

Terrorism and Soft Power: Interrogation of the Clogs in the Wheels of Nigerian Efforts in Combating Terrorism

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Abstract

One of the major security challenges affecting both developed and developing countries alike is the issue of terrorism. In Africa, countries like Kenya, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria are facing terrorist attacks. Each of these countries also engages in seamless efforts to combat terrorism. Nigeria, in particular, has been facing terrorist attacks since 2009, when Boko Haram launched its first attacks. Since then, to date, a series of attacks, both large and small scale, has been mounted on innocent Nigerians. Successive governments have equally made concerted efforts to curb and combat terrorism in Nigeria. However, it seems those efforts have yielded little or no results. The perception in some quarters was that President Goodluck Jonathan did not do enough to fight against terror and that President Buhari, being a northerner and ex-serviceman, would do better. In fairness to him, he equally demonstrated more commitment to fighting these terrorists as he shifted military headquarters to Maiduguri. Despite all these, the situation still remains the same. Why is it difficult for Nigeria to get rid of terror despite efforts to do so? This study examines factors that serve as clogs in the wheel of Nigerian efforts to put an end to terrorism in Nigeria. The research adopts primary and secondary data with the use of interviews, textbooks, journals, online documents, and documentaries. It also adopts Protracted Social Conflict (PSC). The research finds that there are still socio-political and structural problems in Nigerian society that hinder all efforts to combat terrorism. The research recommends that the efforts to combat terrorism should not be concentrated only on the military approach, but must also involve a soft approach or the civil aspect of counterterrorism.

Keywords:

Media; Social Media; Nigeria; National Security.

Article info

Received: 29 July 2025; Revised: 9 October 2025; Accepted: 4 November 2025; Available online: 9 January 2026

Citation: Usamotu, B.O., and T. Agara. 2025. "Terrorism and Soft Power: Interrogation of the Clogs in the Wheels of Nigerian Efforts in Combating Terrorism." *Bulletin of "Carol I" National Defence University*, 14(4): 7-18. <https://doi.org/10.53477/2284-9378-25-54>



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Introduction

Terrorism is an attack on innocent persons for the purpose of obtaining socio-political or economic gains. Many lives have been lost in developing and developed countries alike through terrorist attacks. Each state confronting the menace of terrorism equally frantically tries to put it under control. Developed countries have shown better capacity in curbing terrorism than developing countries. Perhaps it is partly because fighting terrorism requires financial commitment and because factors that trigger terrorism are more prominent in developing countries. For instance, America has shown a high level of capacity to prevent further terrorist attacks in America. Since the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and two other places, there have never been any major attacks. Similarly, Saudi Arabia, which is a middle-power country, equally demonstrated a high level of capacity. Therefore, since 12 May 2003, when there was a horrific coordinated suicide attack that killed 35 people by attacking three housing units in Riyadh, there have not been major terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia. Similarly, Kenya suffered its worst terrorist attack in 2019 when al-Shabaab (AS) attacked the Dusit D2 hotel complex in Nairobi. The use of a suicide vest and the targeting of civilians were notable. However, the case in Nigeria is different, as terrorist attacks are unabated. In other words, the attacks are continual to date. In fact, it seems terrorists are challenging the capacity of Nigerian security.

Nigeria has not been able to curb terrorism. Of importance to note is that terrorism became a security challenge with the emergence of Boko Haram and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in Nigeria. Boko Haram is an Islamic organization that has the name Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād. It means a group of the People of Sunnah for Dawah and Jihad. However, it became an insurgent group with a clash between the group and the Nigerian security forces in 2007. The government of Yaradua at the time cracked down on them, and their leader, Muhammad Yusff, was killed while in the custody of security men. The group retreated but regrouped in 2009. Since then, the group has become a self-proclaimed jihadist militant group based in northeastern Nigeria and also active in Chad, Niger, northern Cameroon, and Mali. In November 2013, the United States designated Boko Haram as a terrorist group. The group has claimed thousands of lives and properties of both Nigerians and foreigners.

Another terrorist group that has shaken Nigeria's security to its bone marrow is IPOB. This group was established in 2012 by Nnamdi Kanu. He also serves as one of the pioneer leaders of the group, while Uche Mefor is the deputy leader. IPOB is a separatist group, as it intends to re-establish the former Republic of Biafra. Biafra broke away from Nigeria in 1967 before the Nigerian Civil War and was disbanded after losing in 1970. Since IPOB was established, several lives have been lost to the attacks of this group. It not only targets Nigerian security and properties, but it also attacks civilians, especially those perceived to be working for the government or against their interests. For example, 30 people were killed on the Okigwe-Owerri

road in Imo State by IPOB gunmen (Amnesty International 2025). In a security report, it was noticed that “there is an increase in conflict and bloodshed. Once one of Nigeria’s more tranquil regions, the Southeast has seen an increase in violence. Given the increase in crime and security concerns in the area, the last several months have been terrible”. It was further said that, “in the first five months of 2021, 63 accidents were reported, resulting in about 254 fatalities. With 101 deaths, Ebonyi State led the incidence table, followed by Imo State with 60. 33 people died in Abia State, compared to 37 in Anambra State. With 22 fatalities, Enugu finished the table with the lowest mortality count” (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2025; Nwagbo and Ofoke 2025).

Terrorism in general has caused Nigeria a lot of havoc, which is not limited to loss of lives and properties, loss of respect, and a good image and dignity among the community of nations. This has discouraged and dragged both local and foreign investors away from Nigeria. Successive governments have tried to combat terrorism since its inception. For instance, President Musa Yar’Adua dealt decisively with Boko Haram and put them under control. However, it reappeared in 2009 when Yaradua was sick. The acting president at the moment, Goodluck Jonathan, equally confronted the group, but it seems the group was triumphant during his administration, as some local governments were under Boko Haram control. President Buhari, who came later, also made some efforts. He even shifted military commands to Maiduguri on the day he was sworn in. This shows his commitment to fighting against Boko Haram and other terrorist groups in the region. However, what could amaze observers and students of security and strategic studies is that terrorists are still successfully staging attacks not only on civilians but also on military bases. What could have been the reason for the inability to put terrorists under control? What are the clogs in the wheel of Nigerian counterterrorism efforts? These questions are begging for answers. This paper is an attempt to investigate reasons why terrorism, especially Boko Haram, has not yet been defeated despite the will to do so.

Theoretical framework

This paper makes use of Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) as a theoretical postulation. PSC was propounded by Edward Azar (1991). He links protracted violent conflicts within communal groups to their desperate need for necessities like acceptance, social recognition, and security. It also covers equitable involvement in the economy and access to political institutions. PSC theory opposes the idea that domestic and foreign politics are different and instead examines the interactions of intrastate players, including communities, tribes, and ethnic groupings. According to Agara and Ajisebiyawo (2017), a state’s function in the domestic connection between intrastate actors is to either please or frustrate them. This determines whether the state averts or encourages conflict.

Protracted Social Conflict theory focuses on intra-state relationships between major actors, with Azar (1986, 1990) identifying four major variables: community

content, deprivation of human needs, governance and state role, and international linkages. Disarticulation between states and racial, religious, ethnic, and cultural groups can promote tense conflicts. Deprivation of human needs, failure to address grievances, and rigid authority structures can lead to protracted social conflicts. International connections influence the formation of domestic social and political institutions and the role of the state. Agara and Ajisebiyawo (2017) trace protracted social conflict to past experiences, fear, and belief, as well as experiences from other states. Antagonistic actions are often seen as threatening, shrinking the space for compromise and accommodation.

Protracted social conflict is appropriate for the study, especially if we are to understand why terrorism exists and persists in Nigeria. Communal content and deprivation of human needs assumptions shall apprise us of why there are protracted conflicts in the northeastern part of Nigeria and give reasons why Nigerian efforts have not yet finally put an end to terrorism despite international support and the federal government and state governments' concerted efforts.

Methodology

We chose to use a qualitative type of research. It relies heavily on qualitative information, which is devoid of numeric figures and other statistical tools. It, however, makes use of both the primary and secondary methods of data gathering. For primary data, interviews are adopted to inquire about necessary information from experts in peace and conflict, residents of the affected area, soldiers who participated in Operation Lafia Dole, and workers of NGOs working in the affected areas of northeastern states, especially Borno and Yobe. Secondary data were sourced through textbooks, journals, online documents, and documentaries. The paper uses content analysis to analyze both primary and secondary data.

Results and Discussions

In reaction to the above question, the interviewees were emphatic that these boil down to a series of factors. According to Professor Tajudeen Akanji, Director of the Institute of Peace and Strategic Studies at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria is facing serious challenges in fighting terrorism because of an inadequate legal framework. He explained that Nigeria's legal framework system is lopsided and cumbersome to the extent that there is a lacuna in the legal framework. He cited the example of the litigation problem, that it is not clear yet whether the trial of the suspected Boko Haram members arrested is a duty of the federal government or the state government. Akanji laments that "if it is a federal government exclusive, there are not enough courts to try these accused within a reasonable time. Furthermore, a special court has not been created to fast-track the process. And if the trial is the responsibility of state governments, states in Nigeria have little capacity to try them successfully. Not only that, are you aware that some of these accused were brought to Lagos for detention and trial? In the North, the legal framework is the Penal Code,

while in the South it is the Criminal Code. Which of these legal frameworks do the states want to prosecute them with?” (Interview conducted with Professor Tajudeen Akanji on May 11, 2021). This report corroborated the findings of Human Rights Watch (2018), which also lamented the flawed trials of Boko Haram suspects.

Another identified reason for Nigeria’s inability to curb terrorism is the problem with the structure of Nigerian security or security architecture. Professor Akanji (2021) maintained that there is a gap between the Office of National Security Adviser (ONSA) and the Chief of Army Staff. The ONSA to the President is situated under the President’s Office, but the office is not so recognized by the military as expected of them. This, according to Professor Akanji, has led to the inability of ONSA to be able to coordinate the implementation of the counterterrorism strategy. He explained further that what really played out in the field was that the military had direct contact with the president, and they gave little or no recognition to ONSA. As such, the efforts have little or no monitoring; rather, all the components that are supposed to work together in fighting against terror only work haphazardly.

The aforementioned issue was linked to a lack of cooperation among government agencies in charge of fighting against terrorists. Specifically, security agencies such as the army, police, customs, and immigration officers, as well as the civilian Joint Task Force (JTF), are not working in unison. There was little or no sharing of intelligent information. This lack of cooperation was also noticed between the military and civilians or natives. People did not give much cooperation to the MJTF, partly because of religious affinity and partly because of a lack of trust in modern government, having failed in the provision of means of livelihood for them over the years. There are even cases of giving terrorists intelligent information about Nigerian troops. Recent complaints of soldiers testify to this assertion (Ezinwa and Agbani 2020).

An additional factor militating against the war on terrorism is Nigeria’s economic issues, as explained by Professor Tajudeen Akanji (2021). He lamented that to fight against terrorists, as is expected, requires spending an exorbitant amount of money. In developed economies like America and Britain, it is easier to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism as prescribed by the first pillar of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Strategy (United Nations 2014). Unlike the American counter-terrorism strategy in Afghanistan, which consisted of combating the Taliban and feeding the masses, particularly the Northern Alliance, which provided American troops with support against their adversary, the situation in Nigeria was not the same (Relief Web 2001). Foods were not following the bullets, and this is not unconnected with the economic status of Nigeria. “Similarly, combating terrorists is expensive. Is it the building capacity of the military and other agencies that we would talk about? All are money-consuming”. Prof. Akanji and Dr. Raji lamented.

Explaining why it is that terrorism has not yet been curbed in Nigeria despite the will to do so, Prof. Akanji believes that there are a lot of things we have not addressed,

and until we address them, terrorism cannot be defeated. Those things are economic problems, bad governance, the elimination of the middle class, and human rights abuses. This position is supported by the work of Emmanuel (2021). Akanji equally laments that the kinetic approach in fighting against terrorists is just a reactionary measure to counter terrorism and that there is a need for the government to address eight pillars of peace: low level of corruption, sound business environment, efficient and well-functioning government, equitable distribution of resources, free flow of information, acceptance of the rights of others, high level of human capital, and good relations with labor, etc. (Vision of Humanity 2022).

There is a document called the National Counterterrorism Strategy (NACTEST). There is little awareness about the document and what it contains. Professor Akanji lamented that a lot of stakeholders who actually have roles to play in the implementation of NACTEST are not aware of it, let alone know their expected roles. He said he even interacted with members of the National Assembly and some House of Assembly Committee Members on National Security. They admitted their innocence regarding the document. Dr. Raji Shittu also seconded this view that the government is not doing enough to bring on board all stakeholders in the fight against terrorism. Dr. Raji emphasized that the government appears to prioritize the military approach over other aspects of counter-terrorism. He also added that the government has not been able to properly define who the terrorists are and what they really want because people are still mixing up the issue of terrorism with all other security issues in Nigeria. He lamented that this is the reason some people are comparing the terrorists with the Niger Delta militants, bandits, ritualists, and armed robbers. Dr. Raji Shittu took a theoretical approach as well. He explained that there are some theories that try to show the importance of a non-military approach. Social theory, for instance, tells us the importance of bringing in more people to participate in counter-terrorism. The structural theory of terrorism also explains that the way a society is structured determines the nature of the crisis it experiences. An unjust society can only bring about violence, and vice versa. Biological theory also explains that human beings need guidance and counselors, and if this is not done, there is a likelihood for such human beings to be wicked. Therefore, we need religious leaders and counselors to talk to youths to deradicalize them. The work of Associate Professor Raji Shittu corroborates his stand here (Shittu, et al. 2021).

In the view of Anonymous 1 (a Nigerian soldier who participated in Operation Lafia Dole between 2015 and 2019), he lamented that the Nigerian army, in particular, and Nigerian forces are trying their best, but the onus is in the hands of politicians. He buttressed his point by saying that the government controls the force; therefore, the government's readiness to curb terrorism would greatly determine the role of the forces and their performance. Therefore, there is a need for politicians to be more committed to the counter-terrorism crusade.

Like the reports of Segun and Segun (2024) and Bolaji (2025), Anonymous 1 explained further that another factor affecting the efforts of counter-terrorism is

the role of saboteurs among security forces. “These traitors relate information to the terrorists before an attack is made. Thus, this does not make our efforts to be successful” (Anonymous 1). Dr. Sarafa Ganiyu (a lecturer and a resident of Yola, Adamawa State) shared the same view. He explained that the choice of the Chief of Army Staff is always politicized, which always causes grudges among the military and, in turn, makes some soldiers justify their acts. Saboteurs are not only among Nigeria’s forces but also among foreign forces. Anonymous 1 accused Chadian soldiers of aiding some terrorists. He explained:

After the creation of MJTF, Nigerian soldiers and other forces from Niger and Chad fought on the same line against Boko Haram under the command of the Nigerian commandant, but suddenly, Chadian soldiers withdrew from this cooperation and decided to guard their borders. Henceforth, attacks by Boko Haram took another dimension, causing devastation in the struggle against the terrorists. (Anonymous 1, a Nigerian soldier who participated in Operation Lafia Dole between 2015 and 2019).

Closely related to the above point is that the masses are not also helpful. Dr. Sarafa Ganiyu was the sole respondent who held this viewpoint. He believed that some civilians were harboring terrorists in their midst. According to him, some communities give intelligence to terrorists against the military. This makes it difficult for the military to overcome the terrorists. Another dimension of the role of the masses is the polarization between political parties and religions. Some people in the Northeast have supported either the ruling or opposition parties at some point. This, to some extent, determines their support for the government and military against the terrorists. Religion is another dividing factor. Dr. Sarafa Ganiyu considers that some see fighting against terrorists as a war against Islam. Consequently, they give little or no support to the government.

Another factor responsible for terrorism’s failure to be curbed in Nigeria is the politicization of everything in Nigeria, including insecurity. Dr. Sarafa Ganiyu (a lecturer and a resident of Yola, Adamawa State) raised this point and explained that even right from the beginning of the Boko Haram menace, political parties have been pointing accusing fingers at one another. He said President Jonathan, ab initio, accused President Buhari and CPC of being responsible for their attacks to make the country ungovernable for him. It took time before he took them seriously. So, the same President Buhari did not believe that the PDP was behind the re-emergence of terrorists and all other insecurities in Nigeria. Similarly, political parties and religions divide the military. Prof. Akanji also seconded this view that politicians always look for one way or another to discredit one another. Therefore, the persistence of terrorism in Nigeria is not unconnected with the plots of politicians.

Anonymous 1 equally complained about the level of equipment that they were/are using. He protested about the fact that Nigerian soldiers are still using those old weapons used by the 1963 N.A., which was *Fabrique Nationale Herstal*, self-identified

as FN Herstal or simply FN. This personal weapon, according to him, does not work well during the rainy season or if it is affected by dust, unlike the AK-47, which is water-resistant and could be used anywhere, everywhere, and in any condition, even inside water. He explained further that the FN has a capacity of firing 20 rounds, but if it is affected by water or dust, it would be difficult for it to complete this process. Dr. Raji Shittu also corroborated the fact that there is a crisis of sufficient and adequate equipment for Nigerian soldiers. He equally added that they do not have enough equipment for intelligent gathering.

On the issue of collaboration among the forces in Nigeria, scholars have different views. Prof. Akanji was of the opinion that they are not doing well at all. He buttressed his position with the fact that each force is now taking credit for a job well done. He cited the example of the police and the Department of State Security (DSS), which would be looking for the same criminal but would find it difficult to share intelligence information with each other. Prof. Akanji believes that this is happening among the forces fighting against terrorism in Nigeria and is greatly affecting their performance. Professor Akanji's position is supported by reports from government officials, including President Isamotu I. (2024) and Nwachukwu J. O. (2024).

Contrary to this view, the soldier interviewed (Anonymous 1) answered in the affirmative. He stated that they had real relationships and collaboration with other forces such as police, customs, immigration officers, and so on. He cited cases when customs would discover some terrorist camps, and they would notify them for prompt action. He equally added that they shared intelligence with one another and that there was also collaboration between land, air force, and naval officers. Closely related to the above is the collaboration with other countries. Dr. Raji Shittu argued that Nigeria is doing great in this area. "You will be hearing from MJTF, which is a collaboration between Nigerian forces and their laboring states in fighting terrorism." States like Chad, Niger, and Cameroon are cooperative with Nigeria. The US is also helpful. The only challenge in getting US assistance is the issue of human rights violations. Once that is improved, the US is ready to improve its support in fighting terrorism" (Dr. Raji Shittu).

Moreover, apart from the points raised by interviewees above, the submission of Mr. Ibrahim Jumu'at (a staff member of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), a non-governmental organization taking care of victims of terrorism in the North-East) is that terrorism and counter-terrorism have been turned into a business. Terrorists have seen it as a means of livelihood. Some youths have seen the government as unserious, only ready to take care of them when they engage in violence. The same is true of so-called counterterrorism. He lamented that those stakeholders in counterterrorism have turned it into a business, which they would never expect to come to an end. He explained further that the government would not like it to end because of the money the government is gaining from NGOs that pay exorbitant amounts of money in taxes to the government. This money is

likely realizable from companies' taxes or otherwise. The military, too, would prefer to keep the war going because of the special benefits some stakeholders among the military enjoy from the war. Only young military men are suffering and dying from the process. Communities are also benefiting from the process. While some are collaborating with the terrorists and getting richer from the process, others are benefiting from the government for empowerment or from NGOs for empowerment or employment. These people see the crisis as beneficial to them, and it must not just end so soon.

From the points raised by scholars and stakeholders in the war on terrorism, one could conclude that terrorism is yet to be put under control in Nigeria, unlike America and European countries, because there are still legal, economic, social, political, and structural problems in Nigerian society; a gap between the office of NSA and the military; the government concentrated more on the military approach and neglected the civil aspect of counterterrorism; there are many saboteurs among the soldiers; equipment used in fighting terrorism is inadequate and substandard; and stakeholders have turned counterterrorism into business.

Conclusion and recommendations

As soon as terrorism emerged, the counterterrorism strategy equally emerged. The global war on terrorism started in recent times in the United States after the attacks on the World Trade Center. Both developed countries like Britain and developing countries like Kenya are making efforts to fight against terror. Nigeria equally swung into action and demonstrated its commitment to putting an end to terrorism. Several efforts were put in place, ranging from police actions and reactions to military involvement in operations, joint task forces among Nigerian forces, and collaboration with other states in the neighborhood. NACTEST was also launched in 2016 by President Muhammadu Buhari and was given the political will it deserves. This is noticed from his body language and policies, and his command to shift the army headquarters to Maiduguri. Despite these efforts, the menace of terrorism persists. This paper has investigated the possible factors responsible for these challenges.

From our findings, Nigerian counter terrorism efforts are as effective as its capabilities as a developing country. It has successfully uprooted the terrorists from areas they had previously occupied. It has also succeeded in sending them away from Sambisa Forest. However, terrorists are still engaging in guerrilla war. They have also resorted to kidnapping, suicide bombing, and sporadic attacks. These attacks have challenged the earlier victory announced by the government. Could we just say that the defeat of terrorist Boko Haram declared by the previous government and the recent one is not sustainable? This problem of unsustainability is not unconnected with the following challenges: firstly, there is a fundamental problem of dichotomy between the office of the National Security Adviser and the military. This gap really created a

vacuum in the efficient fight against terrorists. Secondly, corruption, which has eaten deep into the fabric of Nigerians, is still reflected in the fight against terrorism in Nigeria. It has been discovered from the work that many stakeholders have turned war against terrorists into a business. Literature consulted, and all the interviewees unanimously identified corruption as a major reason for the persistence of terrorism in Nigeria. Be they military, politicians, contractors, or civil societies, many of them were suspected of being guilty of this menace. Also, some interviewees identified equipment. Soldiers who were interviewed stressed the role of insufficient and substandard weapons in reversing the victory over the terrorists. Another challenge is that the terrorist outfit had changed from local to international as they had connected with other international terrorist groups in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the Nigerian government should strengthen its strategy in the area of collaboration with other states since the level of Nigerian cooperation with other nations determines its level of achievement. Moreover, there is a challenge of inadequacy in the provision of needed social amenities, which could assist in curbing crime in the affected part of Nigeria. Only the stability of the electricity supply can go a long way to combat terrorism and crime-related issues. Next is the nature of the socio-political and economic structure of the country, which was also identified by scholars who were interviewed and some literature. In tandem with Protracted Social Conflict, it has been argued that terrorism triumphs in an unjust environment. Finally, it has been mentioned that many Nigerians are not patriotic enough to fight against terrorism, as some still connive with them against the Nigerian state; even some security men are not exonerated from this heinous act.

Since terrorism is a social menace, scholars have argued that it can never be eradicated. However, it could be curbed if adequate steps are taken. Hence, this paper recommends that corruption should be reduced to a minimum in Nigeria. It is often said that either we kill corruption or we allow corruption to ruin our dear nation. Before corruption finally ruins this country, it is better to be controlled. Since the impact of corruption on keeping terrorism flourishing is high, there is a need to curb corruption to allow for curbing terrorism as well. The lamentation of the military and all other concerned Nigerians is the state of weapons being used by Nigerian forces, while terrorists use superior weapons. It is therefore needed to recommend the provision of necessary equipment for the MJTF so that this war can end as soon as possible. The world has become a global village. This fact has been exploited by the terrorists by networking with other terrorist groups in the world. What then disturbs Nigeria to also form alliances with other nation-states in the world to end this menace? Cooperation with foreign countries in terms of intelligent information sharing, training, and strategy, and access to modern equipment should form the basis for the cooperation.

Fighting terrorism is quite expensive; hence, there is a need to seek financial support from the United Nations and developed countries as well. In advanced countries where crime and terrorism are adequately combated, there are adequate social

amenities. These amenities make it easy for them to detect crime and criminals at ease. The provision of needed social amenities in Nigeria will go a long way to curb terrorism in Nigeria. These amenities include, but are not limited to availability of good roads, electricity, crime-detecting gadgets, satellites, etc. A good road, for instance, can make road users move at a speed that could ensure their safety. Restructuring the socio-political and economic structure of the country is another crucial suggestion. Nigeria's structure presently is made in such a way that few benefit from the wealth of the country. There is an urgent need to restructure Nigeria to allow for even development. Resources in the nation are more than enough to cater to everyone's needs if properly managed. Then the idea of using youths for political gains and afterward dumping them should stop. The political structure should be restructured in such a way that people's mandate is not robbed by desperate politicians, as is shown in the formation of Boko Haram. Reorientation for people to be patriotic should be taken with high esteem. The above point has made some people feel unpatriotic. It is quite disheartening that some Nigerians still act as saboteurs, giving terrorists information about Nigerian soldiers' movements. This is a high-level unpatriotic act. This has to change. The issue of reorientation has to be total and general since this ailment is felt all around the country. Vandalization of the state's properties, killing of security men, and agitation for separation and secession are all products of a lack of patriotism and loyalty to the Nigerian state. Finally, there is a need for total compliance with global templates, especially in the area of human rights. The reason is that no one could have any justification to perpetrate any terrorist act in the future.

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