Warning signs of advanced Islamic radicalization

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Abstract

The article analyzes the primary cognitive and behavioral indicators observable following the manifestation of the Islamic radicalization process, specifically the advanced stage of radicalization. The research scope is also related to identifying signals of Islamic radicalization by utilizing a methodology based on the analysis of cases of radicalization among Romanian citizens.

As the research aims to analyze the main signals indicating the advanced stage of individual radicalization, these indicators are valuable for early warning, both from the perspective of practitioners and competent authorities in preventing and combating radicalization. They are also beneficial for civil society to increase awareness regarding the identification of radical discourse encountered in the online environment.

Since the expansion of the manifestation of the jihadist phenomenon in Europe, starting with the terrorist attacks of 2004–2005, the concept of radicalization has begun to receive increased attention in the field of academic research. However, the current state of knowledge remains incomplete: the definitions that theorize the phenomenon of radicalization may vary, and the causes and factors that predispose at an individual level to the triggering of the radicalization process are variable.

Thus, unanimously, researchers, specialists, and practitioners in the field of preventing radicalization have highlighted the need to identify the early signs of radicalization by the authorities with the aim of thwarting attempts to engage radicalized people in terrorist actions. In this sense, this article proposes the analysis of the applicability of the indicators of the advancement of the Islamic radicalization process by using a research methodology that is based on the analysis of cases of radicalized Romanian citizens. The hypothesis the article starts from is the idea that, although the causes that trigger the process of radicalization may vary from individual to individual, nevertheless, the signals that indicate the advanced state of radicalization follow a repetitive pattern in most cases of Islamic radicalization.

The reason why this article presents the radicalization process exemplified through the prism of the typology of Islamic radicalization lies in the fact that, following the applied methodology, it emerged that the incidence of jihadist religious radicalization cases is predominant in Romania compared to other types of radicalization, respectively political, ethnic, or ecological. The research questions to be answered in this article are: What are the cognitive indicators identified in the narrative of radicalized people? What are the main behavioral changes that can be assimilated as behavioral indicators that reflect the advanced stage of radicalization?

In this sense, the main objective of the article is to highlight a set of qualitative indicators, presented from a double perspective (cognitive and behavioral), that can constitute early warning signals regarding the advanced stage of radicalization, starting with their applicability in cases of radicalized Romanian citizens. The novel element that this article aims to contribute to the enrichment of research in the field of preventing radicalization lies in shifting attention from the analysis of the causes and factors that lead to radicalization—a fact often addressed in specialized literature—and focusing the analysis on the primary warning tools. These tools can be utilized by both civil society and authorities to identify the advanced stage of radicalization.

However, the dilemma in a question remains one intensely debated by psychological theories: how does the changing sense of identity operate in the case of young Europeans, shaped by an environment with democratic, liberal values and freedom of expression, to resonate with the brutal practices promoted as legitimate by terrorist organizations? (Campelo et al. 2018). In this context, it is necessary to mention the fact that, in regional environments dominated by authoritarian regimes, the

restrictive application of a rigid religion and the use of force to impose mandatory compliance with Sharia Law make the idea of using extreme violence to implement religious objectives an aspect rooted in the collective psyche as legitimate, a tradition of the place against which citizens have acquired emotional resilience over time (Hirsi Ali 2015). Instead, in the present article, the analyzed cases refer to Romanian citizens, shaped by the democratic values of the European environment, a fact for which analyzing the process of changing previous mentalities and beliefs by adopting radical approaches is useful for understanding the manifestation of the phenomenon at the macro-level, at the European and national level.

Theoretical concepts related to radicalization

The concept of radicalization is explained by a variety of definitions in the specialized literature (Kundnani 2012), essentially explaining the phasing of an individual or collective process characterized by the adoption of a violent ideology and an extremist belief system. Moreover, the process of radicalization can have as its finality a double perspective: obtaining changes in society in accordance with the promoted ideology or obtaining some objectives determined by non-state actors.

Thus, the concept does not benefit from a unanimously accepted definition (Veldhuis and Staun 2009, 4); radicalization can be defined as a staged process that uses socialization as a catalyst for mobilization for violent purposes and the promotion of an extremist ideology, even if it does not lead to materialization of violent actions (Hafez and Mullins 2015) or perhaps it can be explained in a complex way, as an individual or collective (group) process characterized by the promotion of an extremist ideology, which involves a dichotomous vision of the world and the delegitimization of state authority and it presents elements such as the use of pressure and coercion, various forms of political violence or acts of violent extremism in the form of terrorism and war crimes (McCauley and Moskalenko 2011). Although the definitions may vary in relation to the explanation of the phenomenon, nevertheless, the common elements that characterize the radicalization process can be found, such as the gradualness of the process, the legitimization and justification of violence to achieve certain objectives, the promotion and appropriation of an extremist ideology, and radical approaches.

Closely related to the notion of phasing the radicalization process, there are different framings of the concept of radicalization, starting with the difference between radicalization as a cognitive process, of joining and incorporating at a psychological level a set of extremist, radical beliefs (Hardy 2018, 79), and radicalization as a behavioral process, which involves extremist attitudes and behaviors, which can lead to acts of violence (Neumann 2013). In this sense, two psychological schools of thought offer the conceptual framework for understanding the complexity of the stages of the radicalization process, in the sense previously explained, respectively:

the cognitive level of incorporating violent ideology and the behavioral level, in the sense of the materialization of changes in attitude or habits in accordance with the transposition of ideological elements (Wolfowicz et al. 2020).

The cognitive school of thought investigates the mechanisms of human thought and the ways of achieving changes in a person's perception, mentality, and values, starting from the idea that behind every change there is a mechanism of rationalization. The applicability of this school of thought in relation to radicalization leads to the assumption that the process of radicalization takes place as a way of incorporating and building radical ideas. On the other hand, behaviorist theory explains the behavior of the individual as a dynamic process of learning, assimilation, and experimentation with attitudes, actions, and habits. The applicability of behaviorist theory to radicalization is observed in most de-radicalization programs, in which individuals go through a new process of learning moderate behaviors and patterns to be substituted for radical ones (Benevento 2020).

The relevance of these theories lies in the differentiation between cognitive radicalization and behavioral radicalization in relation to the predisposition to respond and register violent reactions in an action plan and to commit terrorist acts, which is essential in the research field of combating radicalization and terrorism. Thus, starting from the attitude-intention-behavior typology, the classic pyramidal model differentiates between radical attitudes that can be evaluated by examining support, justification, or acceptance for radical behaviors and radical behaviors that are also delimited according to the type of ideological motivation: non-violent (activism) and violent (radicalism) (McCauley and Moskalenko 2017).

Radical behaviors motivated by violent ideology represent the manifestation of the radicalization process, essentially representing a sub-type of terrorism as the lethal manifestation of ideologically motivated violence, in the sense that there are more radicalized people than people who commit terrorist actions, but most terrorists are implicitly also radicalized persons (Wolfowicz et al. 2020). Also, an important clarification regarding the specificity of the radicalization process is that, in essence, it is a gradual process whereby a person adopts belief systems that justify the use of violence to bring about social change, identifying two different dimensions of manifestation: supporting beliefs and acting in accordance with them, or adopting radical beliefs without going into action (Maskaliunaite 2015).

Opinions according to which radicalization is a gradual process that involves a phasing of the phases of radicalization, which does not always materialize in committing acts of violence (Bjørgo and Horgan 2009), are frequently found in the specialized literature, highlighting the distinction between accepting radical ideologies and active involvement in committing acts of violence consistent with shared extremist ideological elements (Wilner and Dubouloz 2010). Precisely in relation to this opinion shared in the specialized literature, the distinction is

important to operate in order to highlight the delimitation of specific stages of the radicalization process, containing specific indicators that allow the authorities to thwart acts of violence, until reaching the transition to the planned action by the radicalized person (Silke 2011).

In support of this vision, it can be emphasized that the phasing of the radicalization process has been characterized in the specialized literature in the form of several theories (Hofmann 2012). One of the first models of the gradualness of the process was highlighted through the prism of the four stages of radicalization, consisting of the period of pre-radicalization of the individual by perceiving a social category or a triggering event as wrong, followed by framing them as unjust and revolting, followed by the third stage—the attribution of responsibility—and finally ending with the demonization of the social or governmental category (Borum 2003). Another theory identifies six phases of the radicalization process, explained through the prism of the psychological complexity of the radicalization process, in the sense in which the feeling of injustice triggers the justification for the use of violence, followed by the culpability of the targeted social categories and their dehumanization using a specific ideological language and symbolically, as well as placing responsibility in order to fulfill the divine mission and minimize the effects of terrorist actions (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010).

On the other hand, the radicalization process is explained as being staged in three phases, starting with radicalization, mobilization, and engaging in terrorist actions (Sinai 2012). Mobilization is determined by catalysts in the form of triggers, such as contacts with a terrorist organization, the ability to train, and the willingness to act for terrorist purposes; these triggers determine the last phase of the process. However, in contrast to the theory of the three stages that highlights the gradualness of the radicalization process, the theory of the six stages, as well as the theory of radicalization in four stages, predominantly reflects cognitive elements that could be characterized as conceptual manifestations in the phase of appropriation and sedimentation of violent ideology, intensified by the factor of socialization or the existence of contacts.

Thus, from the perspective of explaining the psychological mechanisms, these last two theories reflect the stage of internalization, assimilation, and identification of the individual, but they do not highlight the transition of the individual that could signal the transition to the action plan. Another essential aspect, which often contributes to the failure of early identification of radicalization signals, is the incubation period (United States Bipartisan Policy Center 2011), understood as the internalization of radical beliefs for a certain period, followed by a turning point from which they can develop two scenarios: advancement of the radicalization process and behavioral manifestation, or abandoning radical beliefs and stopping the radicalization process. Also, the development of the process can be characterized by an alert rhythm of several months, or it can vary up to several years (United States Bipartisan Policy Center 2011).

As previously highlighted by the exposition of the theories regarding the stages of the radicalization process, it is important to clarify the fact that the changes in behavior as a manifestation of the reaction to the incorporation of ideological elements represent a stage prior to the advanced stage of radicalization but offer visible, early indicators regarding the existing risks. Another important aspect to mention is the fact that, regardless of whether it is the causes that predispose a person to radicalization or the pre-existing vulnerability factors (Bongar 2007), these aspects must be analyzed in a particular way, equally with the individualization of the signals that reflect the stages of a person's radicalization process (Schmid 2013). In this sense, in order to understand the conceptual nuances, it is imperative to analyze the cases of radicalization and the particular elements that indicate the gradualization of the radicalization process in order to determine a pattern of common features, a fact that is useful for an increased degree of awareness regarding resilience to the content and the extremist narrative (Stephens and Sieckelinck 2020).

Cognitive indicators of radicalization

Cognitive indicators can be identified in relation to an individual's beliefs, which can highlight a person's radical mindset and ideas and the presence of violent ideological elements. Thus, starting from the variety of definitions that explain radicalization, it can be observed that, predominantly, the phenomenon is explained as a change in the individual's perception and beliefs, orienting towards violence and extremist approaches (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008). Related to the defining elements of the concept, in order to investigate the incidence of cognitive radicalization, in the first instance, it is necessary to investigate the presence, first of all, of changes in the individual's perception and beliefs at a turning point in the individual's life.

Thus, the early warning model developed by the Center for the Study of Democracy proposes three indicators that suggest radicalization at a cognitive level (Khader et al. 2019), such as: openly expressing dissatisfaction with the state or authorities (with the specification that in states that experiencing economic or other difficulties is a normal indicator, which does not reflect indications of radicalization); the existence of a dichotomous vision regarding a certain subject, i.e., black-and-white thinking of the "us versus them" type; and the rejection of the legitimacy of the state authority. Also, another proposed indicator consists of the person suddenly changing from showing little or even no interest in religion to vehement and absolutist views in relation to religious interpretations (Webb 2017). Also, particularly important aspects to consider are the ways of expressing radical beliefs, namely the online environment, a fact highlighted by the numerous cases of radicalization and self-radicalization through virtual means (online social media platforms, video games) used as a tool, mainly with the acceleration of the impact of technologies on society (Akram and Nasar 2023). Thus, the most common signals that indicate radicalization in the online environment as the materialization and expression of radical beliefs

have been identified as the dissemination of violent materials with hateful content and radical speech, as well as photos and videos of extreme violence that promote extermination of social, religious, or national categories, and, on the other hand, the use of extremist language containing expressions from pro-ISIS or anti-European, anti-Semitic, or anti-American rhetoric (Rowe and Saif 2016).

In order to highlight the research starting point in this article, the methodology that it was based on comprised the qualitative analysis of cases of Islamic radicalization of Romanian citizens. Following the analysis of cases of Islamic radicalization, the first aspect observed was the applicability of the theory of online radicalization through virtual platforms and the modality of self-radicalization in all the cases studied. A second aspect observed was the applicability of the theory of the gradualness of the radicalization process, but also the presence of an incubation period, at a cognitive level, prior to the development of radical behaviors. The analyzed cases highlighted that the radicalization processes happened in a relatively short period of time, between one and two years. It should be noted that prior to the initiation of the process, subjects who are not part of a regional framework that predisposes them to the collective acceptance of customs and Sharia law (Ayaan 2015) usually go through an identity crisis, understood as a factor of vulnerability to radicalization.

In the analyzed cases, the identity crisis of the analyzed persons—understood as the loss of purpose and meaning in life, vision, or belonging to known national or social values—was added prior to radicalization to the interaction with elements of Islamic culture at the individual level, or as a result, interaction with Muslim people. However, the aspect that must be clearly differentiated in the present cases is the fact that the interaction with elements of Islamic culture or people with the Islamic faith took place in relation to radical and not moderate approaches to religion. In this sense, this fact should draw attention to misinterpretations according to which interaction with elements of Islamic culture or people automatically leads to the risk of radicalization.

The main differentiation criterion consists of moderate approaches versus radical approaches built on a cognitive level in relation to the Islamic religion. The gradualness of the radicalization process, observed in all existing cases, finds its applicability in the existence of four stages. In the first stage, we note the contact and germination of radical, extremist mentalities and their acceptance as normal due to vulnerabilities related to age, personality, psycho-emotional, or social context, which accelerates the incorporation of elements of radical ideology. In the second stage, their affiliation and validation follow, as well as repetitive, systematic incorporation actions, simultaneously with the isolation of the subject.

The third stage represents the action stage, in which the subjects want to share and disseminate the materials and narratives related to the extremist ideology, as well as to attract new followers, taking on the active role of the promoter of the continuation

of the radical texts. In the last stage, it should be noted that the intense feelings of hatred and enmity, fecundated and accelerated over time by the repeated calls to violent actions of jihadist texts and materials, follow a climax in an advanced stage of radicalization, in which the subject passes from the plane psychologically and verbally in the action plan, when performing acts of extreme violence following the model of those visualized in jihadist materials and carried out by jihadist models or members of terrorist organizations (collective beheadings, mass executions, torture).

Extreme violence produces an even deeper psychological impact than usual due to three indicators: the systematic and repetitive actions of visualizing and indoctrinating the subjects, which determines their resistance to counter-arguments; the mystification and symbolism that accompany the violence carried out by terrorist groups; as well as the attachment of a personal but also a group mission typical of jihadist narratives (Chifu, Popescu and Nedea 2012). In all cases of radicalized Romanian citizens, common elements of the violent Islamic ideology are present in the narrative used in the interaction with the surrounding people, as well as the one spread online on social media platforms and video games, in order to change the set of online user perceptions. Also, in addition to the ideological elements present in the propaganda narrative, aspects that highlight the wrong interpretations of the Islamic religion, religious values, and goals, respectively, are common elements of a radical interpretation of the texts from the Koran and the Islamic Hadiths (Abu Melhim et al. 2023).

As a result of the methodology used, the following indicators of radicalization were identified, which the people in the analyzed cases presented at a cognitive level:

- **The glorification of hatred and violence against "infidels"**, which goes beyond simple intolerance towards Christians, Jews, or moderate Muslims.
- **The glorification of jihadist leaders and the praise of jihad** are observed from two perspectives: both through virtual platforms (video games with jihadist heroes) or social networks through which the violent actions of jihadist leaders are exposed as an example for the promotion of jihadist goals, and in real-time by eulogizing them in front of social circles of contact or in front of family and relatives.
- **The assimilation of suicide as a covenant and proof of faith and fulfillment of Allah's will** comes from a distorted interpretation of the quotes from the Qur'an, which speak about jihad, especially by detaching the sounds related to jihad from the previous context and from the distinction between the spiritual and the military domain. The militarization of jihad was brought into the collective mind as the original interpretation of the Qur'an following Islamic schools of thought that assimilated wartime jihad against non-Muslims who attack Muslims as applicable in peacetime against any non-Muslim who does not accept Islamism. Thus, the idea of spiritual jihad expanded to that of jihad understood in the military sense (Amin 2014). Also, the concept of human sacrifice, or martyrdom, started with the fact that, in the Qur'an, it is specified

that martyrs are forgiven of all their sins and rise to the highest of the seven levels of paradise, not even having to perform funeral prayers on their bodies, assuming that all sins were forgiven and they immediately ascended to heaven (Hirsi Ali 2015).

• **The adoption of Islamic jihadist acronyms**: it is observed as a pattern in most cases of radicalization, as a materialization of the copy-cat effect. In the cases from Romania, two subjects adopted ISIS jihadist acronyms. Another characteristic aspect is the adoption of language specific to the narratives of jihadist discourse and specific terms from Islam to name religious notions related to faith, obligations, and customs (takia, sunnah, shahrib, fatwa, etc.), also taking over some slogans and expressions used by DAESH members, accompanied by religious justifications found in the texts of the Qur'an.

• **The lack of respect for the authorities and the inability to honestly understand the consequences of the actions** taken in relation to the degree of social danger. In all cases, no subject proved a degree of awareness or assumption regarding the seriousness of the actions committed. In this sense, the incidence of the indicators presented theoretically and at a practical level can be observed, such as the dichotomous thinking "us versus them" regarding jihadist objectives, the delegitimization of national and European authorities, as well as the use of extremist language in online materials and extreme violence, accompanied by radical discourse, inciting violence.

Behavioral indicators of radicalization

In the literature in the field, a series of indicators have been highlighted that suggest the advanced phase of Islamic radicalization, understood in the sense of the phase preceding the transition to the action plan, which can be framed as changes in behavior, prior to engaging in jihadist terrorist actions such as: visible changes in style of dress and behavior, alienation from family and old friends and the creation of another circle of friends who share radical ideas, religion becomes an explanation for everything and is constantly referred to; the oppression of moderate Muslims as infidels (Schmid 2013), participation in training, fighting or interest in weaponry, explosive substances, attending religious seminars of radical preachers, visiting jihadist websites and watching jihadist videos; giving language lessons, followed by trips abroad; efforts to evade detection (passport loss, etc.), sudden change of clothing to Western clothes prior to the terrorist attack (Bötticher and Mareš 2012).

Another set of behavioral indicators proposed in the literature consists of the identification of changes in behavior related to: the interruption of the activities of listening to music, television, and cinema; the dramatic change in eating habits; stopping all sports activities; changes in clothing; changing the circle of friends; and breaking relationships with family (Schmid 2016). In order to evaluate the incidence of these indicators in the behavior of radicalized people, an essential aspect is

the notion of self-image, defined as the perception that an individual attributes the accumulation of cognitive, social, emotional, and identity traits that it possesses. The self-image is the starting point related to the mechanisms and actions that an individual will develop or apply as a reaction to the self-image or how it is affected by the perception of the community to which it belongs (Chifu, Popescu and Nedea 2012).

Psycho-social theories (Arena and Arrigo 2005) have explained the importance of self-image and personal identity in the process of radicalization in the sense that a distorted, eroded, unstable self-image contributes greatly to the incorporation of violent ideology. On the other hand, personal identity plays a crucial role in radicalization because, most of the time, the process itself is triggered by an identity crisis, a search for purpose and meaning in life, or a loss of the sense of identification from the past (Ferguson and McAuley 2020). Identity can be lost on a personal level by disconnecting from former values, principles, mindsets, and lifestyles, or on a social level, in the form of isolation and seeking a sense of belonging in another community with different values.

Thus, it is observed in the process of radicalization how the subjects lose their old representation of life and acquire, step by step, more intensified identification with an opposite lifestyle, which marks a drastic, rapid change regarding the new sense of identity that they acquire. In this sense, the following behavioral indicators were identified as characteristics of the advanced stage of radicalization in the studied cases:
- **At the physical level**, changes in the clothing worn (niqab), coordinated changes at the hormonal level to determine the rapid growth of the Sunnah beard, and the adoption of a clothing style similar to that of a jihadist model have been identified, as also, dietary changes.
- **At the emotional level**: identifying with models of jihadist warriors and taking on the personal mission of martyrdom; sacrifice understood in the form of both infidel or moderate Muslim victims; and suicide as a guarantee in the form of obtaining paradise.
- **Exhortations to violence and fighting used in jihadist materials, justifying martyrdom**, accompanied by video and audio scenes representing terrorist attacks against European states seen as demons (jinn), terrorist fighters during training, detonating cars with explosives in public places, and presenting atrocities against Christians and Jews by terrorist members. Also, the presentation to the public of materials that consist of public executions, beheadings, arson, or desecration of corpses has the role of public intimidation, instilling terror and fear, but also attracting followers from vulnerable social categories such as young people or children who can easily instigate violence, being in a fertile period to capture new ideas or orientations promoted by modern means (video games, social media platforms).
- **At the social level**, it should be noted that the period of isolation that the subjects spent before and during the radicalization process was a fact that decisively contributed to the intensification of the incorporation of extremist

ideology. In addition to the fact that each subject demonstrated a total rejection of the old social groups, including their family, under the consideration of identifying people through associations such as "unfaithful" or "unfaithful" and "moderate", it is also noticeable the fact there is an almost unanimous desire for them to be integrated and included in the terrorist groups: either to go to Syria and join ISIS, or to demonstrate loyalty and gain the trust of the members of the terrorist groups. Also, to integrate at the community level and fulfill jihadist objectives, one can also emphasize the learning of the Arabic language during the radicalization process. Learning the native language can be considered a step toward acquiring a new identity in the sense that reciting the Qur'an and other Islamic texts, as well as addressing the ideology of targeted, specific categories, requires knowledge of the Arabic language as well as the feeling of authenticity of belonging to radical Islamic groups.

• **At the religious level**, it should be emphasized that the personal and social identity of the subjects is swallowed up by the religious identity they attribute to themselves. Besides, specific to radicalization is not only the embedded violent ideology but also the extremist, absolutist manner of reducing the whole of existence only to religious objectives and identifying the value of an individual and the meaning of life only in this role.

• **Travel abroad** has been identified prior to the advancement of the radicalization process, in part as an accelerating or triggering factor of radicalization relative to interacting with radicalized individuals in France or showing a desire to go to Syria and seeking logistical and financial ways to leave Romania.

In this sense, it can be observed, on the one hand, that not all radicalized people showed the whole set of indicators foreseen in the specialized literature: some people adopted a new style of clothing or a jihadist acronym, while others did not. Also, only a part of the people was aiming to go to Syria to join ISIS, a goal that was not, at least verbalized, unanimously. However, the isolation, removal or breaking of ties with friends and family, or tensions at work represented an indicator at the social level present in all cases, a fact also highlighted in the specialized literature (Grossman 2018) related to dichotomous thinking and absolutism that the subjects presented in their everyday lives.

A second indicator at the behavioral level identified in all cases is extreme aggression and violence, materialized both verbally, cognitively, and intentionally, in the sense of explicit exposure or through the dissemination of materials, or at the individual level, the intention to kill non-believers and to fulfill the objectives of ISIS. A third common behavioral indicator is the actions of spreading jihadist propaganda and promoting the extremist ideology of ISIS in various forms (video materials, photographs, written materials, violent video games), with the aim of attracting new followers and encouraging terrorist attacks. In fact, in essence, it has been highlighted that the purpose of recruiting and attracting new followers to

extremist ideology is one of the most certain signals in the case of radicalization, being undoubted concerning other indicators that must be correlated and analyzed in its complexity (Silke and Brown 2016).

Conclusions

The main aspect that emerged clearly from the analysis of the cases of radicalization was related to the fact that, although at the cognitive level, all subjects shared the same violent ideological elements and objectives of exterminating the infidels and carrying out jihad, the manifestation at the behavioral level involved customized elements, depending on the affinities of each subject. Also, as I highlighted previously, there is a common basis in the case of behavioral indicators as well, observed especially in the dynamic changes in the subjects' social relationships.

A second important aspect to remember is that one of the most significant elements, unanimously presented by the subjects, is the action of disseminating and promoting violent ideology both in the virtual environment and in social circles. This element is strongly accompanied by the verbalization of the objectives and mission of "carrying out jihad" present in the narratives of all the analyzed subjects. Although the behavioral indicators that emerged from the analysis of the cases mark the changes in attitudes and habits of the radicalized people in a visible way, nevertheless, they must be analyzed on a particular level and accumulated with other purely individual aspects of the history of the people in order to conclude on the incidence of radicalization. However, the direct and unequivocal expression of elements of violent ideology with extremist content, but also of jihadist objectives, is the common and indubitable indicator highlighted in this analysis.

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