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# Integrative and relational approaches to resilience in the NATO concept and action

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## Abstract

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The concept of resilience, suitable for specific operations, has been used within NATO since 2010. The particularity of the term resides in the characteristic phases of implementation in the allied operational environment, which generates appropriate conduct of identifying, analyzing, and avoiding risks, resistance to disruptive and impactful factors, recovery, restoration, and reconstruction of the initial force and action potential. The Alliance's combatant forces will maintain integrity and adequate functionality, even under restrictive, difficult conditions, by implementing, at organizational and operational levels, the two components of layered resilience (operational or military and civil). In this way, a high level of protection, stability, and viability of combat structures of tactical and/or joint forces will be achieved, to face the threats and complex actions of unfriendly (enemy) forces. Through the findings, the present research includes a theoretical approach, with possibilities of concretization in applied resilience in NATO civilian and military fields, because it includes important programmatic details, related to the consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian armed confrontation, which started on February 24, 2022. From here, relevant elements resulted in the consolidation of action power of joint and tactical forces, meant to be engaged in national and multinational operations within the North Atlantic Alliance, against any hostile aggressive forces.

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## Keywords:

instability; competition; resilience; layered resilience; civil resilience; operational (military) resilience; protection; stability; functionality.

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Pervasive instability, strategic competition, and recurring shocks shape the general security landscape. Threats can come from both state and non-state actors, in various forms, such as terrorist attacks, cyber-attacks or hybrid warfare, which blur the lines between conventional and unconventional conflicts. The importance of civil-military engagement and cooperation is evident in the face of threats posed by climate changes, natural disasters such as floods, wildfires, and earthquakes, pandemics, and Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. As new technologies become ubiquitous, the societies of NATO states become more interconnected and interdependent in the economic, financial, informational, and cyber domains. This interdependence has brought significant benefits, but it has also created vulnerabilities and dependencies. In today's security environment, effective and sustained resilience requires a comprehensive approach. This involves the use of the full range of military and civilian capabilities, as well as an active collaboration between the government, the private sector, and civil society (NATO 2023c).

Right after the annexation of Crimea, Alliance planners and commanders implemented several crucial measures to implement the updated NATO Concept, including the development of the Organization's Military Strategy in 2019. As a result, in 2020, the allied Defense Ministers approved the *Concept for the Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area*. Under these conditions, the term *resilience* has become particularly important - originally mentioned in the NATO Strategic Concept from 2010 (NATO 2010). In 2019, NATO leaders agreed, in the London Declaration, to step up efforts to strengthen resilience. Afterward, at the GLOBSEC 2020 Bratislava Forum, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg emphasized the future directions of resilience within the Alliance: "In fact, resilience is in NATO's DNA. Article Three of the Washington Treaty places a duty on the Allies to become more resilient. When the treaty was written, the concern was an armed attack from the Soviet Union. Today, we face a far broader range of challenges. That is why, boosting resilience is a key task for the future" (van Mill 2023, 84). In 2021, NATO highlighted the need to implement *national and collective resilience* as „an essential basis for credible deterrence and defense" (NATO 2021), given the new challenges and global military threats. The NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, approved during the Madrid Summit in 2022 (LSE IDEAS 2023) reinforces the importance of *national and collective resilience* in all essential allied actions, the first being *deterrence and defense*, as a major objective, reaffirmed at the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius (NATO 2023d).

"Resilience in a NATO context refers to the capacity, at the national and collective level, to prepare for, resist, respond to, and quickly recover from strategic shocks and disruptions, across the full spectrum of threats. Simply put, it is the ability for the Allies individually, the Alliance collectively and NATO as an organization to face disruptions and shocks and continue their activities. Geostrategic and military power redistribution requires the ongoing transformation of the NATO

Military Instrument of Power, as well as the alignment of military and non-military capabilities throughout NATO member nations. Alliance's resilience stems from a combination of civil preparedness and military capacity. In this context, civil preparedness directly contributes to NATO defense readiness – well maintained, fast healing, adaptive, durable, and ongoing military systems supported and enabled by civilian capabilities are needed to ensure security and stability throughout the Alliance". ([NATO-ACT 2023c](#)).

In the USA, the Department of Defense (DOD) has developed an expanded interpretation of *resilience* as a concept, applying it in the context of national defense. This perspective is reflected in the development of various policies, doctrines, and guidelines, and on the official websites of the DOD and armed services. For example, in Directive 4715.21 on Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience, DOD defined *resilience* as the "ability to anticipate, prepare for, and adapt to changing conditions and withstand, respond to, and recover rapidly from disruptions". This definition is associated with all areas managed by DOD, such as facilities, personnel, operations, transportation, supply chains, research, development, testing, and evaluation. Another example illustrates how the US Army defines *resilience* in the Army Recovery Care Program - a program for wounded, ill, and injured soldiers. Here, *resilience* is described as „the mental, physical, emotional and behavioral ability to face and cope with adversity, adapt to change, recover, learn and grow from setbacks" ([Herrera 2021, 2](#)). This concept covers multiple aspects of military life and highlights the importance of developing the necessary skills to face and overcome the challenges encountered in their service ([Wheeler 2021, 2](#)).

Currently, the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) is leading the Alliance's operational adaptation process by implementing NATO's fundamental warfighting concept ([NATO-ACT 2023a](#)). This approach includes the need for the operational development of the Alliance's power, based on the concept of *layered resilience* developed by ACT, by the requirements of military transformation, adaptation and maintaining of security in a complex international environment, characterized by the continuous growth of military risks and threats ([NATO-ACT 2023c](#)).

To carry out this novel work in a balanced way, we proceeded, from a scientific point of view, to identify the sources, obtain, analyze, evaluate, and interpret the information and necessary data to create the content of the sequences. The result is an updated study, useful for those interested in understanding the role and importance of resilience in the NATO concept and action, to carry out further scientific work. The holistic construction of this study actually approaches layered resilience whose components are addressed, from a scientific point of view, as follows: civil resilience in sequence two; and operational (military) resilience in sequences three and four.

## General aspects of national and collective resilience within NATO

Each NATO member state must have the necessary resilience to face (with very few losses), possible major shocks, generated by natural disasters, critical infrastructure failures, and hybrid or armed attacks. If we consider the core of the concept, *resilience* represents the individual and collective potential for preparation, resistance, response, and fast recovery from the impact of disruptive factors, to ensure the continuity of activities specific to the functioning of each Alliance state. In this sense, based on Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, ensuring national and collective resilience is essential in designing and achieving credible deterrence and defense, vital for the realization of NATO's efforts to protect societies, populations, and common values. Modern societies are highly complex, with integrated and interdependent sectors and vital services. This makes them vulnerable to major disruptions in the case of a terrorist or hybrid attack on critical infrastructure (NATO 2023c). In Figure 1 we present critical infrastructures (totally or partially) present in NATO member states.



Figure 1 The civil critical potential of each NATO state (Roepke and Thankey 2019)

For most of the Cold War period, civil emergency planning, then known as civil preparedness, was effectively organized and resourced by the Allies, most notably reflected in NATO's structure and command. During the 1990s, however, much of the detailed planning, structures, and capabilities of civilian training underwent significant cuts, both at national and NATO levels. Events such as Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the rise of ISIS/Daesh have marked a change in the strategic environment. These led the Alliance to strengthen its deterrence and defense posture. Meanwhile, terrorist and hybrid threats, especially recent cyber attacks, continue to target the civilian population and critical infrastructures, mostly owned by the private sector. These developments have had a profound impact, highlighting the need to increase resilience through civilian training. Today, the Allies are taking a step-by-step approach to this, in an effort that complements NATO's military modernization and its overall deterrence and defense posture

(Roepke and Thankey 2019). At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, Allied leaders agreed to enhance NATO's resilience to address the full spectrum of risks and threats, and to develop individual civil capabilities of member countries alongside collective capabilities, to withstand any form of armed attack.

They established seven basic requirements for assessing the level of preparedness on behalf of allied countries, as regards national civil resilience (Figures 2 and 3):

- ensuring the functional continuity of government and critical government services (this involves the ability to make decisions and communicate with citizens during a crisis);
- achieving continuous energy supply and developing back-up plans to manage outages (the focus is on the ability to provide power consistently and manage outages through well-defined plans);
- the effective management of uncontrolled movement of people, simultaneously with the deployment of allied military capabilities (with an emphasis on the ability to manage and control the movement of people, including from military areas);
- ensuring sufficient and resilient food and water supplies (especially protected from interruptions or sabotage);
- designing and ensuring the capacity to deal with mass casualties and disruptive health crises (the emphasis will be on building civil health systems that can manage crisis situations, with adequate stocks of medical supplies);
- the operation of telecommunications and cyber networks in crisis, including the use of 5G technology, with robust options for restoring these systems;
- ensuring the rapid movement of NATO forces on the territory of the Alliance, considering that civil services can count on transport networks, even during a crisis (van Mill 2023, 85).

These requirements reflect the Allies' commitment to strengthening national and collective resilience, thus contributing to the security and stability of the NATO Alliance by ensuring the continuity of government, essential services for the population, and civil support for the military.

To reduce potential vulnerabilities and risks of attack in peacetime, crisis, and conflict, NATO states will consider a full corroboration of military efforts to defend territories and populations with solid civil/civilian training in the areas of continuity of government, continuity of essential services for the population and giving civil/civilian support for joint-level military operations with national and multinational status. In this regard, considering the major destructions done by the Russian army in Ukraine, and the sabotage against the Nord Stream pipelines, at the NATO and EU level, on March 16, 2023, an operative group was established to raise awareness of the situation, sharing the best practices and developing the principles needed to improve resilience within both organizations. On announcing the joint work initiative, in January 2023, the Secretary General of NATO – Jens Stoltenberg stated in the presence of the President of the European Commission – Ursula von der Leyen: “We want to look together at how to make our critical infrastructure, technology and supply chains more resilient to potential threats, and to take action to mitigate potential vulnerabilities. This will be an important step in making our societies stronger and safer”. At the same time, NATO and EU leaders signed a new joint declaration to build the partnership between these organizations at a complex



level, including the use of emerging, disruptive technologies and the cosmic space, also taking into account the influences of climate changes on the security dimension. It is obvious that NATO's joint multinational operational forces, especially those deployed during crises and conflicts, will strictly depend on the services related to civil and commercial sectors as regards transport, communications, energy, and even essential supplies, food, water, ammunition, and fuel, to fulfill their missions. Thus results the importance of robust civil/civilian training to enable Allied societies to withstand attacks and/or major disruptions at any time given supporting the Alliance's combat forces to achieve operational objectives and the end state (NATO 2023c).

### Peculiarities of operational resilience within the Alliance

The purpose of realizing operational resilience (Resilient MIOp) within NATO is to support deterrence and defense of the Alliance against any adversary by establishing and using capabilities to anticipate, prepare, and adapt to threats and dangers, as well as by implementing resistance, response and rapid recovery options in the face of strategic shocks (van Mill 2023, 85).

The continuous modernization of NATO has given rise to the Layered Resilience Concept, which includes two components that augment each other, *i.e.* operational (military) resilience and civil resilience, considered essential in supporting the Alliance's military instrument of power (Figure 2). Layered resilience reveals NATO's ability to respond and adapt rapidly to various levels of risks and threats, from conventional to cyber and/or hybrid ones. The main focus of the concept is on operational (military) resilience, to enhance its applicability and realize its interdependencies with civil resilience (shown in sequence 2). In this way, NATO's capabilities of resistance, recovery and adaptation to strategic shocks, will be strengthened (van Mill 2023, 85-86).



Figure 2 Images of layered resilience (operational and civil) within NATO (van Mill 2023, 84)

Following the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian army on February 24, 2022, NATO experts have deemed it necessary to develop a resilience planning process similar to the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP) to harmonize and integrate national resilience plans, strategies and capacities. This approach was considered essential to coordinate a strong collective response from NATO, concurrently with the establishment of a high-level resilience task force, with the mission to identify and propose: multidimensional lessons regarding resilience, based on Ukraine's experience in the face of conventional, hybrid, and societal threats; both national and collective resilience requirements to help achieve a more effective unit effort; recommendations on future policies and investments, to achieve the objective of strengthening European resilience (Dowd and Cook 2022, 1-4).

Subsequently, the complexity and amplitude specific to the Layered Resilience Concept (elaborated) involved (at the Alliance level) the establishment of an appropriate thematic framework for *seven areas* belonging to *operational resilience* (Figure 3). Individually, the areas (listed below) required the establishment of thematic working groups – led by the designated allied nations –, as follows: • Command and Control-C2 System, France; • Warfighting Capability, Poland; • Situational Understanding, Greece; • Logistics/Deployability of Forces, Germany; • Response Planning, Romania; • Military Infrastructure, United Kingdom; • Perseverance, Hungary. To achieve the specific objectives, the thematic working groups will be supported by interested parties and necessary experts in each field. Through the methods and procedures used, related to the listed fields, several types of analyses will be carried out to obtain all the information for specific determinations of potential risks, vulnerabilities, and critical deficiencies, which will be taken into account in the future development of the military instrument of power (Dowd and Cook 2022, 85-86).





Figure 3 Areas of layered resilience, with focus on operational resilience (Dowd and Cook 2022, 86)

Since Romania is involved in one of the seven areas mentioned, the experts of the Euro-Atlantic Resilience Center (E-ARC) participated in September 2023 in the works of a seminar organized in Poland, for the development of the NATO layered resilience concept. For this purpose, E-ARC specialists coordinated, with the involvement of experts from the Romanian Ministry of National Defense, the process of elaborating the content of the Alliance's doctrine regarding "response planning", taking into account several NATO objectives concerning resilience, with an emphasis on: „continuity of government; structured military procedures; rapid mobilization of reserve forces; a harmonious balance between capabilities and capacities" (E-ARC 2023).

The operations of the future involve a continuous confrontation of one's own tactical and/or joint forces with adversary forces, which requires the consideration, design, and manifestation of operational resilience (a component of layered resilience) at tactical and/or joint levels, according to the stages of its development (partly or fully). Therefore, operational resilience highlights a process of preparatory protection, avoidance, evasion, strike-impact, response, restoration and further capability protection of the (national and multinational) combatant force in the action phases integrated with the missions in the theater of multinational joint operations.


Consequently, according to Figure 4, operational resilience involves, in phases, the provision and application of adequate operational risk management at the mentioned action level. It follows, therefore, that the intensive actions of the enemy, with different types of forces and means, can lead to a reduction in operation pace, especially due to the depletion of resources, losses in personnel and equipment, the low and uncertain level of stocks, the physical and mental exhaustion of fighters and their loss of motivation (Herrera 2021, 2-5).



**Figure 4** An image of operational resilience configuration at the level of a tactical and/or joint multinational force (Herrera 2021, 3)



In this context, leaders of operational and logistical support structures, at tactical and/or joint levels, are responsible for collaboration both horizontally and vertically in the military organizations to which they belong, including a joint force group. Therefore, the action synergy, created and developed by each combatant leader, together with the available logistic potential, represent the essential pillars of increasing, maintaining or restoring the operational resilience (Figure 5) of each tactical and/or joint level action structure (Minculete 2023, 230-232).



**Figure 5** Objective determinations of operational resilience at tactical and/or joint levels (Minculete 2023, 231)

Continuing with the operational resilience of a joint force under NATO command, it follows that its augmentation potential determines the maintenance of the territorial and/or critical infrastructures involved, and the continuous provision of resources (from military and civil sources) necessary to plan and conduct operations during a campaign in the face of the enemy's complex attacks. It follows, therefore, that joint operational forces and the integrated logistics support network must have the ability to operate without significant disruption and to adapt to intensive attempts by adversary forces, meant to distort and diminish one's intentions and resources through multiple force actions (Hagen et al. 2016, 6-11). If the avoidance of disruptive (risk) factors can no longer be prevented, even if visible intervention measures have been taken based on the requirements involved in the action effort, there will be insurmountable discrepancies between the dynamic actions of the combatant forces and the immediate logistic support they need

(Ryczynski and Tubis 2021, 16-22). Thus, with respect to operational logistic resilience, a specific crisis will arise quickly, through a partial or total shortage of logistical resources and services (in the following fields: supply; transport; maintenance; campaign services) and medical support, known in the economic sphere as “logistics culmination”, and, at the military operational level – in our view, as “logistics critical point” or “logistics critical deficit”. (Minculete 2023, 143-145). The disruption of operational logistic support is highlighted in Figure 6.




Figure 6 An image of the logistics critical point (deficit) of a tactical and/or joint multinational force (Minculete 2023, 144)

Russia's unjustified and illegal invasion of Ukraine, which generated the largest conflict in Europe since World War II, has now become an armed conflict of attrition and heavy logistic engagement. This complex confrontation highlighted the imperative to address often neglected, but crucial aspects in ensuring the essential operational capabilities required to successfully deploy, execute, and sustain planned operations to accurately accomplish the missions received and achieve the end state (Dowd, Jankowski and Cook 2023, 8-9). Given these conditions, it is necessary to rapidly improve the training capacity and the ability of NATO operational forces, which must be supported by modern, effective, and efficient operational logistics, to ensure an adequate response to counter current and future threats (NATO-ACT 2023b).

As a result, to build high operational resilience, with holistic effects at organizational and inter-organizational levels, it follows the need for intensive planning and performing, by NATO national and multinational operational forces, of training and exercises, modeling and simulation, such as and wargaming for testing leaders, fighters, and for validating processes. According to Alliance experts, training scenarios involving both types of resilience - civil and operational (military) one – will have to include: civil agencies, international and non-governmental organizations, commercial actors and civil defense forces; and current and future

complex environments and threats. At the same time, chaos and failures occurred during training and exercises of NATO operational structures and systems, which will have to be integrated to improve the execution that will be evaluated based on the qualitative and quantifiable resilience indicators (NATO-ACT 2022, 5).

### **Deterrence and defense, essential factors in achieving operational resilience**

The role of deterrence in the military field is equivalent to a state's level of operational potential as compared to that of its adversaries. Through deterrence, adverse threats can be mitigated or diminished, thus, implicitly avoiding the consequences of an extended crisis that could break out. Modern doctrinal approaches highlight deterrence primarily as a psychological process, emphasizing the skillful understanding of the mentality of the opposing forces' elites, who define and propagate the threat through the use of military power of subordinate forces, as well as the ability to influence their immediate conduct. Therefore, message coordination and synchronized transmission on various communication channels, have the role of changing the behavior of the opposing state's leader(s) after understanding the multiple costs and consequences of any reckless military actions at their behest. From here, the doctrinal configuration of operational resilience results, which focuses, apart from the behavioral side, on the theory of games that was and is applied through deterrence with conventional and/or nuclear military potential (Wheeler 2021).

When deterrence is to reach the critical point of failure, NATO operational forces (national and multinational) will have to implement permanent defense and contingency plans (built-in advance based on possible operational scenarios) to face imminent threats, at least in the short term, and prepare the necessary conditions to win the initiative, if it has been diminished or lost (Wheeler 2021).

In the same line, a suggestive historical example of defense and deterrence of the opposing forces is the war of the Finnish state, from the fall and winter of 1939-1940, against the invading Soviet forces, whose potential was given by the force of more than 600,000 soldiers. Finland's defense consisted of only: 300,000 soldiers (including reserves and conscripts); a small number of tanks; a few fighter jets; and a miniscule amount of ammunition for an insignificant artillery force. However, the compensation came from the Finnish civil society prepared to face a far superior enemy. In the course of history, great battles were often won by flexible and much smaller forces than the enemy, and in the case of the Finnish army which was quite inferior to the opposing one, almost all the soldiers were, besides skilled hunters and experienced skiers, capable of combat and survival in the extreme conditions of the Arctic Circle winter. As regards the invading Soviet army, most of the recruits who had to brave the frozen wilderness were not equipped for the combat environment, lacking important items such as snowshoes and skis. Moreover, the Finnish defense

forces gradually drew the invaders inside the national territory, covered by a high layer of snow. Simultaneously the defense organized themselves into small and independent harassing groups, with increased mobility, capable of quick and effective attacks, which enabled them to destroy the less equipped and prepared Soviet units. They were prevented from deploying and forced to move in massive columns along difficult roads, while the Finnish fighters, highly motivated for the liberation of their country, had complete freedom of movement and attack. Later, after 105 days of intense confrontations, the armed conflict that started on November 30, 1939, ended with a peace agreement between the two sides. It resulted, however, in a territorial loss of 11% of Finland, but compensated by the preservation of state sovereignty. The other side, the USSR, lost more than 200,000 people on the territory of the occupied state, compared to only 25,000 Finnish casualties, which portrayed a particularly negative image of the Soviets' international reputation (NATO 2023b).

Today, NATO's military defense power installed in the eastern part of its territory is an important deterrent. This component was built in recent years, when the allied states located in the northern and southern territories of NATO's eastern flank set up, based on the agreements at the level of the Alliance, eight battle groups (BG) with multinational structures (each under a nation-frame). So, as early as 2017, battle groups were established in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and from 2022, in Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria. Moreover, for deterrence and defense, on this eastern flank - from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south - the Allies have deployed a significant number of ships, aircraft and other troops (NATO 2023b). On January 24, 2024, one of the largest NATO military exercises (after the Cold War), called "Steadfast Defender 2024", designed to be carried out over several months, began in the N-E USA (Felstead 2024). The operational capabilities to carry out the exercise are: „around 90,000 soldiers (from 31 NATO allied states and Sweden); 50 warships (from aircraft carriers to destroyers); over 80 fighter jets (F-35, FA-18, Harriers, F-15), helicopters and countless unmanned aerial vehicles; over 1,100 combat vehicles (namely, more than 150 tanks; 500 infantry fighting vehicles and 400 armored personnel carriers)” (NATO 2024; Reuters 2024). The purpose of this complex exercise is to: test and refine the Alliance's defense plans, to strengthen European defense against the possible actions of “a close adversary” (Felstead 2024); conduct and sustain complex operations “in several fields, for several months, over a geographical area of thousands of kilometers, from the High North to Central and Eastern Europe, in any conditions” (Garamone 2024); demonstration of the Alliance's ability to strengthen the Euro-Atlantic area “through the transatlantic movement of forces from North America” (which involves verifying the Alliance's ability to prepare and rapidly transport North American forces for “strengthening the defense of Europe”). The military maneuvers specific to this exercise will be carried out within “a simulated conflict scenario that would occur with an adversary of almost the same caliber” (Garamone 2024). Following the completion of NATO's New Military Strategy in 2019, and the associated concept for *Euro-Atlantic deterrence and defense* in the following year, the Strategic Plan for the entire area of



responsibility of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) was approved. This is *a unique military plan* for the use of Alliance forces, both inside and outside the NATO area, considering both major threats: Russia and terrorist groups. The fundamental details on how to address specific threats were then supplemented by detailed regional and subordinate plans.

Thus, during the Summit in Vilnius, the *regional plans* - for the three Joint Force Commands were approved, as well as *the seven strategic plans available to the commanders of functional domains*. The mentioned NATO Commands completely cover the Area of Responsibility of SACEUR (Area of Responsibility - AOR), namely the (joint command) areas: Nordic and Atlantic (at Norfolk-Virginia); Central - with the Baltic states to the Alps, (at Brunssum-Netherlands); South-East (including the Mediterranean and the Black Sea (in Naples-Italy) ([LSE IDEAS 2023](#)).

## Conclusion

Increased A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) threats in the emerging strategic environment of Europe, the Middle East, and Asia-Pacific have led the US and NATO joint forces to become sufficiently resilient to any attack, by generating the necessary combat power to achieve operational objectives at tactical, joint and strategic levels. Appropriate options for designing and achieving adequate operational resilience, by a multinational joint Alliance force, require a pertinent analysis of theater interactions between potential adversary attacks and one's own actions, to counter them in a timely, effective, and efficient manner.

From a societal perspective, within the Alliance, resilience represents the ability of a society to resist and recover from shocks such as natural disasters, critical infrastructure failures, and hybrid or armed attacks. From here, two key aspects of resilience result, namely, the capacity to absorb and recover from a crisis. Then, resilient actors must be able to respond to a range of potential shocks, whether anticipated or unexpected, and have the ability to survive.

From an operational point of view, resilience is the ability to absorb shocks at strategic, operational, and tactical levels, by reducing risks, which requires proper management. Any NATO military organization needs to implement operational resilience by adopting an appropriate functional framework that encompasses the critical stages of anticipation, detection, deterrence, resistance, response, and recovery. Each of these elements must be supported by well-grounded procedures, to strengthen, thus, the capacity of any operational structure with national and/or multinational status, to face challenges and/or threats.

At the Alliance level, resilience is not just a modern term, but an essential objective whose implementation generates flexibility, adaptability, and resilience. This requires

procedures for incorporating layered resilience, through the operational (military) and civil components, within the complex actions of deploying and engaging the forces of NATO member states in joint national and multinational operations, to defend the Alliance's territory.

Finally, the role of resilience within NATO is given by its major importance in achieving the security and efficiency objectives of the organization to always counter present-day threats, that are increasingly changing in complexity and diversification. Under these conditions, the Alliance will become progressively prepared, continuously adapted, collaboratively strengthened and able to effectively manage risks, so that it can ensure the conditions of stability and security within a dynamic international security environment, which has become increasingly unpredictable.

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