

THE STRUCTURAL AND PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISENGAGEMENT/RENUNCIATION TO THE GLOBAL AGENDA FOR MANAGEMENT OF REGIONAL CRISES

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Reviving the concept of guardianship, after the cold war, was met with reluctance by the great powers, because of high financial costs and ineffective solutions to conflict.

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During the Security Council period of activity, right after the end of the Cold War, there were talks with regards to a renewal of the UN's guardianship role, in order to ensure an impartial, stable, and responsible administration in the countries which would have necessitated an extended reconstruction period. Even though attractive from an intellectual perspective, the idea was not successful in finding support among countries' governments. The great powers had refrains related to embark on costly and undetermined operations¹.

The great powers' reluctance to supporting any new peace sustainment operations in the second part of the last decade reflects this viewpoint. During this period, UN was going through a financial crisis, not because of the arrears that the United States was owing, and who refused to pay for the programs that were not sponsored by Congress and at the same time, was not interested in any modification of UN's financial system, since it would have reduced its influence.

The decline in the Security Council's activism can be attributed in part to the same situation. But, because at the end of the '90, the entire budget

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¹ James Mayall, *Politica mondială. Evoluția și limitele ei*, Antet Publishing House, 2000, p. 103.

allocated to UN's peace sustainment operations weighted less than two days of fighting in the Gulf War, therefore the Occident's reluctance to approve of new UN missions is very obvious – reluctance which is not shown towards NATO- it is explained only partially through the applied financial restrictions. Better conveyed, this attitude is linked to the discovery that was made during the Somalian and Bosnian conflicts, that there is no such thing as a "Chapter six and a half" solution².

The traditional peace sustainment operations necessitated not only all the parties' agreement, but also – because when the UN was involved in the continuous peace devising, it established itself as a trustful and impartial entity- the peace imposing which presumed partiality, especially during the intervention and until the ones responsible for the emerging crisis were to be constrained and convinced to cooperate³.

Practically, the UN's global agenda included in the Peace Agenda assumed, ultimately, the engagement of additional human and financial resources to the occidental powers.

The disengagement in different areas affected by turmoil and the decrease in the strategic importance with the end of the Cold War, based on the incapacity of containing disturbing situations recorded in the conflict zones, gives rise to dramatic circumstances. This way, the Rwanda genocide in 1994, is sometimes considered in common doctrine as the first result of the disengagement policy.

At general level, the Peace Agenda implied a framework of manifestation regarding UN's global role in the international conflict management arena. Certain exercises developed based on the Peace Agenda's principles (Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo) have demonstrated instead the inability – of the doctrine promoted by this document – to materialize in a coherent institutional system.

The main reasons regarding this failure have been linked to the adoption of strategies that have not been adapted to the reality in the field, to organizational difficulties, or to the lack of legitimacy towards the local population. In many cases, UN's intervention have worsened and complicated the volatile situation. The mandates could not be finalized, but remained suspended in the intermediary, since the anticipated results did not occur. In spite of the initial support enjoyed by the launching of the Peace Agenda, its emergence is challenged by the Organization's main financial contributors resistance.

² *Ibidem*, pp. 96-97.

³ *Idem*, p. 97.

In the end, the reduced financial resource and the political pressure towards UN 's reform, determines a switch in the Organization's principles, from a doctrinary perspective, in the sense of the regional adoption of conflict monitoring, in which UN plays a complementary role

The Peace Agenda mentioned, even if more rethorical than practical, the subregional organizations cooperation role. In 1992, Boutros-Boutros Ghali, was suggesting "regional actions, as decentralizing measures, delegation, and cooperation with the UN with the purpose of easing the Council's responsibilities"⁴.

Kofi Annan, UN's General Secretary, was the one who synthesized the formula representing the regional approach to manage conflicts and the need for cooperation between UN and sub-regional organizations: "The support for regional and sub-regional initiatives in Africa is necessary and preferred. This type of support is necessary because OMI does not have the capacity, the resources, and the expertise to tackle all the imminent problems that could rise in Africa. This is preferred because every possibility it gets, the international community has to try to complete and not to replace the African efforts aimed at solving the regional problems in Africa."⁵

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⁴ Boutros-Boutros Ghali, *Agenda pour la Paix*, Secretariat General des Nations Unites, 1992, p. 12.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 15.