

PRELIMINARIES OF ROMANIA'S ENTERING THE WORLD WAR I

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In Romania there was a serious political divide between King Carol I, on the one hand, joined by a small Germanophile group, and the majority of Romanian politicians, on the other hand, supported by the public opinion, favoring the Entente.

It would be noticed that both camps took national interest as their starting point, but considered it from different perspectives.

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In the aftermath of Sarajevo attack, on June 15/28, 1914, the victims of whom were the Austrian-Hungarian heir to the throne, Prince Franz Ferdinand and his wife, on July 15/28, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. The World War I had begun.

On July 10/23, 1914, when the contents of the ultimatum that Austria-Hungary had sent to Serbia became known in Bucharest, the feelings of disapproval and indignation were generally and very stressed. The Austrian-Hungarian Minister in Bucharest, Count Ottokar Czernin, communicated to Vienna this particular mood and expressed his certainty that Romania's aims would not be attained peacefully, but by means of war and not alongside the double monarchy, but against it. By signing, on October 18/30, 1883, a secret Treaty of Alliance Romanian-Austro-Hungarian, which Germany joined, too, Romania had joined the Central Powers in order to be safe against possible aggression from Russia. One of the seven articles of the treaty established that Romania would intervene to support Austria-Hungary in case the Eastern border was attacked. But in the summer of 1914, the treaty becomes inoperable because the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy was the aggressor itself.

On July 15/28, 1914, after the war broke out, Count Ottokar Czernin specifically mentioned during a conversation with King Carol I that,

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according to the treaty, the war led by the double monarchy against Serbia involved Romania's immediate military collaboration. The Romanian monarch guaranteed only Romania's neutrality. Taking into account the German origins of the Romanian royal dynasty, King Carol I declared that if he were to follow his personal feelings, the Romanian Army would be by side of the Central Powers. However, he could not abide by the alliance treaty with the Central Powers, which was a defensive treaty, especially because Austria-Hungary had attacked Serbia and not vice-versa. On the same day, the Austrian-Hungarian Emperor Franz Josef sent a telegram to the Romanian King invoking the old friendship and trust relations established between the two monarchs. King Carol responded in brief, wishing him good luck.

On the other hand, on July 17/30, Sergey D. Sazonov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs conveyed to Stanislav Poklevski-Koziell, the Russian Minister in Bucharest, instructions regarding the specifications he was to deliver to Prime Minister Ionel Brătianu, according to which the Russian Empire was ready to recognize Transylvania's unification with Romania in case of entering the war against Austria-Hungary.

The Romanian Prime Minister, Ionel Brătianu, to whom these proposals had been made, remained reserved on this issue, due to the fact that such proposals should have been ratified in international treaties, in which the legitimacy of Romania's rights on the Romanian-inhabited territories still under Austrian-Hungarian rule was recognized openly by all the Powers within the Entente.

On July 20/August 2, 1914, in the aftermath of a conversation between the Russian Minister in Bucharest, Stanislav Poklevski-Koziell and Romanian Prime Minister, Ionel Brătianu, it became certain that Petrograd would consider Romania's neutrality as an act of friendship towards the Entente¹.

Upon the breaking out of WWI, Romania's situation was very complex. Since 1883 Romania was member of the Triple Alliance – in which Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy were also parts. The events from the beginning of the twentieth century shook Romania's relations with the Central Powers, which was demonstrated by the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). During the Balkan crisis, the Triple Alliance – Austria-Hungary in particular – neglected the interests of Romania by directly supporting Bulgaria. Consequently, Romania's intervention within the Second Balkan War in the summer of 1913 was perceived as an action against the Central Powers².

¹ About the evolution of the Romanian-Russian relationships during the World War I see Sergey D. Sazonov, *Les années fatales. Souvenirs de S. Sazonov*, Payot, Paris, 1927.

² About Romania's involvement within the Balkan Wars see Titu Maiorescu, *România, războaiele balcanice și Cadrilaterul*, Romania, the Balkan Wars and Cadrilater, Machiavelli

In Romania there was a serious political divide between King Carol I, on the one hand, joined by a small Germanophile group, and the majority of Romanian politicians, on the other hand, supported by the public opinion, favoring the Entente. Under such circumstances, the situation of King Carol I was in particularly a difficult one. As a member of the Hohenzollern imperial family, his personal allegiance was with Germany, especially since he was sincerely convinced that Germany would win the war. However, he was perfectly aware of the fact that the Romanians' sympathy laid with France. Moreover, the Romanian national goal was to free Transylvania, where Romanians were living under a harsh regime of denationalization.

Under those circumstances, on July 21/August 3, 1914, King Carol I gathered the Crown Council³. Addressing the audience in French, the King read his declaration in which he condemns neutrality and argues that the Romanian public opinion would not tolerate an alliance with the Entente and that his honor dictates him to join Germany. His speech was followed by a prolonged silence. Petre P. Carp demands an immediate declaration of war against Russia, alongside Germany, emphasizing that the Triple Alliance treaty that had been kept secret until that moment must be abided by. But no one supported Petre P. Carp. The Minister of Finance, Emil Costinescu, speaks against Russia, but Alexandru Marghiloman and Take Ionescu declared themselves in favor of neutrality. Prime Minister Ionel Brătianu favored mobilization, without further engagement and managed to get every one's consent in this direction, excepting Petre P. Carp's. Emanoil Porumbaru, Minister of Foreign Affairs, that had been unaware of the secret alliance treaty between King Carol I and the Central Powers, reached the conclusion that it was too late to consult the Parliament on this matter. Moreover, during the debate, the letter announcing Italy's declaration of neutrality arrives. Finally, King Carol I was convinced to back down and accept the decision of the Crown Council which was in favor of neutrality⁴.

Consequently, the Romanian government notified Vienna and Berlin on the matter of Romania's newly adopted posture towards the Central Powers right after the Crown Council's session ended. From the contents of the document the motivation of Romania's refusal to participate in the war

Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995; Gheorghe Zbucea, *România și războaiele balcanice 1912-1913*. Pagini de istorie sud-est europeană, [Romania and the Balkan Wars 1912-1913. Pages of Southeast European History, Albatros Publishing House, Bucharest], 1999.

³ Ion Gh. Duca, *Memorii*, vol. I, [Memories, vol. I, Expres Publishing House, Bucharest], 1992, pp. 52-68.

⁴ Constantin Kirițescu, *Istoria războiului pentru întregirea României 1916-1919*, ediția a II-a, vol. I, [War History for Romania's Unification 1916-1919, second edition, vol. I], Schools House Press, Bucharest, 1922, p. 125.

was clear, particularly since the document specified that Romania had not even been consulted or worn against the imminent breakout of the war, and the current situation did not present any *casus foederis*. All these matters influenced Romania's decision to remain neutral made by the Crown Council, on July 21/August 3, 1914⁵.

Romania's neutrality lasted for two years; in the meantime, the Romanian political stage was confronted with two big orientations. The first, which had large popular support, was in favor of entering the war alongside the Entente, in which case there was a clear possibility to set free Transylvania, Banat and Bukovina. The second, supported by a series of conservative politicians, proposed that Romania to join the Central Powers, because Russia was perceived as the greatest danger to Romania's existence⁶. The arguments behind this debate were vast on both sides. It would be noticed that both camps took national interest as their starting point, but considered it from different perspectives. The side that favored the Entente put the national objective of reunification first, whereas the other side was in favor of the insurance of national security above all⁷. The Romanian historian Constantin Kirițescu spoke about „the tragedy of Romanian neutrality”⁸.

The interlude offered by Romania's declaration of neutrality was patiently and cautiously used by the Government in order to consolidate the military and political basis of Romania's future alliance with the Entente. Taking into account this situation, Romania signed an agreement with Russia on September 18/October 1, 1914. In the aftermath of the negotiations, the Romanian Government engaged in with the Russian Government, upon the above-mentioned date, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey D. Sazonov conveyed the Romanian Minister to Petrograd, Constantin Diamandy, an official note in which the Russian Empire was committing itself to oppose any infliction upon Romania's territorial *status quo*.

This document represented a declaration of principles of the Russian Government, and it also acknowledged the legitimate right of Romania on Transylvania and the other territories inhabited by a Romanian majority that were a part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. Russia promised to get London and Paris to ratify the commitments it had engaged in towards

⁵ Ion Mamina, *Consilii de Coroană*, [Crown Councils, Enciclopedica Publishing House, Bucharest], 1997, pp. 27-52.

⁶ For a presentation of pro-German side see Lucian Boia, *Germanofili. Elita intelectuală românească în anii Primului Război Mondial*, [The Germanophiles. Romanian intellectual elite during the WWI], Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010.

⁷ Florin Constantiniu, *O istorie sinceră a poporului român*, [A True History of Romanian Nation], Univers Enciclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1997, p. 273.

⁸ Constantin Kirițescu, *op.cit.*, p. 130.

Romania. The text of the document clearly specified the fact that the agreement would be kept secret up to the moment in which Romania would free those territories under the Austrian-Hungarian rule⁹.

On the same day, having been given an authorization by the Prime Minister, Ionel Brătianu, Minister Constantin Diamandy conveyed the reply note in which he mentioned that Romania committed to „keep friendly neutrality towards Russia, up to the point when it will occupy the territories of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy inhabited by Romanians”¹⁰.

The agreement signed between Romania and Russia proved to the Entente Powers that when possible, Romania would become their ally. However, the Romanian Government wished that the most appropriate political, military and strategic moment to be chosen by it. This decision was to be taken by the Romanian authorities depending on the signature of a series of treaties recognizing Romania’s legitimate rights on Transylvania, Banat and Bukovina still under Austrian-Hungarian rule, as well as on the concrete military support that the Entente was to provide Romania in order to equip its Army with modern weapons and military technique.

The period between July 21/August 3, 1914 and August 14/27, 1916, represented the period of military neutrality or the period of „expectation concerning the borders defense” in which an intense political, diplomatic and preparation activity of Romania’s military potential was undertaken in order to achieve the national goal¹¹.

On August 4/17, 1916, Romania and the Entente signed the Political Treaty and Military Convention, two documents that established the coordinates of Romania’s participation in the war. Thus, Romania was guaranteed territorial integrity and it was specified that the Romanian states would enter the war against Austria-Hungary no later than August 15/28, 1916. The four allied Powers (France, Great Britain, Russia and Italy) recognized Romania’s right to reunite with the Romanian-inhabited territories ruled by Austria-Hungary, thus mapping out Romania’s future borders. Also, it was clearly stipulated the obligation of the contracting parties not to sign separate peace with the enemy, and that Romania would be treated equally in the future Peace Conference.

The Military Convention established the technical conditions of the Romanian participation within the war. The allies declared themselves in

⁹ Eliza Campus, *Din politica externă a României 1913-1947*, [From the Foreign Policy of Romania 1913-1947], Political Publishing House, Bucharest, 1980, pp. 53-54.

¹⁰ Gheorghe A. Dabija, *Armata Română în Războiul mondial (1916-1918)*, vol. I, [Romanian Army during the World War (1916-1918), vol. I], I.G. Hertz Press, Bucharest, 1928, p. 20.

¹¹ Dumitru Preda, *România și Antanta*, [Romania and the Entente], European Institute, Jassy, 1998, p. 13.

agreement with the specifications of the Romanian operational plan; the Russian High Command was going to support the Romanian Army's entry the war in an offensive action in Bukovina and by sending an Army Corp, made up of two Infantry Divisions and a Cavalry one, on the front in Dobrudja. Also, the Russian Empire committed itself to act in support of the Romanian Army with its Navy. Moreover, it stood clearly stipulated that in the Balkans the French-British troops were to engage in a massive offensive by the Army in Salonika against Bulgaria before the Romanian Army entered the war¹².

So, on August 14/27, 1916, at 10 o'clock, King Ferdinand headed the session of the Crown Council held at the Cotroceni Palace. This time, three main outlooks confronted each other: Romania's entry into war alongside the Entente, the keeping of neutrality and Romania's entry into war alongside the Central Powers.

This last option did not manage to feature more than the truly fierce support of the old conservative politician Petre P. Carp. Alexandru Marghiloman and Titu Maiorescu upheld the alternative of maintaining the neutrality. Ionel Brătianu's speech, in which he compellingly pledged in favor of leaving neutrality and entering the war alongside the Entente, followed the politicians' speeches¹³. As soon as the Crown Council's session ended, Romanian Minister in Vienna conveyed Romania's statement of war on Austria-Hungary¹⁴. Romania declared war on Austria-Hungary, then Germany declared war on Romania, on August 15/28, followed by the Ottoman Empire, on August 17/30, and Bulgaria on August 19/September 1, 1916.

The historical perspective has proved that the development of coalition warfare requires the establishment of norms and rules concerning the functioning of the alliance, the cooperation of forces engaged in battle and the command act, which materialize in the conventions signed between the allies. In the case of coalition warfare, the harmonization of the participants' interests represents a particularly difficult problem, but the preservation of sovereignty represents a fundamental necessity – especially for those small and medium states – and on it depends the very functioning and vitality of the alliance.

Taking these considerations as our starting point, the political and military relations set up between Romania and the Entente during the war represents a matter of major interest.

On the opinion of the Romanian authorities, the military actions against Austria-Hungary were to be subordinated to the political goals of

¹² Toma Dumitrescu, *Jurnal. Războiul național (1916)*, [Diary. National War (1916)], Academy of High Military Studies Publishing House, Bucharest, 1999, pp. 14-15.

¹³ Ion Gh. Duca, *Amintiri politice*, vol. I, Jon Dumitru Verlag, München, [Political Memories, vol. I, Jon Dumitru Publishing House, Munich], 1981, pp. 271-283.

¹⁴ Ion Mamina, *op.cit.*, pp. 63-87.

freedom and unification of the Romanian territories. This option responded to Romania's fundamental interests. The Powers of the Entente (France, Great Britain, Russia and Italy) signed a political alliance treaty and a military convention in which they recognized Romania's rights on the Austrian-Hungarian ruled provinces; in turn of this recognition, the Romanian side committed itself to enter the war alongside the Entente. On a closer look at the text, one may easily notice that in the summer of 1916, between Romania and its allies there were many elements of contradiction, mistrust and ambiguity, especially concerning the protection that the Western Powers would provide Romania, paradoxically, against an unpredictable ally such as Russia, which Romania feared even more than its assumed enemy.

In fact, during a discussion held on October 12, 1916, by the Headquarter Commander of the Imperial Russian Army, General Mikhail V. Alexeev, with the Head of the French Military Mission, General Henri Mathias Berthelot, the previous considered as "exaggerated the length of Romanian borders to be defended and (...) the Romanian Army must not rely on the Russian troops support in order to defend those frontiers. There is only one possible defending line, the Siret line. Saying that, he marked on his map a thick blue line from Galați to Carpathians, up to the limit of Bukovina"¹⁵.

By the strategic outlook regarding Romania's joining the war, the Romanian Army played the role of a counterbalancing element of mainly the failures of the Russian Army on the front in Galicia; this was possible because Romania's entering the war did not open the strategic direction Budapest-Vienna within the overall context of the Entente's general offensive. The fact that Romania's military performance was dependent upon the strategic developments on the Eastern Front, the calculations and decisions of the Russian High Command would become even deeper in the campaigns of 1916 and 1917 – tragically without either France or Great Britain be able to intervene decisively to prevent the transformation of the Romanian front in a simple extension of Russian-German-Austrian-Hungarian one and to limit the pressure of the Russian ally on Romania. In this respect, it was no surprise that, shortly after Russia's signing an armistice and than at Brest-Litovsk, on March 3, 1918, a separate peace, Romania had to accept the ceasefire, by the Armistice of Focșani, signed on December 9, 1917, and then the imposed Peace Treaty of Bucharest, signed on May 7, 1918.

Several evidences of those moments are relevant in this respect. Count de Saint-Aulaire, the French Minister in Romania declared that all clauses of

¹⁵ Nicolae Ciobanu, Eugen Bădălan, *Cronologia Primului Război Mondial 1914-1919*, [Chronology of the WWI 1914-1919], Academy of High Military Studies Publishing House, Bucharest, 2001, p. 63.

the alliance treaty between Romania and the Entente, „excepting those that imposed obligations on Romania, will be violated”. The French politician André Tardieu admitted that „we have engaged Romania in combat without having studied or evaluated the resources of the enemy”¹⁶.

Referring to the Russian support for Romania, General Alexei Brussilov noted: „We should have sent here not an Army Corp made up of two second-hand Divisions, but an entire Army made up of good troops, and in that case, Romania’s entry the war would have taken a stressed different path”¹⁷.

Addressing to the counterparts of the Entente, the Commander of Dobrudja Army, Russian General Andrei M. Zaioncikovski, expressed openly his opinion about the Russian troop’s commitment in Romania: „I am convinced that no one could presume that we would fight for Romanians”¹⁸.

Referring to Romania’s entering the war, the German General Erich von Falkenhayn specified: “Probably Russia forced it, when Russia observed that the offensive in Galicia was stalled in order to lighten its situation. Certainly the French Commander-in-Chief, General Joffre, insisted a lot upon it to remove the world attention from the Somme offensive, which failed”¹⁹. Assessing the Russian attitude towards Romania, the German General Erich Ludendorff noticed in his memories that the Russians “let the Romanians to be defeated, letting them alone during all the battles” in which they “easily” could join and “only this simple fact brought us the victory”²⁰.

The analysis of the political, diplomatic and military documents of August 1916, signed by Romania and its Entente allies, reveal the fact that these were clear only with regard to Romania’s participation as equal member within the Peace Conference and the acknowledgement of Transylvania’s right to unite with the mother country; but these were conditioned by considerable military commitments and the promise to reject any separate peace with the enemy. However, the principles and means of military cooperation, those regarding the operational command of military operations and the technical aspects associated with the normal functioning of an alliance had not been clearly established yet. Thus, the premises of ambiguity were created, a field of any legal interpretation in which diplomatic acts would steadily recede within the direct relation with military operations. The latter were strictly related with the military and material support of the allies.

¹⁶ Paul Allard, *Les dessous de la guerre révélés par les comites secrets*, collection „Le livre d'aujourd'hui”, Les Editions de France, Paris, 1932, p. 32.

¹⁷ Alexei Broussilov, *Mémoires du général Broussilov. Guerre 1914-1918*, Hachette, Paris, 1929, p. 223.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 224.

¹⁹ Apud Nicolae Ciobanu, Eugen Bădălan, *op.cit*, p. 78.

²⁰ Erich Ludendorff, *Souvenirs de guerre (1914-1914)*, premier tome, Plon, Paris, 1921, p. 347.

Upon the launch of military operations, the Romanian High Command exercised exclusively the operational command of the front stretching between the Carpathian Mountains and Danube River. From 1916 on, the representatives of the allies' armies would arrive in Romania within the framework of the military missions, with liaison, coordination and training responsibilities. The French Military Mission in general and its Commander, General Henri Mathias Berthelot, in particular, played an important role in the provision of allied support, often directly representing a balancing factor in the relation between the Russian and Romanian High Commands, and a counterbalancing one with regard to the influence of the former – particularly because the historical perspective and experience had proven that the Russians would try to subordinate the Romanian troops and command²¹.

The general mobilization brought to arms 19,843 officers and 813,758 soldiers filled with enthusiasm and high morale, but at the same time plagued by huge deficiencies in terms of endowment and supply. Romania was facing the inability to meet the needs of its Army. In order to support the military campaign, Romania had to procure military equipment from the states of the Entente, but at the same time, Romania also had to find a safe way to transport the bought equipments. The only route used was the one between Salonika and Drobeta Turnu Severin, but this supply route was interrupted by the Bulgarian attack on Serbia, in October 1915. Then, up to November 1917, the supplies were to come by a very long route, passing through the Russian ports of Archangelsk, at the White Sea and Vladivostok, at the Pacific Ocean.

The Romanian Army was entering the war inadequately equipped and uncertain about the sources of its logistic support. The most serious problems concerned the endowment with heavy artillery, automatic weapons and their ammunition. At the same time, the Army's rapid mobilization and concentration determined many soldiers to remain at a basic training level; the lack of experience and well-trained officers was fully noticeable. The initial objectives entrusted to the Romanian Army were ambitious and went beyond its operational abilities. At the beginning, the Romanian High Command set up the objective of advancing in Transylvania and overcome the "Someș Gate" in order to push farther over the Hungarian plains on the strategic direction Budapest-Vienna. For this operation, the Romanian Army made available more than 400,000 troops. Other 140,000 troops were deployed in Southern Romanian, having the mission to prevent a Bulgarian-German

²¹ About the evolution of the Romanian-French relationships see Comte de Saint-Aulaire, Charles de Beaupoil, *Paroles Franco-Roumaines*, Imprimerie Socec&Co, Bucharest, 1930.

offensive²². They would provided the cover of the Russian troop's arrival in Dobrudja and establish a defensive front line between Rusciuk and Varna²³.

On December 12, 1916, referring to the Romanian soldiers, the newspaper *Il Giornale d'Italia* noticed: "The Romanian soldiers fought and I don't exaggerate when I use the word: like the lions. If the future chroniclers would have objections, not to them must be made. The peasants of those lands, who sang for many centuries the sad and melancholy Romanian folk song among the gorges with brawling waters and the winding fir-trees of the Carpathian Mountains and the large plains of Moldavia and Wallachia, proved that they knew to die when the homeland asked them"²⁴.

The conclusions resulted from the campaigns delivered by the Romanian Army during the WWI were the starting point for the complex and difficult process of reorganization and optimization of reunified Romania's national defense system. In the modernization process of the military system, the authorities started from the experience provided by the recently ended war and the exigencies required by the national defense²⁵.

Within its interwar frontiers, comprising all the Romanian-inhabited provinces, reunified Romania had an area of 295,049 km², in comparison with 137,000 km² before 1918, and a population over 18 million inhabitants, in comparison with approximate 7,250,000 inhabitants in 1913. As stipulated the Constitution of March, 1923, Romania was a national, united and indivisible state, having the inalienable territory. According to data provided

²² Among the Romanian memories works referring to the WWI see: Ioan Culcer, *Recenzie asupra istoriei războiului pentru întregirea României*, [Review over the History of the War for Romania's Unification], „Independence” Press, Bucharest, 1929; Romulus Scărișoreanu, *Fragmente din războiul 1916-1918. Istorisiri documentate*, [Fragments of the War 1916-1918. Documented Histories, second edition], Cavalry Press, Bucharest, 1934; Constantin Găvănescul, *Războiul nostru pentru întregirea neamului (1916-1918)*, [Our War for the Nation's Unification (1916-1918)], Coresi Publishing House, Bucharest, 1993; Radu R. Rosetti, *Mărturisiri (1914-1919)*, ediție îngrijită, studiu introductiv, note de Maria Georgescu, [Confessions (1914-1919), forward, notes by Maria Georgescu, Modelism Publishing House, Bucharest], 1997.

²³ Laurențiu-Cristian Dumitru, *Manevra de la Flămânda* (septembrie-octombrie 1916). *Noi considerații*, în *Revista de Istorie Militară*, [Manoeuvre of Flămânda (September-October 1916). New Considerations, in Review of Military History], nr. 1-2(93-94)/2006, pp. 16-22.

²⁴ Apud Nicolae Ciobanu, Eugen Bădălan, *op.cit.*, p. 74.

²⁵ Laurențiu-Cristian Dumitru, *Selecția personalului și exigențele reformei militare (1919-1939)*, în Petre Otu (coord.), *Reforma militară și societatea în România de la Carol I la a doua conflagrație mondială*, Occasional Papers, anul 6, nr. 8, Institutul pentru Studii Politice de Apărare și Istorie Militară, [Selection of Personnel and the Exigencies of Military Reforme (1919-1939), in Petre Otu (coord.), *Military Reforme and Society in Romania from Carol I to the WWII*, Occasional Papers, year 6, nr. 8, Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Military Publishing House, Bucharest], 2007, pp. 209-235.

by the census in 1930, Romania showed an ethnic structure in which the Romanians represented 71,9%, Hungarians 7,9%, Germans 4,1%, Jews 4% etc.²⁶

Overcoming the national catastrophe in 1916, having restored hope in the hot summer of 1917, and assuming the achievement of the national goals in 1918, the Romanian nation was faithfully looking at the future. The Romanian politicians would prove their competence in terms of diplomatic skills within the „battles” developed in Paris for the attainment of national goals, which was eventually recognized by the system of the Versailles Peace Treaties established in 1919-1920.

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²⁶ For a description of interwar Romania see Charles Upson Clarck, *România unită*, traducere Doina Roventă, cuvânt înainte Gheorghe Sărac, după titlul original *United Roumania*, New York, 1932, *United Romania*, translated by Doina Roventă, forward Gheorghe Sărac, Malasi Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998.