In defense of a forgotten territory. The fight against ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism at the border of South Dobrogea (1922-1926) II

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Abstract

The support received by the Bulgarian komitadjis from the civil and military authorities in the attacks, robberies, and murders they committed on the southern border of Romania confirmed the suspicion of the authorities in Bucharest that their actions against border guards and Romanian citizens had political connotations and could not be characterized as acts of banditry. Although significant efforts were made by the Romanian government to halt them, both at the diplomatic and military levels, the decision-making factors in Bulgaria during the period investigated in this article did not take any measures to prevent the occurrence of these border incidents.

Keywords: Komitadjji; border incident; South Dobrogea; nationalist terrorism; acts of banditry.
Robberies and murders on the southern border of Romania

This support received by Bulgarian komitadjis had strong roots in Bulgarian society. After the signing on July 28 / August 10, 1913, of the Bucharest Peace Treaty between Romania, Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, ending the Second Balkan War, in the autumn of the same year, Bulgarian refugees from South Dobrogea (Quadrilateral), a territory received by Romania, laid the foundations of an organization whose name and activity, *The society of culture and charity of Bulgarian refugees in Dobrogea* was declarative, contrary to its motto, *Neither Dobrogea without blood, nor blood without Dobrogea*. In the first half of February 1914, the first congress was held in Sofia at which the statutes of the organization were proposed and voted, and in March 1914, the Central Executive Committee was elected which voted on the political tactic. Dobrogea Society was based in Sofia, and published a newspaper under the auspices of this society entitled „Dobrogea“. *Dobrogea* cultural society consisted of two sections: a cultural one, which was legally active, and another secret, revolutionary one, called the Dobrogean Revolutionary Committee (Negoiță 2009, 19).

The propaganda activity of the first section was complemented by the mission received by the second, whose main task was the preparation of Bulgarian komitadjis. This mission facilitated the purchase of weapons and ammunition for them to carry out terrorist actions against the Romanian authorities in South Dobrogea.

Until the occupation of South Dobrogea by Bulgarian, German, and Turkish troops in the autumn of 1916, as well as during the occupation, the mood of the Bulgarian population was similar to the moment of 1913 when Romanian troops entered, during the Second Balkan War, on Bulgarian territory. Therefore, until the winter of 1918, South Dobrogea was administered by the members of the *Dobrogea* society.

During this period, from the fall of 1916 – to the winter of 1918, the Romanian localities in South Dobrogea were subjected to a continuous robbery, the inhabitants of Bulgaria, about whom the leaders of this terrorist group had data that helped the Romanians, were also affected.

The presence of the troops of the 9th Infantry Division in 1919 in South Dobrogea had the effect of diminishing the attacks coordinated by the secret, revolutionary section of *Dobrogea* Society, being reported, amid this period of immediate transition after the end of World War I, attacks by Bulgarian komitadjis organized into gangs of robbers, without political directives, who were not interested in the effects of their actions on Romanian-Bulgarian relations. Such terrorist behavior was also influenced by the accession of many Bulgarians from South Dobrogea to the Bolshevik ideas of the Comintern\(^1\).
which were very well received in this region, where the Revolutionary Committee of Dobrogea was established which had revolutionary committees in Balchik, Silistra, Varna, Bazargic, Ruse, Shumla, Cavarna, Turtucaia and 38 other communes (Cătănuş 2001, 66). The Leninist thesis “on the right to self-determination of peoples came as an unexpected help in the struggle to detach the Quadrilateral from the Romanian state, the communist ideology came as a glove, at that time to the Bulgarian irredentists. Communist ideas caught on in Bulgaria not only because of linguistic, cultural, and religious affinities with Russia but especially because of the disastrous political situation at the end of the First World War” (Negoită 2009, 37).

In 1919-1923, the Aleksander Stamboliiski government did not support terrorist organizations and actions, although they were supported by political and military leaders in the Bulgarian-Romanian border towns.

On the night of 8 to 9 June 1923, a coup was held in Bulgaria organized by the forces of an alliance of the old political parties, The Officers’ League and The Macedonian Revolutionary Internal Organization – V.M.R.O – following which the Stamboliiski government was replaced by the new government led by Alexandar Ţankov, a political leader who discreetly funded irredentist organizations. In this context, in 1923, the revolutionary section of the „Dobrogea” Society was reorganized, creating the Dobrogean Internal Revolutionary Organization – V.D.R.O. In the autumn of 1925, the Dobrogean Revolutionary Internal Organization – V.D.R.O, amid the intervention of the Bulgarian authorities, informed that the leaders of this group influenced by the Bulgarian communists planned to start a revolt, a new organization called the Dobrogean Revolutionary Organization – D.R.O.- under communist coordination was split. From this moment, internally, a strong rivalry began between these terrorist organizations, V.D.R.O and D.R.O (Negoită 2009, 39-46). Therefore, between 1922 and 1925, the irredentist activity of the Bulgarian komitadjis was reflected in numerous border incidents, signaling exchanges of fire between Romanian and Bulgarian border guards, mainly caused by fraudulent crossings of Bulgarian komitadjis, who robbed the Romanian peasants of the villages near the Romanian-Bulgarian border and killed the Romanian border guards who surprised them as they tried to cross the border.

Such an incident was reported on July 22, 1923. The Border Guard Corps submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the report of the 1st Border Guard Regiment and the Commander of the 2nd Calafat Border Sector on the attacks of Bulgarian soldiers on the southern border, at the same time requesting diplomatic intervention to stop them, because the bodily integrity of Romanian officers, soldiers, and citizens was affected by these incidents.

According to address no. 4031, “our patrols and fishermen are regularly attacked with gunfire from Bulgaria at the Gura Olt border crossing, between the Islaz picket and Turnu Măgurele. On June 3, 1923, while the commander of Sector 2 was under inspection, two gunshots were fired from him from Bulgaria near the village of Filarentin. On June 14, 1923, with the “Porumbita” boat on the Danube, it
was summoned with gunfire near km 722, close to the Bistreț picket to shoot at the Bulgarian shore. Zimnicea platoon patrols are frequently attacked with fire. Several gunshots were fired at the port of Bechet, some falling right near the buildings, which led the commander of the Bulgarian border guards in Rahova to come to Bechet and apologize” (Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, n.d.).

The investigation carried out by the commander of the Bulgarian Sector 8, following the interrogation of the Bulgarian officers and soldiers in Sector 22, established that none of them fired a gun. Gunfire was fired during regular exercises on the banks of the Danube near the village of Novo-Selo to the village of Filarentin. Shots might have been fired at the Romanian boat but they were not fired by Bulgarian soldiers. On-site research established that the inhabitants of Nicopolis had fired from neighboring vineyards at targets located on the opposite bank. It was also found that two Bulgarian soldiers under the influence of alcohol in the Oregon garrison fired two shots from a boat. Sanctions have been ordered for those found guilty (Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, n.d.).

On March 26, 1924, the Border Guard Corps reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with address no. 4059 new incidents at the southern border. According to this address, “border companies in Quadrilater report various attempts to cross Bulgaria to us and even attacks by the komitadjis on patrols and pickets. In order to give a more open field of view to the soldiers doing the security service, this command intervened at the Ministry of Domains for the approval of the deforestation of the forests near the border, being given the necessary provisions by the ministry. Forests are also found on Bulgarian territory, with honor please intervene in the Bulgarian Legation so that these forests are cleared to facilitate the security service and contribute to the safety of the soldiers of both states (Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, n.d.).

On this issue, on 31 December 1924, the Romanian Legation in Sofia was informed with address 2834 by the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry that, Bulgarian forests near the border were cleared at a depth of 1000 meters in the forest districts Rusciuc, Razgrad, Şumla, Provadia and at a depth of 200 meters in the Varna forest district (Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, n.d.).

In the summer of 1925, the Border Guard Corps reported several attacks by Bulgarian soldiers on Romanian pickets on the southern border. As a result of these incidents, a joint commission was set up which met on December 4, 1925, composed of Colonel Stănescu Nicolae, commander of the 1st Border Guard Regiment, and from the Bulgarians, Colonel Penev Alexander. The case of the attack of the Romanian picket no. 98 by the Bulgarian pickets no. 16 and no. 17 on the night of July 16 to 17, 1925, an incident that took place following a threat from the Romanian sentry by the Bulgarian sentry that was located on Bulgarian territory in front of our sentry. The research highlighted three unfavorable issues for Bulgarian border guards reported in the minutes concluded on this occasion. The first refers to the threat made by
the Bulgarian sentry to the Romanian border guard for the release of an individual detained by him. The Bulgarian delegation claimed that the threat of the Bulgarian soldier was due to a weak mentality on the part of this soldier who was a deserter from the Romanian army who fled to Bulgaria and was used by Bulgarian border guards in their service (Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, n.d.).

The second problem investigated had as an object the gunfire fired on the Romanian picket no. 98. The Bulgarian delegation said the first gunfire was aimed at two alleged individuals who appeared in front of the Bulgarian picket at a distance of 50 m, and the 17 fires whose traces are found in the wall of our picket are due to the bewilders of Bulgarian soldiers. During the research, it was found that, in the service of the Bulgarian picket no.16 (in front of the Romanian one no.98), an individual named Jordan, a refugee from Romania, was found. The Bulgarian delegate said that this individual had been moved to another Bulgarian picket. This fact proved that the Bulgarians have in their service, on the border, Romanian refugees whom they used to give information and to evade the surveillance of Romanian patrols, the komitadjis crossing the border on our territory, this being the conclusion of the third hypothesis investigated (Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, n.d.).

Due to the strong blizzard, no investigation was made into the other incidents that were still to be investigated, which was postponed for spring. At the meeting of this Joint Committee of Inquiry, which did not in any way lead to any positive results, other than the research carried out as a secondary fact, the following issues were also agreed on: 1) Our refugee deserters were no longer used in the service of the border by the Bulgarian authorities; 2) officers from both border guards were allowed to pass in uniform at the nearest picket of the neighboring state for service relations; 3) the military commanders of both states enjoyed the external signs of respect from the Romanian and Bulgarian border guards (Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, n.d.).

Support from the Bulgarian civilian and military authorities in the actions of the komitadjis

In the spring of 1926, the Romanian-Bulgarian Joint Committee was asked to investigate the killing of three Romanian soldiers by Bulgarian komitadjis established in the communes of Geovegea, Nastradin and Brășlea. Delegates from both sides were due to meet on March 22, 1926, at 09.00 in Turkşmil. To better cooperate, Bulgarian officers had to be accompanied by a translator who knew French and another who knew Romanian and Bulgarian (Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, n.d.).

On March 20, 1926, at 10.30 pm, picket patrol no. 119, Company 8th Curtbunar Border was summoned by words and gunfire by the komitadjis to give up their weapons. The patrol engaged in battle, pursuing the bandits to the Docilar forest...
where, due to the darkness, it lost track of them (Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, n.d.).

On March 22, 1926, at 09.00, the Romanian-Bulgarian joint commission having the same composition being signaled as a novelty, the presence of a representative of the Rusciuc Prefecture, met at picket no. 98 - Turksmil to continue research started in December 1925. Before the resumption of work, the Romanian delegation asked whether the mandate of the Bulgarian delegation also included the investigation into the deaths of the two Romanian soldiers shot on March 6, 1926, by refugee komitadjis in Bulgaria. Although he did not have express permission to do so, members of the Bulgarian delegation said they would discuss the case as well. Discussions on the case in committee called into question the statements of the 3/19th Kiutuklia platoon commander who stated that the 4 suspects, researched and identified by the Romanian side as the authors of the events spent on the Romanian territory on March 4, 5, 6, and 7, 1926, were during that period, in their villages in Bulgaria. From the statements of parents, relatives, and hosts, previously taken by Romanian officers, it was very clear that they were on the Romanian territory where they committed the robberies and the crime. The Bulgarian delegation replied that Captain Ovcearov Ivan’s statement was above the statements of relatives, individuals who had no responsibility for not taking an oath, this being possible only before the courts. At the proposal of a confrontation between bandits and relatives, the Bulgarian side opposed it (Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, n.d.).

Moreover, the Bulgarian delegates stated that the investigation was made by a non-commissioned officer who was the aid of the subsector commander who was on leave, for which he will be accountable to the judiciary for those recorded in his investigation. Wanting to support his comrades, Colonel Penev Alexander asked why Romanian officers did not notify the officers in time because it was possible for the bandits to be caught. Colonel Stănescu Nicolae answered that the Romanian authorities had to establish the culprits first and only based on the documents concluded to intervene with the Bulgarian officials (Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, n.d.).

This was the case with the robbery on the night of March 4/5, 1926, in the case of the murder of soldiers on March 6, 1926, and in respect of the events of March 7, 1926, knowing precisely that the culprits were in Bulgaria, he intervened to catch them. When it was possible to identify the bandits and find out their home address, the Bulgarian authorities hesitated to intervene, which required a confrontation by the Romanian side, a procedure rejected by the Bulgarian committee which, on the ground, argued that it was not empowered to answer the matter. The statement of the Bulgarian delegations was false. An agreement had been signed in 1922 stating that the Bulgarian border authorities had to hand over refugee criminals on one side or the other of the border, whatever their origin. Following this argument, the Bulgarian Commission stated that those identified by the Romanion side were
sent to the Rusciuc Prefecture to be investigated there and to benefit from all legal proceedings. The Bulgarian side requested the names of the culprits, although they were mentioned in the minutes concluded on 7 March 1926 at the border (Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, n.d.).

During the bilateral talks, the Bulgarian government delegate, Colonel Penev Alexandru, the commander of the Border Rusciuc sector, declared to Colonel Stănescu Nicolae, commander of the 1st Border Guard Regiment, the Romanian government delegate, and Major Mladin Dumitru, commander of Sector 3 Guard Border Guards, that the Romanian performer, Anghel Nebuleanu, said on March 7, 1926 that, if the Bulgarian authorities do not support the Romanian authorities and do not take action against the criminals, the Romanian side would follow the example of the Greeks who protested in similar situations. On this statement, Colonel Stănescu reminded the Bulgarian delegation that Anghel Nebuleanu came to the Bulgarian picket no. 16 on March 7, 1926, at 15.00 accompanied by Major Mladin Dumitru, Captain Manoliu B. Ilie, commander of the 7th Border Guard Company, Captain Popescu, Mr. Constantinescu Prețor and Mr. Petrescu Ovidiu, the head of the Turtucaia Security Brigade with the mission to translate to Captain Ovcearov Ivan the circumstances of the crime by the Romanian refugees living on Bulgarian territory. During these discussions, Captain Stănescu reiterated the fact that the Romanian translator explained that it would have been better to take measures against the guilty party in advance because the hesitation of the Bulgarian authorities allowed the authors to hide possible evidence (Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, n.d.).

In fact, the Romanian officer was confused about the grievances expressed by the Bulgarian colonel, asking him how he would have acted instead of the Romanian government which, after the efforts to identify and establish the address of the guilty party, located only 2 km from the common border, they continued to cross in Romania, to rob the villages and mischievously kill the Romanian soldiers, while the Bulgarian authorities did not react according to the facts reported. How can it be interpreted that, after their recognition and sending the signals to the Bulgarian authorities in order to take the necessary legal measures, the culprits were not arrested, they were not removed from the border and the Bulgarian government was not implementing the commitment made in 1922 to mutual competition in border incident investigations. Moreover, the Bulgarian commission did not allow witnesses to be confronted with suspects, for which the Romanian side could interpret that there was no desire to improve bilateral relations (Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, n.d.).

In this atmosphere, on March 22, 1926, the discussions within the Romanian-Bulgarian Joint Committee were completed, and the works on the other cases submitted to the research were postponed for May 12, 1926, whereas the rains and the blizzard did not stop for 5 days, making it difficult for the committee to move on the
spot, which was also recorded in the minutes concluded on that date. This document was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for diplomatic efforts to the Bulgarian government to support the joint commission's investigations and to stop the attacks of the komitadjis and the Ministry of Interior for establishing the damage caused to the victims by the guilty party (Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, n.d.).

On July 6, 1926, the Romanian Legation in Sofia was notified by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, I.M. Mitilineu, in connection with the investigation carried out in respect of the border incident on the night of July 16 to 17, 1925 spent at the border of South Dobrogea. From the analysis of the report sent by the Border Guard Corps, the Romanian Minister noticed that “according to the sketch annexed, on the border stretch is a single Romanian picket no.98 and three Bulgarian pickets (no. 15, 16, 17). If this is the case across the border of the Quadrilateral, we understand why in all our incidents they are not able to do anything, being sure victims. The forest through which the border line passes between the villages of Kiutuellia (Bulgaria) and Turkşmil (Romania) was not crossed on the border area either on our side or on the Bulgarian side. And yet we asked in 1922 and Bulgaria undertake to do this” (Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, n.d.).

On the same day, July 6, 1926, the Sofia Legation also transmitted the result of the investigation into the killing of the two Romanian soldiers on March 6, 1926, to the Romanian Minister, I.M. Mitilineu, by which he proposed the extradition of those who committed the crime, based on the evidence from the report of the Border Guard Corps no. 97/1926 respectively, Petcu Mițu, Stanciu Atanase Stanca, Petru Dumitru Dasiiev, and Nicola Tudor Cocev settled in the village of Ghioveaga, Nastradin, and Brașlea, which, on the night of March 5/6, attacked and robbed the commune of Satu Vechi, and the next day at 10.00, they killed the border guards Buga Gheorghe from the 1st Border Guards Regiment and Corporal Radu Ioan from the 7th Rosiori Regiment near the Masimal platoon. At the same time, Captain Ovcearov, commander of the subsector 3/18 Kitucelia, was requested to move, because since his arrival at the command of this border sector, the attacks intensified and the evidence gathered showed bad intention from this officer in all his investigations (Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, n.d.).

The Romanian Minister from Sofia, Grigore Bilciurescu, appreciated that, in support of the proposal of the extradition procedure, the clauses of the 1922 arrangement concluded between the two governments could be invoked, especially since the Romanian delegate, Colonel Stănescu, asked to hand over the culprits who were on the Romanian territory at the time of committing the assassinations (Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, n.d.).

On July 28, 1926, the Romanian minister in Sofia received the agreement regarding the extradition request. In this regard, Grigore Bilciurescu wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, I.M. Mitilineu, that “I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that,
as I would like to leave to me the work to be done by the Bulgarian Government, I would also like to take advantage of the first meeting with the Foreign Minister to ask him to declare to me categorically if he understands to respect the commitment made by Stambuliiski in 1922 regarding the surrender of the bandits” (Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, n.d.).

The investigated documents did not show the fact that they were extradited; however, on March 15, 1926, the Commander of the Border Guard Corps, the division general Broșteanu, submitted to the Romanian Ministry of Interior with address no.97, the secret report with no. 87 from the same date, of Regiment I Border guards accompanied by all the documents relating to the investigation into the murder committed against the two border guards on 6 March 1926, which showed a clear agreement between bandits and Bulgarian military bodies at the border (Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, n.d.).

According to this secret report, incidents, robberies, and murders committed in South Dobrogea, were reported in full knowledge and agreement of Bulgarian border guard officers. In this investigation, we have established that they give their aid to the komitadjis and cover for them. Our refugees are settled, in full knowledge of the Bulgarian authorities in the nearest border villages. When they commit crimes, they are covered by Bulgarian officers who say they were present with them while their relatives were with us, through statements given to the investigation, they deny the statements of the Bulgarian officers and say that they were on our territory. From here there is a clear agreement between the bandits and the Bulgarian military bodies at the border. Consequently, in this typical case with obvious evidence we should and even must, because of so much bloodshed and so many sacrifices made under the shield of Bulgarian good neighborly hypocrisy, to urgently and very vigorously demand full satisfaction through diplomatic means, namely: the immediate arrest of the alleged bandits and their extradition in order to be given to the Romanian authorities for trial, and for their relatives, 26 people arrested today, who fed the komitadjis to be prosecuted after their crime against State Security. On this occasion, we also need to notify you that in Balbunar commune where Colonel Ghenov, the commander of the border guard sector, is staying, there is a branch of these komitadjis – and that this colonel cannot be unaware of it – against which he has not taken any action so far” (Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, n.d.).

In support of the above, the report stated that “on 9 February 1926, Lieutenant-Colonel Ghenov’s brother-in-law voluntarily surrendered, stating that he was aware of the organization of gangs of komitadjis located on Bulgarian territory in communes located near the border in the constituency of the Kemanlar net, namely: Kemanlar, the headquarters of the gang headquarters under the direction of Petre Enceff, a refugee from us from Afatler commune, Durostor county and where the residence of the Bulgarian border company is also located, and the rest of the komitadjis are scattered in the communes: Zavet, Dikilitaş, Kara-Aci, Geferler,
Gheovegea, Nastradin, Balbunar, Juper, Kiutuklia, the residence of Captain Ovcearov who is the commander of the 3/19 border platoon and Brâșlea” (Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, n.d.).

In conclusion, the report proposed “in order to ensure the lives of our border guards, for state officials to declare throughout the Quadrilateral the state of siege in compliance with Ordinance no.1 of the 5th Army Corps since 1921, with the following modifications: a) to remove from the state of siege the capitals of counties, urban communes and net residences; b) the press to be free; c) the rest of the territory to be under a state of military siege under whose command it will be decided. The intervention for the move of Captain Ovcearov from the border for which we have the following reasons: a) attack of the Romanian picket no.98 as found in the December 1925 investigation that this attack was carried out with knowledge of and even leadership of Captain Ovcearov. Since the arrival of this officer in the service of the border, the attacks in the border area have been repeated very often, facts that did not exist when Captain Obretinov was in that subsector. Confiscation and sale of those refugees – not as it is today, that the lands are worked by their relatives – and the cash products are sent to these komitadjis for their supply and support on Bulgarian territory against us. Due to the results obtained by selling their properties, the families of the victims should be compensated. In the recent case of the shooting of these two soldiers, please intervene to establish that at least 200,000 lei are paid to each victim. If it is not reached from the properties of these refugee komitadjis, this amount should be supplemented by the distribution on the heads of the inhabitants of the territory of the communes where the crime took place, whereas none signaled the appearance of money nor did it help to discover and capture them”.

The conclusion of the Border Guard Corps at the end of this secret report was that the measures shown above should be legislated, if they were not at the date of the report, in this case, complementary measures are proposed regarding “the confiscation and sale by public auction of the entire mobile and immovable property of all those who have been proven and caught red-handed of assassination or concealment, and the proceeds of the sale form a compensation fund for victims robbed or killed by bandits, as is the case with our soldiers. To legislate the removal of all relatives and hosts from proven bandits or those who have relatives fled to Bulgaria and enlisted in the gangs of komitadjis. To witness these robberies and murders without taking action against them, I think it is a crime on the part of the state” (Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, n.d.).

Conclusion

Amid the general discontent that existed in Bulgaria after the loss of the First World War, communist ideas imported from Bolshevik Russia merged with the irredentist policy promoted by Bulgarian political and military leaders who allowed and
supported terrorist organizations and actions against neighbors, especially Romania. During the period before the magazine’s readers, the Bolshevik threat floated on the European continent.

This article is written in memory of the Romanian border guards who fell on duty in defense of the state border. In 1924, the Bulgarian communists planned to start a revolt that would cover the entire territory of Bulgaria and the occupation by the gangs of komitadjis of the strategic points on the border with Romania. The intervention of the Bulgarian authorities thwarted the intentions of the irredentist organizations, many of their leaders being detained by Romanian soldiers while trying to cross the border fraudulently.

With all the diplomatic efforts made by the Romanian Government and the military authorities of the Border Guard Corps who by setting up the Romanian-Bulgarian joint commissions for investigating border incidents tried to find a mutually agreed solution to end the attacks of Bulgarian komitadjis, they continued and intensified, calling into question Bulgaria’s good neighborly policy.

The author intended to bring to the attention of readers the names of Romanian officers and soldiers who were killed by Bulgarian komitadjis so as not to remain anonymous. Eternal gratitude!

References

