As African states grapple with the challenges of democratic governance, there are postcolonial experiences of mob-related violence. Such is manifest in the extrajudicial reaction of citizens across North-East Nigeria to suspected attacks by agents of the Boko Haram insurgency. Scholarly contributions have established various dimensions of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. However, little attention is given to the nuances of gender and mob-induced violence and their implications for the security and development of women. Thus, this work examines the contexts of mob justice meted out to women webbed in Boko Haram-instigated suicide bombing. Findings from the study reveal that female suicide terrorism and the resultant social sanctions have further positioned women as vulnerable instruments of terror and subsequently as bearers of the security burdens that accompany mob justice perpetration within contexts of the Boko Haram insurgency.

**Keywords:**
women; mob encounters; female suicide terrorism; Boko Haram; North-East Nigeria.
The frequency of mob justice across Africa has necessitated broadening the discourse on violence and human (women) security. Mob justice is perpetrated by faceless angry crowds who engage in extrajudicial actions, which include accusing a crime suspect, acting as jury and judge and violently attacking an alleged criminal on the spot (Adu-Gyamfi 2014; Bello 2018). Mob justice is prominent in developing countries characterised by the latent potential for initiating widespread civil disobedience as a reaction to state failure or fragility (Momboisse 1967). It is an insurgent mode of social control or securitisation as well as a contextual expression of disdain for the state's unwillingness/incapacity to contain dangerous forms of violent crimes (Orock 2014). Scholars attribute the incidences of mob justice to the weakness of state structures as citizens find satisfaction in administering mob justice to act fast against the ineptitude of the state (Yeboah-Assiamah and Kyeremeh 2014; Ilori 2020). “Most people are not opposed to them on principle; (as it is their way of) expressing the pain that many feel about the violent crimes, and their desire for instant restitution” (Cole 2012).

As problems of development differ across spaces, the variants of mob actions are influenced by specific situational factors such as witchcraft, kidnapping, blasphemy, theft and, more recently, suicide bombing. One of the reasons for the resurgence of mob attacks against females in northern Nigeria is their link with the activities of Boko Haram. Despite the established legal and judicial structures that are seemingly more impactful in urban and sub-urban settlements (Feld 1991), the recurrence of mob attacks against women in the north is still evident in the metropolitan areas.

With the intensified involvement of women in the violent activities of the Boko Haram insurgency from 2009 to 2019, this work presents women’s experiences of mob justice as induced by the precedence of suicide bombing in selected northeastern states of Nigeria. By interrogating the connection between Female Suicide Terrorism (FST) and women’s encounters with mob justice in North-East Nigeria, the work builds on previous narratives that explain issues as well as socioeconomic and cultural contexts that surround or define the vulnerability of women as perpetrators and victims of extreme violence within the discourses of gender violence and human insecurity (Rush and Schafluetzel-Iles 2007; Jacques and Taylor 2008; Pearson 2015a; (Bloom and Matfess 2016; Koziel 2017; Sigsworth and Kumalo 2016). On mob attacks occasioned by suicide bombings, two possible scenarios are explored. The first is that of women as victims; seen in instances of mistaken identity, particularly for veiled women (women wearing hijab) suspected to be hiding bombs under their garments. The second is that of women as co-perpetrators of mob justice, wherein women join the mob which mete out punishments to female suspects for crimes against humanity. This affirms that aside from the role of men, women may also play ‘neo-patriarchal’ agents to reinforce existing male-defined hegemony, sustaining gender hierarchy and power arrangement by protecting attackers and/or fuelling violent attacks (Hunnicutt 2009; Habiba, Ali and Ashfaq 2016; Anonymous 2017).

The Boko Haram crisis complicates life in the northeast of Nigeria as daily living is carried on with fear invariably heightening the vulnerability of women to mob
attacks. While sustaining the argument that feminised violence is informed by certain socio-cultural and religious contexts, a critical examination of this less-discussed evolving challenge to Africa’s development is expedient. The work examines why FST provokes women-encountered mob justice in some areas of terrorism-ridden North-eastern Nigeria but does not provoke a similar response in others. Hence, this article provides insights into feminised violence, analyses Female Suicide Terrorism (FST) and mob justice, examines manifestations of FST in North East Nigeria; and causative factors in the incidences and non-incidences of mob justice in both urban and rural centres; explains how FST perpetration and/or victimhood may be explained within rural and urban spaces; including the security implications of FST and mob justice on women and girls in North-East Nigeria.

**Boko Haram: A Historical Basis**

Nigeria has – since independence in 1960 – experienced some series of developmental fallouts (Forrest 1993), resulting in unequal access to infrastructure and social protection. Directly linked to this is the menace of child begging on the streets of northern Nigeria. Such children, lacking basic social welfare grew into disgruntled young adults. In such categories were the followers of Muhammad Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, who was extra-judicially killed by the police in 2009. Although there had been similar movements since the 1940s, they were rarely violent (Buchanan-Clarke and Knoope 2017). The name, Boko Haram, means ‘Western education is sin’.

Boko Haram condemns the socio-political and economic structure of the society with a key focus on deconstructing developments that evolved from the West.

The aggregate membership of the insurgency group comprises underprivileged and neglected youth, discontented politicians, school drop-outs, out-of-school girls, neglected widows, and jobless graduates (Allotey-Pappoe and Lamptey 2019). The state’s insensitive handling of the issues led to the consolidation of the group, which allied with some international terrorist networks (Mustapha, Boko Haram: Killing in the God’s Name 2012; Mustapha and Meagher 2020; International Crisis Group 2017) in the bid for self-determination and independence from a supposedly failed state. Having argued that the state had turned the citizens into victims, Boko Haram continues to attack the Nigerian state, using mass kidnapping, mass killings and, more recently, suicide bombing (Ladbury, et al. 2016). For a while, the masses affected by their attacks have been left helpless and susceptible amidst the government’s delayed responses to the insurgencies. Over time, mob attacks became one of the tactics deployed by citizens to deal with suspected Boko Haram suicide bombers who frequently unleash violence on communities. Beyond the popular male-centric perception of Boko-Haram attacks, research has shown newer dimensions, involving women and girls (Bloom 2010; Horowitz 2015; Bawa 2017). Here, the women and girls are not necessarily featured as victims; rather, they either volunteer or are co-opted to perpetrate terrorist attacks. Invariably, the incorporation and utilisation
of women for the nihilistic objectives of the Boko Haram insurgency engendered the phenomenon of Female Suicide Terrorism (FST).

**Understanding Feminised Violence**

Within the existing broad structural inequality and patriarchal framework, women are entangled in the web of violence as sufferers of physical, mental and psychological attacks (Okech 2016; Sigsworth and Kumalo 2016). The Boko Haram-instigated gendered violence has suddenly transcended capturing women for sexual gratification and other domestic purposes (Zenn and Pearson 2014) including using young girls as arms and foodstuff carriers to recruiting women as suicide bombers (Conley 2004; Bloom 2010; Marks 2014; Chotia 2014; Bawa 2017). The increased deployment of females as suicide bombers by Boko Haram is referred to as the ‘feminisation of terror’ in Nigeria (Onuoha and George 2015; Bawa 2017). Allotey-Pappoe and Lamptey’s (2019) study, reveals how women are made to see terrorism in Nigeria as a noble cause, as girls are used in suicide bombings. Based on assumptions of females’ (especially young girls’) innocence and the stereotype that women are less risk-takers, female suicide bombers catch people unaware and penetrate places where male bombers are suspiciously questioned.

Therefore, a new and gendered dimension to the Boko Haram insurgency is bifocal—the perpetration of insurgency acts by females and the victimisation of women suspected to be working with the insurgents. Many fatal cases show the rate at which Boko Haram is recruiting young girls as suicide bombers and devastating the society (Oduah 2016). Having “deployed 469 female suicide bombers in 240 total incidents from June 2014 to the end of February 2018, killing an estimated 1,259 people (bombers excluded), 1,673 people (bombers included), and injuring 2,967 more people” (Pearson 2018, 34), the recruitment/instrumentalisation of female terrorists does not solely result from coercion (by men) (Horowitz 2015). Feminised violence is a combination of complex circumstances (Utas 2005) which could be framed within feminine profiling, familial, irrational and ideological contexts (Ursu 2016). Therefore, female suicide bombers emerge from those kidnapped or abducted, cajoled, induced, forced, threatened, intimidated or indoctrinated to be disenchanted with the Nigerian system (Oduah 2016; Anyadike 2016).

Following research on masculine hegemonic structures that foster the domination and subordination of women (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Robert 1992; Hunnicutt 2009), the root of violence involving women cannot be discussed without reference to patriarchy (Sultana 2011). In any circumstance where female bombers are indoctrinated and used, the prevalence of patriarchal culture explains the ‘commodification of the female body’ (Olaniyan 2017), largely culminating in some dire social, political and economic implications (Amalu 2015; Eseoghene and EfanoToor 2016; Chuku, Abang and Isip 2019). Indeed, one cannot overlook the interplay of feminised poverty, both material and intellectual, as evident in the
poor capacity to meet basic needs and, the low quality or lack of education and exposure (Omotoso and Fajimbola 2017; Omotoso 2020). The increased awareness of the emergence and proliferation of women as participants in terrorism has spurred varied responses from society. One such social response is the mob attacks, described by Samah (2006) and Salihu and Gholami (2018) as street crime, aimed at dispensing extrajudicial punishments to terror suspects. Indiscriminate and illegitimate accusations, trials and punishments of female suspects by angry crowds are the manifestations of a gendered perception in which women, among other demographic groups, are the major targets of informal and crude prosecutions (Chowdhury 2014). Consequently, young women often face the double jeopardy of working as suicide bombers as well as becoming victims of angry mobs that are seeking justice. Stemming from the perceptions of young women as agents of terrorism, mob justice is publicly portrayed and branded as street vigilantism, especially in the cities (World Bank 2011). This necessitates probing into the dynamics of feminised violence by interrogating socio-cultural disparities of mob justice against females in selected communities of North-Eastern Nigeria.

**Methodology**

The work adopts phenomenological and historical analyses to account for feminised violence from the perspective of women who encountered mob justice in North Eastern, Nigeria. Boko Haram was taken as a security phenomenon to construct the basis of suicide bombing. Secondary data sources, such as newspapers, videos and journals were consulted to articulate the historicity of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Oral interviews on the phenomenon of suicide bombing were conducted in areas ravaged by the Boko Haram insurgency, in the North-East of Nigeria. The interviews were unstructured and open to participants, also the questions and discussions about mob encounters snowballed into other questions. The selected areas are; Muna, Bale Galtimari, Alau, Dala Kafe and Mulai. These were selected as the study area because, before 2016, each of the aforementioned locations had experienced Boko Haram-sponsored suicide bombing at least three times in two weeks (Nigeria Watch 2019). The communities are ideal targets for suicide bombing because they are all located close to forests- these forests serve as safe havens where Boko Haram reside and from where they conveniently launch attacks. News reports of everyday occurrence of the Boko Haram situation is used to explain the case studies and it is corroborated by books and journals.

Some of the communities identified (for example, Muna), are also settings that the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have now converted to markets. This for Boko Haram is another favourite location to cart away market wares under the cover of every suicide bomb attack, which usually throws the community into pandemonium. The study population of this work is tripartite, comprising people mostly recruited by Boko Haram for suicide missions, the direct and indirect victims of the attacks and the group committed to forestalling further attacks in the areas involved.
Therefore, the research targeted women, youths, parents, security personnel, journalists and community leaders in rural and urban areas. Deviance and social control theories are engaged in this study. Deviance is essentially perceived as threatening because it undermines predictability and the foundation of social life. Deviant acts are not determined by their being socially evaluated as criminal or illegal; they are defined by social reactions to them (Sherman 1993). Behaviour is unacceptable, when it violates social rules and norms. Thus, social contexts determine what qualifies as deviant acts (Stuart and Craig 1999). To address deviance, human groups develop a system of social control as a means of enforcing established norms. Violation and sanction are linked in such a way that where there is deviant behaviour, there are also social controls (Wood 1974). Likewise, individuals found engaging in counter-normative behaviour are often sanctioned by other members of the group or society because their behaviour is interpreted as threatening to the collective survival (Nupier, et al. 2007). Inferentially, social control is conceived specifically in relation to crime and deviance (Oliverio and Lauderdale 2005).

Female Suicide Terrorism (FST) and Mob Justice

Within the FST framework, Boko Haram takes advantage of two social constructs: the masculinisation of war and the feminisation of peace, thereby negating the idea that women are pacifists in the context of terrorism (Anonymous 2018). This surreptitious shift from the social norm informs the deployment of women as suicide bombers. Bloom and Matfess (2016) described FST as a global trend of using women to perpetrate violence in war and crisis. Thus, FST is a component of Boko Haram's overall strategy, claimed to counter the essence of Westernisation as a whole. Furthermore, Zedalis (2004) explains that the decision of women to perpetrate terrorist acts, create disorder and FST is one of the acts that lead to mob attack. However, the connection between FST and mob justice in the context of Boko Haram's terrorist activities in Nigeria appears problematic. FST compounds perceptions about security as Boko Haram-sponsored female suicide bombings challenge the prevalent social norm that women genetically fit into domestic roles. Alakoc (2018) conceives FST as a means of increasing propaganda and exposing the message of aggression, as girls are used as bargaining chips with the government and it provides examples of how women are victimised to victimise others (Bloom and Matfess 2016). Thus, the male actors are the principal while the women are the peripheral entities. As Slavicek’s (2008) historicises suicide bombing, the motivation for engaging in suicide bombing goes beyond the popular political analysis, inferring that the contemporary use of girls in suicide bombing is both politically and religiously motivated.

Terrorism and suicide bombing, irrespective of geographical scope also portray political, economic and social forms of violence that make them classifiable as deviant behaviour and a crime against humanity. In an opposing perspective, Black
(2002) notes that terrorism is a form of social control where actors (also known as freedom fighters) aggressively display grievances against the state. However, Becker (1963) adds that there is a public near-unanimity that an act of mass violence, characterised as consensus crime, is deviant behaviour.

One may then surmise that social adversity of the violence in the terrorised communities qualifies terrorism and other related activities as deviant behaviours. Women's participation in terrorist suicide bombings sociologically qualifies them as deviants on two grounds. First, the overwhelming understanding of terrorism as criminal and deviant and second, that terrorism is a manifestation of a larger societal structure of dominance and patriarchy. On this, Oliverio and Lauderdale (2005) note that, from the women's viewpoints, using patriarchal strategies of dominance cannot produce the desired positive social change. Therefore, women who deviate from this status quo to perpetrate terrorism are tagged deviants not only because they are engaging in terrorism but because they are doing so as women. Mob justice against FST acts is a holistic manifestation of the developmental gaps that engulf impoverished Nigerian societies. Social disillusionment permeates Nigerian society and a large number of citizens are disconnected from the state and its institutions (Maiangwa, et al. 2012). This allows citizens to become recruits of ethnic, political and religious irredentists who resist the state by causing chaos and disorder at any opportunity. With this, women are vulnerable to being the perpetrators of suicide bombing when they act in sympathy for the Boko Haram causes (Weinstein 2007; Anonymous 2017). To this end, mob justice initiated by suicide bombing is a form of counter-reaction to the way the state initially handled the Boko Haram group; it embeds anarchy that is reactive to the vengeance the Boko Haram exhibits.

**Manifestation of Female Suicide Terrorism (FST) in North-East Nigeria**

Female Suicide Terrorism (FST) entails engaging women to carry out suicide attacks as the bombers kill the targeted people along with themselves. FST emerged as a terrorist strategy in the 1980s (Bloom 2011; Brunner 2016) and scholars have advanced tactical reasons, strategic reasons and cost-effectiveness (Speckhard 2008) as the major factors responsible for the deployment of FST by terrorist groups. Notwithstanding their active roles, Ness (2005) advances that the use of women as terrorists rarely liberates them; rather, it negates and relegates them to traditional roles. Records exist of women playing overt and covert terrorist roles as sympathisers, mobilisers, conciliators and perpetrators. This aligns with the assertion that ‘African women are capable players within all the spheres, transcending natural and cultural confines to which they have been restricted’ (Omotoso 2018, 63).

By implication, women have transcended their supposed vulnerabilities and are now actively involved in terrorist acts (Anonymous 2017). This negates the view that
men are the sole and habitual perpetrators of terrorist acts (Goldstein 2001) and establishes that the attitude of women towards violence is shaped by their experiences of the larger socio-economic problems. Since Boko Haram evolved, FST has become a major strategy for communicating its aggressive posture against the Nigerian state. Reports of the Boko Haram activities by the media show that the identities of female suicide members are rarely known. However, about 60% of them are teenagers between 13 and 19 years of age (Pearson 2018). The young girls are raised with the ideology of Islamic fundamentalism which states that suicide bombers would be rewarded bountifully in the hereafter (Gonzalez-Perez 2011). This high level of ideological indoctrination benefits from the abysmal level of girl-child education in the northern region. Keeping girls out of schools in Northern Nigeria is often regarded as the cultural norm which perpetually requires the state’s interventions to reverse. Furthermore, women’s action as perpetrators of suicide bombing is linked, in a deeply complicated manner, to their traditionally prescribed gender roles. MacDonald (1991) posits that women’s participation in terrorism results from frustration and repression. Nacos (2005) explains that the stereotypes that frame women as excluded from terrorism are false and that women are complicit, especially, as perpetrators of suicide bombing. This corresponds with Bloom (2010) that the use of women as suicide bombers makes it easier to avoid detection. However, the tact of detection, often including mistaken identities complicates the question of gender and security.

Women’s involvement in Boko Haram-sponsored female terrorism assists to secure and sustain Boko Haram’s army and structure, particularly in Michika, the most terrorised local government area in Adamawa State. According to a respondent: Most of them (women) were forced into insurgency to serve as shields and work for the terrorists. By the time they (insurgents) abduct their (members of the communities’) daughters from them, they have women in their midst who will hinder the conventional military from attacking their bases, paving the way for negotiations and ransom payment so that they can achieve their goals (Focus Group Discussion, January 17, 2020). Therefore, as women were used to carry out easy target operations through suicide bombing, more casualties were found among women across the local communities of North-East Nigeria. Women’s higher vulnerability in the face of suicide bombing is attributed to several reasons. Since suicide bombers aim at concentrated spots, women’s tendency to stick together and be amongst themselves predisposes them to easy targets in situations of conflict (Fisker-Nelsen 2012). Also, rural women become victims of FST because of their domestic roles as housekeepers and protectors of children. Below are specific encounters of women as victims of FST in a rural community of North-East Nigeria:

**Bale Galtimari Community**

**Narrated Encounter 1**

…women, they can’t run and leave their children and that of their neighbours. It is at this point that the suicide bombers take advantage of them. As for the men, the moment
they hear the sound of a gunshot, they just run leaving everybody behind, including their family members sometimes. Also, in the course of running, some of these women run into their fellow women, thinking they are together in the same danger, unknown to them that the person they are hiding with is a suicide bomber on a mission (Personal Communication, July 18, 2019).

A survivor in the Galtimari community described her encounter thus:

**Narrated Encounter 2**

*It was on a Sunday evening in 2014 when Boko Haram laid siege on our town. We all ran for our dear lives. We ran into a house with many women and children. Unknown to us, a female suicide bomber was right there with us, she detonated the explosive. As you can see, I lost my left arm in the incident. This is the most terrible thing that has ever happened in my life* (Personal Communication, July 16, 2019).

The narratives here affirm that FST perpetrators are aware of the psychology of chaos and panic, which they exploit to strike.

**FST Encounters and Mob Justice**

Using selected narrative encounters across the studied communities, this section discusses the incidences and non-incidences of mob justice, its causative factors and how it plays out across rural and urban communities.

**Non-incidences of Mob Justice**

**Narrated Encounter 3**

*In 2016, a woman on a bombing mission was caught. Immediately she saw us, she began to cry for help. She raised her hands, assuring us that she would not detonate the bomb. We asked her to remove it and she complied with us. The army came and took her up for rehabilitation* (Personal Communication, July 23, 2019).

**Narrated Encounter 4**

*We know the girls are not in control of their senses when they do these things. A female suicide bomber came into this community and reported herself to us. She said that she was carrying a bomb. We called on the CJTF and the military to continue her interrogation. She told them that she was kidnapped on her way to Dikwa from Maiduguri to attend a wedding ceremony in 2015. After spending six months in captivity, she was sent on a suicide mission* (Personal Communication, July 23, 2019).

**Incidences of Mob Justice**

**Mob Encounter 1**

*Muda Lawal Market, Bauchi, March 1, 2015 At 11 a.m. at the entrance of the Muda Lawal Market in Bauchi, northeast Nigeria, a young girl refused to allow the security operatives to check her. This aroused the suspicion that she was a suicide bomber, she was beaten and burnt to death. A police officer, Haruna Mohammed, explained that she*
had died before they arrived at the scene and the mob had dispersed. At the bus station in the market, the lady was alleged to have refused to be checked by the metal detector. On checking her body, two bottles were strapped around her waist (PMNews 2015).

The incident at the Muda Lawal market shows the tenseness of the people relative to any form of insecurity. According to The Guardian (2015), though it is possible that the girl was on a test mission to determine the possibility of perpetrating FST, the police deputy superintendent, Mohammad Haruna, doubted whether the girl was a bomber, as she did not detonate any explosives when she was attacked. Haruna described her as a victim of a mob action carried out by an irate crowd. Relatives of the killed suspect (Thabita) claimed she used to work as a trader until 2007 when she became mentally ill and that she was never a Boko Haram member (The Guardian 2015).

Mob Encounter 2
Inability to detonate a bomb in cattle Market, Maiduguri
Perhaps, on the 26th of December, 2016, at 8.40 a.m., a suicide bomber at the Cattle Market in the Maiduguri Market could not detonate the bomb on her body swiftly. This brewed a suspicion and she was lynched. The caption of her lifeless body depicts the typical atmosphere of the post-mob situation, where no one can be pointed at (Haruna 2016).

Mob Encounter 3
The Yobe Experience
A female suicide bomber has killed at least seven people and injured 30 others at a crowded bus station in the city of Damaturu, capital of Yobe State. The female suicide bomber arrived in a vehicle and walked into a crowd outside a grocery store at the end of the terminal where she detonated her explosives. …an angry mob stopped emergency workers from retrieving the remains of the bomber and instead set them on fire (BBC News 2015).

Causative Factors of Non-incidence and Incidence of Mob Justice

1. Fear
As the instances of Boko Haram-sponsored FST increase in both rural and urban communities of North-East Nigeria (The Irish Times 2018; VOA 2014), community responses have been either confrontation or avoidance. The manifestations of fear in these communities are evident in their varied responses which Tappelet (2009) describes as either fight or flight. The accounts from the rural communities reveal the vital roles of Boko Haram and FST-induced intimidation as bases for the non-occurrence of mob justice. One such is the fact that no one wants to be blown up while attacking a suicide bomber. This, according to Moore and Trojanowicz (1998), explains why fear is often interpreted as the most enduring legacy and the contagious agent of victimisation during or after any criminal deviance. After the
execution of the Boko Haram leaders, many of the group's members fled to the rural areas where they remobilised and began to engage in counter-attacks and guerrilla attacks (International Crisis Group 2016). Consequently, the rural communities were rendered more vulnerable to highly unpredictable insurgent attacks. One of the community heads in the Bulama community expresses the reason people do not attack any suspected female suicide bomber:

We cannot handle such cases because we are not security… even the soldiers cannot come close to them [because they are strapped with bombs]. So, what they do is shoot them either in the leg or the hand and then call the Anti-bomb Unit of the Army to handle them (Personal Communication July 17, 2019).

A similar reason was given by the women in the Mulai community (FDG, 23 July 2019) that even when some of these female suspects are caught with explosives, 'nobody dares to touch them or is allowed to come close to them.' A government official adds thus:

…when the girl was dropped to go and detonate a bomb in a mosque at the University of Maiduguri, the residents ran away and the military was able to apprehend the car and the people. It was them the community was after, not the perpetrators (the female bomber) (Personal Communication January 16, 2020).

Despite the series of intimidation, some rural communities express their fears by being hostile to Boko Haram female terrorists who are caught in the act. Through the communal efforts of vigilantism that has gradually metamorphosed into the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), occasionally adamant and 'stubborn' FSTs receive aggressive sanctions such as public shaming, beating, maiming and burning for violating social norms. A member of the CJTF expressed this thus:

We, the CJTF, are in charge of all these issues and, as soon as we get them, we hand them over to the military. It is when they refuse to comply with our directives that we now beat them before handing them over to the soldiers (Personal Communication July 23, 2019).

A similar mob justice situation is described by a group of women in the Bulama community where the “community catch them and normally beat them before the CJTF arrives to hand them over to the soldiers”. Here, they are treated not as Boko Haram’s victims but as terror perpetrators. This incidence of mob justice in the cities could be traced to the community’s consciousness to protect lives irrespective of the fear of terror instigated by the Boko Haram insurgents. They have seen women who are commanders in the Boko Haram camps (Field Interview, 2019). According to the Senior Administrative Officer of ADSEMA and camp manager in one of the IDP camps:

If you go to Maiduguri, it is like you are in a situation where you have nothing to lose. They (members of the community)
see the suicide bombers as ordinary human beings who can be fought back...because the only road access to Maiduguri is now something else...some people have hardened their hearts; they make sure they follow the perpetrators of violence, apprehend them and give them jungle justice. Some are handed over to the military (Personal Communication January 16, 2020).

With the regular occurrences of FST attacks in the region, the city inhabitants’ fears manifest as a ‘productive’ force that, according to Moore and Trojanowicz (1998), motivates the members of these communities to engage in crime control activities. Therefore, through the physical, verbal and psychological attacks of the suspected female suicide bombers, the community members have devised some informal social control systems that protect people from those forms of deviance (like being engaged as suicide bombers) that harm them and/or others.

2. Communal Spirit and Empathy

Communities have different ways of enhancing the communal spirit and expressing social empathy, and these determine their responses to FST. This is because the rural and the urban community populations of the Boko Haram-ridden North-East Nigeria have created some opposing descriptions of homogeneity and heterogeneity that largely define the non-incidences and occurrences of mob attacks on suspected female suicide bombers. Crowder and Copper (2002) state that spiritual bond, friendship, kinship and commonality of interest are homogenising factors associated with a community with a relatively small population. Heterogeneous societies that have been largely influenced by urbanisation and industrialisation have resulted in not only the influxes of different people but also dislocating modernity (Crowther and Copper 2002). Communities have therefore exhibited different responses to FST. The sense of community in the rural areas discourages mob justice as the communities retain the consciousness of not wanting to hurt their children who have been forcefully recruited by the insurgents. They regard them as victims of the Boko Haram indoctrination who have been weaponised for destruction. The pre-existing social structure of Islam that perceives women as occupiers of private spaces is more evident in the rural communities and it is on this basis that FST successfully thrives. Thus, it is surprising that women from these communities display a willingness to blow themselves up in the public arena. An NGO worker in an IDP camp in Yola gave his perspective on this, thus:

Sometimes, these young girls who are used as suicide bombers are not in their right senses. It is believed that they (the Boko Haram) use some charms on them. No normal human being will want to go and bomb himself or herself like that. Some people had been in contact with them before they detonated their bomb and they discovered that they were not in their right senses...Sometimes, they are teleguided; somebody somewhere says ‘Move to this place’ (Focus Group Discussion January 16, 2020).
One of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) members in the Alau community stresses that while “men [suicide bombers] are not trustworthy and are sometimes very stubborn”, women and girls usually cooperate when they are caught. Another member of the CJTF in the Alau community clearly states their perceptions of deviant women who engage in terrorism:

Women, on their own, can never take the decision of taking their own lives and that of anyone else. These suicide bombers are not just forced into what they do; the Boko Haram insurgents even use some charms on them. That is why once they are arrested; they try as much as possible to remove those bombs without getting blown up (Personal Communication, July 23, 2019).

Although more women were recruited or forced to join Boko Haram from the villages (International Crisis Group 2016), mob attacks on perpetrators of FST remain largely peculiar to the cities which are characterised by the concentration of diverse people than in rural areas. As the highly heterogeneous population permits women and girls to move around low-profile places, sighting young women in the city in crowded business clusters allows for people to regard them as potential suspects of FST. This explains the frequency of mob actions in the cities such that FST suspects become the targets of mob attacks which state security infrastructures and personnel can rarely manage effectively.

3. Security Presence
The pattern of journeying in (Narrative Encounter 4) shows a movement from the city to a rural area and this depicts the efficiency of the CJFF and the intervention of the military personnel to neutralise Boko Haram in the rural communities. The rural nature of the communities and the involvement of the locals in the security system through the CJTF have helped in preventing the frequency of mob attacks. For instance, the Alau community created an order that advocates a culture of respect despite the incidence of FST. As an alliance initiated to be a self-help strategy among the citizens for the identification of crime spots and for making the necessary interventions to maintain order, under the auspices/supervision of the constituted military authority, the CJTF in the Alau community emphasises stopping any mob justice that is induced by FST. The CJTF’s intervention in curbing mob attacks on the FST perpetrators is tucked in the ideology that women are weaker beings and are often brainwashed to become deviants. Contrarily, within the urban spaces, mob actions on FST perpetrators became a marker of vigilantism and self-determined communal action towards protection. Rather than relying on legal authorities, groups of people informally sanction lawbreakers, justifying this by affirming that there are inadequate legal mechanisms to properly punish them.
Vigilante groups use various degrees of violence (from verbal, and physical assaults and lynching) because the actions of the suspects are adjudged to be counter-normative as well as criminal (Monday and Okpanuchi 2019). The vigilantes, under
the different nomenclatures, justify their actions as a fulfilment of communal or societal wishes. From ad hoc group security formations to the well-known CJTF, organised extrajudicial actions (Weisburd 1988), acting in lieu of the regular justice system in the northeast of Nigeria, have emerged to control FST. The position of Pratten (2008) that there is an irreducible ambiguity of vigilantism in Nigeria situates the operation of the CJTF, in particular, as multifaceted especially when the constituted military authorities are inadequate. It is therefore understandable that a different societal response to deviance, particularly under vigilantism, is plausible where the presence of security personnel in urban and clustered communities is not so manifest to deal with it. In North-Eastern communities outside Borno State, particularly in Adamawa, the ongoing post-conflict efforts also deter the perpetration of mob justice on FST suspects. One of the NGO workers attests to this:

I have never heard of women bombers being beaten by the community because, generally, awareness is being created in, most especially, this part of the North-East. You know there are so many gender-focused radio programmes to educate the populace about what these people are doing and how they are forcefully initiating people. These are the things that help (Focus Group Discussion January 16, 2020).

FST, Mob Justice and the Perpetrator/Victimhood Nexus

With the overall goal of altering the immediate and the future behaviour of deviants, both verbal and non-verbal communication modes that depict the total disapproval of their acts are carried out by persons or groups other than law enforcement agents. This approach of dealing with counter-normative activities, prior to or independent of the involvement of the relevant authoritative third parties, and enforced by the highly decentralised local social forces like vigilantes, is described as informal social control (Emerson 2006; Nupier, et al. 2007). Informal sanction comes with some level of flexibility which means that the more serious a society takes a norm, the harsher the penalty for breaking it. This explains why most negative sanctions are informal (Pfohl 2009). Women’s involvement in counter-normative acts like suicide bombing is more prone to informal sanctions that manifest in a series of aggressive or violent social rejections and norm enforcement. This link between deviance and social control from the gender perspective is expounded by Hagan, Simpson and Gillis (1979). They hold that there is a sexually stratified inverse relationship between structurally differentiated processes of social control such that women are frequently the instruments and objects of such informal social controls while men are frequently the instruments and objects of formal sanctions. Regarding the female suicide bombers as perpetrators or victims in the context of mob justice is intertwined with the deviant and social control theories. The engagement of women as suicide bombers is seen particularly by the respondents, from the studied communities, as being beyond the criminal acts of terrorism. This
is borne out of the dominant position that the decision to ‘perpetrate’ terror is not made solely by the women or girls who are Boko Haram suicide bombers. Rather, these women or girls deviate from their socially assigned roles as caregivers not out of their volition but as a result of their forceful recruitment and indoctrination. While they consistently perpetrate terror by successfully ‘hiding explosives under their hijabs for detonation in open places’, they are victims in the hands of Boko Haram who take advantage of their high-level poverty, low educational level and helplessness (Field Interview 2019). The subjection of the suspected female bombers to more informal sanctions like verbal abuse and social rejections by community members, including members of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), in line with Hagan, Simpson and Gillis’ (1979) argument, is another perspective from which one is to view FST as deviance. Irrespective of the extent of empathy for women and the atmosphere of fear in the afflicted communities, potential bombers, are seen as terrorists. According to the interviewed NGO workers and journalists in Adamawa and Bauchi States, these women or girls are “being sent to detonate bombs in the (host) communities but are not indigenes of these communities” (Focus Group Discussion January 16, 2020). After their abductions, “they are most often taken to a different community where they are not known” to carry out the act of suicide bombing. It is “therefore very difficult for one to identify that they were kidnapped” or for members of the host community to show any expected empathy. Meanwhile, in the urban communities of Borno and Bauchi States, the less concentration of security workers, explains the late responses of the military personnel to reported suicide bombing scenes. Moreover, the poor state of preparedness of some CJTF members informs the mishandling of suspected female bombers and contributes to considering suspected female suicide bombers as perpetrators rather than victims, leading to resulting mob attacks (Focus Group Discussion January 16, 2020).

In addition to the conversation with some respondents from the traditional media, it was revealed that some of CJTF members carry out their activities ‘under the influence of drugs’. This dynamic further contributes to the difficulty in distinguishing between the perception of female bombers as victims and the portraiture as perpetrators (Focus Group Discussion January 16, 2020).

**FST, Mob Justice and Security Implications**

Negative vigilantism, as manifested through mob actions, complicates the lives of women in public and private spaces. On one hand, in the public space, the sight of teenage girls has become a misnomer. Their fundamental human rights to free movement and life are now being impeded. On the other hand, seclusion in private spaces has increased Boko Haram’s access to recruiting females for domestic and nursing services. Apart from the migrants from the other regions in Nigeria (mostly Igbo, Yoruba, Tiv, and Igala women), indigenous women in North-East Nigeria are not culturally expected to operate in public spaces (Robson 2006) or work at the
market centres. The control of women’s mobility through seclusion further triggers the suspicion of them being on a suicide mission when sighted in densely populated public spaces. These contestations and entanglements of public and private spaces matter in intertwining contexts of FST and mob justice. From the abduction and the indoctrination of women and girls, and their recruitment as suicide bombers to the aftermath of successful or attempted suicide bombings, the dynamics of FST and their security consequences are evident. One significant offshoot of FST and mob justice across Boko Haram-afflicted North-Eastern Nigeria is the community rejection of female returnees from the camps of the Boko Haram insurgents. First, community members who have encountered or learnt about cases of attempted female suicide bombing fear or lose trust in these returnees. Also, verbal and physical condemnations of female suicide bombing suspects deprive returnees of the courage to return to their communities. An NGO worker interviewed in Adamawa State buttresses this observation thus:

Sometimes, they (women and girls) willingly give themselves to the insurgents because when they came back, their communities rejected them and they were forced to go back to the insurgent camps. I have interacted with someone who escaped from the camp. They were used as cooks, they have seen blood… and how people are being killed (Focus Group Discussion January 16, 2020).

Another respondent, a journalist adds:

The funniest thing is that few of the women who escaped from the insurgents’ camps have no intention of bombing any public space but even their family members are running away from them; they reject them (Focus Group Discussion, January 17, 2020).

On the one hand, there are reported instances of some returnees, who, upon a long period of relationship with the Boko Haram members (before being sent on any mission as suicide bombers) still maintain concrete communication channels with the Boko Haram members (Field Investigation 2019 and 2020), and this makes the community members label them as conspirators, as far as national security is concerned. On the other hand, abducted and potential female suicide bombers who have stayed in the Boko Haram camps for an appreciable period come back home with permanent reminders (pregnancies and children) that bring about stigmatisation and societal rejection. This security implication is described by some respondents, thus:

…And the major challenge now, some of them who were rescued by the military or who ran away from the hideout of the insurgents come out from the insurgency bases with children; they face rejection; the society calls the children they had with the terrorists the children of the devil and to integrate them into the society becomes a great challenge (Focus Group Discussions January 16, 2020).
Conclusion

Women’s and girl’s encounters with Boko Haram in North-East, Nigeria, have exposed them to the different dimensions of security threats. In rural communities, the instrumentalisation of women as agents of terror has negated their perception as caregivers and domestic/informal productive workforce. Despite the rarity of the occurrence of mob justice in the studied rural communities, the negative consequences of the communities’ postures against FST manifest in the everyday living of the average women and in the lives of the female returnees from Boko Haram’s enclaves. Urban centres, with clusters of heterogeneous people, are more prone to the typical vigilantism against terrorism therefore, such communities increasingly resort to some dangerous alternatives, in place of the formal criminal justice system, to curb female suicide bombing. Mob justice is not only an aftermath of terrorist attacks or their reactions to terrorism; rather, it is also a cause and manifestation of violence against women, as female suspects who survive mob justice are permanently stigmatised and rejected. Along with the constant reminders of their interaction with terror, many of them remain social deviants. Boko Haram-afflicted states of North-East Nigeria are battling the challenges of community reintegration for the girls and women who have been exposed to FST. The reintegration of women and girls affected by Boko Haram insurgencies is a continuous process among state and non-state actors in Nigeria, which opens up new frontiers of research and action.

References


