is realized by the author of the article).

40 *Ibidem* (*n.n.* the translation is realized by the author of the article).

41 As some specialists have noted, the definition of the *role* used by the institutionalist and neo-institutionalist authors is particularly weak. A. Stone Sweet and W. Sandholtz, for example, use the term *role* simply to describe who are the "actors". See A. Stone Sweet and W. Sandholtz, "European integration and supranational governance", *European Journal of Public Policy*, vol. 4 (3), 1997, p. 310; see also A., Smith, "Elites without territory, the European Commissioners", *South Pole*, No. 7, 1997.

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GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE PHYSICAL TRAINING REQUIRED BY THE MILITARY FOR THE EXECUTION OF THE MARCH

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Since ancient times, during military conflicts, soldiers had to carry their combat equipment on the battlefield or up to certain areas of stationing as close as possible to the battlefield. Even today, the physical ability of load bearing is a vital skill, and there is no other way to achieve it with a reasonable degree of stability, accuracy and efficiency than exercise. The instructive-educational process of military physical preparation can provide the military with complex and varied motor skills, including the fast deployment of subunits in unfavorable weather conditions, with appropriate weaponry and equipment.

Keywords: physical training; military physical education; physical exercises; heart rate; march.

Introduction

Throughout the centuries, history has been decided on the battlefield, the difference between winning and losing being attributed to multiple factors, like: structure of the army, used tactics, combat equipment or the bravery of the soldiers. Until the beginning of the 18th century, during the movements of the troops, rarely and only in special scenarios, had the military personnel transported cargos exceeding 15 kg. The additional equipment, usually consisting of all the weapons, clothing and accessories which a soldier had on the battlefield, was transported by auxiliary personnel with the help of horses and covered wagons. This, as well as equipping the troops with enough supplies for more days, contributed to the development of maneuvering capacities and the encouragement of moving autonomy. Gradually, after the 18th century, the emphasis on the centralized transport of materials faded; the armed forces, becoming more disciplined, imposed soldiers to carry their own cargos. This offered the troops much tactical flexibility and maintained a high level of individual effort capacity in the ranks.

Physical training in the army is not a sports branch which includes different contests like athletics, but it is done with types of training that

develop the soldiers' basic movement abilities to an extent which allows them to complete their missions, without being influenced by external factors like: food, sleep, shelter or heat. Soldiers must be capable of living in rough conditions, not wasting energy wailing, marching, and then fighting. There is no point in travelling faster than anyone and reaching the destination without having any physical resources to enter the combat or travelling the distance, being ready for combat and having to wait for your teammates, which may arrive very late or not arrive at all. The most important physical components which exert influences over the physical training of a unit are the morale and the will to fight. The level of these is very high if we improve the group's cohesion, strengthen the bonds between members, finding the right leader of the group which will help improve the unit's performances.

„Physical training, as for war, wants to educate the basic movement abilities (strength, endurance, speed, sleight), the adaptation of the physical efforts to the potential scenarios, utilizing means of action that include all the individual equipment in light work conditions, as well as hard conditions of work.”¹.

Considering all these aspects, a march consists in a fast, organized travel, on varied terrain, having the weapons and combat materials on the soldiers, and the development of the ability to successfully finish this combat actions' component; the great maneuvering of troops represents a permanent

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concern of the NATO armed forces. However, even if the march can be a decisive factor in winning a fight, in some climate conditions, it must not be done, because it could lead to the loss of functional capabilities of soldiers' organisms as a result of excessive strain caused by heat.

A march in marching order² is known in British army as "Tab" (an abbreviation for *Tactical Advance to Battle*³) / "tabbing" or "Yomp" in an unconventional language used by marine corps from *Corps of Royal Marines*. In British army, the march in marching order is considered as being a basic movement skill, being annually evaluated with a test (known as "Combat Fitness Test" - CFT) conceived to measure the level of muscular force and endurance of soldiers. "The test includes a march on varied terrain, in a fast pace, using complete combat equipment (instruction uniform, individual weapon – SA80 and the backpack with a weight of 15 - 25 kg). The distance that must be covered (between 6 and 8 miles) and the weight depends on the unit's quiddity and soldier's specialization"⁴. During the selection of future soldiers, the recruits, in the beginning phase, are ordered to march for a distance of 2 miles, because leg wounds are frequent during the basic military training, since many teenagers are not used to executing physical training in military clothing.

The most famous recent "Yomp" was the march executed during the Falklands War (well-known as Malvinas War) in 1982. After they had landed on the beaches in San Carlos (on the North-West coast of East Falkland), British soldiers went to attack the Argentine troops, travelling 90 km along the Islands for 3 days, having on them marching orders weighing between 36 - 54 kg. As a war consequence, the word "Yomp"⁵ (hard march with all the equipment on you) definitely entered the British slang.

General aspects regarding the execution of a march

The march with cargo is considered as being a form of physical training which involves a big consumption of energy, that is why soldiers have to be sure that they: have a good general physical condition, are aware of the hard nature of this form of training, previously been through a training schedule which included a combination between developing strength and endurance, and

that they have consulted a physician regarding their capability of participating in such physical activities.

The gradual increase of overloading is an important principle of all the physical training practices for soldiers who will execute a march. Also, it is important to balance all the components of the instructional and educational process, because this physical component is not the only one in the conception of the physical trainings of soldiers. The 4 basic principles below illustrate how a march training must be structured and, more important, illustrates the order in which they must be used so as to prevent the overworking or exhaustion (only one movement quality must be developed during one training session):

- the principle of frequency refers to the fact that the first aspect which must be developed is the frequency of the training sessions (start with one per month, then two per month and finally three per month);
- the principle of duration (time and distance) involves the increase of time allocated for the marching drill, by gradually increasing the number of kilometers that have to be covered (for example: 2 km, 4 km, 6 km, 8 km, 10 km), which will cause an increase of time;
- the principle of intensity admits in advance that the intensity of a march is the 3rd element that has to be increased, this being determined by: the weight, the speed (pace) of the march and the type of terrain (off road or ground level, covered in asphalt, gravel or unpaved land). The increase of intensity can be combined with the reduced duration (for example: travelling 10 km with 20 kilos to 8 km with 30 kilos);
- the principle of overcompensation refers to the fact that a good recovery between two training sessions is essential for becoming more powerful and more prepared. The growth of movement qualities, like strength and endurance, are based on this principle. This means that, at the end of every march executed the energy resources in the organism are consumed, and during the rest they recover. However, the indicated process will not make the body return to the state before the training, but produces an over recovery or a state of over reward. If we execute the next march too soon, before a full recovery, the state of overtraining may appear.

Depending on the operational requirements, the structure of a training program as for executing drill marches depends on a series of factors that have to be taken into account: the aim of the physical instruction process (the type of march – normal or forced, travelling speed, the weight, the distance to be covered, the type of terrain, the meteorological conditions and the physical state of soldiers – sleep deprivation, fatigue, etc.), the initial level of physical preparation of each soldier (and of unit) and the time available for executing training sessions.

The body will need time to accommodate as intensity of the training increases and this will be equally applied to the recruits who execute base military training and are not used with marches, and it will also be applied to the soldiers that are preparing for this kind of exercise (for training, evaluation or combat). Therefore, a good coordination between classical principles and the proper instruction methods in the process of physical training of soldiers is important for the following: to prevent the emergence of a state of extreme fatigue (first of all because of travelling long distances), to reduce the risk of injury and to improve performance. In time, after more months, as a consequence caused by the changes occurring in the conditions of the body, there will appear some structural and functional changes such as: adaptation to walking with boots, bones (especially the metatarsus), muscles, ligaments and tendons

becoming stronger.

During the execution of an organized march in a formation in which the unit is arranged in a column, a soldier that has a step distance and a traveling speed very close to the average of the group must be established as a directional to impose the pace. If the pace imposed by him is not quite constant, then it is possible that many soldiers may have difficulties, which will lead to division in multiple groups and, in the end, stopping in order to regroup. Therefore, the establishment of travelling speed in a march drill is very important (this depends, obviously, on the purpose of the march, the terrain that will be travelled on, and the weight) to not negatively influence the group's efficiency during military operations which will be later executed.

Research demonstrated that the heart rate will increase proportionally to the movement speed, as follows: with approximately 5 heartbeats/minute when the speed increases from 5 to 5.5 km/h, with approximately 10 heartbeats / minute when speed varies between 5.5 and 6 km/h and with approximately 15 heartbeats / minute when speed increases from 6 to 6.5 km/h⁶. The correct estimation and the monitoring of the movement speed can be done by timing the necessary time to cover a certain distance (to complete a certain track). To accomplish the proposed objectives, the next table can be used to establish if an adequate travelling speed has been selected, time being approximated for the ease of calculations. After

Table 1 Necessary values for determining the adequate travelling speed

Travelling speed (km/h)	Seconds necessary for travelling 100 m	Minutes necessary for travelling 1 km
4.0	90	15:00
4.5	80	13:20
5.0	72	12:00
5.5	66	11:00
6.0	60	10:00
6.5	55	09:15
7.0	51	08:30

choosing a travelling speed, it must be maintained, as much as possible, during the march.

Different weights and loads that soldiers transport, and also their attributions in the group, must be taken into consideration in elaborating a training program for marches.

If these are related, but there are differences regarding soldiers' body weight, this must be examined at the moment of conceiving the training program. A soldier who weighs 60 kg will have more difficulties with a pack which weighs 40 kilos than a soldier who weighs 100 kilos. This can seem contrary for the idea that all of group must carry the equipment and, therefore, they need to train in the same marching order. The idea is that they must keep a balance in the training schedule, taking into account the length of step and the body weight of every soldier and, also, the necessity of fulfilling the mission (objectives).

This means that sometimes training must be done with packs which are based on certain percent of soldier's body weight and, sometimes, with equipment which is connected with the next operational task. A practical report for weight of pack, based on percentages of body weight, is: between 25 - 40% for men and between 23 - 32% for women. Some research conducted by the United States Army demonstrated that the trained soldiers (specialized soldiers in special operations) can carry a load which is equivalent with 45% of body weight during 8 hours (including periods for rest, and the medium moving speed was 4 km/h)⁷. The difference between men and women, with respect to the marching order appears because women have less muscular mass in comparison with men. However, there is a percent of military personnel that has a relatively low weight, which causes training in a lighter marching order than the one that needs to be carried in next military operations. It is recommended that this group of soldiers need to train within the parameters highlighted above at the beginning of training period and to advance until they can carry the necessary weight. This may help for the motivation of soldiers and to prevent and exclude causes which imply the appearance of injuries and overtraining (pathological condition which results from exaggerated efforts).

For that kind of soldiers, whose physical performance is reduced by the appearance of medical conditions (injuries, diseases, etc.) and

by skipping the training period, an adjusted (individual) schedule must be drawn up. These soldiers, who have not trained for about 6 weeks or more, are advised to not return too early to the physical training of group, of their current level, because this may cause injuries. Thus, in case of injury, disease or absence for another reasons, it is recommended to apply the 50% rule. This rule means that those soldiers who return to physical training must, as a general rule, do it after 50% of their lost time (for example, the lack of 6 weeks training means the return after 3 weeks of individual specific training).

Considering the delivered information based on the research conducted on necessary physical training of soldiers for executing marching drills, there are three main additional recommendations. The first guide-line refers to alternating specific training sessions with marching with those for strength (especially the muscles of superior part of torso) and resistance (the capacity of aerobic effort), succession which will lead to the biggest progress of physical performances of soldiers for marching in marching order⁸. The favorite mix of most specialists in military physical education is two sessions of training for strength and two sessions of training for endurance per week; these can be combined (strength and resistance within same lesson). Instead, one lesson of training specific for march cannot be combined with resources of action such as physical exercises for the development of strength or resistance.

The second important aspect of marching drill is to obtain a balance between constant improvement of performances and avoiding excess. In this regard, I would recommend executing a march in marching order once in ten days, considering, of course, the objectives of training and the capacity of physical effort of group. The last recommendation would be including in the training program the sessions of short but intense effort, especially for groups that must execute, finally, drill marches between 30 - 40 kilos. By growing the intensity (the weight of knapsack) and by the substantial reduction of distance, more beneficial results can be obtained in a short time. This kind of training program must include alternating long distance drill marches (carrying about 25 kilos) and short distance/intense marches, with heavy weights (for example: a march of 6 km in 4 parts with 1.5 km per part, with a

weight of 45 kilos, and after every part is followed by a break of 5 - 10 minutes). It must be noted that this short and intense marches need to be realized by soldiers during the general period of physical training or if they missed training for a long time. The soldier needs to be well prepared and strong enough to finish this kind of training.

By the emergency of situation, by the effort and by the movement speed, the march can be normal or forced (by speed). This is an efficient modality of moving a group of soldiers from point A to point B. Practically, this element can be realized in a few different ways (by objective), there exists 3 basic factors: weight (basic for stabilizing the movement speed), the stage of physical training by group and what military operation needs to be conducted at the destination (or how fast you can get to the respective point).

One of the distinctive basic marks of forced march is the impact of effort for tendons, ligaments and joints. The combination between this high strain of physical capacities for achieving the goal and wearing boots can increase the chance of accident (for example: a painful patellofemoral syndrome, disease of Achilles's tendon, inflammation of plantar fascia, iliotibial tendon syndrome, periostitis etc.). The prevention of situations which can cause an injury and reducing risks in this respect can be realized following some easy steps such as:

- first execution of a normal march, because the human body will accommodate with this kind of effort;
- first 2 specific trainings for the forced march must be executed with high quality sport shoes, focusing on accommodation with effort parameters (capacity, intensity, complexity), without causing any abnormal reactions to the body;
- for ensuring a bigger absorption of shocks with high impact, an unpaved surface (like a forest area) must be used;
- during a training session, development of movement qualities like power and stamina must be combined with specific training for the forced march to optimize its performance;
- stamina, deciding factor of forced march, can be improved with at least 2 endurance trainings per week;
- the final element which must be improved is the intensity of specific trainings for forced march,

this implying: weight gain, movement speed gain, progressive reduction of walking time and progressive running time gain (alternating them);

Moreover, several general principles of training were discussed, including a few variations of speed movement during march. However, usually in practice, training programs must be designed, so as to combine training for normal march with forced march. Then, the following principles should be applied:

- the gradual increase of the level of physical training of the military with the help of the parameters of physical effort (frequency, intensity, density, complexity);
- the beginning of the training based on normal march, and after three or four weeks the introduction of specific training for the forced march;
- the alternation between normal and forced march should allow the human body to recover between two forms of training. Then, we will use a weekly training program, alternatively using two types of walking, thus slightly reducing normal frequency of 10 days.

Conclusions

The process by which you can complete a march drill without having the feeling of repulsion is represented by the gradual completion of an appropriate training program using the right clothing and equipment, following the recommendations on hydration / food intake and preventing accidents by establishing prematurely their signs and symptoms. Finally, if you must participate in a walk, make sure it is properly organized by an experienced and professional specialist, who will provide all the right safety measures and first aid procedures.

Apart from the fact that, historically, marching is the simplest and most effective way to train the military to successfully fulfill their specific obligations, it is also an exceptional way to improve aerobic capacity, strength, body posture and their mental health. Although much further research is needed on this topic, it is appropriate that, in light of recent developments in the nature of military operations conducted by military forces around the world, the available evidence should be considered and appropriate strategies implemented to enhance the capacity to carry all the weight implied by

marching order and to reduce the risk of accidents in the military.

Strong physical tasks such as *marching*, digging and handling of materials have been identified by the researchers as common physical activities of primary importance in the current NATO missions (humanitarian, counterterrorism, peacekeeping, conflict resolution, etc.). Given the ultimate goal of choosing the optimal solution to improve the physical training of the military, by reviewing the lists of essential tasks and taking into account the types of missions undertaken by NATO forces (past and present), the Romanian army must adapt the criteria and methodology according to the requirements of the modern combat space, aiming to increase the level of physical training of the military personnel.

NOTES:

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5 *Your Own Marching Pace* according to the website <https://acronyms.thefreedictionary.com>.

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APPLICATIONS OF UNMANNED SYSTEMS IN MILITARY LOGISTICS

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In the changing conditions of the operational environment and facing the new security environment which is the most complex and the most ambiguous ever, the nature and the size of threats at the address of security changed a lot. Because of that, the modern army started looking for alternative or better options to exceed this challenge. In the current conflicts, the emergence of autonomous systems represented an opportunity but also a challenge for the armed forces, offering on the battlefield a number of advantages such as increasing the force, speed, response of reaction, precise coordination but also disadvantages such as lack of motivation and flexibility of human intelligence. Combining the best elements of the human-machine team can increase the capacity of future armed forces. The challenge is determining the proper balance between man and machine. Currently autonomous systems are already capable of eliminating the human presence in solving many tasks performed by the military and have the ability to improve over time. The purpose of this article is to analyze both existing and potential uses of autonomous systems in military logistics, focusing on the advantages and risks for military organizations and operations.

Keywords: Unmanned Systems; military logistics; AS/RS; UGV (Unmanned Ground Vehicle); UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle); AVS/R.

Introduction

Throughout history technological developments have influenced the way of waging a war (the weapons used by the military have evolved from swords and spears to firearms), military commanders have come to understand that victory is closely linked to having enough units, soldiers, weapons and assets at the right time and place. In other words, logistics became an essential part of military operations and the superior logistics capabilities gave the military a competitive advantage. Yet, the human resource as well as the others is not infinite. For this reason, the modern army tried to replace this resource with autonomous systems¹.

The development and use of autonomous systems appeared from the need to transport essential logistics goods to a war zone. Together with the remote control (teleauto) invented by Nicola Tesla, in the battlefield of World War I, new, interesting technologies were also introduced which

a few years earlier were SF – autonomous systems and unmanned weapons. These appeared like a possible solution when the war entered a deadlock. So the “electric dog” appeared, a three-wheeled trolley designed to follow a light spot emitted by a flashlight, an armored tractor which was designed to move alone and detonate 450 kilos of explosives in enemy trenches, and as the air drone appeared Kettering Bug, a small plane flying on the basis of a gyroscope and then crashing over a target^{2,3}

Current applications and future possibilities of using autonomous systems in military logistics

To face the challenges of current conflicts, the organization of logistic processes requires methods to optimize physical processes in order to offer end users faster, better and more profitable services by applying innovative technologies. More and more autonomous systems have the potential to play a key role in military operations. The main missions of the autonomous systems, without closing the list, in the military logistics are presented in Figure 1.

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


Figure 1 Possibilities of using autonomous systems in military logistics

Use of autonomous systems in warehouses

Within the military structures there are a lot of warehouses where you have to work permanently and without interruptions. Inside the warehouse they carry out logistic tasks such as material handling, packing – unpacking, storage maintenance, inventory etc. Warehouse operations tend to be laborious and require large space for facilities. Large buildings are needed for storing materials

on shelves, moving stocks, unloading and loading. These tasks require a large number of personnel performing routine, boring and sometimes even dangerous operations (handling ammunition and explosive materials). All warehouses are inventoried by people and sometimes this causes problems due to human factors. In this context, the concept of deposit automation emerged^{4,5}. Although the concept seems new, the first automated

warehouses appeared in 1960 in Germany using the concept of AS / RS (Automated Storage and Retrieval System)^{6,7}. Figure 2 shows a classic AS / RS system.

System) systems. Figure 3 shows the basic elements of an AVS / R system.

These systems use pallet racks, with each other being passage corridors and using automated




Figure 2 Graphical presentation of the AS / R system⁸

It is an automated system for entering - storing - removing materials and consists of a variety of computer-controlled systems for automatically inserting and removing loads from defined storage locations. They have a number of advantages such as the possibility of moving into and from the warehouse of a very large volume of loads, the

guided vehicle systems that operate at every level in each aisle. Vertical transport is carried out with the help of elevators¹¹. Figure 4 schematically shows the flow in a warehouse with AVS/R and AS/RS systems.

Another possibility of using autonomous systems is the inventory of the materials in a




Figure 3 Storage system AVS/R¹⁰

increase of the storage density; the fact that it does not require additional costs related to the training and salary of a person handling the materials⁹.

In the last period, regarding the automation of deposits, the emphasis has been placed on AVS/ R (Autonomous Vehicle Storage and Retrieval

warehouse, necessary having as a condition of accomplishment the standardization and the use of bar code labels. Figure 5 presents a fully automated inventory of logistics materials. An Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) moving near each rack is used as a ground reference for UAV

(Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) flight which is used as a mobile scanner that flies vertically to scan bar codes¹³.

forces are recorded when supplying the fighting forces in direct contact with the enemy. For this reason, autonomous systems can be used for the




Figure 4 Flow in a warehouse with AVS/R and AS/RS systems¹²




Figure 5 Inventory diagram of an automated warehouse¹⁴

Use of autonomous systems in surveillance missions, guarding and accompanying logistic facilities and convoys

Autonomous systems can be used for reconnaissance and surveillance activities to provide logistics convoys; identifying and if possible, neutralizing the potential dangers for logistics convoys or offering solutions to avoid ambushes, surveillance of pipes, power lines, rivers, supply depots, contaminated areas, etc. The largest number of human losses within the logistics

supply of units in combat to avoid personnel losses. In Figure 6 cases of supply of combat forces¹⁵ are possible.

In studying the conflicts, it was found that most victims of medical personnel during battles occur after the treatment of soldiers under fire and among the fighters there are many victims when they provide assistance to injured comrades. At the same time, human medical personnel have difficulty performing interventions in dangerous areas (e.g. mined) or NBC contaminated. Autonomous




Figure 6 Possibilities of supplying with autonomous systems the forces in contact with the enemy¹⁶

systems can have a number of applications such as: location, extraction and tactical evacuation of wounds, route care during transport of the wounded military man, delivery of medicines, telemedicine^{17,18}. An operational conceptual scheme is presented in Figure 7.

Conclusions

Autonomous systems play a key role in military operations, respectively in military logistics. These tendencies for the development of autonomous systems present both an opportunity and a challenge for the military as well as for the political decision makers. Such systems have the potential to provide more effective military force on the




Figure 7 Operational conceptual scheme for the use of autonomous systems and medical support missions¹⁹

battlefield, allowing them to operate in dangerous environments. Autonomous systems can operate without the human limit. Commanders can also send robotic systems on more dangerous missions, for which they would not be willing to risk a human life, allowing completely new operating concepts. Increased automation will allow military forces to operate with greater coordination, intelligence and speed, by shortening decision cycles or, in some cases, eliminating people from decision making.

Given the potential benefits of autonomous systems in the military, the use of this technology in military logistics would prove valuable in reducing costs, taking more risks with less losses, increasing capacity and speeding up delivery processes.

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THE MANNER OF ACCOUNTING FOR NON-CURRENT ASSETS, INVENTORIES AND EXPENDITURES WITH HUMAN RESOURCES IN ENTITIES OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE, ACCORDING TO THE CURRENT LEGISLATION CONFIGURED ON THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTING STANDARDS (IPSAS), OF THE EUROPEAN ONES IN THE FIELD, WITH THE FEATURES SPECIFIC TO THE MILITARY ENVIRONMENT

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Part of the military science, together with the theory of organization and training of troops, with the C2 system / command and control in the army and with the other components, the financial-accounting management in the military field implies the knowledge of the legal norms that regulate the financial-accounting activities, their organization, use, permanent management and monitoring of the use of financial resources. International Public Sector Accounting Standards / IPSAS are a set of rules developed for the purpose of their application within public institutions in order to complete and submit financial statements. Public accounting is a branch of economic science that aims to highlight operations related to the components and dynamics of public property and its sources of financing. The general framework for drawing up and presenting the financial statements sets out the concepts underlying this process. In its capacity as a basic component of the financial-accounting management in the Ministry of National Defence, accounting is organized and conducted on the basis of the regulations in force, both at the level of the principal authorizing officer for his own activity, and at the level of about 350 secondary and tertiary authorities of loans. We have highlighted some specific features of the public accounting of the Ministry of Defence, in particular some regarding the management of the current assets of the inventory invoice, as well as the personnel expenses.

Keywords: International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS); financial accounting management; patrimony; financial statements; accounts plan.

Introduction

The complexity and, at the same time, the increasingly diversified challenges regarding the contemporary security operational environment determine major changes and reorientations of the state and non-state actors from a geopolitical and geostrategic point of view.

International relations, as well as alliances concluded not only from a spatial point of view,

but by pursuing global macroeconomic interests or even common ideologies, assume that the physical environment is no longer a determining factor in provoking / breaking out of conflicts / crises in different regions of the world.

Also, even within alliances, it is no longer certain that a partner will always be a partner, which determines that state and non-state entities adapt to this new reality so that they will "conform" to the common rules, but at the same time, they will take the necessary measures to ensure the minimum capabilities necessary to guarantee national independence, sovereignty and identity. At the same time, the enemy can become a "partner" on certain levels and in short periods of time, but this only when creating a mature diplomatic environment and pursuing common interests or ideologies.

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Our country, following the accession to the two major alliances, has adapted its specific legislation to the accounting process in public institutions according to the general provisions specific to the partner countries. This is why the provisions of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards / IPSAS have been implemented within the Romanian public accounting system. Within this material we have addressed the issue of accounting for non-current assets, stocks and expenses with human resources in public institutions in our country, but especially within entities of the Ministry of National Defense based on the implementation of IPSAS as part of the national effort to ensure interoperability and from financial and accounting point of view.

General aspects of IPSAS regarding non-current assets, inventories and expenditures with human resources

IPSAS is a set of international accounting standards developed for the purpose of their application within public institutions for the purpose of finalizing and submitting financial statements.

These have been elaborated or revised periodically by a special council created for this purpose called the International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board / IASB having as a starting point the International Financial Reporting Standards / IFRS.

Currently, a number of 32 IPSAS are in force and partially applied in the public sector in our country, including within entities of the Ministry of National Defense. Regarding the main IPSAS regarding non-current assets, stocks and expenditures with human resources, we would like to bring to your attention the following standards: IPSAS 1 - Presentation of financial statements; IPSAS 12-Inventories; IPSAS 17-Property, plant and equipment; IPSAS-25-Employee benefits and IPSAS 31 - Intangible assets¹.

Within this material we have analyzed the particular aspects of these standards within the Romanian public institutions and especially within the entities of the Ministry of National Defense.

Some features of the process of accounting for assets and sources of financing in public institutions in our country

Most definitions of accounting converge on the idea that its role is to provide information that

is predominantly financial in nature, regarding the activity of an entity, information that should allow internal or external users to make judgments and make informed decisions. According to some experts in the field, over 80% of the information circulating within the information system of an organization is economic in nature, and within it, accounting information represents 47%.

The accounting information system in our country is organized according to the dualistic conception, being structured on two components: financial accounting and management accounting. There are similarities between the two components, so both record events from the economic life that they quantify in the money standard, providing information to interested users. Also, there are notable differences between the two components such as: from the point of view of the main objectives – financial accounting “must ensure the chronological and systematic recording, the processing, the publication and the keeping of the information regarding the financial position, financial performance and flows. of cash, both for their internal requirements, as well as in relations with financial and commercial creditors, customers and other users”².

In contrast, management accounting provides a detailed picture of each activity (hence the name of analytics), recording the operations regarding the collection and distribution of expenses by destinations, respectively by activities, sections, manufacturing phases, cost centers, cost calculation, procurement, production, processing of incoming goods, obtained, works executed, services provided, from production units, commercial, service providers, financial.

Public accounting is a component of the general accounting whose object of study is the record of operations within a public property. A well-known specialist in the field, Professor Dumitru Rusu defines “the object of accounting as being the whole of the movements of values, expressed in money, from a perimeter of small or large extent (autonomous management, commercial company, public institution, banking company, etc.). and the economic-legal relationships in which the patrimonial unit is a part and which generates money settlements; the accounting calculations suddenly reflect the movement and transformation of the means as well as the resources in their order

of formation and after their destination in the process of reproduction”³.

According to the accounting law, the object of the patrimony is “the reflection in money expression of the movable and immovable assets, the money availabilities, the securities, the rights and obligations of the patrimonial units, as well as the movements and modifications intervened as a result of the patrimonial operations carried out”⁴.

Accounting, through its field of action, is taxed on a patrimonial unit. Property represents the totality of rights and obligations with economic value and with a monetary estimate. From an accounting point of view, the patrimony must be considered to be an entity that includes the material and non-material elements that can be expressed in value and which lose their individuality when they form an indivisible unit.

The first component of the patrimony, the goods, is materialized by their usefulness and value. The second component, rights and obligations, expresses the property relationships within which the rights are acquired and managed.

In addition to the movements regarding the elements of the public patrimony, the public accounting also includes operations of control over the public goods and income. In order to know and manage the property of a public institution, accounting uses a series of categories specific to its object of study, such as the assets and liabilities that express and characterize its situation.

The growth of “the role of accounting in the process of synthesizing and controlling the economic-financial activity requires the continuous improvement of its methodological norms, the use of modern means of calculation and records, as well as its rational organization on a scientific basis.”⁵

The evidence is an essential element in the management of the economic-financial activity based on performance criteria, as it involves economic and financial order and discipline. The rational and concise management of the records leads to contractual, financial, economic and managerial discipline.

In order to achieve a clear and concise image of the economic and financial activity, it is compulsory for all that information from the financial statements to reflect the reality, to comply with the legal provisions and to be of quality.

Starting from the main provisions of IPSAS, we have considered it necessary to study and analyze the general framework for drawing up and presenting the financial statements, especially regarding the accounting of non-current assets, stocks and expenses with human resources in public institutions in our country and in Romania, especially in entities within the Ministry of National Defence.

The general framework for drawing up and presenting the financial statements establishes the concepts that underlie this process, addressing the following aspects:

- a) the objective of the financial statements;
- b) the qualitative characteristics that generate the usefulness of the information presented in the financial statements;
- c) identification, recognition and evaluation of the elements underlying the preparation of the financial statements;
- d) the concepts of capital and maintaining its level.

This framework refers to the general purpose financial statements, including the consolidated financial statements that are prepared by the patrimonial entities belonging to both the public and the private sector, representing the main source of information for users.

The financial statements represent an image of the financial position and financial performance of a military unit. These are usually drawn up on the basis of an accounting model based on elements such as recoverable historical cost, respectively the concept of maintaining the nominal financial capital level. The general framework has been developed to be used on a number of accounting models and concepts related to capital and maintaining its level.

In the Ministry of National Defence, within the financial-accounting management, the organization and management of the accounting of non-current assets, stocks and expenditures with human resources is a major concern of the Finance General Directorate, which exercises its competence and has responsibilities established in this regard by the laws and regulations. in force.

Particularities of the process of accounting for non-current assets, inventories and expenses with human resources in entities from the Ministry of National Defence

Part of the military science regarding the theory of the organization and training of the troops and, at the same time, part of the C2 system / command and control in the army, the financial-accounting management supposes the knowledge of the legal norms that regulate the financial-accounting activities, their optimal organization, the use, permanent management and monitoring of the use of financial resources.

Studying and analyzing the concept of financial-accounting management of an organization/institution, we observe that it includes those provisions of legal and administrative order, as well as the specific operation of the organization/institution so as to allow it to plan, organize and manage the activities also so that the funds available to them can be used efficiently and according to the specific standards in the field such as: increase of income, expense management, financial accounting and asset management.

Part of the ministerial management system in the field of defense, the financial-accounting management in the Ministry of National Defence represents all the actions, activities, measures and operations that are carried out in order to achieve a good management of the public funds, of the public patrimony under administration, to fulfill the specific objectives, in conditions of efficiency and economic efficiency.

Subscribed to the goals and objectives specific to the military system in our country, the main objectives of the financial-accounting management in the Ministry of National Defence we find the following:

a) providing on time and within the approved budget the necessary funds for the realization of the programs regarding the equipping of the army with technique of domestic production and import, interoperable with NATO, the maintenance and repair of the material goods from the endowment, training, maintenance and education of the troops, payment of social rights and other monetary rights, payment of social rights due to the army personnel, as well as the satisfaction of other administrative-household needs of the military units in the organizational structure of the army;

b) establishing, recording and paying

military pensions and other rights due to military pensioners;

c) organizing the financing of the missions within the international forces destined to maintain the peace or constituted for humanitarian purposes, the elaboration of the draft normative acts for the financial-accounting regulation of these activities;

d) the use of financial means and tangible assets, in accordance with the approved programs and budget, in compliance with the norms and regulations established according to the legal provisions, in order to obtain maximum results with the lowest consumption;

e) organizing and conducting auctions and procurement of material goods under the law, strengthening the contractual and financial discipline in all military units;

f) organizing a strict record of the patrimony and a proper, systematic and demanding financial control regarding the economic-financial activity and its results;

g) the development of the responsibility for the judicious management of the material and financial resources entrusted to the keeping, handling or administration of the entire staff;

h) improving the financial-accounting activity, by increasing the quality of the planning works, increasing the transparency of the use of the funds by following the procedures regarding the four phases of the budget execution: commitment, liquidation, ordering and payment of expenses;

i) protection of public funds against inefficient use as a result of errors or negligence in the service, of dismissal or fraud on the part of the personnel with attributions in the financial-accounting field;

j) request and development of information systems for collecting, storing, processing, updating and disseminating financial-accounting data and information;

k) development of an accounting system that provides the information needed to analyze the way of achieving the objectives, indicators, as well as the costs associated with the approved programs.

The objectives of the financial-accounting management are analyzed at the level of the Ministry of National Defence by the military specialists. Thus, in accordance with these we have discussed about areas of activity according to these objectives in order to streamline and optimize this type of management.

Regarding the accounting process, the Ministry

of National Defence has implemented at the level of military units the main provisions applicable to public institutions in our country, of course presenting certain particularities considering the special character of activities specific to the military field which we discuss below.

The areas of activity in the financial-accounting area, which find their solution within this ministry are:


- a) budget planning;
- b) budget execution;
- c) organization and management of accounting;
- d) state military pensions and other social rights;
- e) the salary of the personnel;
- f) foreign currency settlements and transactions;
- g) managerial control;
- h) the methodology regarding the financial-accounting management.

In order to better understand these areas and their correlation with the aspects related to the organizational structure of profile at the top of the ministry, we present below the organizational chart of the Finance General Directorate⁶.

It can be observed that the organizational structure of this direction naturally has many elements synchronized with the activity areas on the financial-accounting area at the ministry level.

Accounting is regarded as "specialized activity in the measurement, evaluation, knowledge, management and control of assets, liabilities and equity, as well as of the results obtained from the activity of legal entities, which must ensure the chronological and systematic recording, processing, publication and retention of information regarding financial position, financial performance and cash flows, both for their internal requirements and in relations with financial creditors, customers, public institutions and other users"⁷.

Regarding the accounting process specific to the military units, the organization of the ministry's financial management system is taken into account, considering that at certain levels the commanders or the heads of the military units are authorizing credits (principal, secondary or tertiary). This particularity applies from the level of the public institutions to the level of the military system, taking into account the organization on the steps, the missions and the objectives that certain military units have to fulfill in order to establish



Source: [www.mapn.ro/Direcția general financiar contabilă](http://www.mapn.ro/Direcția_general_financiar_contabilă), accessed on 23.10.2019

them according to the specific activities that will be carried out by the level of the authorizing officer of the military unit.

The accounting of the military units provides to the authorizing officers that data and information regarding the execution of the budget of income and expenses, the non-current assets and the stocks under administration, as well as for the preparation of the annual account of execution of the state budget, of the annual account of execution of the social insurance budget, government and special funds.

The economic life of the military units, in permanent transformation and adaptation, shows that increasing the degree of complexity of the activities they carry out requires the provision of real, accurate and complete information that must be provided by the accounting.

In its capacity as a basic component of the financial-accounting management, the accounting is organized and conducted on the basis of the regulations in force, both at the level of the principal authorizing officer for his own activity, and at the level of about 350 secondary and tertiary authorizing officers.

The accounting of the military units regarding the non-current assets, the stocks and the expenditures with the human resources provides to the loan officers those data and information regarding the execution of the budget of incomes and expenses, the result of the budget execution, the patrimony under administration, the patrimonial (economic) result, the cost of the programs approved by the budget, as well as that data and information used to prepare the general annual account for the execution of the state budget, the annual account for the execution of the state social insurance budget and the special funds.

According to the national legislation specific to the field, military units like any public institution are required to organize and manage their own accounting, respectively financial accounting and, as the case may be, management accounting.

In the Ministry of National Defence, the accounting of non-current assets, stocks and expenses with human resources is organized within the military units that manage material and monetary values, regardless of the sources of financing the expenses and provided in the states of financial-accounting compartment.

In the situation of general mobilization or transition to a state of war, the organization and management of the insurance accounting based on specific norms elaborated by the Ministry of National Defense, but at the same time respecting the national legislation in force.

A legislative change was made in January 2006, according to which the military units whose commanders have the status of authorizing officers, as well as the activities financed from their own income that organized the accounting in the double party have the obligation to use the Plan of accounts for public institutions.

The plan of accounts is realized based on the general framework of the plans of accounts, elaborated by the Ministry of Public Finance in the context of the measures to improve the economic information system. Based on the accounts within the Plan of Accounts, the existence, movement and transformation of the patrimonial elements in the execution of the processes of execution of the budget of incomes and expenses is ensured, thus obtaining the systematization of the information and their reporting through the financial statements.

In the course of 2018, a series of changes were made to the General Accounts Plan through the Order of the Minister of Public Finance no. 2531/2018 of July 11, 2018 for the approval of the Accounting Reporting System on June 30, 2018 of the economic operators, as well as for the modification and completion of some accounting regulations⁸ and through the Order of the Minister of Public Finance no. 470/2018 of January 11, 2018 regarding the main issues related to the preparation and submission of the annual financial statements and the annual accounting reports of the economic operators at the territorial units of the Ministry of Public Finance, as well as for the modification and completion of accounting regulations⁸. Thus, following these changes, the plan of accounts drawn up according to the principles of classification and symbolization of the decimal system contains nine classes of accounts symbolized with figures from 1 to 9 as follows: 1) capital, provisions, loans and assimilated accounts; 2) fixed assets accounts; 3) stocks and production accounts in progress; 4) third party accounts; 5) treasury accounts; 6) expense accounts; 7) income accounts; 8) special accounts; 9) management accounts⁹.

In the Accounts Plan, the synthetic accounts



have been developed / developed on the basis of the analytical accounts, which are the basis of the preparation of the financial statements and especially of the execution of the budget of incomes and expenses.

For the unitary application in the Ministry of National Defence of the accounting norms approved by the Order of the Minister of Public Finance no. 1917/2005 with the subsequent modifications and completions, the Finance General Directorate elaborated a plan of third-degree analytical accounts for all military units.

The analytical development of the accounts provided for in the Plan of Accounts was carried out in accordance with the principles mentioned in the instructions for applying the Plan of Accounts taking into account the need for the distinct highlighting of certain elements of assets and liabilities and the specific activity of the subordinated units. The instructions for the implementation of the Accounts Plan establish the content of the classes and the accounts, defining the latter's functioning and exemplifying through the correspondence between the accounts the registration of the main operations that take place within the public institutions.

At the same time, in addition to the content of each account, the instructions include guidance regarding the information that can be obtained from the accounts of the respective class and the specific way of using them for analyzing and controlling the activity specific to the military units. For each synthetic account, a delimitation of the content was made taking into account the legislation in force, as well as the main methods used in accounting in order to facilitate the learning of the functioning of the accounts and the technique of recording the correct transactions.

"The provisions of the Plan of Accounts and of the instructions for application do not constitute the legal basis for carrying out certain operations, but they serve only for the recording in accounting of these operations. Any economic-financial operation of the military units subject to registration in the accounting should be carried out in strict accordance with the provisions of the normative act that regulates the respective operation."¹⁰

Due to the approval of the program budget by the Parliament, the analytical accounting is ensured so that it can present the execution accounts for each program and source of financing according to the

approved budget, as well as the way of achieving the approved result indicators, physical indicators and efficiency indicators.

Of the specific elements that are very particular, which highly characterize the accounting in the Ministry of National Defence of the general public accounting in our country, on which we intended to focus in particular in our article is "the way out of office and the disposal of fixed assets, such as and the declassification and classification of material goods, other than fixed assets, regulated by an order of the Minister of National Defence no. M.92 / 2013"¹¹.

We refer below to some details provided in the above mentioned normative act regarding these assets. "The documents proposing the removal from operation of the fixed assets are subject to the approval of the principal authorizing officer, with the specialized opinion of the initiating structures, as well as with the approval of the Defence General Staff for the fixed assets, except for those in the accounting records of the General Directorate of Defence Information and with the opinion of the Directorate of Domains and Infrastructures for the fixed assets if the latter are of the nature of the constructions, the networks related to them and the landscaping"¹².

The approval of the request for termination of the fixed assets is requested, through reports addressed to the principal or secondary authorizing officer, to other persons empowered, as the case may be, according to the internal norms regarding the promotion and transmission of documents in the Ministry of National Defence.

The principal authorizing officer approves the commencement of the dismissal procedure for the following assets:

- a) fixed assets: by the armor, anti-aircraft, aviation, navy, artillery, communications and computer science, respectively genius;
- b) tangible assets other than fixed assets: ammunition, mines and explosives;
- c) constructions of any kind;
- d) fixed tangible / intangible assets;
- e) fixed assets in the own accounting records of the Department of Armaments, of the General Directorate of Defence Information, of the Medical Directorate, of the Directorate of Domains and Infrastructures, of the major states of the categories of forces and of the Joint Logistics Command.

"The analysis and approval committee requests the records of records and functioning of the heads of the specialized departments in whose responsibility the fixed assets are located and verifies, on the spot and in the presence of the manager, the status of the fixed assets and the reality of the data contained in the presented documentation"¹³.

For those fixed assets that are the object of the proposals of dismissal, no resources are allocated and, at the same time, they are no longer in the plans of periodic maintenance, technical revisions or repairs, except the following situations:

- a) for ships that are in an imminent danger of diving;
- b) carrying out laboratory analyzes and taking out ammunition from warehouses;
- c) conservation of the aviation technique.

The military units proposing to put into service the fixed assets will be able to submit supporting documents at the request of the upper echelons with endorsement duties as follows:

- a) the technical book, the booklet, the book or the operating sheet;
- b) the record sheet regarding the activity of the apparatus, the aggregate, the equipment, etc.;
- c) copies of the legal documents for recording the fixed assets, the inventory situations and of other documents, in the case of those fixed assets for which, from the aforementioned documents, the time during which they were used cannot be established;
- d) analysis bulletins, metrological verification;
- e) any other documents that justify the proposal to dismiss.

"The disposal of tangible assets represents the set of operations and activities whereby the fixed assets discharged or the material assets downgraded, other than the fixed ones, are dismantled, demolished or cut into parts / parts that are unusable for the purpose for which they were used as a whole or irretrievably destroyed"¹⁴.

The cancellation is done in the presence of a commission; this is called by the agenda per unit by the authorizing officer. The Commission is made up of three members, with the specification that at least two of them have specialized knowledge.

The internal and external capitalization of the material goods under the administration of the Ministry of National Defence is carried out through the National Company ROMTEHNICA SA.

Inventory objects and materials from the feeding supply, the management tools, respectively inventory objects and the construction-accommodation materials belonging to the Directorate of Domains and Infrastructures are capitalized both by the selection of price / direct negotiation offers and by retail.

"The carrying out of the procedures for the valorization of the goods, except for the valorization through the retail sale and the transmission without payment, is carried out within the Ministry of National Defence by the National Company ROMTEHNICA SA, which establishes, in the process of valorization, direct relations for evaluating the situation and the relations information with the major states of the categories of army forces, weapons commandos and other structures involved"¹⁵.

In cases where the decommissioning of fixed assets is not approved, the competent structures are obliged to provide, in writing, once the minutes are back, the appropriate measures.

"It is not proposed for the commissioning of fixed assets, although they have completed the normal duration of use, if they are in one of the following situations:

- a) the physical and technical state allows their continued exploitation;
- b) for operational or economic reasons it is justified to keep them in operation, even if the cost of the repair exceeds 60% of the replacement value;
- c) they are necessary to the Ministry of National Defense and there are no possibilities of replacement, and through repairs and repairs can be used for a certain period"¹⁶.

After receiving the approved discharge reports, the units holding the fixed assets carry out the following activities:

- a) elaborate the documents of recovery according to the provisions of the Regulation regarding the organization of the procedures for the valorization of the goods under the administration of the Ministry of National Defence approved by the Order of the Minister of National Defence no. M 99 / 22.09.2009 for the approval of the Instructions for the application of the Regulation regarding the organization of the procedures for capitalizing the assets under the administration of the Ministry of National Defence"¹⁷;

b) dispose of the fixed assets following the resulting tangible assets to be valued according to the provisions of the above mentioned order.

Another peculiarity of accounting in the Ministry of National Defence is found in the part of expenses with human resources, not so much in terms of the actual accounting of operations, but especially in relation to the calculation of salaries and the specificity of the documents based on which they are calculated and calculated, grants various bonuses, allowances, food and equipment rules and other benefits in money or in kind. In the army there are both military personnel (officers, military masters, non-commissioned officers), contracted military personnel and contractual civilian personnel, who benefit from a variety of salaries, bonuses and allowances, which need to be very well and carefully calculated, accounted for and budgeted. They are established according to the specificity of the activities carried out by the military and civilian personnel, respecting the legislation specific to the public institutions and, at the same time, following the framing within the limits of the principles of the military field. It is considered the incentive for the personnel and their remuneration taking into account the particularities of the functional attributions that they fulfill.

Finally, within the Ministry of National Defence, regarding the expenditures with human resources, the changes brought by the legislation in the field were applied, in particular the increases that intervened periodically in order to apply the unitary law for the remuneration of the staff and the granting of holiday vouchers starting with the year. 2018. We would like to mention that at the level of the entities of the Ministry of National Defence, the method of calculating the salaries and granting the specific bonuses presents a classification degree considering the specific character of the military field and respecting the principle of confidentiality.

The analytical accounting of the material goods from the management of the military units is organized according to the quantitative-value method (on the analytical account sheets), which consists of keeping the quantitative records on groups or subgroups of goods, at the places of use and stores and the quantitative-value records, at the accounting department within the financial-accounting office.

The quantitative-value evidence of the material goods under the administration of the Ministry of National Defence aims to:

a) ensure the integrity of the patrimony of the Ministry of National Defence;

b) reflect quantitatively and in value all movements on material goods;

c) provide the information necessary for establishing the patrimony, drawing up the technical-material supply plans and carrying out all forms of control.

The supporting documents on the basis of which it is arranged to be executed and recorded in the accounting, the operations regarding the movements of material goods are those stipulated in the "Methodological norms for the preparation and use of the common forms regarding the financial and accounting activity and their models"¹⁸ and in the "Methodological norms for the preparation and use of the specific forms regarding the financial and accounting activity and their models"¹⁹.

In addition to the particularities mentioned above, we must also add the restrictive character of access and circulation of accounting information that is generated through the specialized activity, in the military entities, only certain persons strictly specified in the normative acts having the right to know this information and to use it adequate in managerial activity.

Conclusions

At the global level we are witnessing a wide extension of the accounting harmonization, in particular of the way of drawing up and presenting the accounting information as a result of the changes in the international economic plan having consequences regarding the evolution of the accounting.

The plan of accounts approved by the Order of the Minister of Public Finance no. 1.917/2005 with the subsequent modifications and completions and which is harmonized with the International Accounting Standards contains those accounts through which the military units have the obligation to organize and to manage the accounting in a double party.

Military units organize and lead the process of accounting for non-current assets, inventories and expenditures with human resources, respecting the national legislation in force applicable to public

institutions and taking into account the specificities specific to military activities.

The central pivot of the harmonization of the activities specific to the military field with the national provisions in the field is represented by the General Financial-Accounting Directorate that ensures the financial-accounting management at the level of the Ministry of National Defence and which coordinates the financial-accounting activity at the level of the entities of the Ministry of National Defence, taking care as through the promotion of the different orders of the minister, to materialize the way of managing and accounting for the different non-current, current assets or sources of financing (as we have also exemplified several situations in our article).

NOTES:

1 <https://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/ipsas>, accessed on 10.10.2019.

2 *Legea contabilității nr. 82/1991*, republicată, cu modificările și completările ulterioare, publicată în Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, nr. 454 din 18 iunie 2008.

3 D. Rusu, *Bazele contabilității*, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, București, 1980, p. 23.

4 www.ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contabilitate accessed on 29.09.2019.

5 C. Năstase, *Managementul financiar-contabil în Ministerul Apărării în condițiile integrării României în NATO*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare "Carol I", București, 2006, p. 26.

6 *Legea contabilității nr. 82/1991*, republicată, cu modificările și completările ulterioare, publicată în Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, nr. 454 din 18 iunie 2008.

7 Published in Official Romanian Gazette, no 623 of July 18, 2018.

8 Published in Official Romanian Gazette, no 66 of January 23, 2018.

9 <https://contabilul.manager.ro/a/14197/plan-de-conturi-2015-conform-omfp-1802.html>, accessed on 08.11.2019.

10 Ministerul Finanțelor, *Precizarea pentru reflectarea în contabilitate a operațiunilor privind primirea și utilizarea fondurilor din contribuția financiară a Comunității Europene, precum și a fondurilor de cofinanțare aferente acestora din 16.06.2000*, text published in Official Romanian Gazette, in force starting with August 14, 2000.

11 ****Ordinul M. 92/2013 privind scoaterea din funcție și casarea activelor fixe, precum și declararea și clasarea bunurilor materiale, altele decât cele fixe, în Ministerul Apărării Naționale*, published in Official Romanian Gazette, Part I, no. 609 of 1 October 2013.

12 *Ordinul M. 92/2013 privind scoaterea din funcție și casarea activelor fixe, precum și declararea și clasarea bunurilor materiale, altele decât cele fixe, în Ministerul Apărării Naționale*, cap. I, art.2, pct. 2.

13 *Ibidem*, cap. I, secțiunea 2, art. 5, pct. 1.

14 *Ibidem*, cap. III, art. 19.

15 ****Ordinul ministrului apărării naționale nr. M. 99/22.09.2009* pentru aprobarea Instrucțiunilor de aplicare a Regulamentului privind organizarea procedurilor pentru valorificarea bunurilor aflate în administrarea Ministerului Apărării Naționale, published in Official Romanian Gazette, Part I, no. 685 of October 12, 2009.

16 ****Ordinul M.92/2013 privind scoaterea din funcție și casarea activelor fixe, precum și declararea și clasarea bunurilor materiale, altele decât cele fixe, în Ministerul Apărării Naționale*, published in Official Romanian Gazette Part I, no. 685 of October, 12, 2009.

17 *** *Monitorul Oficial al României*, Partea I, nr. 685, din 12 octombrie 2009.

18 ****Ordinul ministrului finanțelor publice nr. 2634/2015* privind documentele financiar-contabile.

19 ****Ordinul ministrului finanțelor publice nr. 1.792/2002, Normele metodologice privind angajarea, lichidarea, ordonanțarea și plata cheltuielilor instituțiilor publice, precum și organizarea, evidența și raportarea angajamentelor bugetare și legale actualizat în anul 2017.*

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****Monitorul Oficial al României*, Partea I, nr. 685 din 12 octombrie 2009.

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Năstase C., *Managementul financiar-contabil în Ministerul Apărării în condițiile integrării României în NATO*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare "Carol I", București, 2006.

****Ordinul ministrului finanțelor publice nr. 470/2018 din 11 ianuarie 2018* privind principalele aspecte legate de întocmirea și depunerea situațiilor financiare anuale și a raportărilor contabile anuale ale operatorilor economici la unitățile teritoriale ale Ministerului Finanțelor Publice, precum și pentru modificarea și completarea unor reglementări contabile.

****Ordinul ministrului finanțelor publice*



nr 1.792/2002, Normele metodologice privind angajarea, lichidarea, ordonanțarea și plata cheltuielilor instituțiilor publice, precum și organizarea, evidența și raportarea angajamentelor bugetare și legale actualizat în anul 2017.

***Ordinul ministrului finanțelor publice nr. 2.531/2018 din 11 iulie 2018 pentru aprobarea Sistemului de raportare contabilă la 30 iunie 2018 a operatorilor economici, precum și pentru modificarea și completarea unor reglementări contabile.

***Ordinul ministrului finanțelor publice nr. 2634/2015 privind documentele financiar-contabile.

***Ordinul M92/2013 privind scoaterea din funcție și casarea activelor fixe, precum și declasarea și clasarea bunurilor materiale, altele decât cele fixe, în Ministerul Apărării Naționale, publicat în Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, nr. 609 din 1 octombrie 2013.

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NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK IN THE FIELD OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FOR NON-CURRENT ASSETS, INVENTORIES AND EXPENDITURES WITH HUMAN RESOURCES: PREMISES, MOTIVATIONS AND EVOLUTION UNTIL PRESENT

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It is necessary to study the occurrence, evolution and the main provisions in the field of the accounting system in order to identify those aspects that have been taken into account from the beginning to bring this system to the current state. The adoption by the IPSASB/Council for International Public Sector Accounting Standards of IPSAS represented a measure of international accounting harmonization. And our country joined this effort and implemented in the public sector IPSAS, including within the entities of the Ministry of National Defence, where the evolution of the accounting took place in the context of the development of the public accounting in Romania. After 2005, a series of normative acts designed to bring the accounting system in Romania to the level of the states within the international community to which our country joined. Each military unit organizes its quantitative-value accounting using the plan of accounts and the application instructions developed by the Ministry of National Defence and endorsed by the Ministry of Public Finance.

Keywords: authorizing officer; analytical accounting; patrimony; financial situations; accounting standards.

Introduction

The international context, in which our country was after the events of December 1989, as well as the changes in the international geopolitical environment, determined the adoption of measures that Romania had to take in order to guarantee its independence, integrity and sovereignty. Thus, the fall of the communist bloc in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the tendency to expand the North Atlantic Alliance, as well as the European Union, required numerous changes, including on the economic and financial level. The desire of our country to join the two major alliances with capitalist orientation was a starting point in the modification of the main legislative provisions in the field of public accounting.

Public accounting is a part of the general accounting that deals with the records of operations within a public patrimony. In the basic law of accounting, this is defined as "specialized activity

in the measurement, evaluation, knowledge, management and control of assets, liabilities and equity, as well as of the results obtained from the activity of legal and natural persons ... must ensure registration chronological and systematic, the processing, publication and retention of information regarding the financial position, financial performance and cash flows, both for their internal requirements, as well as in relations with present and potential investors, financial and commercial creditors, customers, public institutions and other users"¹.

In addition to the movements regarding the elements of the public patrimony, the public accounting also includes operations of control over the public goods and incomes. It is also natural, since the control operations regarding the public revenues are far ahead of the realization of these revenues and exceed the period during which this realization takes place. "The receipts from taxes, taxes, etc. are prepared in the form of a draft budget, are tracked and collected, subsequently constituting the public funds, which are distributed according to the public needs"².

Public institutions are represented by those units through which the state performs its functions

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in the field of administration, in the sphere of social-cultural actions, justice, the prosecutor's office, the defense of the country, etc. The law of public finances contains certain details regarding the formation, administration and use of the financial resources of the state, of the administrative-territorial units and of the public institutions.

Requirements for updating the legal framework of public accounting for non-current assets, stocks and expenses with human resources

It is well known that, since its emergence as a science, accounting has been connected to the establishment, management and efficient use of the patrimony, being the discipline that makes available to the management of the company operational data and information, as well as a synthesis on the state and management of the patrimony. The operational data and information are taken from the current accounting records, and the summary ones are centralized and then taken over in the annual financial statements, which present the situation of the company's assets and its results at a given time, thus constituting the indispensable instrument for an economic-financial diagnosis. It is necessary to evaluate the performance of the company and to detect any vulnerability in the activity carried out.

In order to understand the process of accounting for non-current assets, inventories and expenditures with human resources, I have studied the emergence and evolution of this concept in order to identify those aspects that have been considered from the beginning to bring this process to its current state. Given the dynamic changes in the international context, an analysis of this process is permanently required to identify the vulnerabilities and make those essential changes in order to optimize the results obtained and to improve the accounting activity.

"In ancient times, the first author of accounting was considered Hammurabi (2002-1960 BC) the king of Babylon, who ordered the engraving on a diorite block of the oldest known code of commercial and social laws, which also imposed the legal obligation of recording certain transactions in the form of accounts"³.

Towards the end of the 13th century, certain changes were made regarding the way of keeping records, creating two accounts, namely: one for

the customer and the second for the supplier. Thus, each operation generated two records: one in the customer/supplier account and the other in the cash account. This change resulted in the use of two separate registers.

"Thus, double-party accounting appeared, long before the first accounting treaty that presented it. We owe it to a Franciscan monk Luca Paciolo, who published in Venice in 1494 an encyclopedia called "Summa di arithmetica, geometrica, proportioni et proportionalitá" which comprised 36 (thirty-six) chapters on account keeping. Paciolo referred to three registers: the memorial, the diary and the large register. He demonstrated the technique of the double game and the constancy of the equality between the debtor and creditor amounts. We owe Luca Paciolo the promotion and popularization of accounting in a double party, which has not undergone profound changes until today"⁴.

The present picture of accounting originates in France, where in 1673, following Colbert's issuance of an order, traders were forced to use accounting records and the journal book. Therefore, the accounting has become a tool of control of public administration bodies, an aspect that is valid and currently taking into account the fiscal role it holds.

Since the twentieth century accounting rules and regulations have been issued and become binding on all organizations. Thus, Germany being the first state that, in 1937, adopted an accounting plan called the "Göring plan". Previously, the former USSR had drafted in 1925 the first accounting plan through which five-year economic plans are verified.

"In the USA the crisis of 1929 determines, for reasons of financial information, the editing of the first essential accounting rules, even though the problem of defining the general accounting methods and principles was raised much earlier.

In France, the first accounting regulation dates from 1942 (under the Vichy regime), then in 1947 an accounting plan was drawn up from the one drawn up in 1942. It is revised in 1957, and the current version was promulgated as a law in 1982"⁵.

In our country, the moment of reference regarding the evolution of public accounting is represented by the Unification of the Romanian Principalities from 1859. On November 29, 1860,

when the public administration was under the rule of Alexandru Ioan Cuza, the Finance Regulation was issued and approved, document which represented the first law of financial organization in Romania. The main provisions of this Regulation have been improved and revised following the experience and accounting practices from that time, changes that were used in the General Accounting Law of the state, passed in 1864, also containing all the principles of budget law.

Based on the Romanian Constitution of 1864, this law constituted the first "Law of public accounting" which regulated the elaboration, adaptation and execution of the state budget in our country, which had undergone many modifications and improvements in the over 30 years during which it was in effect.

"The fiscal reform of Vintilă Brătianu from 1923 – the year in which a new Constitution was voted – made a new law of direct contributions implemented (The law of direct contributions from 1921 was not applied entirely due to political maneuvers).

On December 25, 1929, the Law for the repression of tax evasion for direct contributions was adopted, which determined the acceleration of the process of implementation of the provisions of the Public Accounting Law"⁶.

Following the events of December 1989, numerous changes were made that aimed to harmonize the Romanian legislation with the European regulations in the field, reaching the current provisions of the Accounting Law no. 82/1991, respectively of the Law of public finances no. 500/2002, modified and updated.

Thus, the accounting law no. 82/1991 obliges all the companies, the autonomous companies, the natural persons who record income, as well as the public institutions to organize and manage their own accounting, respectively the financial accounting, according to the law and the management accounting adapted to the specific activity of each entity.

I would like to point out that in the Ministry of National Defense the evolution of accounting for non-current assets, inventories and expenditures with human resources took place in the context of changes and evolution of public accounting in our country, given the new state of Romania as a NATO member and of the EU.

Over time, an important role in the development

of accounting of current assets, stocks and expenditures with human resources in the Ministry of National Defence held the central financial-accounting structure of the ministry, which over time has had different names, starting with the one from the 7th Directorate of Accounting (May 20, 1891) to the General Financial-Accounting Directorate, as it is called today.

A marked temporal landmark within the financial-accounting activity of the Ministry of National Defence is represented by the approval of the Regulation of the financial-accounting activity of the army through the General Order of the Minister of National Defence no. 32 of 1978, document that began to be applied starting with 01.01.1979⁷.

Also, starting with January 1, 1996, the units within the Ministry of National Defence organized and conducted their own accounting in a double party using the Accounts Plan and its Instructions for application, approved by the order of the Minister of Finance no. 324 of 1984, with subsequent additions.

Therefore, I brought to the attention the main premises regarding the evolution over time both in our country and in other partner states currently within the alliances which Romania is a part of.

Motivations regarding the need for the permanent updating of the main provisions regarding public accounting for non-current assets, inventories and expenditures with human resources

World experience has confirmed that as in current language people use well-defined concepts and accounting rules and rules are needed to make it possible to rigorously define both the content of accounts as main working tools and the methodology used to determine results.

This need to print information is imposed by the economic relations that are created inside the country between the economic agents, as well as by the international relations for the facilitation to which the 4th Directive of the European Economic Community and the International Accounting Standards have been issued. The regulation of the accounting language is also imposed by the relations established by law between the public power and the economic agents regarding the pursuit of the fulfillment of the fiscal obligations.

The emergence of International Public Sector Accounting Standards/ IPSAS has been a reference point for the reform of the public accounting system worldwide, but with a significant importance in Europe. Thus, the adoption by IPSASB/ Council for International Public Sector Accounting Standards of IPSAS represented a measure of international accounting harmonization.

International Accounting Standards/IAS are "unanimously accepted accounting principles, rules, procedures and policies that accountants around the world must use and apply in the preparation and presentation of financial statements so as to ensure appropriate terminology for the purpose of providing viable accounting information on which its users make economic decisions⁸⁷", increasingly diversified and sophisticated.

By studying and analyzing the regulations in the accounting field, I have found international, European and national accounting standards.

Regarding the international accounting standards, which are the basis of the other two categories mentioned above, these are elaborated by the International Accounting Standards Committee /IASC. Their purpose and main characteristics are:

a) "providing generally valid accounting rules, accepted in all countries of the world, capable of harmonizing to the greatest extent the accounting standards and procedures practiced in different countries;

b) providing the same basis for the preparation of financial reports so that international investors and banks can make comparative analyses of the different investment opportunities;

c) IAS does not overlap with the national accounting standards. If the national standards are very different from the international ones, then the IASC representatives have the task of convincing the competent bodies about their advantages and their harmonization;

d) the scope of the IAS is limited only to the essential elements and from the date specified in the text of the standard, except those which are applied retroactively⁹⁷.

The European accounting standards are issued by the European Union based on the 4th Directive which contains the rules on the preparation and presentation of the annual social accounts (of the companies), the 6th Directive which regulates the

consolidated accounts prepared by the group of companies and the 7th Directive regarding the free accounting profession oriented towards auditing the annual accounts.

National standards are developed by each country in relation to international standards and European directives. These reflect national identities, accounting traditions of their socio-economic situations, a process in which each country defends its interests.

The application of these standards was also realized in the public sector, thus being able to discuss International Accounting Standards in the public sector/International Public Sector Accounting Standards/IPSAS, a number of 32 IPSAS being elaborated. Since the advent of the first IPSAS, European countries have had a different way of implementation and some specific aspects can be brought to your attention as follows:

a) France has applied the accounting of commitments in the public domain since 1999, but in the first phase it showed difficulties in applying IPSAS, requiring new rules and procedures in line with the new standards;

b) Germany has applied them since 2013, the implementation process being an arduous one because it was necessary to update the specific provisions of this field;

c) The United Kingdom in turn has applied commitment accounting since 1995, initially implementing IPSAS only with an experimental role in order to identify the benefits, but also the vulnerabilities of their use in the public sector.

At the same time, if expanding the scope of IPSAS, I have noticed that Australia has applied a mix of IPSAS with IAS, called Australian Accounting Standards¹⁰.

In view of the wide changes in the geopolitical space of our country and the tendency of standardization at European Union level and regarding accounting practices regarding non-current assets, inventories and expenditures with human resources, Romania joined this effort and implemented in the public sector IPSAS, including within the entities of the Ministry of National Defence which I have discussed in this material.

The evolution of the legislative framework in the field of accounting for non-current assets, inventories and expenditures with human resources

The desire to respond to new international requirements has led to the need for major changes in the public accounting system for non-current assets, inventories and expenditures with human resources in our country. Thus, Romania's accession to NATO in 2004 and the desire to join the European effort that materialized in 2007 required the adoption of legislative changes in the field of public accounting of non-current assets, inventories and expenditures with human resources to bring it to the level of the states within the international community which our country has joined.

The public institutions are obliged to conduct the accounting in a double party, respecting the provisions of Law 82/1991, updated with subsequent amendments and completions, with the help of the accounts provided for in the general accounts plan approved by the Order of the Minister of Public Finance 1917/2005, with the subsequent modifications and completions which I have discussed in the framework of this material and which is in line with international accounting standards, the international system of accounts and the financial regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Community. Using these accounts, public institutions have the obligation to record economic-financial operations when generating debt or debt rights (the accrual principle), according to their requirements.

Accounting of non-current assets and inventories is an integral part of public accounting and has as its object the records of inflows, outflows, non-current assets and inventories and produced goods and is kept in accordance with the MFP Order no. 1917 of December 12, 2005 for the approval of the Methodological Norms regarding the organization and management of the accounting of the public institutions, the Accounting Plan for the public institutions and the instructions for its application, as subsequently amended and supplemented, published in the Official Monitor no. 1186 of December 29, 2005. Subsequently, it was modified in several successive stages, the last modification being made through OMFP no. 1176 of January 26, 2018 for the modification and completion of the Methodological Norms

regarding the organization and management of the accounting of public institutions, the Accounting Plan for public institutions and the instructions for its implementation. This order constituted a reference moment in the evolution of public accounting for non-current assets, inventories and expenditures with human resources making a series of changes in this area meant to bring this system to the level of other partner states and to meet the specific requirements of the economic market. Within the Ministry of National Defence, for the unitary application of the accounting norms approved by this order, the Financial-Accounting Directorate has elaborated a plan of analytical accounts of degree III for all the military units, a plan that, over the years, has undergone changes in order to harmonize the accounting system, also for non-current assets, inventories and expenditures with human resources.

With respect to the preparation and submission of the financial statements of public institutions over time, a series of normative acts were issued aimed at regulating and updating this area. Thus, through the MFP Order no. 616 of December 31, 2006 a series of changes were made regarding the preparation, signing, filing, composition, and filling in the quarterly financial statements of public institutions, as well as their models, changes that took into account and the new regulations in the field applied internationally. These provisions have been permanently updated to meet the specific requirements of the economic market and, at the same time, the changes made at international level, in particular by applying IPSAS, which led to the Minister of Public Finance issuing order no. 640/2017 of April 28, 2017 for the approval of the Methodological Norms regarding the preparation and submission of quarterly financial statements of public institutions, as well as of monthly financial reports in 2017, for the modification and completion of the Methodological Norms regarding the organization and management of the accounting of public institutions, the Accounting Plan for the public institutions and the instructions for its application, approved by the Order of the Minister of Public Finance no. 1.917/2005, as well as for the modification and completion of other methodological norms in the field of public accounting, plan of accounts that has undergone modifications also in 2018, in the sense that these

currently contain nine classes of accounts numbered from 1 to 9 and namely: 1) capital accounts, provisions, loans and assimilated debts; 2) fixed assets accounts; 3) inventories and production accounts in progress; 4) third party accounts; 5) treasury accounts; 6) expense accounts; 7) income accounts; 8) special accounts; 9) management accounts¹¹.

Following measures adopted at national level determined by the need to prevent and combat tax evasion, the implementation of Council Directive 2016/1164/EU of July 12, 2016 laying down rules against practices to avoid tax obligations that have a direct impact on the functioning of the internal market (ATAD), published in the Official Journal of the European Union of July 19, 2016, as well as the observance of the Governance Program, GEO no. 79/2017 was adopted for amending and supplementing Law no. 227/2015 regarding the Fiscal Code, a decree that had positive consequences on the state budget by encouraging the declaration of some revenues and the timely payment of the related contributions.

One of the changes made in recent years in public accounting in Romania (including the Ministry of National Defence) refers to the certificate of attestation of the knowledge acquired in the field of the European System of Accounts (SEC) and is stipulated in OMFP no. 2081/2019 regarding the modification and completion of the Order of the Minister of Public Finance and of the Minister delegated for the budget no. 496/2014 for the approval of the Methodological Norms regarding the acquisition and withdrawal of the certificate attesting the knowledge acquired in the field of the European System of Accounts.

Another set of changes made in 2019 in the accounting and budgeting system set up in public institutions refers to the FOREXEBUG system, a change recorded in OMFP no. 128/2019 regarding the modification and completion of OMFP no. 517/2016 for the approval of procedures related to modules that are part of the operating procedure of the national reporting system FOREXEBUG.

According to this order and in 2019, until July 31, the public institutions that use the national reporting system regulated by OUG no. 88/2013 regarding the adoption of fiscal-budgetary measures for the fulfillment of commitments agreed with the international bodies, as well as for the modification

and completion of some normative acts, approved with modifications by Law no. 25/2014, with the subsequent amendments and completions, submit in the national reporting system FOREXEBUG the individual budgets, and at the territorial units of the State Treasury, they submit the budgets drawn up on paper, distributed and approved according to the law, by the authorizing officer of hierarchically superior or by to the local council, as the case may be, which were the basis for drawing up the individual budget in electronic format.

OMFP no. 2080/2019 for the modification and completion of the Methodological Norms regarding the opening and distribution/withdrawal of budgetary credits from the state budget, the state social insurance budget, the unemployment insurance budget, the budget of the National Health Insurance Fund, the State Treasury budget, the Fund budget environment and local budgets also bring a series of changes and clarifications in this area, contributing substantially to the optimization of the budget system and social insurance.

At the same time, within the Ministry of National Defence, over time, the military specialists in the field have identified solutions, but not enough, for the modernization of accounting in order to achieve a management channeled towards objectives and performance, which will connect the three fundamental elements of the financial planning process, respectively sectoral policies, programs/projects with measurable objectives and budgetary resources.

In the Ministry of National Defense, the experimentation activity was carried out on the basis of the Order of the Minister of National Defence no. 187 of 22.12.2004. The experimentation process included: the principal authorizing officer for his own activity, six secondary authorizing officers, as well as thirty-two tertiary authorizing officers.

The organization of the technical-operative and accounting records, as well as the management of the fixed assets in units is made on the basis of the General Norms regarding the organization and management of the accounting in the Ministry of National Defence no M.73/1997, of the instructions regarding the organization and management of the quantitative-value records of the assets under administration of Ministry of National Defence no M. 8/1999, of HG no. 2230/1969 regarding the hiring of managers, the establishment of guarantees

and the liability in relation to the management of the assets.

Each military unit organizes its quantitative-value accounting using the plan of accounts and the application instructions elaborated by the Ministry of National Defence and approved by the Ministry of Public Finance.

In the Ministry of National Defence, the accounting of non-current assets, inventories and expenditures with human resources is organized within the military units that manage material and monetary values, regardless of the sources of financing the expenses and have provided in the states of financial-accounting compartment.

In the situationcase of general mobilization or transition to a state of war, the organization and management of the accounting is ensured on the basis of specific rules developed by the Ministry of National Defence, but at the same time respecting the national legislation in force.

The authorizing officer and the chief accountant of the military unit in which the accounting is organized, have the obligation to ensure, according to the law:

- a) the organization and the correct and up-to-date management of the accounting;
- b) organizing and carrying out the inventory of assets and liabilities, as well as capitalizing on its results;
- c) observing the rules for the preparation of the financial statements, their timely submission to the law enforcement bodies;
- d) keeping the supporting documents, registers and financial statements;
- e) organization of management accounting adapted to the specific of the unit.

From my point of view, the specialists in the field were and are constantly concerned about updating the legislative framework regarding the accounting of non-current assets, inventories and expenditures with human resources. I consider that the changes that have been made in this area have been well-founded being determined by the need to make improvements in order to optimize this process, to obtain positive effects and, above all, to standardize the specific activities according to the status that our country has internationally.

Conclusions

A pressing necessity is the management accounting that must be adapted to the specific of the activities carried out within the military units in order to achieve a clear image of their heritage.

The credibility of the information included in the preparation of the records and the supporting documents, as well as the way of recording in the accounting can be verified through the inventory activity.

The military specialists in the field are permanently concerned with the application of international and national provisions to the specific activity of the army. With all the difficulties encountered during the implementation of the system of quantitative and value records, it was also demonstrated in this way that the decision makers in the army are concerned with respecting the law of the country in all areas of responsibility, as well as the efficient management of the military heritage according to the model modern armies.

In this material we identified the main effects of the changes made in the last years of the main legislative provisions regarding the public accounting system in our country regarding non-current assets, stocks and expenditures with human resources in public institutions and implicitly to entities within the Ministry of National Defence.

NOTES:

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***MFP Order No. 1917 of 12 December 2005 approving the methodological rules on the organization and management of the accountancy of public institutions, the plan of accounts for public institutions and the instructions for its application, with subsequent amendments and additions, published in the Official Gazette of Romania No. 1186 of 29 December 2005. Subsequently, it was modified in several successive stages and the last modification was made by OMFP No. 1176 of 26 January 2018 for the modification and completion of the methodological rules on the organization and management of the accountancy of public institutions, the plan of accounts for public institutions and the instructions for its application.

***MFP Order No. 616 of 31 December 2006 for the approval of methodological rules for the

preparation, signature, filing, composition, manner of completion of the quarterly financial statements of public institutions in 2006 and their models.

***MFP Order No. 3769/2008 for the approval of methodological rules on the preparation and filing of public institutions' financial statements on 31 December 2008.

***MFP Order No. 2021 of 17.12.2013 for the modification and completion of the methodological rules on the organization and management of the accountancy of public institutions, the plan of accounts for public institutions and the instructions for its application, approved by order of the Minister of Public finances No. 1917/2005.

***G.P.O. No. 79/2017 for modification and completion of Law No. 227/2015 on the tax code.

***MFP Order No. 191/2017 of 30 January 2017 approving the methodological rules concerning the preparation and filing of public institutions' financial statements on 31 December 2016, as well as for the modification and completion of Annex No. 41 to the methodological rules on the preparation and filing of quarterly financial statements of public institutions, as well as monthly financial reports in year 2009, approved by order of the Minister for Public finances no. 629/2009.

***MFP Order No. 640/2017 of 28 April 2017 approving the methodological rules on the preparation and filing of quarterly financial statements of public institutions, as well as monthly financial reporting in 2017, for the modification and completion of the methodological rules on the organization and management of the accountancy of public institutions, the plan of accounts for public institutions and the instructions for its application, approved by order of the Minister for Public finances no. 1.917/2005, as well as for the modification and completion of other methodological rules in the field of public accountancy.

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METHODS AND TECHNIQUES USED TO EVALUATE THE PERFORMANCE OF INTERNAL PUBLIC AUDIT

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In order to elucidate some essential aspects regarding the evaluation of the performances of the internal public audit, we had to highlight for the first time some defining issues in the area of internal management control activity.

A second issue that we focused on relates to some fundamental aspects regarding the requirements of the missions of evaluation in the internal public audit activity, where we pointed out some relevant things such as: internal and external evaluations of the quality and performance of internal public audit.

The final part was dedicated to highlighting the considerations regarding the evaluation of the performances of the entities of the Ministry of National Defence with the help of the internal public audit.

Keywords: internal managerial control; internal public audit; evaluating the quality; Balanced Scorecard (BSC); performance indicators;

Considerations regarding the definition of the control of internal managerial nature and the connection with the performance evaluation in this process

First, we are going to try to define the concept of internal managerial control. We find a definition of internal managerial control in the Government Ordinance no. 119/1999¹. According to this normative act the **internal/managerial control**² represents "the set of the control forms exercised at the level of the public entity, including the internal audit, established by the management, in accordance with its objectives and with the legal regulations, in order to ensure the administration of the public funds in an economical, efficient and effective manner; it also includes organizational structures, methods and procedures"³.

Analyzing this definition it can be observed that it highlights some very important characteristics: a) it covers all the forms, methods and control procedures that are carried out at the level of the public entities and all the organizational structures

within them; b) it includes internal audit as an activity which is not viewed separately, as distinct from control; c) the forms of control are established by the management of each public entity, but appropriate to the specific activity of each individual, yet, in accordance with the normative acts and the objectives of each entity; d) it emphasizes the purpose of internal control over the administration of public funds in an economical, efficient and effective manner, which is a major objective of any entity, whether it is public or private.

We could conclude that it is a modern, comprehensive definition and of great conceptual depth.

The organization of the internal management control system of any public entity considers the achievement of **three categories of objectives**: a) *operational*; b) *reporting*; c) *compliance*.

The design, implementation and continuous development of a viable internal control system are possible only if the **system meets the following requirements**:

a) to be adapted to the size, complexity and specific environment of the entity; b) to target all levels of management and all activities / operations; c) to be built with the same "instruments" in all public entities; d) to ensure that the objectives of

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the entity will be achieved; e) from the beginning to strictly follow the observance of the condition, according to which the costs of introducing this control system are lower than the benefits obtained from this activity; f) to be subordinated to the general minimum management requirements stipulated in the profit standards.

The **internal management control tool** can be classified into the **following large groups**: 1) objectives pursued; 2) means (resources) used; 3) information system used; 4) chosen organization; 5) procedures that can be used; 6) the control mode to be executed.

The design of a viable internal management control system is a process that has an important duration, which requires a remarkable activity from the personnel of the public institutions and, especially, from the personnel holding management positions.

Public institutions that have introduced a quality management system can satisfy the requirements stipulated by the Code of internal managerial control, by means of the own principles of the established management system, with the requirement that the principles be applied in a unitary way on the whole of this entity of this nature.

Next, we will point to the content of the **Standard 7 of internal/managerial control** which refers to the **Performance evaluation of all the standards of internal managerial control**.

The head of the public entity arranges the monitoring of the performances for the objectives and/or the activities of the compartments, through quantitative and/or qualitative indicators, including those on economics, efficiency and effectiveness.

This standard implies the following **requirements** from the compartment managers: 1) to monitor the performances of the activities under coordination, by developing a system adapted to the size and specificity of the compartment's activity; 2) to ensure that at least one performance indicator is established for the objectives set and the activities foreseen in the plan and/or carried out, with which the achievements are monitored and reported; 3) based on the reports that are performed annually on the monitoring of the performances transmitted by the profile structures, to prepare a set of information regarding the monitoring of the performances of the state entities for the benefit of

their leaders; 4) the organizational chart and the depth of the way of monitoring the performances is conditioned by the size and particularities of the activity of the public entity, by the change of objectives and indicators, by the way of employees having access to the information they need.

The management of the public institutions decides on a regular basis the evaluation of the performances, detects the possible deviations from the objectives established initially and initiates measures of prevention and of correction that are necessary.

Such standard has as **main references** the following **normative acts**: Law no. 500/2002⁴, Law no. 273/2006⁵; budget laws that are approved each year; Government Emergency Ordinance no. 86/2014⁶; Government Decision no. 611/2008⁷; Government Decision no 478/2016⁸; Government Ordinance no. 119/1999⁹; Order of the Minister of Public Finance no. 1.159/2004¹⁰.

These normative acts are added those that appear during the course and complement constructively or almost completely replace some of the older ones, which no longer retain their validity in the new circumstances.

The leaders of the public entities must adequately answer at least the following questions and challenges: 1) Is there a performance monitoring and reporting system established, based on the indicators associated with the specific objectives? 2) Is there an examination and ranking of the performances based on the performance indicators set maintained? 3) If there is a possible deviation from the requirements of the objectives, are preventive and corrective measures taken necessary?

To these questions each manager or head of compartment at all the hierarchical levels of each public entity must be able to answer, in an appropriate manner, precisely. This means that at each hierarchical level there must be an adequate and relevant system of performance indicators that each employee must reach, regardless of the position occupied in the hierarchy. There is also a need for a very precise and realistic system for monitoring and reporting the performance of each structure and of each employee that is part of them, and if deviations from the required objectives and performances are found, the heads of structures should be able to propose and, respectively, to

decide the necessary corrective measures, without resorting at any price to the sanctioning or dismissal of the persons of management or execution who did not reach the required performances.

Some defining aspects regarding the mission whose purpose is to evaluate the activity of internal public audit

The main objectives of the internal public audit activity are as follows: 1) risk management assessment; 2) evaluation of the functionality of the internal control system; 3) management advice. For this activity to be carried out as efficiently and responsibly as possible, its evaluation is also required.

Evaluation of the internal public audit activity, according to the Government Decision no. 1086 of December 11, 2013¹¹ constitutes an assessment, on analytical grounds, of the internal audit function in public institutions, in order to ensure the achievement of the objectives, according to the profile standards.

Examining or evaluating the quality or performance of the internal public audit activity is an ex-post activity.

This evaluation has its origin in the examination of the internal audit activity according to the compliance and the performance against certain criteria, such as the provisions of the normative framework specific to the field, the established objectives and so on.

Evaluation of the quality or performance of the internal public audit (including in the Ministry of National Defence) is performed through **internal and external evaluations**:

Internal evaluations are performed by the head of the internal audit structure and can be of two types: 1) *periodic evaluations*; 2) *continuous evaluations*¹².

External evaluations are periodic assessments performed by UCAAPI/internal public audit departments constituted at the level of hierarchically superior public entities, through:

a) Verification of compliance with the norms, instructions, Code on the ethical conduct of the internal auditor;

b) Evaluation of the quality of the internal audit, on the basis of criteria set in relation to the normative framework that is applied in the field;

c) Expressing an opinion, in relation to the

levels of appreciation granted and by formulating recommendations aimed at correcting non-conformities and improving activities, in each internal public audit mission¹³.

The problem of internal audit evaluation (public and private entities) is met professionally and at two Romanian brand specialists in the field: Ghiță Marcel¹⁴ and Boța-Avram Cristina¹⁵.

The carrying out and completion of the internal public audit evaluation missions involve at least the following actions:

a) objectively measuring the internal audit carried out in public entities, with the help of an in-depth analysis, to see the extent to which the compliance and performance requirements with the previously established criteria are met, through the normative acts and other supporting instruments specific to this activity;

b) the delivery by the internal auditors carrying out the evaluation of this activity of profile, of an independent opinion and objectives related to the extent to which the audit departments have reached the degree of compliance and performance;

c) Making recommendations for raising the bar of internal public audit activity, in order to increase its efficiency and effectiveness.

Internal auditors formulate their opinion on the internal audit activity evaluated in relation to the levels of appreciation granted and the results of the recorded findings, taking into account the following requirements: a) the extent to which the specific general and methodological norms regarding the exercise of this activity are respected; b) the extent to which the compliance of the internal audit activities with the procedures of the profile compartment is respected; c) the level of coverage of all the processes and activities of the state entity through the audit missions carried out; d) examining the level of effectiveness of the internal audit; e) the added value brought by the internal audit in the activity of the public entity.

The scope of the evaluations of the internal public audit activity includes, at least the following aspects: a) the content of the mission, competences and responsibilities of the internal public audit department; b) the degree of independence of the internal audit structure within the public entity; c) the level of competence and professional awareness of the internal auditors; d) how the management of the internal audit activity is performed; e) the nature

of the internal audit activity; f) the coordinates of the quality assurance and improvement program of the internal public audit activity; g) the extent to which the specific norms are respected in carrying out the internal public audit missions; h) objectively establishing and operationally communicating the results of the internal public audit missions.

The methodology for carrying out the missions for evaluating the internal public audit activity involves following the specific procedures (which include: initiation of the internal audit; drawing up the statement of independence; developing the notification regarding to the start of the evaluation operation; organizing the opening of the mission session; collecting and processing information; developing the evaluation mission program; collecting and analyzing the audit evidence; reviewing documents and setting up the audit evidence; closing session; drawing up the draft report of the evaluation mission; elaboration of the evaluation mission report); and making related documents, as required in the pattern presented in the Government Decision no. 1086 of December 11, 2013¹⁶.

A very useful tool for evaluating performance in different fields, including in internal public audit is "Balanced scorecard" (BSC).

"Balanced scorecard" (BSC) is a performance management tool, initially developed by Kaplan and Norton (1992). These two specialists introduced the Balanced Scorecard in an article in 1992 on the Harvard Business Review (Kaplan and Norton, 1992). Since the publication of the HBR article in 1992, several companies have quickly adopted the Balanced Scorecard, providing the initiators deeper and broader information about their power and potential.

This article describes the roots and motivation for the original Balanced Scorecard article, as well as the subsequent innovations that connected it to a larger management literature¹⁷.

The "balanced scorecard" can be successfully applied for both commercial and non-commercial activities, having a double quality, to be at the same time both a working tool and a management model¹⁸.

In principle, the **Balanced Scorecard** as an appropriate tool can be used for evaluation, performance improvement, and as an element of the reporting system, in order to add value to the

activity, but also to prove responsibility.

It is time to mention that a project with European funding implemented in our country aimed to use such an instrument for evaluating the performances of a very important structure of the central state apparatus – the Ministry of Public Finance¹⁹.

According to the manual elaborated after the completion of this project, performance management includes activities that ensure the achievement of objectives in an effective and efficient manner. It can be oriented towards the performance of the institution, a department, an employee or even the process implemented to obtain a service. Performance management refers to the way in which both behaviors and outcomes are managed, two basic elements in defining performance.

Performance is viewed as behavior through the way institutions, teams and individuals act to perform their tasks. Performance management is a strategic and integrated approach to ensure lasting success in the activity of institutions, by improving the performance of the institution, teams and individuals.

Performance management brings the following benefits: 1) It offers a structured approach oriented to results and profit, not to the activities; 2) It involves the parties - beneficiaries, employees, management structures, other stakeholders - in the performance planning and evaluation process; 3) It proposes an ethical mode of behavior; 4) It facilitates the achievement of the objectives, the orientation of the entire staff towards the common goals of the institution, the adoption of better decisions, in a shorter time, the assurance of trust and motivation among the managers and the staff.

The stages of a performance management system are as follow: 1) Establishing objectives and standards; 2) Defining a performance measurement system; 3) Setting an agreement of responsibilities; 4) Establishing a system for collecting data on performance; 5) Establishing a system for analyzing and comparing data on actual and objective achievements; 6) Making a decision on corrective actions.

A performance management system is oriented to the following directions: a) to help to better understand the needs of the beneficiaries; b) to help their institutions and employees to become result-oriented; c) to contribute to improving the quality of services by improving processes

and practices; d) to create links between the individual objectives and those of the institution; e) to translate the strategic priorities into measures and targets of the performance; f) to signal the individual contribution to the achievement of the institution's objectives by involving the parties in the performance planning and evaluation process; g) to identify the strengths and areas that can be improved; h) to facilitate internal and external communications.

The Balanced Scorecard (BSC) is used as a management and guidance tool for the organization for pursuing certain strategic objectives. In comparison with the mission and vision of the institution (which appear as essential in the strategic plan), BSC proposes the creation of measurable strategic objectives through performance indicators, in order to achieve this strategic plan; next, BSC proposes to carry out activities/initiatives for the implementation of these objectives.

Depending on the type of organization, the fundamental perspectives are: 1) clients (beneficiaries); 2) financial perspective; 3) internal processes; 4) innovation, learning and development.

These perspectives can be adapted to the specifics and needs of the organizations. 1) Customers/Beneficiaries/Partners – the strategic development area where the organization must develop and improve its services; 2) **Financial perspective** – the strategic development area regarding the own financial management; 3) **Internal processes** – strategic area regarding the way the organization functions from the point of view of internal bureaucracy and management systems; 4) **Innovation, learning and development** – strategic area that refers to the satisfaction and retention in the institution of employees, training systems for employees, motivation systems for employees.

The balancing of this indicator plan is done by two methods: 1) by choosing several indicators for each objective of a perspective for which BSC operates; 2) by the fact that the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of an objective within a perspective leads to the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of another objective within another perspective, a relationship highlighted by the Strategic Map of an organization.

BSC allows institutions to manage their

Strategic Plan by interconnecting objectives, activities/initiatives, indicators and targets at all levels and, at the same time, centralizing sets of measures and targets for monitoring progress in the key areas.

The reasons for BSC implementation can be oriented towards 1) Formulating and refining the strategy; 2) Communicating the strategy and priorities in the organization; 3) Creating links between long-term strategic objectives and budget; 4) Monitoring progress and applying measures to improve performance.

Within each classical perspective there are 4 important concepts: 1) **Strategic objectives** – represents the main component of a Balanced Scorecard and ensures the concrete strategic directions assumed by the institution by implementing the Strategic Plan; 2) **Indicators** – represents the unit of measure of the strategic objective; 3) **Targets** – the targets represent the value assigned to each indicator; 4) **Initiatives (activities)** – represents the way to achieve the proposed objective, through a sum of actions, measures (possibly even corrective measures, if the values of the indicators are far from the proposed target values).

Using this very useful tool in our country was also realized in a study entitled "**Balanced Scorecard in Romania 2010**" published in May 2011 by ACUMEN INTEGRAT. People. Systems. Technology, in Cluj-Napoca, through the efforts of the following researchers: Adrian Brudan, Alexandra Moldovan, Sorina Mone and Nicoleta Dorina Racołța-Paina²⁰.

Also worth mentioning is another study by specialists Turcu Dan Radu and Turturea Mihaela²¹.

We cannot omit the conclusions drawn from the article written by a group of leading specialists with a person endorsed in the field Dascălu Elena Doina who held the position of vice-president of the Court of Accounts of Romania²², from which we will point out some defining elements, which are useful for the topic we are currently analyzing.

The objective of the research aimed to establish the way of performing the performance monitoring in the internal public audit departments in order to identify possible solutions for improving the internal public audit activity.

The research methodology was based on

questioning the auditors of the public sector regarding the way of monitoring the performances of the internal public audit activity.

The questionnaire included 18 questions, out of which 10 referred to performance monitoring indicators in the internal audit activity.

These questions referred to the following issues:

a) General information: 1) Type of public entity (central public institution/ministry, public institution under the subordination/coordination/under the authority of a central public institution/ministry, local public institution, other types of public sector organizations); 2) The number of employees of the public entity (on different ranges of values); 4) The size of the internal audit compartment (total number of auditors); 5) International certifications held regarding internal audit; 6) Experience in internal audit (years); 7) Position as auditor: execution, management; 8) Age.

b) Questions regarding the performance monitoring indicators in the internal audit activity (these questions were established in accordance with Standard 7 - Performance Monitoring, the Code of internal management control of public entities), as follows: 1) Within the internal audit compartment have you defined performance monitoring indicators? 2) How many indicators for monitoring the performance of the internal audit

objectives and how many activities associated with these objectives (according to Standard 5 - Objectives and Standard 6 - Planning from the Code of internal managerial control of public entities) have you defined/identified during the mentioned period (for the years: 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016)?

4) What is the frequency of measurement of these indicators (daily, weekly, at 2 weeks, monthly, bi-monthly, quarterly, semi-annually, annually)?

5) To whom do the people in the organization communicate the level of these indicators and the frequency of communications (the head of the organization, the audit committee, the head of the internal audit department, the monitoring committee of the control system, others (detailed)?

6) What are the main indicators for monitoring the performances used in the internal audit activity (indicator name, measurement frequency, calculation mode)? 7) Estimate the degree of difficulty regarding the definition of performance monitoring indicators (very easy, easy, medium, difficult, very difficult); 8) Indication of the extent to which you agree with the following statements regarding the usefulness of performance monitoring indicators (DT - completely disagree; D - disagree; N - neutral/do not know; DA - agree; FD - strongly agree), according to the table below:

9) What are the main difficulties you face in defining performance monitoring indicators and

Assessments regarding the usefulness of performance monitoring indicators	DT	D	N	DA	FD
<i>The performance monitoring indicators are useful for the audit activity in the compartment in which I operate</i>					
<i>Performance monitoring is not useful in relation to the time allocated to it</i>					
<i>I have at least one performance monitoring indicator that I monitor</i>					
<i>Performance indicators are always fulfilled</i>					

activity have you used for the years: 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016? 3) How many specific

monitoring them? 10) Do you think it would be necessary to establish a set of minimum indicators

for the internal audit departments in the public sector (yes, no)?

The answers to the questions were requested subject to anonymity. Replies to 46 questionnaires were received from auditors from various internal audit departments in the public sector.

From this study we selected for example some of the most important conclusions.

Regarding the number of performance monitoring indicators defined within the internal public audit departments: most respondents (about 36%) defined between 4 and 8 indicators; about 17% defined over 12 indicators; there were also cases of internal audit departments that defined 20 respectively 38 performance monitoring indicators.

Regarding the periodicity analysis of the measurement of the defined indicators: over 72% of the respondents measure the defined indicators only once a year, and approx. 16% quarterly.

Regarding the level of reporting of the obtained performances: over 58% of the respondents communicate the level of the indicators obtained in the internal audit activity at the highest level, respectively to the head of the entity, approx. 33% communicates the level of indicators to both the entity's manager and the commission for monitoring the internal management control system, and about 5% only to the mentioned commission.

Regarding the defined performance monitoring indicators: from the questionnaires, about 67 indicators regarding the performance of the internal public audit activity were identified. Among the frequently used indicators, the following are mentioned: 1) The degree of accomplishment of the internal audit plan; 2) The degree of implementation of the recommendations made; 3) Number of days of professional training; 4) Number of accepted recommendations in relation to the number of recommendations made; 5) Number of deviations from the ethical code; 6) The percentage of ad-hoc missions from the total of the missions carried out; 7) Number of endorsed recommendations relative to the number of recommendations made; 8) Number of audit reports.

A few performance monitoring indicators are not clearly defined or their relevance to the performance of the internal public audit activity can be considered as low. For example, the following indicators are mentioned: 1) Dynamics of risks

related to the audited activities; 2) Updating the list of activities to change the legislation; 3) Compliance with the minimum structure of the audit reports; 4) Number of procedures developed; 5) Decreasing the share of risks associated with the objectives; 6) The total number of identified risks; 7) Providing a unitary framework for carrying out audit missions; 8) The number of risks in the audit department should be as small as possible; 9) The degree of achievement of the evidence; 10) Participation in the meetings of the SCIM monitoring committee; 11) The added value added through the efficiency of the audit reports.

Regarding the identification of the main difficulties that the auditors face in defining the indicators. The processing of the results of the questionnaire did not indicate a major difficulty; the identified difficulties were punctuated by several aspects such as: 1) the lack of a set of minimum indicators for the audit; 2) personnel shortage; 3) lack of confirmation from the higher hierarchical body; 4) lack of models; 5) lack of a methodology for establishing the indicators; 6) measurement difficulties; 7) lack of long-term strategies; 8) staff fluctuation; 9) poor communication; 10) lack of legal provisions.

On the need to establish a set of minimum performance monitoring indicators for the internal audit departments in the public sector: over 69% of the respondents pointed out the usefulness of such a set of indicators for monitoring the performance of the internal public audit activity.

With respect to the degree of difficulty regarding the definition of performance indicators: over 72% of the respondents mentioned a medium level, a level that may indicate a certain indecision in this; in detail, the answers were polarized as follows: very slightly - 5.56%; slightly - 11.11%; medium - 72.22%; difficult - 11.11% and very difficult - 0%.

In view of the resulting aspects, in order to improve the monitoring of the performances of the internal public audit activity in the public sector, the authors of the study consider it interesting to promote the following directions of action:

1) Elaboration of a guide regarding the monitoring of the performances in the activity of internal public audit in Romania by a team of specialists with experience in this field, which will ensure the improvement of the performance monitoring indicators in the public sector;

2) Establishing a minimum set of indicators regarding the monitoring of the performances in the activity of internal public audit in Romania that will ensure the comparability of the results obtained by different departments of internal public audit and allow the improvement in this field;

3) Organizing workshops with the auditors (within the professional training activities) to improve the skills in establishing the indicators for monitoring the performance of the internal audit activity.

Some considerations regarding the evaluation of the performances of the entities of the Ministry of National Defence with the help of the internal public audit

For a structure of the nature of the Ministry of National Defence, its general and specific objectives are of utmost importance for the knowledge and evaluation of the performances of the entities that make up this ministry.

General objectives compete in the fulfilment of the ministry's mission and are stipulated in the law of its organization and functioning or in the normative acts and the specific planning documents.

Specific objectives are the objectives resulted by deriving from the general objectives and contribute to the achievement of the corresponding general objective.

These are customized by each commander or chief of military structure, in accordance with the activity and duties of each structure and are incorporated in the plan with their main activities or in other appropriate planning documents.

The hypotheses or premises are logical constructions between variables, based on complete information from the quantitative and qualitative point of view, which highlight the possible changes in the internal or external environment of the components of the ministry.

The objectives are configured in such way, so that they meet the S.M.A.R.T. requirements which we referred to earlier in the article.

The general and specific objectives are required to be set in such a way that their completion can be tracked and verified with measurable performance indicators.

The measurement of performance is generally

oriented either to the results of the activity (output) or to the impact of the program (out-come) in the long term.

The types of performance indicators are characterized by the following parameters:

a) Quantity is an indicator of what the activity / program will actually produce;

b) Quality measures the quality of the results produced in the military structures;

c) Duration depends on the nature of the result, being very useful when the time factor is a very important parameter in the course of the activity or program;

d) Efficiency is a measure of contributions, such as cost per unit of output;

e) Effectiveness is an indicator of the extent to which a program has achieved its objectives.

In the process of selecting performance indicators, the following aspects must be taken into account: a) correlation of indicators - the objectives set to be as clear as possible; b) specifying the reference values among the most current historical values of an indicator; c) regular activities are required to collect information on relevant indicators; d) setting the target values for each quarter of the current financial year²³.

When introducing and developing systems of the nature of internal managerial control within entities of the Ministry of National Defence, the following principles must be respected: a) the principle of legality; b) the principle of adaptability; c) the principle of completeness; d) the principle of uniformity; e) the principle of finality; f) the principle of efficiency; g) the principle of effectiveness; h) the principle of economics²⁴.

For monitoring, coordination and methodological guidance of the implementation and improvement of the internal management control system, the **following commissions** are set up and functioning, according to the hierarchical level, in the Ministry of National Defence:

a) At the level of the Ministry of National Defence – the monitoring commission of the ministry;

b) At the level of the organizational components of the ministry, where commanders or heads fulfil the function of authorizing officers - the monitoring commissions;

c) In the structures of the ministry whose commanders or chiefs do not have the quality of

authorizing officers – a person responsible for monitoring the implementation of the internal management control standards²⁵.

The monitoring commission of the Ministry of National Defence has the following composition: a) chairman – the deputy secretary general of the Ministry of National Defence or the deputy general secretary of this ministry; b) members – the director of the General Staff of the Defence and the deputies of the departments and directions of the ministry.

Internal public audit has an extremely important role on the line of evaluating in an independent and objective manner the internal management control system of the components of the Ministry of National Defence.

In order to substantiate the Report on the internal management control system at the end of each year, according to the annex no. 4.3 of the instruction that is part of the Order of the Secretary General of the Government no. 600/2018²⁶, the following responsibilities are set at the level of the ministry:

a) The entities audited by the specific structures (internal or external audit) in the field of the managerial internal control transmit to the General Secretariat, within 30 days from the conclusion of the mission, the main recommendations and measures arranged in order to implement them;

b) The Internal Audit Department sends, in its turn, to the General Secretariat a summary of the main findings in the field of managerial internal control and elements considered relevant in the program and activity of the audit structure, until January 25 of the following year, for the previous year²⁷.

From the ones presented by us from this normative act we can draw some conclusions regarding this type of control in the army: 1) it clearly establishes the organizational structures meant to monitor the internal managerial control in the army; 2) it rigorously establishes the general and specific objectives of this type of control according to the requirements of type SMART; 3) it specifies precisely the indicators for measuring the performances of the entities subject to internal control and why particular aspects must be taken into account; 4) it stipulates the principles that must be respected in the process of implementation and development of this activity in all military structures.

Regarding the evaluation of the internal

management control system, in order to increase the performances of the entities of the Ministry of National Defence, we consider that the activity of internal public audit must take into account at least the following aspects:

1) Begin any internal public audit mission, starting from the requirements of the internal/managerial control standards and the international internal audit standards;

2) Provide the necessary resources (human, financial, time, etc.) for each audit team descending into internal public audit missions to be carried out in entities of the Ministry of National Defence, for the full completion and with future favorable effects for those audited;

3) Assure judicious establishment of each internal audit mission to the entities that will be audited in the ministry, after a very rigorous assessment of the risks that may arise as a result of shortcomings in the internal/managerial control activity;

4) Establish with high realism and wisdom the recommendations after the completion of each audit mission and then, tenaciously pursue the implementation of the recommendations agreed between the parties (the audit team and the audited entity);

5) Periodically evaluate the performances of the internal public audit teams from the Internal Audit Directorate and its territorial structures within the Ministry of National Defence, taking into account the concrete results obtained subsequently by the audited entities, also using for this purpose the formidable valences of the Balanced Scorecard which we made some references at in the article.

Conclusions

The evaluation of the performances of the internal public audit is directly related to the internal/managerial control with all the elements that define it, starting with the concept of internal/managerial control, continuing with the instrumentation of internal managerial control, the content of the Standard 7 of internal/managerial control, normative acts which refers to internal/managerial control and ending with questions and challenges to which the leaders of public entities must respond.



In order to understand the defining aspects of the mission of evaluating the internal public audit activity, we had to try to clarify some things of overwhelming importance for the topic of the article, such as: internal and external evaluations of the quality and performance of internal public audit; what involves the carrying out and implementation of the evaluation missions of the internal public audit activity; the possibilities of using the „Balanced scorecard” (BSC) as a tool for evaluating the performance of the internal public audit.

The evaluation of the performances of the entities of the Ministry of National Defence with the help of the internal public audit is an extremely important and natural necessity and it cannot be done without the knowledge and operationalization and the following defining aspects such as: considering with all the attention and responsibility of the general and specific objectives of this governmental structure and the components that come into its composition; better reviewing and improving the adequacy of the types of performance indicators for public entities in the military; enhancing the role of the internal public audit on the line of independent and objective evaluation of the internal management control system of the army structures and constructive review of the elements that this audit must take into account, including the use as a research tool in this field, of „Balanced scorecard” (BSC) method for the significant increase of the added value that the internal audit can bring in the activity of the army entities.

NOTES:

1 It refers to internal/managerial control and preventive financial control and was published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 799 of November 12, 2003.

2 According to the definition in Art.2 of the Government Ordinance no.119/1999.

3 According to the definition in Art. 2 of the Government Ordinance no. 119/1999.

4 Concerning the public finances, republished with subsequent amendments and completions, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 597 of August 13, 2002.

5 Concerning the local public finances, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 618 of July 18, 2006.

6 It refers to the establishment of reorganization

measures at the central public administration level and for the modification and completion of some normative acts, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 920 of December 17, 2014.

7 To approve the rules regarding the organization and development of the career of civil servants, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 530 of July 14, 2008.

8 To amend and supplement the Methodological Norms for the application of Law no. 544/2001 regarding the free access to the information of public interest, approved by the Government Decision no. 123/2002, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 516 of July 8, 2016.

9 Regarding internal/managerial control and preventive financial control, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 430 of August 31, 1999.

10 To approve the Instructions on the content, presentation form and structure of the programs elaborated by the main authorizing officers for the purpose of financing certain actions or set of actions, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 1100 of November 25, 2004.

11 According to Chapter V entitled “Misiunea de evaluare a activității de audit public intern” of the Government Decision no. 1086 of December 11, 2013 for the approval of the General Norms regarding the exercise of the internal public audit activity, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 17 of January 10, 2014.

12 See section 2.3.6.2.1 of the General Norms regarding the exercise of the internal public audit activity approved by the GD no.1086/2013 for the approval of the General Norms regarding the exercise of the internal public audit activity, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no.17 of January 10, 2014.

13 See section 2.3.6.2.2 of the General Norms regarding the exercise of the internal public audit activity approved by the GD no.1086/2013 for the approval of the General Norms regarding the exercise of the internal public audit activity, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no.17 of January 10, 2014.

14 We refer to the work *Auditul intern*, Second Edition, Economic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009.

15 We refer to the work *Auditul intern al societăților comerciale*, RISOPRINT Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 2009.

16 To approve the General Norms regarding the exercise of the internal public audit activity, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no.17 of January 10, 2014;

17 Kaplan Robert S., *Conceptual Foundations of the Balanced Scorecard*, Working Paper 10-074, Harvard Business School, 2010, p.2.

18 Coracioni Alexandru, „Balanced scorecard” și *auditul financiar*, article published in the “*Practica de audit*” Journal, Year 2, no. 3/2013, pp.20-24.

19 It is about the project *BSC Handbook “Development and implementation of the performance evaluation tool at*

the central level of the Ministry of Public Finance: *Balanced Scorecard*" SMIS 10579 code, co-financed from the European Social Fund through PO DCA 2007-2013;

20 This is the project entitled "*Balanced Scorecard in Romania 2010*".

21 It is about the article "*Study on performance reporting through the system of indicators: the financial perspective of the Balanced Scorecard*" published in the *Audit Financier Journal*, Year XI, 8/2013, pp. 44-51.

22 The article entitled "*Management and monitoring of performance in the internal audit for the public sector in Romania*" by Dascălu Elena Doina, Marcu Nicu and Hurjui Ioan, published in "*Amfiteatrul economic*" Vol. 18, No. 43, August 2016, pp. 460-475.

23 ****Order of the Minister of National Defence no. M.75 of July 12, 2012* for the approval of the Methodological Norms regarding the internal/managerial control system in the Ministry of National Defence, published in the *Official Gazette of Romania, Part I*, no. 531 of July 31, 2012.

24 ****Article 4 of the Order of the Minister of National Defence no. M.100 of May 13, 2019* for the approval of the Methodological Norms regarding the system of internal managerial control in the Ministry of National Defence, published in the *Official Gazette of Romania, Part I*, no. 456 of June 6, 2019.

25 ****Article 5 of the Order of the Minister of National Defence no. M.100 of May 13, 2019* for the approval of the Methodological Norms regarding the system of internal managerial control in the Ministry of National Defence, published in the *Official Gazette of Romania, Part I*, no. 456 of June 6, 2019.

26 It refers to the Instructions regarding the preparation, approval and presentation of the report on the internal management control system of the Code of internal management control of public entities, published in the *Official Gazette of Romania, Part I*, no. 387 of May 7, 2018;

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