BULLETIN

OF
"CAROL I" NATIONAL
DEFENCE UNIVERSITY

3 / 2022

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C ONTENT

Bulletin of "Carol I" National Defence University. Celebrating 85 years of existence and certification in the Romanian military publishing landscape

While "Carol I" National Defence University is celebrating 133 years of existence, almost two thirds of it equal the age of the most important and long-lived cultural and scientific journal in the military field: **The Bulletin of "Carol I" National Defence University.**

The journal was first issued in the Romanian publishing landscape early 1937 under the name of *Buletinul Școalei Superioare de Război (The War School Bulletin)* and has since remained loyal to the values of the institution shown in the topic profile and evolution of the military institution, commanders and staff officers` theoretical and practical training on armed combat at various times throughout national and universal history, but especially shown in the notoriety of the officers and generals who have published in the pages of the magazine. Many of the authors ranked captain, major and colonel who signed for the Bulletin during its 85 year` issues became generals and great commanders in time, some of them – with a distinguished conduct on the Second World War battlefield. Others, equally important as contributors, brought their input to the enrichment of Romanian military theory and practice through their ideas and opinions published in the pages of the magazine, all under the aegis **"Labor improbus omnia vincit" ("Earnest work overcomes everything")**.

Since the first issues, the Bulletin has promoted ideas and opinions necessary for the renewal and improvement of the Romanian military system in accordance with the changes in the organization and equipment of modern armies. Through its pages, these ideas reached the entire military system, as General Ilie Șteflea, former professor and director of this prestigious institution of higher military education (1937-1939) stated in one of the editorials of the Bulletin: "In this way, the Higher War School considers that it is fulfilling one of its roles: that of disseminating tactical knowledge in the military". The Bulletin was also a sounding board, as it still is today, for the most interesting and heated debates in military theory and practice of the time. An example of this is issue 3-4 of the Bulletin in 1939 which was devoted to the theory of the role of movement in military art and strategy. Its Foreword stated that the Bulletin will be of interest both to the officers of the troops (the theoretical part in particular) and to those of the various commands".

These are just a few of the hundreds of examples in the Bulletin's early pages that show that this magazine, , has been a continuous spring for those who promoted the new and a beacon of knowledge for those who wanted to improve, allowing military leaders to develop intellectually to build an army performing its duty to the people when needed, throughout all its 85-year history, regardless of various title changes.

After the Second World War, the military and the Higher War College, as indeed the entire Romanian society, stepped into an era of unprecedented change that swept the Central and South-Eastern European world. The institution and its journal had to face these challenges for almost half a century. For a good part of the time during the communist regime, ideas and Soviet military doctrine theses were imposed on the Bulletin's pages, which influenced both the thinking and the training of the military. The editors and authors who signed articles and studies in the pages of the Bulletin, however, also experienced a time of emancipation from the Soviet tutelage and the magazine became a standard-bearer for the return to Romanian military traditions and thinking.

Everything changed with the fall of Nicolae Ceaușescu's regime in December 1989 and the beginning of the transition process in Romania towards a democratic society based on Euro-Atlantic values. The Bulletin became a forum for debate and analysis, for the design of a modern military, with structures and personnel capable of operating in the new post-Cold War security environment. Academics, researchers, doctoral and post-doctoral students, students, military and civilian personnel from defence, public order and national security institutions at home and abroad, have equally published articles in this publication. Through the quality of its studies, the journal has thus become a prestigious publication recognized in the field of **"Military Sciences, Intelligence and Public Order"** by the National Council for the Accreditation of University Degrees, Diplomas and Certificates.

On the 85th anniversary of its existence we can say that the Bulletin of the National University of Defence "Carol I" is a journal always close to all that is new in the military thought and practice. It has been and continues to be a scientific publication in the spirit of the times. through the efforts of those who manage the publication of each issue and, last but not least, through the quality of each author present in its pages, a military journal we are truly proud of.

Happy anniversary in promoting the novelty for the Romanian military thinking and in stating the ideals of freedom, security and stability!

Col.(ret) Professor
Constantin Hlihor, PhD

"ROMANIAN BRIDGEHEAD" AS A POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONCEPT IN SEPTEMBER 1939

Assoc.prof. Paweł Gotowiecki, Ph.D.*

The article concerns the intention to group Polish troops on the so-called Romanian bridgehead, created during the Polish campaign of 1939. The author presents the geopolitical conditions for the Polish strategic concepts, including the special importance that Romanian diplomatic relations had, including the common border relevance for Poland's defence. The article presents the assumptions and changes to the Polish operational plan, in which, along with hostilities' progress, the importance of the intention to create a defensive redoubt based on the Romanian border grew. The author sums up the article by discussing the military significance of the Romanian bridgehead during the military operations at the beginning of World War II.

Keywords: World War II; Polish-Romanian relations; Romanian bridgehead; Polish campaign.

Poland's international situation in the months preceding World War II outburst was extremely unfavorable. The shaping of the borders after World War I and the partition of Czechoslovakia in the years 1938-1939 meant that Poland primarily bordered on hostile or potentially hostile states. Poland's land border total length was 5,408 km, including the Third Reich border (altogether with Slovakia, the puppet, and the Free City of Gdańsk), 2,759 km, the border with the USSR 1,412 km, and the border with Lithuania 507 km. For Hungary (border length 277 km) and Latvia (border length 106 km) there was no risk of aggression, quite the contrary, we can even speak of close diplomatic relations with Hungary, but it should be taken into account that Latvia, did not have greater strategic importance for Poland, due to its location, while Hungary, orbited towards an alliance with the Third Reich, despite its sympathy for Poland. In this situation, Romania was Poland's most important partner to bound by an official alliance but also with the greatest geopolitical significance (a border with 347 km length) (Andrzej Jezierski 2003, 258).

Romania in the Polish political and military plans

Poland and Romania were bound by an official military alliance – the "the resistant

*University of Business and Entrepreneurship in Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski, Poland
e-mail: *gotowiecki@wp.pl*

alliance convention "on March 3rd, 1921, and then extended twice by the "treaty of guarantee". In the treaty, the main paragraph read: "Poland and Romania undertake mutually against all aggressive external intentions that undermine their territorial integrity and political independence." Although this general formula did not specify whom the alliance was to be aimed against, the secret military convention (updated several times, for the last time in 1931) indicated joint military actions against the USSR. Although the Polish-Romanian alliance was by far the most important actor in the event of a Soviet Union war, Romania's geographic location meant that Polish-Romanian relations were also of great importance in the event of a Poland versus Germany war. Should a war with Germany have occured, Poland counted on "benevolent neutrality" – the use of Romanian harbours (Constanța) for reloading purposes, rail, road and air transit for war materials, as well as deliveries, especially gasoline (Łossowski 1995, 168-169) (Polskie Siły Zbrojne w drugiej wojnie światowej 1951, 106-107). As for during the war approach, the concept of Polish authorities evacuation to the West crossing the Romanian territory emerged. Considered in the field of historical science as well as in international law, this issue provides separate considerations that go beyond this article.

Although the political events unfolding between the fall of 1938 to the summer of 1939 weakened the Polish-Romanian alliance rather than strengthening it (mainly due to the extremely different policy and territorial program

both countries had towards Hungary), the Polish government expectations, counting on Romania's benevolent neutrality, building its political and military concepts on this attitude, remained. The first Romanian authorities declarations suggested such a position. It was on September 4th, 1939, when the Romanian government issued a message welcomed by the Polish government, about the fact that "Romania wants to maintain its current position". In the following days, however, German diplomacy took very active steps to isolate the defending Poland. A special role in these activities was played by the Third Reich envoy in Bucharest, Wilhelm Fabricius, who demanded Romanian authorities to provide strict observance of neutrality, a closure of the border and an absolute internment of those Polish soldiers who would find themselves in Romania", as well as a prevention of the military materials transit to Poland. Romanian authorities did not bow to German blackmail and did not change their official position on the war material transit for Poland through Romanian territory (Skrzypek 1989, 138-139) (Polskie Siły Zbrojne w drugiej wojnie światowej 1959, 14-16) (Michowicz 1999, 112-113).

The Romanian "friendly border", the area of the so-called Eastern Lesser Poland (Małopolska), adjacent to the Polish-Romanian border, bounded by the rivers Stryi and Dniester from the North-West, covering approximately the area of three voivodeships: Lviv, Tarnopol and Stanislaviv (located farthest to the South-East) received an utmost importance from the Polish authorities. The importance of this area for the Polish Republic defence was emphasized in July 1939 ,by Colonel Stanisław Kopański in a note on Poland's strategic and political position. Kopański pointed out the strategic importance that Lviv - Stanislaviv - Śniatyń railway line has, connecting Poland with Romania. According to the Polish officer, keeping Eastern Lesser Poland in a Polish possession would also have other advantages – it would prevent the USSR from entering the war (from the Polish raison d'état, point of view the USSR neutrality in the ongoing conflict was optimal) and it would make it difficult for the Germans to use the Ukrainian minority card. In the realities of the ongoing military operations, the importance of having this territory was also influenced by a number of other potential benefits: it could have

been a place of military units reorganization and replenishment, a place of aviation relocation, a place of residence and functioning for some Polish military and administrative authorities, and finally a typical front line base. On the other hand, in terms of materials and personnel, it should be borne in mind that the Polish mobilization and military base was located on the right bank of the Vistula and its loss, despite the strategic importance of South-Eastern Poland, could not be compensated in the long run (Włodarkiewicz 2014, 27-28).

The above assumptions were reflected in the operational plan "West" – developed only in the first months of 1939, i.e.the operational plan of the Polish Army in the event of war with Germany. The plan assumed that Germany would attack Poland with four great operational formations in four main operational directions: from East Prussia, Pomerania, Lower Silesia and Upper Silesia. The Polish defence line was along the Polish borders. In this situation, the Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły decided to play the fight in three phases: 1) in the first, to fight the battle in defensive positions, covering the areas of the country necessary to carry out general mobilization and develop forces, 2) in the second phase of operations, to stop the defensive battle and withdraw in the general South-East direction, 3) the third phase was intended to conduct defence activities based on river valleys and mountain ranges of Central and Eastern Poland. The second, and even more so, the third phase of operations were never prepared in a staff-like manner, and on the basis of individual reports, it can be concluded that the Polish Supreme Command was quite flexible in its approach to later scenarios of military operations. It was assumed there would be both the possibility of keeping the Vistula line longer, but also the necessity of a deeper departure of the troops towards the South-East. However, the withdrawalgeneral concept was clear, assigning the Army "Kraków", based on the fortifications of Upper Silesia, the role of a pivot, enabling the withdrawal of the most advanced Polish armies – "Poznań" and "Pomorze". Finding itself in the war planning stage, the Polish Supreme Command acknowledged that they should give the area - to the German army, after the border battle but it was not able to predict the depth of the withdrawal and the detailed course of hostilities after departing from the starting positions. Nevertheless, the attitude towards

the retreat axisSouth-Eastern general direction indicated the South-East Poland and the Polish-Romanian border strategic importance for the future hostilities phases planning. (Abraham 1972, 358-359) (Porwit 1983a, 78-80) (Polskie Siły Zbrojne w drugiej wojnie światowej 1951, 277-281).

The first days of the Polish Campaign had already shown that the Polish operational plan was unfeasible, given the German military numerical and especially technical advantage (air domination and effective use of armored weapons). On September 2nd, the Germans made a deep breach between the "Łódź" and "Kraków" armies, and the Commander-in-Chief agreed to "Kraków" Army withdrawal for fear of tearing down the front. Thus, the formation that was to play a pivotal role while saving itself from the encirclement, broke the front and made the Polish operational plan obsolete.

The Romanian bridgeheadconcept

There are no direct sources when the Commander-in-Chief began to consider making the decision to withdraw the Polish Army to South-Eastern Poland, but from various reports it can be concluded that this took place between September 4 and 6. Years later, somewhere in September, Colonel/General Stanisław Kopański recalled that he had heard Colonel Tadeusz Klimecki (both of them held managerial positions with the Commander-in-Chief Staff) saying that the Commander-in-Chief had anticipated a general retreat towards the Romanian border (Kopański 1989, 164-165). Perhaps this should be combined with General Kazimierz Sosnkowski`s suggestions, who, in an early September campaign was out of assignment, but who was also one of the most prominent representatives of the Polish generals at that time. In talks with Rydz-Śmigły on September 3rd 4th and 6th, Sosnkowski, suggested that he would regroup the front and shift the axis of the operation to the Xouth, shorten the front, fortify the area of South-Eastern Poland (using the Dniester River and its tributaries) and shift the existing reserves and resources there (Sosnkowski 1988, 68-71). Rydz-Śmigły either listened to an experienced general or came to similar conclusions himself, as the situation at the front was unfavorable.

The final decision to withdraw troops to the area of South-Eastern Poland was made by Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły on September 8, 1939. After more than a week of fighting, the Polish army was in constant retreat. After the lost border battle, all Polish armies left their original defensive positions, of which only the Army "Poznań" together with the depleted Army "Pomerania", so far not involved in the fight, had the opportunity to take the initiative and make an offensive turn towards the German 8th Army, marching towards Warsaw. However, this could not change the general strategic situation and the position of the Polish troops, which were either already defeated (the partially destroyed Reserve Army "Prusy") or were on a deep defensive, withdrawing and trying to avoid encirclement (the armies "Modlin", "Łódź", "Kraków"). On that day, the first Wehrmacht units (4th Panzer Division) reached Warsaw. The Polish Commander-in-Chief, in the face of the direct threat to Warsaw, moved the headquarters to Brest-on-the-Bug on September 7, and the government evacuated to Lutsk in Volhynia.

On September 8, late in the evening, Marshal Rydz Śmigły informed his staff about the concept of rolling up the front and evacuating to South-East Poland. It was mentioned in later reports, among others of the Chief of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, General Wacław Stachiewicz (he himself was still in Warsaw at that time) or the then Colonel Stanisław Kopański. Moreover, the simultaneous decision on the aggressive turn of the "Poznań"Army towards the German 8th Army was to play, from the Commander-in-Chief's point of view, a mainly auxiliary role for the evacuation of the remaining Polish troops to the South-East, delaying the outflanking movements of the Wehrmacht (Kopański 1989, 177).

In the following days, executive orders were issued for the concept of organizing resistance in South-Eastern Poland. On September 10, the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief developed the "Plan of focusing in the Eastern Lesser Poland"area, which was based on: "Keep Eastern Lesser Poland and the connection with the Western countries through Romania at all costs." The plan indicated that the area was optimal for defence in the West by the line of the San River, and from the West by a line from the Brest-on-the-Bug fortress, through Polesie to the border with the USSR. The plan rightly emphasized the great importance of the extreme Southern wing of the Polish army between the Carpathian range and the mouth of the San

Figure 1 *The area of the Romanian bridgehead bounded by the rivers Dniester and Stryi.*
(Source: *Map of Polish waterways*, ed. T. Tillinger, Waterway Directorate in Warsaw, 1931)

River to the Vistula River. An important role was played by Polish troops defensive and delaying actions led by General Kazimierz Sosnkowski in this area, carried out as part of the Southern Front established on September 10, 1939. On September 11, on the basis of the above-mentioned plan, "the own forces concentration Guidelines in the South" were developed. This document partially contained orders and decisions issued the day before (Polskie Siły Zbrojne w drugiej wojnie światowej 1959, 185-189).

On September 13, General Sosnkowski's report from September 12, which presented the situation on the Southern Front as "extremely difficult", arrived at the Commander-in-Chief headquarters (moved in the meantime from Brest-on-the-Bug to Włodzimierz Wołyński). The report showed that the German forces were trying to outflank Sosnkowski's forces, gaining a free way to Lviv. In this situation, it became clear that the defence area indicated in the September 11 order was unrealistic. In response, the Commander-in-Chief issued on September 13 "General Guidelines for Action in Eastern Lesser Poland", limiting the defence area in South-Eastern Poland to a "bridgehead" based on the Romanian Border, limited by the lines of the Dniester and Stryi rivers. It was an area of approximately 15,000 square kilometers (about 90% of the Stanislaviv voivodeship). Moreover, the isolated garrisons of Lviv and Przemyśl were to be defended to the end. Of great importance, not only strategic, but also psychological and symbolic too, was the validation of the first of these cities, the capital of South-East Poland, which gained the name *"Leopolis Semper Fidelis" over the centuries (including the years 1918-1920).*

In this way, on September 13th, the strict Romanian bridgehead concept was created, known for the Polish troops final defence area. In his memoirs, The Commander-in-Chief's Chief of Staff emphasizes that the concept of the Romanian bridgehead should not be associated with the evacuation of the Polish authorities to Romania. On the contrary, the Commander-in-Chief Concept assumed the creation of a kind of fortified area in which the Polish army, strengthened by troops departing from Central and Northern Poland, was to await the results of the French offensive on the Western Front, planned for September 16 (Stachiewicz 1989, 73-74).

Organization of defence in the Romanian bridgehead

The intention to base the defence on the Romanian bridgehead required the organization

of the armed forces in this area. On September 13, the Commander-in-Chief gave an order to General Kazimierz Fabrycy, the then current commander of the Army "Kapraty"/the Army "Małopolska" (whose previous role was largely taken over by General Kazimierz Sosnkowski and his Southern Front) to go to the Stanislaviv-Stryi region, to recreate the Army "Karpaty" and the organization of defence. General Gustaw Paszkiewicz became Fabrycy's deputy. Two operational groups were subordinated to General Fabrycy: "Stryj" (General Stefan Dembiński), which was to organize defence along the Stryj River, and "Dniestr" (General Maksymilian Milan-Kamski), which was to organize defence along the Dniester River.

Originally, the forces at Paszkiewicz's disposal were very few. The most serious formations, 3-4 divisions and a motorized cavalry brigade operated within the Southern Front between Przemyśl and Lviv, i.e. West of the designated area, and the question of their arrival remained questionable. In the area of the Romanian bridgehead there were only de facto forces of the "Stryj" Operational Group (the size of a reinforced infantry division), but without artillery. The potentially greatest chance for a quick strengthening of the defence was the inclusion of several smaller groups operating to the West and North-West and the formation of new troops in backup centers, located in large numbers in the Eastern part of the Lviv and Stanislaviv voivodeships. In the Corps District VI Command area (territorial administrative district in the Polish Army) based in Lviv, there were about 40,000 partially armed soldiers, of whom about 15 infantry battalions were to be formed. A small part of the Polish aviation also reached the Romanian bridgehead, but its activities were limited due to fuel and ammunition lack. The Polish Supreme Command had great hope for the war material first transports from France – between September 17 and 20, a transport with tanks, planes and ammunition was to arrive at the Romanian port in Galați (Dalecki 1989, 347-356) (Kopański 1989, 199-201) (Grzelak and Stańczyk 2005, 243) (Włodarkiewicz 2014, 81-92) (Moczulski 2009, 814-817) (Porwit 1983b, 58-64).

A positive circumstance for the Polish plans was a marked decrease in the German attack pace for the Southern section, during the third week of the war. This resulted from objective difficulties (logistical problems, gasoline shortages for German armored units), but also from the of, General Sosnkowski`s effective action troops, above all, This talented commander, breaking through from the west towards Lviv, defeated the SS-Standarte "Germania" regiment in the Jaworów battle. The activity of the Polish troops and the increasing number of the Lviv garrison made it difficult for the German armored forces to operate in the deep hinterland of the Polish troops. In theory, this gave at least a few days to organize a strong defence on the Stryi River. So while Polish troops' general situation was generally bad in the third week of the war, and some of the Polish troops were either doomed to extermination (the Armies "Wielkopolska" and "Pomorze", ending the offensive on the Bzura River and trying to break through to Warsaw) or their fate was uncertain (the Northern Front, Army "Kraków" and Army "Lublin" operating in the Lubelskie Voivodeship), the partial stabilization in the Southern direction gave the Polish staff a glimmer of hope for the Romanian bridgehead implementation. This assessment of the situation was shared by the French Mission head, General Louis Faury, who sent the report to Paris, in this spirit (Kopański 1989, 202-203).

On the morning of September 17, fulfilling the provisions of the secret protocol to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 23, 1939, six Soviet armies crossed the Polish Eastern border, making the proverbial "stab in the back" of the still fighting Poland. The Polish Eastern border was manned primarily by the Border Protection Corps (Korpus Ochrony Pogranicza, KOP)weak formations, hence the local attempts to defend them could only be delayed. In addition, the Soviet troops used disinformation in many places, claiming that they were coming to Poland to help, and some Polish commanders, wanting to spare soldiers or believing in Soviet assurances, laid down their arms without a fight. The Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Rydz-Śmigły, gave a significant order: "Do not fight the Bolsheviks, except in the event of an attack on their part and an attempt to disarm the troops." Poland also did not take advantage of the possibility to declare a state of war with the USSR (which would be beneficial in the light of international law) and gave up asking Romania for allied aid despite the occurrence of *casus foederis* (which, in turn,

did not make sense in Poland's position view). The President, the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Commander-in-Chief, staying near the border with Romania, crossed the Polish-Romanian border on September 17-18 with the intention of transit to France and continue the war alongside their allies. The internment of the Polish authorities in Romania, as noted, is a separate topic, repeatedly discussed in the literature and going beyond the considerations of this article. Polish military units, which were to defend the Romanian bridgehead mostly crossed the borders with Romania and Hungary on the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. Until September 20, the Red Army captured the area of Romanian bridgehead (Moczulski 2009, 841-861).

Today we cannot fully say whether the Polish authorities expected Soviet aggression. In Commander-in-Chief's Chief of Staff's opinion, General Wacław Stachiewicz, "the crossing of the border by the Soviet troops was a complete surprise for both the Supreme Command and the government. Foreign missions were also completely surprised" (Stachiewicz 1989, 75). One cannot fully agree with the latter statement in particular - as a result of the German diplomat's actions in Moscow, Hans von Herwarth, who passed information about the pact content to an American colleague, Moscow's intentions were known in the capitals of powers. In one form or another, German indiscretions went to Polish diplomats (Kornat 2020, 87-120). On the other hand, even the conviction or certainty about the Soviet aggression could not change much in the behavior of the Polish civil and military authorities, which were not able to conduct a war on two fronts, but were also not able to prevent Soviet aggression.

Conclusions

At the end of this article, it is worth considering the question regarding the extent to which the political and military concept of the September 1939 Romanian bridgehead had any chance of being implemented. Despite the more than 80 years passage since the outbreak of World War II, this issue has still not been unequivocally assessed, at least by Polish historians.

Undoubtedly, the intention to base the burden of Polish defence in South-Eastern Poland, revised later as a narrower concept of the Romanian bridgehead, was based on several analogous examples from the past World War. An example is the Yser Front in Belgium (keeping a scrap of Belgium under the control of Belgian troops, based on France) or the Romanian Front (based on Russia). Polish politicians and the Supreme Command counted on Romania's benevolent neutrality, the possibility of arms deliveries and transit through its territory, and perhaps even – again using the analogy of World War I – the soldiers transport in a changing situation, in favor of the geopolitical situation. Unquestionably, several objective factors could work to Poland's advantage: the deteriorating weather (especially important in the South-Eastern Poland Roads poor condition), the possibility of guerrilla operations at the rear of the German army, reconstruction of the military units in the "Polish side of the front" backup centers. Of course, Polish decision-makers counted on Allies' active attitude, the French offensive in the West (which would force the Germans to dislocate some of their forces from Poland to defend the Western border), of war materials transports, the allied air force and navy activities. With these assumptions, many respected Polish historians (Leszek Moczulski, Paweł Wieczorkiewicz) do not exclude the chances of success to lean "back" on the Romanian border[1].

However, the disadvantages brought by such a concept should also be pointed out. First of all, theWorld War I examples cannot be compared to the situation in 1939. Romania and Belgium were able to keep some or even a scrap of their territory based on an allied country fighting side by side as part of the alliance (even ignoring the positional nature of World War I). In 1939, Polish-Romanian relations were deprived of this component. Despite the Romanians' generally loyal attitude and the Romanian Prime Minister Armand Călinescu's nobility and courage, who did not succumb to German pressure (and soon was murdered by a member of the Iron Guard), Romania was neither politically stable, nor even one that guaranteed benevolent neutrality in unpredictable future in 1939. Of course, Romania's future involvement on

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[1] On this subject, Wieczorkiewicz writes: "*Hipoteza o szansie utrzymania 'przyczółka rumuńskiego' jest zatem na tyle prawdopodobna, że wymaga poważnego przebadania*", zob. P. Wieczorkiewicz, *Rozważania o kampanii 1939 roku* [in:] *Polski wiek XX: II wojna światowa*, Warszawa 2010, p. 15.

the Third Reich's side was largely influenced by the German domination in Central and Eastern Europe, but a very important factor of this domination was break-up in 1939. Even taking into account that the Poles could stay in the Romanian bridgehead for some time.

In addition, there was a lot of criticism on the Romanian bridgehead concept, as early as September 1939. The Polish ambassador to France, Juliusz Łukasiewicz,expressed his doubts. despite the fact that the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, General Maurice Gamelin, was a supporter of the withdrawal of Polish troops to South-Eastern Poland (not even to the Romanian bridgehead). He pointed out that such a situation may result in the Soviet troops entry into North-East Poland abandoned territories and for Polish troops grouped in a relatively small area, in a exposure to harassing attacks by aviation (Skrzypek 1989, 135-136). The list of this type of concern can be extended. First of all, the military significance of the Polish redoubt would be limited. To a large extent, deprived of air force and armored forces with a limited number of weapons and ammunition, it could only perform defensive functions, and thus be blocked by relatively small German forces. There were very little prospects that any larger Polish formations would be able to reach the area, except for ,maybe, the 10th Cavalry Brigade (motorized), reserve and fortress units from the North, the mobile cavalry groups. German diplomatic pressure on Romania, significantly limited them., even if it did not completely block Poland's transit and purchasing possibilities. Finally, South-East Poland region, and the Romanian bridgehead in particular, are agricultural areas, devoid of industrial centers, and, in addition, inhabited by a hostile or at least reluctant Ukrainian national minority (the majority in this area). And so, all the above considerations must be based on two sine qua non conditions - a situation in which there is no Soviet aggression against Poland, and there is a French offensive in the West. Without these conditions, the concept of the Romanian bridgehead could only be what it actually became – an illusory concept in a war in which Poland was doomed to defeat.

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DIMENSIONS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY. A CHRONOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Mario MARINOV, Ph.D. Candidate*

The Federal Republic of Germany and its armed forces, the Bundeswehr, stand as a cornerstone of the European and NATO defence and security. It is vitally important to understand one of the major European conventional powers' policies, concepts and overarching capabilities, along with the history behind them in a 21st century evermore complex security environment. The following paper examines the Bundeswehr historical evolution the major focal points in its strategy and capabilities development, since the beginning of the Cold War. The paper extends the historical discussion towards the present moment and the security policies undertaken in the 21st century, reaching the major policy re-evaluations occurring in 2022 and their importance both for the German state and its allies.

Keywords: Bundeswehr; Germany; security; defence policy.

Introduction

In the 21st century third decade, the global security environment is defined by an accelerating fragmentation process that the established post-Cold War United States of America Centred unipolar system is facing along with a movement towards an international multipolarity system. This process has been facilitated by inordinate factors, amongst which the re-emergence of the Russian Federation (Russia) as an international actor with aspirations for regional and global military, economic and political importance can be mentioned, as well as the People's Republic of China (China), which has similar ambitions for an international affairs leading role. At the same time, and in an increasingly conflict-prone international environment, the United States of America (United States/USA), strives to maintain its role as the preeminent power post-Cold War era, an objective whose fulfilment has come to be in direct competition and even confrontation with the Russia and China`s goals for redefining the balance in world affairs. For the European states, belonging to both the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and as greater Euro-Atlantic community and US allies and members the shift in global affairs brings

a multitude of risks and challenges that require a re-evaluation of security policies and approaches towards individual and collective security and defence matters.

With the outbreak of the Ukraine conflict early 2022, the European security environment has been greatly compromised, resulting in the near complete fracturing of relations between the Russian Federation and the Euro-Atlantic Community. As past structures and models providing for and ensuring security in Europe collapse into the past, it is of vital importance to adequately allow deterrence capabilities to go forward, with a view to preventing a wider military escalation.

In the European security and NATO framework context, the Federal Republic of Germany (Germany) and its Armed Forces (the *Bundeswehr*), encompass a pivotal importance role. Despite a massive reduction in size after the end of the Cold War and the reunification of the German state, the *Bundeswehr* remains the second largest NATO force in Europe and is considered one of its premier armed forces. The German Armed Forces thus play a central role in NATO defence planning, serving also as a cornerstone in multinational combined military formations in the European theatre, both on the NATO and EU levels, and the German armaments industry being one of the largest and most developed on the world stage. Despite these principal aspects of German defence capabilities, the German Armed

*University of Library Studies and Information Technology, Sofia, Bulgaria
e-mail: *m.marinov@unibit.bg*

Forces and general German security and military policy have been -– for decades ¨– subject to major criticism and debate. The current security situation on the European continent has become an enabling factor in fostering needed public and political consolidation and consensus on Bundeswehr future development as part of increasing NATO and EU military capabilities. It is thus important to understand the many aspects that make up the German security and defence policy debate, as well as the armed forces capabilities. These aspects can be subdivided into three broad categories: the armed forces and defence policy historical development since their formation when Cold War started, a long evolution process that gradually led into the 21st century and the armed forces state prior to the last German defence policy major overhaul; the most recent official defence policy assessment covering the 2016 White Paper, whose main focus was the introduction of a drastically new course for Germany and address the state of the armed forces and deficiencies in equipment and policy in a changing global security environment; lastly, the recent developments owing to the changed security environment starting in 2022, which provided a further transformational factor in the previously assigned course.

A Complex Past

In understanding the German Armed Forces contemporary state and the Federal Republic of Germany security and defence policy, it is vital to understand defence as a historical concept with a complex evolution both in relation to Germany and with the defensive NATO framework in an expansive timeframe spanning the past seven decades. It is important to note some of the key challenges that have come to materialise in this period of time and to understand their impact in the contemporary era.

On defence matters the Second World War outcome had a profoundly deep impact in shaping the context for the policies and concepts development within the modern German state. This context continues to encompass a diverse set of social, political and economic factors that have shaped the opinions and policy towards state defence capabilities even to this very day. In a manner of some similarity to Japan, the post-war German state had severe restrictions placed by the greater international community on its military capabilities development (Bundeswehr 2015). These restrictions and more importantly the deep scars left within the German national mindset shaped Germany's defence posture, constitutional framework, and the general stance that both the population and political elites had towards a more restrained approach on the armed forces size, military spending, rearmament and military forces deployment beyond the nation's borders (Szabo 1990, 13-25).

Unlike Japan, and disregarding both internal and external attitudes towards German rearmament in the aftermath of the Second World War, the immediate position the divided Germany had within the European post-war security situation, ensured that both the Federal Republic of Germany and its socialist counterpart, the German Democratic Republic, would play pivotal roles in the security and defence architecture held by NATO and the Warsaw Pact as emergent opposing factions. Thus, by the emergence of the already mentioned alliances in the early 1950s, the position both Germanies had as frontline states necessitated their rearmament and military expansion to a degree where they could successfully fulfil the broader tasks and objectives associated with the both security alliances` planning. The West German Armed Forces, or the Bundeswehr, came to be founded in 1955. During the Cold War, considering a possible ground war on the European continent and specifically on the territory of Germany, the Bundeswehr was expanded to become the second largest state within the NATO alliance armed forces in Europe, numbering nearly 500,000 active-duty personnel (NATO 2006, 1), second only to those of the French Republic. This proportionality of the size the Bundeswehr had compared to other European NATO states continues to this day, with 183,000 active-duty personnel (IISS 2022, 109). In consideration of the assigned military objectives within NATO planning dating back to the late 1950s, when planning evolved to include the defence of Germany itself, the Bundeswehr was geared towards the main tasks of facing Warsaw Pact forces on land, and thus developed itself towards achieving superiority in this specific field, unlike the French and British militaries, which were also geared towards a broader set of strategic level.objectives. As such, Germany, steadily

became the primary guarantor and factor for NATO forces conventional military deterrence in Western Europe (Bundeswehr 2022). Conventional military deterrence was further enhanced through nuclear deterrence capabilities, as part of the "nuclear sharing" program with the United States since 1957 (Lutsch 2015, 16-18) and the US nuclear doctrine evolving concepts for initially *"massive retaliation"* and later *"flexible response"*, which in many ways dictated the German state engagement on the nuclear sharing matters. The German Air Force, the modern Luftwaffe, thus became a key element within NATO and US nuclear deterrence planning, operating air-delivered weapons, initially based on the infamous F-104G Starfighter and later Panavia 200 Tornado aircraft, as well as on Pershing 1a theatre ballistic missiles (Bundeswehr 2022). In this principal arrangement, the modern Bundeswehr did not stray from its force structure and objectives. Conversely, it continued to maintain a strong conventional military force, with a principal focus on armoured and mechanised force composition, supplemented by the ability to enable the utilisation of a credible nuclear deterrent as part of the US and NATO nuclear posture. This, in turn, has led to certain deficiencies when considering strategic deployment capabilities and the German Armed Forces lack of engagement in broader NATO operations, especially after the end of the Cold War. Such a policy course for Germany has been a matter of state's role and perceived importance as first- the principal military actor within NATO's conventional forces in Europe, and second – the wide public and political opinions within Germany that would not get engaged in major military operations overseas, aside from peacekeeping within both the UN and NATO frameworks, and even then, with force much limited size contingents and mission assignments compared to other NATO members.

Germany's military specific development processes and role within the European security framework were further enhanced by the additional commitment to Bundeswehr integration and cooperation with other NATO European member states armed forces. Germany has been the cornerstone of multinational formations in cooperation with France, Denmark and the Netherlands since the Cold War, and more recently with its Eastern allies, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, and the Baltic states. Such cooperation processes and integration have determined a high percentage of the Dutch forces to be directly integrated in the Bundeswehr.command structure They have further been encapsulated in efforts to consolidate into a separate EU led security initiative, which had some successes, but no far-reaching results over the years, largely due to spending considerations on the defence structures creation, parallel to NATO`s.

Another most important factor in understanding Germany's security and defence policy is that of the national military industrial complex role, capabilities and limitations. As the German Armed Forces were allowed to expand, great impetus was also provided to restarting Germany's dormant military-industrial complex, which a mere decade before the foundation of the Bundeswehr had been one of the largest in the world. This was seen as a necessary step in sustaining a large military force for Germany, but would later grow to become a vitally important one for NATO's overall defence capabilities. Some of the Cold War and Post-Cold War major companies eras include Porsche, Rheinmetall, Thyssenkrupp, MAN, Heckler & Koch, as well as others, which have retained Germany's status over the decades as the highest quality leading arms manufacturer. The German military industrial complex has since the 1960s been able to provide the Bundeswehr with most defence material needs except for the aircraft development, where a greater emphasis was placed on foreign purchases partly due to the interoperability need for the US nuclear weapons deployment along with the German aircraft development initial constraints. In the modern German military-industrial complex evolution a strong emphasis was placed on the quality of material, as well as on the engagement with other NATO states in common armament programs. Such programs were often unsuccessful in providing results; however, such outcomes did not prevent the German armaments sector development, deriving useful experience and becoming a vital light and heavy armaments exporter to both other smaller NATO and non-NATOmembers by the late Cold War Since the end of the Cold War, this process has only accelerated, especially with the enlargement of NATO, to the point where the German Leopard 2 tank and its variants is the main

battle tank choice among the larger part of NATO states. However, somehow ironically, the German military industrial complex apparent effectiveness in providing a high quantity of quality equipment does not necessarily materialise within Germany itself. After the reunification of Germany and the end of the Cold War in 1991, the qualitative edge of the Bundeswehr had fallen off dramatically due to an array of factors that created a self-propagating process. Germany`s military budget had fallen to a low-point of 25 billion USD in 2001, from its historic high of 40 billion USD in 1990 (The World Bank 2022). This change in spending policy was largely due to the Armed Forces size reduction after the Cold War and the population and politicians` unwillingness to support a strong peace-time military. The limited budgets have also been hamstrung by what has been described as equipment acquisition ineffective bureaucracy and legal system, expressed in a parliament vote dependent limitation on armament purchases beyond a 25 million Euro threshold on the one hand, and on the other in the organisation of the *"Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology, and In-Service Support"* (BAAINBw), which is tasked with testing, certifying and approving purchases, culminating with numerous consecutive governments inability to properly address an exponentially worsening situation in the Bundeswehr (Deutsche Welle 2022). Overall, the limited budgets and a questionable bureaucratic apparatus are assumed to have gradually introduced a situation of extreme equipment disrepair and lack of readiness for the Armed Forces, in a period lasting more than two decades. By 2015, the Bundeswehr,detailed situation was presented to the wider public in a series of leaked documents and later governmental public admission which both represented a grim reality for the Armed Forces. At that time the Bundeswehr status, in all the armed forces branches presented equipment operability levels at below 50%. Only 42 of 109 Eurofighters, and 38 of 89 Tornado were operational (Deutsche Welle 2014), whilst in the armoured branch, 70 of 180 GTK Boxer armoured personnel carriers, remained combat capable, with the tank force of 306 Leopard 2s reaching reported level of inoperability of nearly 80%; and the navy possessing only 1 operational Type 214 submarine out of 4 (The Washington Post 2014) (Spiegel 2014). The reasons for the equipment situation are complex. On the one hand they combine the limited budgets and mismanagement while on the other they also include a of rotating units equipment strategy depending on deployment or training demands, thus reducing the ready equipment overall need (IISS 2022).

Regardless, such policy decisions were considered erroneous in retrospect and, in turn, led to a gradual change for the German defence policy. The developing situations in the international security environment by 2015 required a further re-evaluation of the previously undertaken policies in relation to the armed forces capabilities and tasks, alligned with the broader NATO policies undertaken. The 2016 Defence White Paper was the initial result, which sought to alleviate concerns, chart new directions for the Armed Forces and overall define Bundeswehr current and future role in Germany and allies` increasingly worsening security situation allies.

Addressing German Defence Policy.
The 2016 Defence White Paper
The 2016 White Paper on Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, is the latest (by 2022) comprehensive policy document presented by Germany. Its creation was based upon the need to remedy the many deficiencies found in the Bundeswehr at the time, as well as to provide the groundwork for the armed forces future development in an increasingly more complex and dynamic security environment, with a principal emphasis placed upon committing Germany to a leadership role in the European defence and the need for the armed forces to contribute to NATO collective-defence tasks (IISS 2022). As the document has remained in force up until 2022, and has thus been the guideline in reshaping German policy and its armed forces, it is important to understand its many aspects.

The document followed the wake of the Ukraine 2014 conflict, the subsequent worsening relations with Russia and the increasingly more active foreign and military policy in China, as well as the still ongoing conflict in North Africa and the Middle East, with their aftershocks being felt in Europe at the time. As such, a principal document starting notion was the international order

changing nature and the German state ovel security environment which is described as *"[having] become even more complex, volatile, dynamic and thus increasingly unpredictable"* (Federal Government of Germany 2016, 28).

The move towards a multi-polar world order is clearly underlined as a main transformation factor, and a process that is unlikely to slow down in the future. Specific attention is placed on China and its growing economic potential, as well as the likelihood of the current system's relations fragmentation between states and new blocks formation. Regardless, the United States central role is recognised as remaining vital for Germany and Europe Security interests. It is stated that there would be a greater need for security responsibilities consolidation and equalisation between NATO members facing a greater number of systemic challenges (Federal Government of Germany, 2016, pp. 30-31). As a principal risk to peace and security established systems specifically for the European continent and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the document identifies Russia, defined as *"openly calling the European peace order into question with its willingness to use force to advance its own interests and to unilaterally redraw borders guaranteed under international law"* (Federal Government of Germany 2016, 31-32). The policy document recognises Russia "as challenge to the security of [the European] continent", but at the same time recognises the broad range of common interests and relations, as well as the impossibility to establish Europe peace and security without the Russian participation.

In terms of broader German security policy, challenges groups the document identifies an assortment of asymmetric threats and risks, with a *"mutually reinforcing dynamic"*, possessing the ability to coalesce into larger systemic threats. These challenges derive from: transnational terrorism; challenges from the cyber and information domain; interstate conflict; fragile states; global rearmament and WMD proliferation; uncontrolled migration; climate change; and finally, pandemics (Federal Government of Germany 2016, 34-44). All of the indicated outside challenges can be summarised to derive from the immediate historical situation in the years leading to 2016, and the primary challenges faced by the German state. These include the statescollapse in the immediate European vicinity, the rise of transnational terrorism deriving from such conflict zones and their transfusion into Europe through uncontrolled migration flows, as well as the rearmament of both China and Russia in this period, and both Iran and North Korea nuclear weapons pursuit.

With the categorisation of the diverse set of both specific and more abstract challenges to German security interests and concerns, the German stateset policy places a clear focus on Bundeswehr future development and on the need to vastly increase capabilities, compared to previous levels, and even compared to the role undertaken during the Cold War. TheGerman future role is taken to be that of both *"a substantial and leading"* force in NATO and EU military efforts, specifically in increasing deterrence capabilities along the periphery of the alliance structures. Such deterrence capabilities are realised to differ from the principal Cold War conventional deterrence to include a range of both overt and covert, hybrid and traditional threats, which would require a structure and capabilities that would "enable the Bundeswehr to deliver effects across the entire operational spectrum" (Federal Government of Germany 2016, 88-89).

The topic of available financial resources is considered essential to meeting NATO objectives. It is expressly recognised that the state possesses neither the resources, nor structures necessary to provide for such resources and in a flexible manner to support adequate levels of mission-ready forces as of the document period, (Federal Government of Germany 2016, 117). However, there is no concrete undertaking to reach the 2% of GDP in a specified period, as per NATO obligations. Instead, it is understood that gradual increases should be made over time and over consecutive yearly budgets spanning the period through 2019. The German government's conclusion, is that such increases will fulfil both the German armed forces expanding tasks array, their respective maintenance and reequipment needs, as well as allow the allied states's increased cooperation and capability fostering and development within the EU and NATO.

Joint development initiatives within the EU and NATO mainly feature in German efforts within the set national strategy and German overall

conduct in the past decade. Emphasis is placed on both increasing the multinational military units cohesion and ability and the national command structure broader cooperation, a process that has been a cornerstone for the German efforts, both within NATO structures, as well and more recently, for the initiatives to create independent European structures and military capabilities. Furthermore, the concept of a cohesive approach towards defence matters is also seen as key in developing the military industrial complex abilities on the EU level, described as *"[remaining] highly fragmented along national lines"* and *"[resulting] in unsatisfactory cost structures, disadvantages in international competition, and potentially higher burdens for [the German] defence budget"* (Federal Government of Germany 2016, 129). Thus, it can be summarised that the Federal Government, has moved towards seeking a comprehensive and more economical approach based on international consolidation and coordination, in recognition of key deficiencies within the military spending capabilities and development. The 2016 Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr White Paper followed decades of downsizing and neglection for the German armed forces and thus had the ambitious task of setting the groundwork for their rebuilding in an increasingly complex international security environment. With six years having passed since its adoption, the situation in Europe has dramatically deteriorated in 2022 with the events in Ukraine, materialising a new and sudden transformational factor for the security and defence planning of the German state and the German armed forces.

German Defence Capabilities and Ambitions Going Forward. Developments in 2022

The 2020 and 2021 Covid pandemic deeply shifted the focus away from the defence spending, limiting the outcomes of 2016 policy paper set program and further delaying efforts to re-establish and expand military capabilities. Coupled with a reorganisation of the internal political landscape and a new ruling government format by late 2021, the debate on defence was expected to undergo a re-evaluation, especially considering the ever-worsening geopolitical situation. By late 2021, the new ruling coalition had set the ambitious task of moving forward with accomplishing the set goals,

as well as creating the *"first"* proper national security strategy for the country (Federal Foreign Office 2022) (Singh 2022). However, intended efforts which sought to continue the policies on military budget radual increase and facilitate discussion on overall defence policy goals took an abrupt turn in early 2022 with the proverbial explosion of the security environment on the European continent.

Within the first couple of months after the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine in late February, 2022, Germany made concrete commitments to drastically change its approach towards the Bundeswehr capabilities, with more drastic and timely commitments which have become the hallmark of Germany's change in defence and security policy in the first half of 2022. Thus, the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz government committed to a 100-billion-euro defence expenditure, and a steady increase of defence spending towards the 2% GDP NATO goal (Singh 2022) (Frankfuter Allgemeine 2022). The stated defence spending bill is mainly focused on remedying said deficiencies in the Bundeswehr. The sum is stated to be spread across a period of three years, on top of the regular defence budget, thus bringing overall defence spending close to the NATO goals of 2% of GDP, or roughly 80-billion-euro, marking a substantial increase over preceding years.

However, the spending bill is, in its essence and main objectives, geared towards specific goals, with the primary being materiel acquisitions, and such should be viewed as complementary to Bundeswehr`s defence budget and not as an outright systemic increase. The first primary acquisition is meant for the United States 35 fifth-generation F-35A multirole fighters and 15 Eurofighter ECR specialised electronic-warfare fighters (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2022). The F-35A purchase is of particular interest, as it is meant to replace the Tornadoes ageing fleet in the Luftwaffe arsenal. As had previously been stated, this aircraft`s main role in the German arsenal is that of a nuclear deterrence through the United States" nuclear sharing" program. Considering that similar proposals in preceding years had been rejected on numerous occasions and in conjunction with the ever-going debate on the presence of nuclear

weapons within Germany, this step on the part of the German government should be measured as a reaffirmation and expansion upon the commitments made with the United States and the overall strategic posture within Europe. Overall, the purchase of both aircraft systems makes up for a considerable commitment in the spending bill, and a considerable commitment for the future in their maintenance and deployment cycles.

In its essence, the budgetary commitments represent an attempt towards a paradigm shift in German security and defence policy. It is the overcoming of both a physical and psychological barrier in the German security culture, and an attempt to re-establish the Bundeswehr`s security importance on the European continent. This process further results will be represented in the national security strategy to be adopted. Based on the current course of events in Europe, the perceived outside threat arising from the events in Ukraine and Russia, in particular, will most likely be dominant, alongside Germany's role as a European defence cornerstone in a defence commitments bilateral system. This bilateral system will continue the historical course reaffirmed in the 2016 policy paper, and Germany's overall defence posture, namely that of a key NATO power in Europe, but also that of a the main actor in the independent EU defence capabilities formation. To achieve tenable results in both directions, the Bundeswehr capabilities and the previously mentioned associated hurdles will have to be overcome, which cannot happen in the immediate short term.

With the long standby endeavour to revitalise the Bundeswehr, the purchase of the F-35 platform, and 35 aircraft (in limited quantities), one can consider this to represent one step in a long transformation process covering the set tasks before Bundeswehr`s return to its Cold War-era roots as a primary security provider. As it has been established, the Bundeswehr is to defend a primary conventional force position on the European continent and should be a capability enabler for both NATO and EU defence efforts on every front – from multinational battlegroups to consolidation and integration of the European defence industry. In facilitating this process, the German Bundeswehr would require years of sustained change and adjustment, of acquisitions

and spending. With the polarisation of global politics and the foundation of new security structures opposed to one another, the course of remilitarisation, albeit often an unwanted one, is the course of greater certainty.

Conclusion

In historical terms, the Federal Republic of Germany armed forces were created and settled as a NATO security provider. Historically, this has been a policy at odds with post-World War II perceptions within the German public and political circles, outweighed however, by the Cold War-era security environment immediate demands. In the Cold War aftermath, with the defence spending cuts and the shift away from the security and defence matters, the Bundeswehr capabilities had suffered greatly and over an extended period of time, calling into question Germany's ability to provide for its own security needs, those of its NATO allies and its further leader aspirations for an EU focused security complex. By 2016, the lack in the German armed forces capabilities required urgent action, as well as a re-evaluation of German security policy in a changing international system, along with a deteriorating security situation on the European continent. With efforts placed on rebuilding the Bundeswehr as a main force in Europe, the escalating situation in Europe, specifically the Ukraine conflict and the German status towards Russia, all became a key enabling factor in garnering both the public, political and financial support as well as willingness to commence the armed forces reequipment and consolidation large-scale process, as well as the formation of concrete national security strategies. The German process and commitments have ambitious aims; however, they also face years of neglection and inefficiency, which require sustained remedial action and measures. Whether Germany will fulfil these goals and to what extent, as well as how it would later utilise a potential potent and capable military within the broader security policies formation and actions within both NATO and the EU is still to be seen. It is also still uncertain how the broader international system will react to such an outcome, considering the opposing sides' hastening remilitarisation, in a confrontational multipolar system with a European focal point.

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FEATURES OF SMALL TACTICAL UNITS' ACTIVITIES IN THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

Lt. col. Georgi Belchev, PhD*

This article discusses the challenges faced by small tactical units when operating in the information environment. Globalization, the development of communications and the complexity of combat operations increase its importance in conducting tactical activities. The article examines the characteristics of the information environment and some tools that can be used in the decision-making process. Additionally, some of the capabilities that small tactical units should possess are analyzed. Their importance derives from current capabilities and practical experience.

Keywords: tactical units; information environment.

Introduction

Tactical activities take place in the operating environment which retains its complexity of elements and interconnectedness. The fundamental domains of the operating environment are land, sea, air, space and cyberspace which are affected by actor's activities, facilities, population, geography, weather, terrain, natural disasters, the information environment, the electromagnetic environment (EME), and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats and hazards (NATO, AJP-3.2, 2022, 1). In practice, the aforementioned elements do not exist independently, but they are inter-linked and many processes take place among them.

Nowadays, small tactical units are beginning to pay more and more attention to the information environment. In recent years this is a result of globalization and the connectivity of every part of the world. The majority of the population lives in cities, it has many means of communication, constantly exchanges data in various forms and has freedom of action. These facts make it much more difficult to control the dissemination of information, whether it is in the form of data, photos, video or voice communication. Therefore, the requirement is imposed on the small tactical unit commanders to understand the information environment, to raise their awareness and to

***Vasil Levski National Military University, Bulgaria**
e-mail: *gbbelchev@nvu.bg*

build skills to meet the successful execution of the ordered activities. In this trend, the research in the present article is directed to the analysis of the conceptual apparatus and formulation of the capabilities necessary to conduct tactical activities in the modern information environment.

Information environment

One of the main concepts used in the present research is information environment. The term is not new, but it can be endowed with increasing importance for small tactical units. An information environment comprised of the information itself, the individuals, organizations and systems that receive, process and disseminate information, and the cognitive, virtual and physical space in which this occurs (NATO, AAP-06, 2021, 68; NATO, AJP-3-10.2, 2020, Lex-5). Information, as an element, can have physical or immaterial expression depending on how it is disseminated. Actually, there are more characteristics, most of them are the quantity of issues and the speed of dissemination, as well as the borders of dissemination. Each one is important and needs to be defined for each source or object in the environment. In addition to the objects and subjects in the information environment, the regulatory frameworks governing public relations in this sphere are also important. In this case, we can talk about censorship or limiting the spatial dimensions of the environment. Therefore, if we have discovered an object that collects information, but at the same time we know that it cannot disseminate information freely, then its influence is excluded or eliminated.

However, in modern conditions, it is very difficult to define the boundaries of the information environment. Global communications work constantly and people from different places exchange data constantly. If information is obtained in one place, it can be disseminated to the other end of the world. This feature contrasts with the spatial parameters of the area of operation. In these conditions, the work of the small tactical unit commanders will be significantly more difficult and, in most cases, it cannot even enter their combat powers. Therefore, when carrying out tactical activities, the possibility of disseminating information outside the area of responsibility should be taken into account and, in addition, structural elements within the area should be affected.

with quantitative indicators for each object. The characteristics are with different content and the determination of weight coefficients is necessary. For example, the commander should assign ratings for each characteristic from 1 to 6 with each value having a description of what it contains. In this case, a value of 1 can mean for the quantity of issues – a minimum amount, and for the speed of dissemination – very slow. Accordingly, the opposite value is assumed for the value 6.

For the dissemination area, the values need to be related to certain spatial dimensions. For example, for value 1 – the dissemination area is within the settlement's borders, value 2 – the dissemination area goes up to 20 km², value 3 – the dissemination area goes up to 40 km² etc. This

Figure 1 *Information objects model for the area of operation*

Referring to the results of the information environment analysis, a proposal for a tool can be defined when planning a given activity in an environment where information environment is essential. In the mission analysis, it is important to determine the objects that receive, process and disseminate the information and to develop a model of the area. To visualize the explanations about the current research we compiled figure no. 1.

The area of operation boundaries and the objects that receive, process and disseminate the information are present in this model. The quantity of issues, the speed of dissemination and the borders of dissemination (zones) are determined

activity needs to be performed before planning the tactical activities or the operation. It is appropriate to draw up an operating procedure or instruction in which the values of the three characteristics of the information objects are described. In this way, each commander can easily compile the presented model and make a real assessment of the information environment.

The location of each object should be indicated with grid or with a line as shown in Figure 1. This will reduce the spatial error when determining its location. In the case that the object changes its position, an area in which it is most likely located can be determined.

Figure 2 *Information dissemination zones for objects in the area of operation*

Additionally, depending on the "zone" indicator, spatial parameters can also be defined to be graphically represented in figure no. 2, which is compiled to visualize the explanations about the current research.

The development of the terrain information model can provide information on which areas are appropriate to conduct operations without the opposing forces gathering data about them. At the same time, zones can be formed where activities could be easily detected and future activities and their likely nature predicted. Therefore, during planning, these areas should be avoided or the presence of own forces should be reduced. For better results, the zones that each object collects information from should be marked on the map. If the intended activities should be misleading or false, then the opposite solution should be sought to be induced. In this case, it is necessary to plan deception activities where the adversary will necessarily discover friendly forces and receive information about their activities, thereby misleading him.

Areas where operations take place are usually saturated with sensors that receive and transmit information. In these conditions, it is also important to indicate the degree of credibility. Each person perceives the same data in a different way, and there is a great possibility that it will change when transmitted again, depending on his social status. This is one of the most important features of the information environment, namely the exchange of information and its distortion or misunderstanding.

Analyzing the process of information exchange, or how we transmit and the opponent receives messages, we reach the next important point related to the information environment. These are its domains: physical, virtual, and cognitive (NATO, AJP 3.10, 2015, 1-2). In practice, they cannot be defined and visualized, but only their essence can be described. The three domains also exist in normal life, but most people do not even think about their importance and continue to receive and disseminate information in various forms. To visualize the explanations about information flow through the three domains we compiled figure no. 3.

Figure 3 *Information environment domains*

In the information environment, every single object or organization collects information that is processed, filtered and arranged. As a result, the data is structured and recorded on different types of physical media.

The physical domain is what is seen and can be transmitted in any material form. It relates to the ability of people to perceive data through their senses. Usually, the physical dimension is the totality of all media such as newspapers, photos, documents, video, audio, articles, TV shows, reports, events/facts and others. These items provide data that can be collected whether or not the collector finds them important. Suffice that they are related to the operation which is being conducted or will be conducted.

The virtual domain is represented by a set of data that provide the necessary information to conduct of tactical activities. In another sense, this domain is the content of its physical and structural forms and its main element is the information. The information can be processed, arranged, transformed and disseminated. Additionally, the information is an object of protection from adversary forces that seek to acquire, destroy or replace the data in it. With this activity, the information protection function is implemented, which ensures security during conducting operations. Typically, these capabilities are built at the battalion level and above, that have the appropriate sections and personnel to do this.

The cognitive domain provides the link between the other two domains. This area of the informational environment is imaginary and is the most difficult to understand. Unlike the other two domains, the cognitive domain is entirely in the area of human understanding and functional areas. This means that it is difficult to develop a reliable software or similar virtual product that can implement the necessary activities in this area. Usually, the skills of personnel are formed based on the social, cultural, religious and historical characteristics of the society to which they belong. Globalization, to a certain extent, reduces this feature, but nevertheless each person remains more or less attached to the upbringing he received in his native country. The cognitive domain makes it difficult to predict the activities of the opposing forces due to the fact that it cannot be determined how they can perceive data from the physical

forms of information. Therefore, planning tactical activities is drastically more difficult and the risk of their implementation increases.

Nowadays, civilians and media of all kinds are an invariable part of the battle areas. At the same time, the smart devices they have at their disposal allow taking video and photo footage from a distance without even being noticed. The dissemination of acquired data happens instantly without wasting hours of data transfer. All these conditions require tremendous acquisition of capabilities by small tactical units that are adequate to the environment.

Small tactical units' capabilities

There is a variety of opinions about these capabilities, depending on the hierarchical levels. The next few paragraphs will introduce thosem that should be possessed by the small tactical units for which this article is intended. Identification of small tactical units' capabilities is based on analysis of NATO and US Army publications. The main capabilities and techniques for activities in the information environment are: presence, profile and posture, soldier and leader engagement, military deception, soldier camera, destruction and lethal action.

Presence, profile and posture are used to describe and characterize a set of elementary tactical activities performed to achieve the necessary aims (NATO, AJP 3.10, 2015, 1-12). Presence relates to the units' physical presence on the battlefield or in the area of operation. This is one of the most common methods of influencing the adversary's intentions. Presence in some cases can interrupt an adversary's intention. The use of this element haphazardly is not advisable and must be in accordance with the requirements of the senior commander. The planned presence or absence in a certain area, as well as its periodic implementation, could contribute to the achievement of the planned aims or deceive the enemy in his planning.

Profile is the value by which the presence of the units is measured. In other words, it determines the quantity and quality of troops that perform the main tasks. A profile is a tool that can be used to manipulate enemy intelligence about one's own presence on the battlefield. In certain situations, it is necessary, with the available forces and means, to create the impression of a much larger number

of units, by conducting successive maneuvers of the same units. This activity is associated with military deception, which to a certain extent gives a wide field in the planning and execution of this capability. In most cases, own forces always try to hide or not show all the availability of forces and assets in the area. This activity is performed when the enemy should not determine our main intention, direction or area in which we have concentrated our efforts. Unlike presence, profile gives commanders the freedom to demonstrate their combat skills in tactical mission settings.

Posture is the third element of the capability analyzed and embodies the content of the message we want to send with the presence and profile we have implemented. In certain cases, we may seek to convey hostility, in others a friendly intention. Of course, this all depends on the specific mission or main objectives. Achieving these goals is done with elementary activities such as carrying additional equipment and weapons, behavior of individual soldiers, intimidation and others. Normally, profile and posture are conducted under specific instructions and cannot be changed in large limits because it will disturb the achievement of the major objectives. In such situations, posture is an element that can be manipulated and used by commanders to realize the freedom of their decision and their intent.

Presence, profile, and posture make up therefore a set of interconnected capabilities that enables commanders, within the objectives of the operation in which they are engaged, to define and implement their intentions without exceeding the overall framework.

Soldier and leader engagement make up an individual capability (NATO, AJP 3.10, 2015, 1-15). In practice, it is usually implemented by the commander, whose behavior is supported by his unit. This capability cannot be carried out haphazardly, but must be consistent with the overall objectives of the operation. Typically, soldier and leader engagement use personal behavior to convey messages and information when establishing contacts with the local population. The performance of this capability requires preliminary training to avoid mistakes and misunderstanding of the transmitted information. In most cases, soldier and leader engagement are part of information operations and adhere to their requirements.

Military deception is a part of every tactical activity in the information environment (NATO, AJP 3.10, 2015, 1-13). Its forms are usually implemented in a complex manner – concealment, imitation, disinformation and demonstration. Each of them has its advantages and disadvantages, which predetermine their place in the sequence of tactical activities performed. Concealment is associated with camouflage and deceives opposing forces about our presence on the battlefield and the location of own positions. Imitation is used when we want, with little effort and resources, to create the illusion of the presence of a much larger unit. Disinformation is usually associated with information operations and its aim is without using the resource of units to deceive the enemy about our presence or absence on the battlefield. Demonstration is the use of forces and means to perform deceptive maneuvers without getting in contact with the enemy.

Military deception can be used for an individual soldier, equipment, unit, data, and information exchange. It is necessary for the commanders, when planning each activity, to rely on the use of methods of military deception (US Army, FM 3-13, 2016, 9-3). Their focus is on adversary intelligence and decision-making teams. In this way, they can be misled, causing their activities or inaction to benefit the operation which is conducted by our own forces. Military deception should not be conducted haphazardly and should be coordinated with the higher authority. In this way, wrong decisions in the execution and main plan of the operation will be avoided.

In certain cases, it is concluded that the information disseminated in the information environment can be altered or used for propaganda purposes. This is largely used to manipulate the local population to oppose and sabotage our activities. Using cameras to record the actions being performed is a capability that can reduce this problem (US Army, ATP 3-13.1, 2018, 3-3). The video footage obtained can be used to contradict the reports and reveal the true intentions of the commander in conducting the operation. This capability should be used within certain limits and when it is necessary, as it can go to undesired effect.

Destruction and undertaking lethal actions are a very finite capability that can be used in

the information environment (US Army, ATP 3-13.1, 2018, 3-2; Michael, 21, 4). Its main purpose is usually to intimidate and create chaos in the opposing forces. Disadvantages related to the consumption of resources and the danger of collateral damages and casualties reduce the effectiveness of this capability, which causes its less frequent use.

Military information support operations, civil affairs operations, electronic warfare, cyberspace operations and others are also presented in the sources used for this article. They are excluded due to the fact that they are not used by the small tactical units targeted by the research.

Conclusions

Information environment nowadays has been increasing its size, complexity and speed of data dissemination. This requires its decomposition, analysis and evaluation. An analysis about the domains (physical, virtual, cognitive) and relationships among them in the information environment is conducted in the article. It would help commanders and their personnel to conduct tactical activities. At the same time, small tactical units' education and training should be aimed at acquiring capabilities and techniques give an adequate response to threats and challenges, as well as ensuring the appropriate speed and synchronization of activities. The main capabilities and techniques for activities in the information environment are as follows: presence, profile and posture, soldier and leader engagement, military deception, soldier camera, destruction and lethal action. Each one of them is analyzed and additional information is given.

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AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLORE THE POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE IN RUSSIA'S DOMESTIC SYSTEM AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY: LESSONS ON THE COLD WAR END

Ph.D. student Petar MURGINSKI*
M.Sc. student Preslav TONKOV**

The Cold War is not an event, it seems, but a process that continues nowadays, too. In this scholarly article, we defend the thesis that the asymmetric end of the Cold War left a lasting memory on Russia's foreign policy. In developing this thesis, we proceed as follows: firstly, we will outline the realist counterargument to our thesis which suggests that no lessons can be learned from the ending of the Cold War because the bipolar struggle itself and the period after were continuations of the constant struggle for power between states in which historical narratives and ideas have no part to play. Secondly, building on the existing constructivist perspective, we will show that understanding the different ideational frameworks that developed in Washington and Moscow are paramount to understanding the deterioration of Russia's relations with the West in the past decade. Thirdly, we will show how the narratives that developed within Russia about the ending of the Cold War and Russia's place in the world are critical to understanding the potential for change in the domestic system.

Keywords: Cold War; foreign policy; geopolitics; Russia; USSR; USA; NATO; Ukraine.

Introduction

The ending of the Cold War was the most significant geopolitical development in Europe since the defeat of Nazi Germany. The division of the old continent between communist East and capitalist West was no longer the primary principle of organizing international relations. Since the implementation of the Truman doctrine in 1947 which dictated that the USA has a global responsibility to contain and resist communism until the *perestroika* reforms that foreshadowed the demise of the USSR, concerns over the bipolar struggle between East and West dominated domestic and foreign policy in Moscow.

For 45 years, Kremlin's *raison d'être* was to advance the global communist revolution with varying degrees of success. In just two short years, between 1989 and 1991, it all came to an abrupt end – a new global order was upon humanity as it reached the "end of history" (Fukuyama 1992).

The idealistic vision of the new world order after 1989 proclaimed by liberal *historicists* failed

***Military Academy G. S. Rakovski**
e-mail: *murginski@yahoo.com*
****The London School of Economics and Political Science**
e-mail: *preslavtonkov@gmail.com*

to materialize. Relations between the West and Russia, the USSR's successor state which inherited both its seat at the UN Security Council (UNSC) and nuclear arsenal, have deteriorated significantly in the 21st century (Stent 2015).

For proponents of *realpolitik*, the ending of the Cold War and subsequent antagonism between Russia and the West is a normal part of the perpetual Hobbesian war of all against all which the international system imposes upon states (Mearsheimer 2012). There are no lessons to be drawn from any historical moment in this everlasting struggle because there is no escape from the desire of the strong to dominate the weak. The post-Cold War era is just another episode of the eternal struggle for power.

Yet, the ending of the Cold War was different from other international settlements because it was not an event that happened at a specific date, but a process that unfolded over time. Unlike the reshaping of the international system at other intervals of history such as the Napoleonic Wars or the First World War, there was no treaty to define the parameters of post-Cold War international relations. There was no Congress of Vienna or Treaty of Versailles because the Soviet Union had not lost the Cold War, it had reformed and ended the struggle peacefully, not through violent conflict.

Without a settlement, Russia and the West were left to freely reconstitute their relationship; a relationship which was underpinned by radically different interpretations about the ending of the Cold War.

Realist counterargument: no lessons can be learned from the ending of the Cold War

Realists link the genesis and demise of the Cold War to the perpetual struggle for power in the international system. As such, no lessons can be deducted from the ending of the Cold War for Russia because all states are rational actors which respond to the balance of power within the international system in the same way.

Realists zoom in on the historical continuities in Russian foreign policy. As Donaldson, Nadkarni and Nogee conclude in their work on the enduring themes in the Kremlin's foreign policy establishment: "the foreign policy of Russia – whether in its tsarist, its Soviet, or its democratic form – is an expression in some measure of certain relatively fixed geopolitical realities" (Donaldson, Nadkarni and Nogee 2014, 17).

The Cold War, and by extension any contingent historical episode of this eternal struggle for dominance, cannot be used to develop lessons for the foreign policy of any particular state, because each state responds to the power imbalances imposed on it in the same way as other rational actors would. In turn, domestic politics is a function of the high politics in the international arena which takes primacy – states cannot worry about progressive reforms at home ahead of existential threats abroad. In a Russian context, this mirrors the statist school described by Andrey Tsygankov which emphasizes the states' ability to maintain social order as a vital precondition for maintaining security (Tsygankov 2019).

Through the latter half of the 20th century, the existential threat for the USSR came from the United States. After the Yalta conference when Moscow and Washington divided the spoils of the Second World War and set the diplomatic tone for the new international order, it quickly became apparent that the two ideological rivals could be set on a collision course against one another. A war between the two superpowers never materialized but they were involved in a continuous process of balancing in this "cold" conflict.

Realists account for this by looking at the balance of power in the international system. Given there is no world *Leviathan*, the international system is based on anarchy (Waltz 1979). This does not mean that war is a *conditio sine qua non* of international relations, but the possibility of war is always lurking in the background. The tragedy of international politics is that the steps a given state takes to enhance its security are immediately interpreted by its rivals as antagonistic (Mearsheimer 2012). Such actions give the signal to other states that they must also seek to balance the state in question leading to an ongoing security dilemma (Tang 2009). This process reached its pinnacle with the arrival of nuclear weapons in Moscow which brought a sense of equilibrium to the bipolar struggle. While the cost of conflict rose exponentially, that was not the whole picture. The necessity to sustain competition with the United States with the faltering economic foundations of state-led communism was unstainable in the long run.

According to William Wohlforth, Mikhail Gorbachev and his apparatchiks realized that their country was "in a systemic decline" (Wohlforth 1994, 100). In turn, the logic of *realpolitik* presented the Kremlin with three grand strategic choices:

- ***"Lash out"*** to reverse the ongoing decline with a preventive war;
- ***"Hold fast"*** and maintain the *status quo* as long as possible; or
- ***"Appease and retrench"*** to allow for domestic reforms which would revitalize the USSR.

The Cold War bipolar system was heavily skewed towards the capitalist US and as such, from a realist perspective, the rational response to a relative decline was appeasement towards the stronger superpower. Gorbachev approved the strategic choice.

The *perestroika* reforms that followed were the result of Soviet decline and consistent with realist thinking – all changes to state behavior are the consequence of relative power adaptation. Managing decline meant de-escalating the Cold War.

From here onward, the post-Cold War era picture which realists paint is one of US hegemony and Russian subordination. Despite inheriting its

nuclear arsenal, huge landmass and substantial natural resources, the successor state of the USSR was forced to adapt to the unipolar world. The systemic decline could not be reversed overnight.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, Russia was stifled by the transition from state communism. This relative weakness enabled the West to rewrite European security architecture in its favor, with two expansions North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) performed, encompassing territories in the Baltics that were previously part of the USSR and thus bringing the organizations' borders intimately closer to Moscow.

After the turbulence in the 1990s, as Russia recovered its power in the Putin era, it became a *revisionist power*. The 2000s commodities boom allowed Russia to have a greater say in international relations. The late 2010s saw Russia become an opposition force to the West.

Once President Vladimir Putin was able to establish order domestically and build back the Russian state capabilities, e a shift occurred – Russia was able to react and balance Western influence. For realists such as Stephen Walt, "relations with Russia deteriorated largely because the United States repeatedly ignored Russian warnings and threatened Moscow's vital interests" (Walt 2018, 25).

This account of post-1989 Russian foreign policy is solely based on crude power politics. There is no space for lessons from the Cold War because international politics follows a logic divorced from ideas – it is the states material capabilities that are paramount. As the Soviet Union declined, it had to adjust. Its successor state continued this adaptation until it reached a position of relative power from which it could revise the international order the West had been trying to impose upon it.

However, treating the ending of the Cold War as merely a balancing act from the Soviet Union underplays the significance of the ideas which developed in Moscow and Washington about the meaning of this monumental transition. The asymmetric ending of the Cold War imprinted a lasting memory on the Russian collective psyche which is pivotal to understanding its foreign and domestic policy. This provides lessons in understanding both Russian relations with the external world and the potential for systemic change domestically. Without taking into account the meaning of the end of the Cold War, it is impossible to understand why Russia's relations with the West have degraded and to make sense of Vladimir Putin's personalistic autocracy.

The transition from the Cold War was not violent, it was an opportunity to create a *new world order,* but that opportunity was surrendered to the divergent narratives about the meaning of this colossal change. Russia, the successor state of the USSR was not defeated like Napoleonic France or Nazi Germany, but the failure to create a post-Cold war settlement, more than three decades later,, meant that the liberal *historicist* dream of ending history remains a distant utopia.

Cold War ending for the Russian Foreign Policy- lessons from the past

The break from USSR meant that Russia had to define a new foreign policy for itself, as a the successor state. Realists assume that this foreign policy is naturally deducted from the state's material capabilities, but to cite Alexander Wendt, "material capabilities as such explain nothing; their effects presuppose structures of shared knowledge, which vary and which are not reducible to capabilities" (Wendt 1995, 95). This is where constructivism proves its utility by showing that no state possesses a stable identity derived from material power alone.

All states are marked by inherent tensions and identities which dominate at different historical intervals. Russia is no exception to this rule. Andrey Tsygankov has suggested that "there are three historic ways of defining Russia's relations with the external world and all three were available as strategies for the newly created state in 1991" (Tsygankov 2019).

Firstly, the *Statist school* mirrors the realist approach described previously. It suggests that Russia's foreign policy has responded to geopolitical realities by emphasizing economic and military power, not values. It is aptly summarized by Joseph Stalin's remark that the "history of Russia was a continual beating she suffered because of her backwardness" through which he justified the power politics necessary to protect USSR and Russia (Ibid., 31).

Secondly, the *Western school* is a tradition that can be traced back to Peter the Great who viewed

Russia as part of the European family of nations. This school of foreign policy thinking, therefore, stresses Russia's similarity to the West, the latter perceived as the most progressive civilization in the world. Identifying with the Enlightenment values of liberty and equality means that Russia's actions in the international sphere should be driven by a desire to emulate the West (Ibid., 52).

Lastly, the *Civilizational school* suggests that Russian values have always been different from those of the West. The disciples of this school act in the international space with a desire to challenge the West's system of values by insisting on Russia's cultural superiority. The school sets itself as the antithesis to the West and as such, it explains Russia's foreign policy as a counterweight that has historically sought to project its alternative worldview (Ibid., 70).

Each of these schools of thought provides a template for Russian leaders to follow. During the Cold War, the communist ideology masked crude *realpolitik* equivalent to the statist school. The discrediting of the communist revolution meant that, by 1991, *Marxist-Leninism* had a limited impact on Russian foreign policy (Donaldson, Nadkarni and Nogee 2014, 55). Each of the three historic schools described by Tsygankov could have formed the basis of Russia's foreign policy.

Realists assume that Gorbachev's reforms were a function of Soviet decline but a more nuanced way of interpreting this change is to place Gorbachev firmly in the Western tradition. This explains why it was Gorbachev rather than his predecessor Yuri Andropov who decided to reform the USSR. Gorbachev justified *perestroika* as a means for Russia to return to the "common European home" (Gorbachev 1989).

Gorbachev fits within the Western ideal type identified by Tsygankov. The ending of the Cold War was a monumental event from which liberalism and democracy were set to conquer the Russian *corpus politicum*. Yet, in the present day, Russia seems to be far away from the idealistic common European home which Gorbachev aspired to.

Later studies (White and Feklyunina 2014) of the popular identities that political elites use to anchor foreign policy empirically confirm the existence of these broad identities. In their view, the discourses articulated by the political elite situates Russia in three distinct ways against Europe, which they describe as:
- *"Russia as Europe"*;
- *"Russia as part of Greater Europe"*; and
- *"Russia as an Alternative Europe"*.

The first discourse mirrorsWesternizers, the second suggests that Russia is merely a large, pragmatic European state which must act according to *realpolitik* and the third imagines Russian history as an alternative to the West.

How do we explain why the Western idea of Russian foreign policy did not prevail? The answer lies in the Cold War asymmetric ending when Gorbachev's successor in the new Russian state was Boris Yeltsin, also a pro-Westerner. Initially, Russia displayed an eagerness to be integrated into institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the G-7 countries (Stoner 2021, 240). The search for a new identity pulled Russia towards integration with the West but this vision failed to materialize.

The cause of this can be found in the divergent narratives about the Cold War.ending. NATO's assertiveness in the Balkans in the 1990s is the paramount casing point. As the Yugoslav state collapsed in 1991, Yeltsin was placed in a difficult position. Croatia and Bosnia`s assertion for independence led to fightings between Croats, Serbs and Muslims, the most intense episodes of which occurred in Bosnia. Russia and the West temporarily found themselves on opposing sides in this struggle. Russia was supporting Cold War and the Slavic ally Serbia, while the West sided with the ethnic conflict victims. Initially, Yeltsin cooperated with the West and authorized sanctions and limited NATO airstrikes in 1995, through the UN Security Council, giving evidence for the Western school gravitational pull in those years. As the conflict escalated, in 1999, NATO took the unilateral decision to intervene in Kosovo to protect the ethnic Albanians. This time there was no UNSC approval. As Vincent Pouliot argues "if NATO aggression looked like mere propaganda inherited from the Cold War, the intervention in Yugoslavia became a manifestation of its validity" (Pouliot 2010).

The issue for Russia was not with the intervention itself, but the legitimacy of the institutions which facilitated it. Russia favored a stronger role for the UNSC and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),

not NATO. Historically, NATO was a military alliance created to prevent Soviet expansion into Europe – to keep the Germans down, Americans in and the Russians out (Thies 2012, 92). Its existential foe had given up arms and sought to redefine the security architecture for a new global era. From the Kremlin's perspective, NATO was being utilized as a tool for American power in similar ways to the Cold War. Russia's relationship with the West could not be reconstituted inclusively because of NATO's actions. The Yeltsin presidency cemented the view that Russia will not be treated as an equal partner in the post-1989 era, because the West acted as the winner of the Cold War.

Russia was thus treated as the defeated power in the Cold War at a time when its leaders were attempting to align it with the West. This meant that the reset of relations was conducted on an unequal footing. Pouliot has argued that these unequal terms became "habitualised", meaning that they informed what was seen as new normality, after 1991. Kosovo's key effect was to "turn Russia into a subordinate player in the post-Cold War rules of the game" (Pouliot 2010, 89).

The Cold War legacy was to imprint this unequal dynamic in Russia's relations with the West. This was manifested by usingNATO as the premier post-Cold War security institution in Europe. Times of crisis in Europe's periphery required fast response and, as Celeste Wallender argued, NATO had "general assets" for the coordination of military actions which were not specific to the bipolar struggle (Wallender 2000), yet this explanation falls short when we consider that NATO expanded in 1997 and 2003.

The first wave of expansion extended membership to former Warsaw Pact states – Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The second wave included the former Soviet states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania together with Cold War allies – Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria.

It is important to acknowledge the of post-communist states agency andagency not treat them as passive actors. The ultimateThe expansion did not fit the public narrative of a defensive alliance. Thus, the bigger and more critical questions to ask are:

- Why NATO expansion was a policy choice?; and

- Why was there no inclusive security institution in which Russia could participate without the legacy of the Cold War hanging over it, by 1999,eight years after the initial troubles in the Balkans?

These two questions about the post-1989 world order cannot be answered without reference to the asymmetrical ending of the Cold War. The *húbris* of the 1990s started isolating the newly created Russian state. The former did not perceive itself as a defeated power, but as an essential partner in de escalating the bipolar struggle through peaceful means.

Therefore, the failure to create an inclusive post-1989 settlement lies in the Cold War meaning ideas. The Yeltsin presidency was a wasted opportunity for Russia's relations with the West that stemmed from the triumphalist ideas development about the Cold War in the West. Russia was not treated with dignity and respect but as a defeated power which meant that the post-1989 international system was not rebuilt through a culture of cooperation but with one of antagonism in which the security of the West came at the expense of Russia security.

The *zero-sum game* pursued by the West was driven by the ideas which surrounded the ending of the Cold War. The lesson for Russian foreign policy is that the unequal footing which stemmed from the divergent narratives about the meaning of this transition created an unstable foundation for the post-Cold War era. This meant that the Western school could not be triumphant internationally with Russian foreign policy, but it also meant that the Western idea on Russia did not succeed domestically. This is our next section topic

Systemic change within Russia

Russia's precariousRussia position within the European geography has a long history (Neumann 2016). Europe, and "West", so called after 1945, have been shaped by mutual othering toto a large degree (Neumann 1998). Without Russia'sexistence we would be discussing European civilization or, in the era of *Pax Americana*, the Euro-Atlantic civilization. Russia is a critical, but different part of Europe and by extension, the West.

Viatcheslav Morozov has argued that Russia has found itself in an inferior position in the Western-dominated normative order (Morozov 2015). At the heart of this argument lays the

universalization of a particular normative order. As a latecomer, Russia failed to internalize the norms of the existing international system because it could not fully identify with them. When the post-1945 system was created, the USSR was on the opposing side of the bipolar struggle. Once the Cold War had ended, the successor state to the Soviet Union could not simply slot into existing institutions.

The critical difference with other international settlements such as those at the end of the First or Second World Wars was that the Cold War was only lost *ideationally*. As such, at the end of the bipolar struggle, Russia found it difficult to submit to a normative world order which it had opposed for over 70 years. By contrast, for the West, the Cold War was won *ideationally* and materially as the capitalist model triumphed. There was no reset of the international system because the Soviet Union had lost the ideological struggle.

When other states, like China, attempt to challenge the Eurocentric, Western international order, they can produce independent ideas about global politics. Their identities were not constituted through a historic belonging to Europe. Russia's ambiguous relationship with the West, which the communist experience problematized further, meant that it could display such independence.

Post-communist states other than Russia have also found it much easier to invoke the idea of returning to Europe, and the West, by developing new identities in opposition to their authoritarian past.

The divergent narratives about the ending of the Cold War left Russian identity, which historically has been defined through mutual othering with the West, in a precarious position. Russia could no longer oppose the West because the Cold War had ended. At the same time, the asymmetric ending of the bipolar struggle meant that the West did not feel the need to reimagine the international system and Russia essentially became a dependent part .

The model of liberal democracy which *the end of history* supposedly brought to Moscow could not simply be consumed like another product from the Western ideals.menu. The menacing authoritarian past that other post-communist states used to justify reforms was not a natural option because the successor state to the USSR could not be liberated

from its authoritarian past in the same manner.

The "return to Europe" which opens membership to institutions like NATO and the EU was not a real possibility for Russia. Those institutions had to be reimagined in a way that gave Russia a voice, but they were not because of the West's triumphalist interpretation of the post-Cold War settlement which warranted no concessions to Russia.

This made Russia's democratic transition different to other defeated powers. While the conditions under which democracies fail or flourish are complex, there is a wide consensus that the two most successful democratic transitions in history are Germany and Japan who, both ideologically and materially, were were defeated powers after the Second World War. Those states developed new strong national ideals which aligned with the Western liberal capitalist world order. In 1989, Russia was not in the same position because its *corpus politicum* did not perceive itself as defeated. At the same time, the West was not able to foster the Western ideal in the Russian society, as it did in Japan and Germany, precisely because it developed a triumphalist narrative about the bipolar struggle.

The Cold War asymmetric ending did notinevitably and directly lead to the "gold standard of contemporary autocracies" (Fish 2018, 343), but rather it sufficiently stained Russia`s Western idea and provided Vladimir Putin with the discursive tools to conflate Russian national interests with the need to maintain his rule. The blurring of the lines between domestic and foreign policy is exemplified by Russia's annexation of Crimea[1].

Richard Sakwa's Frontline Ukraine central thesis is that the "Ukraine crisis escalated because of the multiplicity of power centers, contested narratives and divergent understandings of the nature of the post-Cold War world order" (Sakwa 2016, 4). Michael McFaul has furtheradded nuances to this explanation by suggesting that Crimea`s annexation can be rooted in Vladimir

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[1] This essay has provided a condensed version of the last thirty years of relations and has omitted important episodes like Georgia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria in which the divergent visions about the post-Cold War order, particularly around intervention and democracy-promotion, clashed. The Georgia links with NATO are also extremely important for understanding the Ukraine crisis but the Crimean annexation was prioritized due to the word limitations and as the most vivid manifestation of our argument about the lessons of the Cold War.

Putin's "erratic adventurism" (McFaul 2014, 169). The annexation allowed Putin to portray himself as the defender of Russian interests, as his prolonged semi-democratic rule increasingly morphed into a personalistic autocracy. This is reinforced by research into the state-controlled media's manipulation of the narrative around the Crimea`s annexation which points to Putin's pragmatism, particularly in amplifying stories on the status of ethnic Russians (Lankina and Watanabe 2017). Such sinister media management was increasingly necessary as he returned for his third term as president after the "tandemocracy" (Monaghan 2011) orchestrated with Dmitry Medvedev.

We are not arguing that the Cold War asymmetric ending put Russia on a collision course with the West, that culminated in Crimea`s .annexation. This crude argument will not be consistent with international relations reality of the post-Soviet space, for the last thirty years. There have been numerous opportunities for cooperation between the West and Russia since then (Stent 2015, 150). The most substantive realignment yet came during the second Obama administration, in 2009, when, the US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton presented Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov with a "reset" button as a symbolic signal to the world (Reuters 2009).

This *détente* was ended by the annexation of Crimea, but we cannot directly point to the end of the Cold War to explain the escalation of the conflict. There was a plethora of policy options available to Russia to deescalate the tensions, just like there were other options to better accommodate Russia into the international system in the 1990s.

The point we are making here is subtle. The asymmetric ending of the Cold War tainted the Western idea of Russia. Internationally, Russia could not become a legitimate member of the of Western nation-states family because it was treated like a defeated power. This rejection trickled down domestically, creating a climate conducive to the discrediting democracy and the idea of alignment with the West. It pushed Russia away from the West and fed into Putin's initial political pragmatism which over time moved Russia further away from liberalism and democracy and closer to conservative nationalism and autocracy.

Conclusion

Baruch de Spinoza famously wrote that "peace is not an absence of war", but a virtue which must be cultivated. In the 1990s, there was no cultivation of the "cold" peace. The asymmetric ending of the Cold War did not pre-determine the souring of relations in the 21st century but rather the failure to reset relations in 1991, spawned by the different narratives of the winners of the Cold War. In conclusion, Russia's "Western" idea could not prevail, neither domestically, nor internationally in its foreign policy.

Without a post-1989 settlement like the ones in Vienna or Versailles, Russia and the West were left to freely reconstitute their relationship; a relationship which was underpinned by radically different interpretations about the ending of the Cold War. This was a function of the "cold" conflict and its peaceful demise nature.

In the early months of 2022, Russia and the West are again at odds with each other over Ukraine, reinforcing the argument made in the introduction of this article, that the end of the Cold War was not an event, but a process that continues today. Without the 1990s, lessons it is impossible to understand how the West lost Russia as an international ally and how this divergence subsequently created fertile ground for Vladimir Putin's risePutin.

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COUNTERING HYPERSONIC THREAT

Col. adv. instr. Cătălin CHIRIAC*

Hypersonic missiles represent the new class of threats, capable declaratively and in a way that has not been proven in a theater of operations, to annihilate air and anti-missile defences that exist at this time. The sum of the new threat's characteristics, high speed, increased maneuverability, and low flight altitude, get major concerns for air and missile defence, as effective detection and combat are reduced by compressing available time. Rethinking how to combat the new threats thus represents the main concern of military specialists in countries that want to complete their arsenals with new weapons.

Keywords: hypersonic speed; threat; countering hypersonic missiles; missile, hypersonic vehicle; anti-missile systems.

Introduction

The hypersonic threat[1] is no longer an element of novelty since the daily vocabulary of the military and the media is quite often improved with references describing this threat, tests with such missiles are frequent, and the conflict in Ukraine has already made known their use. Possessing hypersonic missiles is neither simple nor achieved in a short period of time. Countries that engaged in the such weaponsresearch and development were forced to identify substantial funds for this challenge, especially when the defence industries generally had limited technologies in the missiles.production

Hypersonic weapons may have been designed to exploit traditional air and missile defence system limitations. Their defining characteristics, sustained flight at hypersonic speed and maneuverability in- or -out- of the atmosphere, can compromise today's air defence principles by limiting reaction time.

However, the problem is that up to this point their features are stated and less demonstrated. In this way, hypersonic weapons add a new dimension to existing threats through their ability to rapidly engage key strategic level elements or infrastructure, their use in the early stages of a conflict resulting in potentially blocking or paralyzing planned operations. They could provide long-range, relatively short-time strike options against immediate, heavily defended, and/or time-sensitive threats or in case other forces are not available or preferred.

However, the simple idea of developing such weapons amplifies the concept of threat in a way that was no longer necessary. At the NATO level, threat is defined as a measure *of an attack likelihood or probability of being attempted against a particular target within a specified time frame*. As a rule, threats are considered deliberate and intentional acts carried out by individuals or organizations, generally with a hostile purpose (NATO Term 2022).

The new weapons systems development creates unknown challenges for stakeholders, both in their use or counteraction. Actually, the of great powers` desire is to update the already developed arsenals with the new threats, their quantity and performances being again challenging details. However, hypersonic missile programs are still in their infancy and must reach the maturity acquired by other weapon systems, be them used or not, over time. In other words, they must be able to identify both the skilled operating personnel resources and the ability to develop, produce, and test the above mentioned ones. For example, in the U.S., reasons for concern have been identified[2] regarding the

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[1] *** N.A.: As a rule, the hypersonic threat is most often related to various hypersonic missile development programs. The debates in this field, specific to virtual space, have as their subject both the hypersonic missile or weapon in general, and the hypersonic vehicle. Thus, throughout the article the terms hypersonic missile, weapon or hypersonic vehicle will be used interchangeably

***"Carol I" National Defence University**
e-mail: *catalin_chi@yahoo.com*

[2] *** N.A.: These issues were detailed by Mark J. Lewis, Executive Director of the National Defence Industrial Association's Emerging Technologies Institute, and presented by John A. Tirpak in the article *Catching Up on Hypersonics*, published in the April 2021 issue of Air Force Magazine

development of hypersonic infrastructure, related to test facilities or locations, the actual propulsion testing or the availability of flight-test range (Tirpak 2021, 45). Another problem identified in the development of hypersonic weapons, again in the U.S., is given by the fact that they do not have clearly defined mission requirements (Sayler 2022), being somewhat developed as a result of technological progress and less as part of a strategy (Acton 2018).

At this point, the systems capable of using hypersonic technology are at a relative advantage since both space-based sensors designed to detect ballistic missiles and surface-based radars are unable to counter this threat.

What is a hypersonic missile?

Regarding the name of ballistic missiles and hypersonic missiles, there are opinions according to which *ballistic* or *hypersonic* does not define a type of missile or a type of propulsion and that, actually, *ballistic* describes a parabolic trajectory defined by gravity while *hypersonic* refers to a quality of supersonic flight (Karako and Dahlgren 2022, 7-8). Beyond this point of view, the literature presents hypersonic missiles as those aerial vehicles capable at a certain moment of the trajectory to fly at a speed of at least five times the speed of sound (over Mach 5)[3] and which have a maneuverability component higher than the ballistic missiles.

The approach to hypersonic missiles must be made through the speed, point of view because the aerodynamic phenomena around Mach 5 are different from those that occur at supersonic speeds or outside the atmosphere. Thus, hypersonic speed together with lower altitude and increased maneuverability provide a qualitative combination that makes it difficult to predict hypersonic missile trajectories, especially with surface-based sensors.

Various reports or articles in the field of hypersonic missiles present other weapons systems that are capable of such velocities, and in these cases long-range ballistic missiles are just

one example. Under these conditions, military analysts appreciate that a lower altitudes with increased maneuverability and a hypersonic speed development inferior to the ballistic missiles[4] case, make hypersonic missiles both attractive and in high demand (Karako and Dahlgren 2022, 5). The presentation of the characteristics of hypersonic missiles, most of the time compared to ballistic or cruise missiles, led to the situation where they became the main threat in the case of possession but, above all, of use.

Based on the concerns main countries have to get such weapons, there are two main categories of hypersonic weapons (Sayler 2022, 2):
- Hypersonic glide vehicles/HGV that are launched aided by another air vehicle before gliding to a target;
- Hypersonic cruise missiles/HCS that are powered by high-speed engines, or "scramjets", after acquiring their target.

For example, Figure no. 1 shows a comparison between the ballistic and hypersonic missiles trajectories (Karako and Dahlgren 2022, 6).

Interest in the hypersonic threat

While the United States, Russia, and China are recognized as having the most advanced hypersonic weapons programs, a number of other countries, including Australia, India, France, Germany, South Korea, North Korea, and Japan[5], are interested in hypersonic weapons technology (Sayler 2022, 20).

Much of the attention given to the hypersonic threat focuses on the programs developed by Russia and China. According to online sources, the first hypersonic weapons equipped the Russian forces in December 2019, while some experts believe that, the first hypersonic weapons entered China's service as early as 2020. According to the same open sources, the United States is not expected to

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[3] *** N.A.: More details on the types and characteristics of hypersonic missiles can be found in the RAND Corporation study, *Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation, Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons*, Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2017 as well as in Tom Karako, Masao Dahlgren, *Complex Air Defence, Countering the Hypersonic Missile Threat*, A Report of the CSIS Missile Defence Project, CSIS, 2022.

[4] *** N.A.: The flight altitude is unusual for these missiles (between a few tens and 100 kilometers) in terms of the speed developed, according to the RAND Corporation study, Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation, Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons, Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2017.

[5] *** N.A.: A summary of these states' concerns regarding hypersonic technology can be found in Kelley M. Sayler, *Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress*, Updated May 5, 2022, available at https://crsreports.congress.gov

Figure 1 *Comparison between ballistic and hypersonic trajectory*

field hypersonic weapons before 2023 (Sayler and McCall 2022).

To provide a general idea, China, the United States and Russia's concerns in the field of hypersonic missiles are briefly presented below[6]:

China

- China's race to develop hypersonic weapons, as is the case with Russia, reflects its concern that the U.S. hypersonic weapons could allow them to carry out a pre-emptive strike on China's nuclear arsenal and supporting infrastructure (Sayler 2022, 16);

- In 2020, the PLARF[7] began its first operational hypersonic weapon system development called the DF-17, a medium-range ballistic missile equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle/HGV (Annual Report to Congress 2021, VII). At the same time, it made steps towards scramjet engine development that can be used in the hypersonic cruise missiles development (Annual Report to Congress 2021, 144);

- Simultaneously with the DF-17, it tested the DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile, which could be modified to carry an HGV, conventionally or with a nuclear payload, which would significantly increase the Chinese forces' nuclear threat (Sayler 2022, 17).

United States

- Congress designated MDA[8] as early as 2016 as being responsible for the of hypersonic defence concepts' development and implementation. Thus, the MDA established a *Hypersonic Defence Program* in 2017, and in 2018 requested 21 white papers to explore hypersonic missile defence options, including interceptor missiles, hypervelocity projectiles, laser guns, and electronic attack systems (Sayler 2022, 11);

- The first MDA funding program was presented in the fiscal year 2018. In a short term, MDA aimed to develop a limited terminal defence, proposing also a longer-range defence for the future, to detect and counter hypersonic weapons in their glide phase of flight. At the same time, MDA will improve the existing surface-based radars to ensure hypersonic engagement support, in time developing space-based radar prototypes capable of tracking a hypersonic threat throughout flight (Karako and Dahlgren 2022, 18);

- In January 2021, MDA awarded contracts to L3Harris Technologies and Northrop Grumman to develop *Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensors/ HBTSS*, as well as contracts for a Glide

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[6] *** N.A.: The measures adopted and presented in this article are not exclusive and only have the role of drafting in the interest shown by the three states in the field of hypersonic weapons. Details regarding the allocated funds, approximate completion dates and technical characteristics, declared for open sources, can be consulted in Kelley M. Sayler, *Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress*, Updated May 5, 2022, available at https://crsreports .congress.gov

[7] *** People's Liberation Army Rocket Force.

[8] *** Missile Defence Agency.

Phase Interceptor/ GPI.The former will be surface-based radars integrated, to track hypersonic missiles anywhere on the globe, A two-prototype satellite HBTSS demonstration is planned by 2023 (Mahshie 2022);

- At the United States Armed Forces' branches level, concerns for the hypersonic domain are various. Thus, the Air Force has requested funds for the *Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon / ARRW* system research and development, one of the first U.S. hypersonic weapons scheduled to enter service in fiscal year 2023, and for the *Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile/HACM* program (Bugos 2022). While, attention is directed to the two hypersonic weapons programs running at the Navy level, the *Conventional Prompt Strike/ CPS* system and the H*ypersonic Air-Launched Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare/HALO* system, scheduled to be equipped in 2028 (Bugos 2022), the Army is currently developing the *Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon/ LRHW* program, scheduled to be equipped in fiscal year 2023 (Bugos 2022);

- In terms of infrastructure, the U.S. had 48 critical hypersonic test facilities and mobile assets in 2014, needed for the defence systems development with hypersonic technologies maturation by 2030 (Sayler 2022, 12).

Russia

- Although Russia has conducted research on hypersonic weapons technology since the 1980s, its efforts were accelerated in response to both the U.S. missile defence systems deployment in United States and Europe and the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM[9] Treaty in 2001 (Sayler 2022, 14);

- Russia has two hypersonic missile programs under development: the Avangard, which is a hypersonic glide vehicle/HGV, launched with an intercontinental ballistic missile which gives it a declaratively unlimited effective range, and the Zircon 3M22, a ship-launched hypersonic cruise missile, capable of striking both ground and naval targets (Wilson 2021, 2) (Sayler 2022, 14). At the same time, it is assumed that the Kinzhal missile, a maneuvering air-launched ballistic missile, included by military analysts in the category of hypersonic threats due to its stated characteristics (Sayler 2022, 14-15);

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[9] *** Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

- The Kinzhal missile was used in the Ukraine conflict on March 19 and 20, 2022, against warehouses in western Ukraine, the first use of a hypersonic weapon in a conflict (Woolf 2022, 3). Even though the missile was used against ammunition and fuel depots, which are not targets for such weapons and do not have a solid air defence, the Russians' objective was achieved: to demonstrate that the missile is operational and that the first use was a success. However, assessments of the usage effectiveness for the first hypersonic missiles in the Ukraine conflict are not entirely positive. General Mark A. Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated: "*Other than the speed of the weapon, in terms of its effect on a given target, we are not seeing really significant or game-changing effects to date with the delivery of the small number of hypersonics that the Russians have used*" (Bugos 2022).

Defence against hypersonic missiles

The U.S. understanding is that the safe way to prevent a war is by being prepared to win one (Department of Defence 2018, 5). Thereby, preventing a missile-dominated conflict can consist of a comprehensive approach to identifying and training forces to deter their use and counteract them.

The possession of hypersonic missiles is a growing trend among nations that want to complete their missile arsenal, and purely ballistic and somewhat predictable trajectories are being replaced by ones in which the flight time is shorter and, much more importantly, less predictable. By understanding the environment in which it operates and the characteristics necessary to evolve in that environment one can anticipate the defence needs future development. Budgets allocated to the hypersonic threats development force their usage against important targets in order to justify their use. Air bases, naval forces groups, air and missile defence, command and control or force projection elements etc., represent possible targets whose elimination can substantially limit the way military actions are conducted.

Generally, the threat, similar to an action, is anticipated to create some effect aimed at obtaining a strategic, operational, or tactical advantage over an adversary, At the opposite pole, the measures adopted for defence are directed against a distinct

threat or a spectrum of threats. If until now, deterrent or combat measures have been identified, for the threats generated by ballistic or cruise missiles, or unmanned aerial systems/UAS, the hypersonic threat represents an area that is too little covered, the measures against it being currently subject to identification and implementation.

Since the hypersonic threat exists, adequate and acceptable countering means must be identified. Great powers' interest in this area has demonstrated that a defence against hypersonic missiles is militarily necessary and technologically possible. The resources allocated over the last few years have emphasized that there are, and will be, funds for various programs to combat the hypersonic threat. Reality has shown that this is difficult to achieve, as the approaches are much more complex than those used in ballistic or cruise missile defence. Hypersonic defence will not be easy, yet not impossible, nor should we assume that hypersonic missiles are unstoppable.

The hypersonic missile specific features are actually a sum of ballistic and cruise missile characteristics, since it combines the ballistic missiles speed and range with the cruise missiles flight profile and maneuverability. If systems have been developed for countering ballistic and cruise missiles, the sum of a hypersonic missile characteristics requires new vision, concepts, and systems.

A question that arises is also related to the type of defence. Can we consider a pure defence against hypersonic missiles, or should it be investigated in the broader spectrum of air and missile defence, taking into account the missile's flying environment? Experience and investment in air and missile defence can be the starting point for hypersonic missile defence, which must evolve from the current air defence framework, rather than being developed independently from scratch.

The challenges of hypersonic missile defence are multiple and relate to warning, interception type, interceptors type and quantity, timing, command and control, deployed resources, etc. In the the U.S. level field of command, control and communications, the MDA approach has been to develop and adapt the existing Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications/ C2BMC system to the new challenges and requirements, instead of developing a new system (Karako and Dahlgren 2022, 27). Viable solutions can also

be provided by artificial intelligence use, which can optimize the use of sensors and resources for future defence architectures (Karako and Dahlgren 2022, 30). It should not be forgotten that ballistic missile defence has in turn generated the same type of challenges, which in time have been overcome with research and testing generous investments.

The effectiveness of air and missile defence systems is determined by existing sensors and interceptors performance. Because the threat will always be ahead of countermeasures, it is highly unlikely that there will be systems available at that time to combat threats from the full range heights and speeds. Particularly for the hypersonic threat, it is possible that some systems radars may ensure their timely discovery, and others', interceptors of their combat. But again, it will be a matter of time for integration, joint operation, testing, delegation of authority, command and control relationships, etc. The common point between ballistic and hypersonic defences is that you cannot defend everything, just as you cannot combat all threats. Under these conditions, the problem of prioritizing the objectives or infrastructure to defend returns[10].

The starting point in countering hypersonic missiles can be the *point defence systems* that ensure small targets or areas' missile defence. The PATRIOT and THAAD systems are the first systems in this regard, suported by the fact that speed itself is not an insurmountable barrier for defence against hypersonic missiles.

The most advanced missile defence system in the field is currently the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 system, whose missile can reach hypersonic speeds to hit its target. Hypersonic experts believe that current missile defence capabilities could protect high-value targets against hypersonic threats if they are placed in the right location (Mahshie 2022). The Patriot and THAD systems can be adapted in a way to provide defence against hypersonic missiles, on the terminal phase of the missile's trajectory, the obvious disadvantage being the size of the defended space (Acton 2018). If the *point defence* may appear approachable,

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[10] *** N.A.: In the study *The Hypersonic Missile Debate*, Robert S. Wilson presents a well-researched point of view on the hypersonic missile debates, in which elements regarding the prioritization of defence against them are also presented. See Robert S. Wilson, *The Hypersonic Missile Debate*, Center for Space Policy and Strategy, 2021

defending theaters of operations, countries or continents is already challenging.

In the current security architecture, the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 system is seen as a solution to combat hypersonic missiles in the terminal phase of flight when they are quite maneuverable. Current air defence and missile interceptors, designed for slower or more predictable targets, do not have the kinematic performance to favorably intercept a terminal-phase hypersonic missile.

More favorable options are aimed at employing hypersonic missiles in the gliding flight phase where they are less likely to consume energy for evasive maneuvers. Thus, a long-range interceptor that is warned by a space radar offers a much larger battle space and also increased early warning in compliance with the *Shoot-Look-Shoot* doctrinal principle. In this way, the countering missiles challenge in the flight final phase is avoided, but it also influences the missile flight (adjacent trajectories, successive maneuvers) in the sense of performance loss (Karako and Dahlgren 2022, 24-25). MDA Director, Vice Admiral John Hill, stated that: *"We have a program that we are working toward ... that takes us further back into that trajectory for a layered defence against hypersonic [threats], and that would be in the glide phase"* (Mahshie 2022).

The characteristics of hypersonic missiles that have created this impossibility of flight interfering myth, also constitute opportunities for those who develop strategies to counteract them. According to hypersonic flight researchers and specialists, organizing the defence against the hypersonic threat must take into account several elements:

- Missiles are not invisible, their flight at very high speed and at an altitude of up to 100 km, creates a thermal footprint that can be detected by early warning satellites;

- The hypersonic flight normal physical phenomena over longer periods of time provide vulnerabilities that should be taken into account when designing hypersonic missile defences (Karako and Dahlgren 2022, 10). The challenges inherent in hypersonic flights can provide interesting possibilities for defence against the hypersonic threat, making it more approachable, but not easy;

- Detection remains central to achieving a

an infrastructure, defence capability against a hypersonic threat. Because the current surface-based radars are limited by the horizon and the curvature of the earth, existing capabilities can only provide the missiles counteraction in the flight terminal phase. In this case, the missiles speed ensures very little time available to identify the optimal combat solution, communicate the necessary dispositions and, last but not least, the combat itself. The current radars and interceptors vulnerabilities in the fight against hypersonic missiles can be limited by masking, increasing the number of capabilities or deploying them in depth.

Prolonged flight through the atmosphere can generate unpredicted or unidentified failure modes while the ability to maneuver will have an impact on the autonomy and power consumption. A hypersonic missile consumes energy while maneuvering, which can be exploited by providing a layered defence that requires frequent maneuvers[11]. Also, during hypersonic flight, missiles can be affected by impact with objects, no matter how small, by disturbances or changes in their structure or in the surrounding airflow (Karako and Dahlgren 2022, 14). Every maneuver executed in the air has a cost, and air and missile defence forces must take advantage of this by deploying to locations that force the adversary to frequently use the maneuver or an undesirable flight profile. In this way, the time required for warning and combat will be increased, the performance of the threat will be reduced and all these results will generate some uncertainty regarding the hypersonic weapon system.

There is a possibility that influencing the evolution conditions of a hypersonic missile will not allow the desired performance to be achieved. If we consider that the flights in the conditions specified for a hypersonic missile often require exotic materials and an extremely integrated design (Karako and Dahlgren 2022, 11), a question arises related to how many such systems can be developed. It is a premise that is currently favorable for the military that are thinking about defence against such missiles. However, quantity should

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[11] *** N.A.: Some suggestive calculations regarding the influence of maneuver on flight characteristics are presented in Abraham Mahshie, *Hypersonics Defence, How hypersonic weapons maneuver and what to do about it*, available at https://www.airforcemag.com/article/hypersonics- defence/, accessed on 22.06.2022.

not be put before effectiveness, still to be proven. Even if hypersonic weapons will be designed that are not affected by varied and harsh environmental conditions, new technologies (particle and directed energy) may force the development of hypersonic systems that are more traditionalist in terms of construction, heavier or with lower performance (Karako and Dahlgren 2022, 34-35). All these contribute to achieving the missile defence objectives.

If detection, hypersonic missiles identification and tracking are possible, the next step is to combat them. This can be done under an active defence cover, as kinetic interceptors or blast-fragmentation interceptors. The alternative is future technologies, with varying levels of maturity, such as lasers, high-power microwave technologies or particle clouds designed to disrupt hypersonic flight (Shaikh 2021). Some analysts have suggested that surface-based and space-based sensors, arranged in a layered structure, integrated with tracking and fire control systems to direct high-performance interceptors or directed energy weapons could theoretically represent viable defence options in the hypersonic weapons future war (Sayler 2022, 3).

Active defence alone may not be able to cope with a hypersonic missile attack, to which the existing ballistic and cruise missiles can be added. In this case, passive defence is also necessary to be considered and an increased role in the wider context of counteracting the hypersonic threat shoulg be granted.

Early warning, camouflage, concealment, deception, and dispersion are just some of the passive defence forms that can be used in this context and that can deter the use of hypersonic missiles. The actions of decentralizing command and control, prioritizing the objectives to be defended, the existence or establishment of reserve command points to take over the attributions of the basic ones in the shortest possible time, the improvement and application of tactics, techniques and procedures that make the most of forces mobility, are equally important (Chiriac 2020, 55). In the long term, the transition from a large, centralized, well-protected infrastructure to smaller, dispersed, adaptive basing with the ability to use active and passive defences may represent a viable solution to the hypersonic threat (Department of Defence 2018, 6).

Conclusions

Speed, which is the core of this threat, can be exploited to identify the vulnerabilities needed to build defences against hypersonic missiles. Speed and low-altitude air friction problems, and the design challenges, exotic materials required, maneuverability-to-performance ratio are all considered in building the robust defence against hypersonic threats.

The characteristics of hypersonic missiles could define the future war in which they become the main actor, and how the defence mission against them is accomplished may shape the missile defence future. Otherwise, giving up active or passive defences against hypersonic missiles can cause missile defences to fail in general.

At the same time, we must not see hypersonic weapons as the *miracle weapons* capable of winning a war or the *technological marvel* that will improve the leaders` .less inspired decisions. What is certain is that the hypersonic weapon will provide one of the tools, vital if we are to consider the efforts made for research and development, which will ensure the psychological comfort and that extra necessary to achieve victory. The varied defence architectures and the existence, of different mechanisms for countering hypersonic missiles, at least theoretically, (missile, physical destruction, electronic warfare systems, various classes` directed energy systems and types) may pose new problems to hypersonic missile designers, who must take into account their optimization against more or less implemented threats.

The issue of hypersonic missiles is frequently seen as a debate in which technology is the predominant element. The reality is much more nuanced. Once the technological barriers are overcome, attention will be directed to production capacity, logistics, command and control structures and relationships, i.e. the entire chain necessary for their use. We must not lose track of the fact that their use should ensure those effects for which they were developed. This is an easy thing to establish, but difficult to achieve. What is certain is that the approach to hypersonic combat must be different because the threat is different. Consequently, we cannot pretend to achieve a fulminant success in tomorrow's conflict by fighting with yesterday's weapons.

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SECURITY, GEOPOLITICAL CAPABILITY, SOCIETAL RESILIENCE AND THE PUBLIC POLICIES TO ENFORCE IT

Assoc. prof. Iulian CHIFU*

Resilience became a concept of first importance for today's hybrid threats and conventional turbulences, even full-fledged wars in Europe. But since there is a number of theories and definitions of this concept, some type of rationale should be made, as for the instruments needed to measure the level of resilience of states, nations and societies. Moreover, there are a lot of projects, attempts and possibilities to do that, coming from different disciplines and fields of research which also need to be rationalized. More importantly, we need to find a proper set of indicators to show us an actor's level of resilience in order to therefore propose a solution and public policies to enforce it. That is our aim in a multi-institutional approach to be launched in the near future. The most problematic part is that of finding suitable measurable items in order to describe some of the criteria for resilience that need to be approached in order to create a map of indicators and to deal, therefore, with a resilience level improvement.

Keywords: resilience; competitiveness; geopolitical capability; societal security.

Resilience and conceptual reference terms

Resilience is the capacity of an actor – be it state, nation, society, company, city or human community of any kind – to survive and to recover from the turbulences coming from the day-by-day life. This general approach has several developing ways since studies have proven that nations are more resilient or less capable of surviving in the history even though they are facing the normal day-by-day life and not any type of cataclysm, natural disaster of manmade crises (Daron and James 2013, 529) (Kissinger 2015, 350) (Bremmer 2012, 229). So, the first idea was how to compare nations and why some survived, some developed and some other were absorbed or dissolved. That is a first line of research dealing with how to compare nations.

On the same trend, the next level of concern was about the crisis. There is an external factor that impacts states, nations or societies and can completely destroy those actors. So, resilience would be the capacity to survive and recover from the impact of such crisis. We would prefer this definition and line of thinking approach (Chifu 2018a, 23-30) (Chifu 2022a), with a

"Carol I" National Defence University
e-mail: *keafuyul.@gmail.com*

cognitive-institutional (Stern 2001, 299) in order to judge crisis decision making and sustainability of those actors (Chifu 2019, 335) (Chifu and Ramberg 2007, 387) (Chifu and Ramberg 2008, 352). But the preparedness and anticipation of crises prove to be the most important part of the resilience, specifically exercises, prevention and reaction in time of crisis. And this has to do with the early warning systems and with the prospective studies (Chifu 2015, 38-45) (Chifu 2022d) (Chifu 2022b).

Here too, a new value is added since we do not know to anticipate each and every crisis, so we need beyond the horizon scanning and capacity to foresee possible future crisis and types of crises, or what we usually call "new crisis", in order to prepare and prevent the impact, specifically to raise awareness and resilience.

Another line of thinking is linking security with resilience (Chifu 2022c). And it seems as natural as possible: when an actor is facing threats, risks and vulnerabilities, his level of resilience can be measured according to the capacity to deal and manage those security turbulences. But here, too, we need to pay attention to the nature of the actor involved in the estimation of the resilience, since there is a lot of literature discussing type of antagonism between security and democracy (including in the democratic states), but also

between security of the state and institutions and security of the nation, societal security and the state security or security of different communities and that of the whole society (Chifu, Oazu and Oleksandr 2008). The whole dichotomy is debatable, but we need to consider, when it is up to national resilience, what we are talking about and how we have to estimate the balances once inside a democratic society.

Studies have proven that an important part of the instruments used in order to raise resilience are linked with the narrow niche of competitiveness (Chifu 2018b). As much as nations and societies are prepared in this field, they can face better resilience as long as their competitiveness is at a highest level. Since 2018, RAND Co has identified the basic indicators for a human community a different actor competitiveness This emerged into a study developed solely on the fundamental criteria of a society that becomes a competitive actor, which proves to be a resilient one, at the same time (Mazarr 2022).

Another line of thinking has pointed out to studies quantifying the geopolitical capability of a state, nation or community, with a very balanced combination of indicators that represent and aggregate a summum of qualities that mirror the capability of a country (Roger 2019) – exceeding the usual evaluations of power, military power, economic resources and political leadership that are coming from the same family of thinking about the perspectives of resilience. For sure, a resilient country is not necessarily a powerful one, yet the geopolitical capability can provide us with numerous useful indicators for measuring resilience.

Resilience and its instruments in NATO and EU frameworks

NATO and the EU are institutions that have introduced resilience recently in the core of their documents especially after an important development of the hybrid threats that require a cooperation of the state and its institutions, the society and the citizens (Chifu 2018). It has been the same in tackling terrorism and radicalization, but with a lower level of impact once citizens do not cooperate with the institutions. Hybrid threats are one issue where this cooperation needs to happen, but it is subject to numerous conditions,

the main one being the trust in the institutions, the authorities and their aim of protecting societies and each of the citizens. This is not easy to achieve.

NATO has proven to be more practical due to its focus on the objectives that the organization has. This refers to the security approach, to the resilience at the level of the state and society alike, considering each and every member state a democracy, too. It also refers to both national and societal resilience and to the protection of critical infrastructure. Societal security is seen as limiting the vulnerabilities of a society in order to face attacks and coercion (NATO 2022) and to safeguard societies, populations and common values (NATO 2021).

There are seven basic requirements or condition quantified by the Alliance:

1) ensuring the governance continuity and the critical governmental services;

2) constant and sustainable energy supply at affordable prices;

3) ability to confront and cope efficiently with the uncontrolled migration of individuals;

4) constant water and food resources for the population;

5) ability to manage high level casualty crises;

6) functional and resilient communication systems at all times;

7) ensuring resilient transportation systems (Shea 2016).

The European Union also has a strategic document, the Strategic Compass, defining resilience (European Union 2022). It is a combination between the security approach and crisis approach to resilience, in this case too. The themes involved focus on climate change, disasters and civil emergencies. The EU, however, is also looking into the economic resilience, discussing supply chains,, transport routes, freedom of navigation, supplies security . Societal resilience is focused on informational warfare and democracy insisting on securing access to credible information and independent media, tackling manipulation and foreign interference at an informational space level, but also the resilience of democratic processes and that of the society facing disruptive technologies used by the strategic competitors of the EU or by third states.

Projects and indicators useful in resilience evaluation

There are different levels of projects and indicators useful in the evaluation of the resilience and societal resilience. In some cases, we have clear quantifiable and measurable indicators. In some other, the sense of the approach to resilience indicators is less mature and has just a formulation of the idea to be measured or the phenomenon that need a Cartesian approach. In the third category, we just have a detailed evolution, trend or track of an event and we need to figure out how we can obtain a useful indicator that really reflects and quantifies the trend of a developing event.

For instance, if we look at the project of competitiveness, the relevant characteristics of the actors aim at democracy and freedoms versus authoritarianism and closed, dictatorial regimes, nationalism (Mazarr, Blake, et al. 2018). They are related to the strength and depth of national identity, the degree of revisionism, measured at the level of international actors and the continuous evolutions aimed at increasing access to the distribution of goods; increasing the relative relevance of the state; increasing the global relevance and influence of one's system of values and ideology; changing the rules governing the system; increasing its relevance in establishing the new set of rules.

Then, the theoretical grounds for a competition between international actors introduces the differentiation between these moderate and the most militaristic revisionist approaches: a repeated violation of international rules for the concerned actor's unilateral benefit; territorial ambitions and the desire to create a sphere of influence through military aggression, to be militarily dominated; a vision of the international order as deeply illegitimate, created against them, hence the need not for reform, but complete and profound change, even for the complete destruction of this order.

The recommendations of the study – which point out also to resilience needs in a competitive environment - refer specifically to setting a suitable and feasible actors' level of ambition at the level of managing these developments and competition respectively and, to a lesser extent, to plan to win this competition. Predictability and the evolution management for those processes are the main goals proposed, to avoid their excess and lack of management in change and competition per se, competition for the sake of competition or achieved victories, which is interpreted as a high-risk game. Also, the option limits spending and wasting resources, which is much more important during this period.

The capacity of the states was subject to a study (Roger 2019) undergone by Henry Jackson Society, as a continuity of studies on geopolitical capacity coming on a trend since 1944 (Fox 1944), with the first "Composite Index of National Capability" (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972) issued in 1960 . The current Composite Geopolitical Capability Index (Roger 2019) contains four combined weighted average indices, as follows:

- National base – representing 20% – made up of national welfare (10%), population structure (6%), national distribution (3%) and the self-sufficiency of resources and capabilities (1%).
- The national structure – representing 40% – with three pillars, five indicators, respectively the economic pillar representing a share of 15%, activity and technological achievements (10%) and cultural prestige (15%).
- National instruments – representing 30% – with two pillars, five indicators, diplomacy (15%) and the military instrument (15%).
- National determination (actually measuring the will) – representing 10% –, consisting of four indicators, governance effectiveness (7%), economic determination, strategic determination and altruistic determination (1% each).

As subjective as the system may be, the approach deserves to be considered in terms of future development and adaptation capacity, in terms of the premises and conclusions obtained by the study.

Balance and its role in developing public policies for enforcing resilience in a society

After a 15-month research, Michael J Mazarr has produced a study about the elements that make a society both competitive and resilient (Mazarr 2022). It is true that each and every classic characteristic of a state like military capabilities, reinforced defence, investments in defence and deterrence, in key technologies, economic capacities all are making the difference on the substance of power, but also on a state and nation level of resilience. Mazarr brings to life

multiple cases where this is not enough, and those characteristics of power are insufficient to explain resilience and success in other cases where the ingredients for a victory are different and coming from different other sources.

The explanation for the success in this type of competition is coming from resilience specifically, in this case from the fundamental qualities of a society to generate economic productivity, societal cohesion and national will, characteristics that have proven to be important and even making the difference in a war, as for wining a competition and forging resilience (Lyall 2022). The long live of a verified and adaptable system and the ability to offer security and prosperity to its own society are fundamental elements of success in bilateral rivalries at a global level.

The study has proposed seven fundamental societal characteristics, all of them part of societal resilience, even though far from being easily able to be quantified or spread in a number of useful indicators. The work in this field is ahead of us:

- national ambition;
- shared opportunities and competitive access for all citizens;
- a common and coherent national identity;
- an active state;
- efficient social institutions;
- a major interest for learning and adaptation;
- a significative degree of diversity and pluralism in the society (Mazarr 2022).

For sure, the study does not rule out the perspective of the involvement of other factors inside the resilience, like natural disasters, pandemics or geography, which play their role in assessing the societal capacities that could lead to success. And those could not be necessarily linked to the seven characteristics evoked previously. So, all those could be added and discussed inside a dynamic approach of the societies, not only into a statical and substantiated format of those characteristics.

However, one of the most interesting Mazarr findings in his study is that all those seven clusters of characteristics, all important for the perspective of resilience and competitiveness, should be addressed in a balanced way. In other words, if one or more characteristics reach the peak, some other lagging behind, we will have a less resilient society than the original one. The excess of each of those benefic characteristics is harming dramatically all the other as well as the entire society, leading to important and even catastrophic side effects.

That is an important lesson learned once we would like to move to public policies in order to enforce the resilience of a society, because all those terms should be approached at the same time, and the monitoring of the evolution of the resilience and competitiveness in that society should be made timely and thoroughly in order to build up a balanced set of resilience characteristics for the society, maintaining both its democratic characteristics and the level of resilience and competitiveness that we are hoping to achieve.

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THE HYBRID WAR CONCEPT EVOLUTION IN ROMANIA'S NATIONAL DEFENCE STRATEGIES

Ilie-Răsvan DUMITRU, Ph.D. candidate*

The disappearance of the bipolar hegemonic character, the globalization process, the preservation of some hegemonic statutes and the hybrid aggressions emergence against the tense competitive markets and resources background were the key factors that led to international security environment major changes, fact that required a national defence rethinking, based on new risks and state threats. The way national defence strategies are designed and their content have varied from one period to another, depending on international events, economic crises, geopolitical games as well as past and present affiliations with regional or international institutions and organizations. The hybrid war concept was graduallly introduced in the defence strategies, initially being associated with some more well-known patterns such as asymmetric, informational aggression, terrorism or cyber attacks. However, considering that the conceptual boundaries between peace and war were diluted, they would all need a better nuanced, developed and argued approach.

Keywords: strategy; security; defence; aggression; hybrid warfare.

The disappearance of the bipolar hegemonic character and the globalization process were the key factors that led to the first major changes in the international security environment, which required the rethinking of national defence based on new risks and threats against the state. Given the security field dynamism and that the power balance on the global actors map is constantly reconfiguring at high speed, the transnational threats increasing incidence is observed, which, due to globalization opportunities have become much more dangerous, insidious and volatile, operating on a system-wide scale and with implications beyond the borders of a country, region or continent.

Although global security seemed, until recently, to be no longer threatened by major military conflicts, the general characteristic of the contemporary security environment was a constant conflict, generated by hegemonic statutes preservation, regional or global power transfers, but also by differentiated and restricted access to resources, their limitation and unequal distribution mechanisms, the interconnected and interdependent markets, energy dependencies and economic disparities. Ethnic, religious, cultural or ideological identity differences, as well as some historical reminiscences have also contributed to fueling

tensions in certain regions where power games are becoming more obvious and acute. The new threats emerging from the conventional paradigm, as well as their transnational character, make contemporary security acquire a strong holistic character, thus transcending the boundaries of traditional military security by including a mix of interconnected and interdependent of social, economic, political or environmental activity components, striving for its completeness.

Until the Russian Federation subversively seizured Crimee in 2014, the security policies comparative analysis, strategies or doctrines, as well as the normative basis for the operation of these policies, but especially of the Central and Eastern European States's national security structural changes forces and systems of the howed relatively naive democratic systems in understanding the new type of hybrid warfare, which fueled security vulnerabilities. This lethargy fueled by some States' strategic myopia was only a consequence of the fact that they either did not understand, did not have the capacity or were not allowed to take effective measures to counter hybrid aggression (Chirleșean 2013). Certainly, at least the Eastern European States including Romania were still familiar with such aggression, which is otherwise hard to distinguish, and still offset the cost of being considered defeated States in the Cold War, in an opaque confrontation type from which only the economic or social effects are

The Ministry of Finance
e-mail: *dumitrurasvan@yahoo.com*

distinguished and which cannot thus fit into the commonly accepted conventional war definitions. Reality shows that contemporary wars have spread and demilitarized and that current conflicts have diluted in a series of events that tend to replace natural phenomena and normal activities specific to globalization, as well as the effects generated by the economic reset, inevitably generated by the 4.0 industry.

The national security policy (strategy) is the regulatory framework that describes the ways in which a state ensures and guarantees its security and that of its citizens. It shall be presented in the form of a position document, systematized, structured, summarized, reasoned and accessible as a plan, a strategy, a concept or doctrine. Regardless of how this strategic document is named, its design starts from identifying the a nations' identity key elements: its main interests and objectives in the long term; priority actions that lead to those objectives, as well as the principles that underpin those actions; threats and risks likely to disrupt the chances of achieving these objectives as well as the main ways, means, techniques, directions of action, ways and tools necessary to mitigate their effects, correlated with the resources available or possible to mobilize ("Ovidiu Şincai" Institute 2006, 3).

The Country Defence National Strategy (NSCD) refers both to the present and to the future, because it defines a nation's vital interests, it establishes the direction to be followed and the lines of action necessary to potentially cope with all present and future threats, aiming to include the management of the ordered measures favorable developments. As a general rule, it is hierarchically superior to other security policies, such as military doctrine, military strategy or any other economic, social, environmental strategy. In fact, the latter approaches national security only through certain bodies viewpoint, covering only part of the overall security dimensions. As regards the NSCD reporting to the National Security Strategy (NSS), it goes without saying that as long as all security dimensions (economic, political, social, military and environmental), are covered by the NSS, the difference between those two terms is only semantics. Thus, in line with Barry Buzan's interpretation in Copenhagen School (Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998, 22), by introducing the national security 5 dimensions, he formalizes a

much more comprehensive understanding of this concept (Dima 2019). In this regard, we can recall that, a strategy prior to the one in 2008 was rejected by the Parliament due to the lack of clarifications, precisely on the grounds of its title – the Security Strategy. They then invoked art. 65 par. 2 letter f of the Romanian Constitution (Romanian Parliament 2003), which stated that the Parliament approved the National Defence Strategy.

Until the outbreak of the bloody Russian-Georgian military conflict in 2008, respectively the Russian *green men* invasion/diversion for those deployed to Crimea in 2014, the hybrid war concept implementation in the South-Eastern European States' military doctrines had an abstract approach, the concept not being fully assimilated and integrated into their defence strategies,but tangent to most by including elements that visibly went beyond the scope of the conventional. In fact, the security strategy concept evolved over time from the classical (Clausewitzian) approach, in which the security system relied on military force due to predominantly military threats, to the modern, American concept in which security is characterized by multi-dimensionality, interconnectivity, inter-dependence and globalization.

The NSCD manner of development and content varied from one period to the next, depending on international events, geopolitical games and to regional or international institutions and organizations with past and present affiliations. Moreover, in its conception, Romania followed the Western States example to gradually develop its own national security document, initially more superficially but more firmly, yet with an administrative apparatus maturity. Thus, an analysis of its development evolution closely follows the security policy maturity stages, with a gradual development, enough to generate a complex of fundamental documents as a base for the national strategy configuration. In this regard, as the security environment became complicated and threats diversified, state institutions gradually matured, becoming more proactive, thus generating a series of specific documents in response and protection to these changes[1].

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[1] Thus, the forerunners of Romania's National Defence Strategy (2010) were: Romania's National Security Law, no. 51/1991; National Defence Law of Romania, no. 45/1994; National Security Strategy of Romania, 2001; Military Strategy of Romania, 2002,

The main elements that directly influenced the 2006 NSS design and left in the project stage to then be entirely assimilated within the 2008 NSCD were getting the NATO Member status and the European Union integration process, the main directions aiming to secure the eastern border according to EU standards and to strengthen Romania's active role in the wider Black Sea area. Thus, in the effort to support the EU neighborhood policy, on the Eastern, Southern or Western Balkans dimensions, the Romanian state commits itself to deepening the EU Member States perception through NSCD regarding the emerging risks in these regions, as well as strengthening the complementarity and strategic coordination relationship between NATO and the EU at regional and global level (Romanian Information Service n.d.). This strategy was considered to be *"a realistic, bold and pragmatic national project"* that responds to the need and obligation to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, vital national values and interests as the Romanian state existence breakpoint (Afas 2006). The preamble highlights Romania's favorable position as a NATO and EU Member in relation to the of economic and social development acceleration and as a contribution to the regional and global security maintenance. Although it does not refer strictly to the new conflicts hybrid tendencies, this concept has not yet been developed even in the major players strategic documents on the global political scene, yet the strategy refers to *new, of a military or non-military nature asymmetric threats, including those that manifest themselves in the form of cyber or informational aggression* and endanger national security. These threats to national security revolved around international terrorism, frozen conflicts and transnational crime, elements that tangentially touch the spectrum of hybrid aggression. Moreover, the lack of originality determined by the fact that all 4 threats detailed in the strategy are also found in the European Security Strategy adopted by the EU in 2003, betrays Romanian decision-makers' mimicry and lack of personality (Council of the European Union 2009), who instead of innovating or adapting the strategy, to Romania's

needs identifying threats, risks and vulnerabilities specific to the country's area, simply preferred to copy, compiling Western theories and documents. Thus, through the lack of originality, the 2006 NSS, respectively the 2008 NSCD have become a simple act of mimesis, without local reality substance and content, with a simple *must have* necessary to *"do good"* in front of the Alliance partners   .

If the NSS adopted by the National Defence Supreme Council on April 17, 2006, still in a draft stage until the 2008 NSCD was published, contained only a few disparate elements in terms of non-conventional aggressions, the *2010 Romania's National Defence Strategy* had a more applied approach to the non-conventional aggression phenomenon. This was due to the effects the late 90[2] and early 2000 regional and global events produced[3], leading to the Clausewitzian paradigm change over wars, gradually introducing hybrid warfare concept into their doctrine. At declarative level, NSCD 2010 *"...reflects a balance between classic and unconventional risks, threats and vulnerabilities"* (The Supreme Council of defence of the country 2010)*,* having a pronounced multidimensional character, which simultaneously targeted the military, political, economic, social and ecological dimensions and which proposed integrated security management by promoting the idea of a security community. As a vulnerability, it, *"the phenomenon of ordered mass-media campaigns, with the aim of denigrating state institutions, by spreading false information about their activity; the pressure exerted by media trusts on political decision"* (The Supreme Council of defence of the country 2010)*,* was identified in a simplistic and relatively clumsy way and used, instead of the informational aggression generic concept which had not yet been assimilated.

According to it (The Supreme Council of defence of the country 2010), the main vulnerabilities identified were a decrease of some state institutions' law enforcement capacity, a

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2004; National Defence Planning Law of Romania, no. 473/2004; White Paper on National Security and Defence, 2004; National Security Strategy of Romania, 1999; National Security Strategy of Romania (2007);

[2] This was marked by the conflicts in the Balkans that ended with the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the creation of new independent states (Serbia and Montenegro in 2006, Kosovo in 2008) (the area of the former Yugoslavia).

[3] It was represented by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the territory of the USA, and, later, by the attacks in Europe, from Madrid (March 11, 2004) and London (July 7, 2005). These attacks were the main factors that determined the emergence of appropriate responses from European decision-makers.

reduction in the central and local administrative capacity, some institutions' excessive politicization at all levels, the budgetary imbalances' wrong political decisions, the lack of a coherent forecasting, planning and control mechanism to support the budget management, corruption, tax evasion, smuggling and phenomena specific to the underground economy. The main state concerned terrorism risks and threats generated by religious radicalization, cyber terrorism, virtual environment propaganda, weapons of mass destruction proliferation or ballistic missile programs development. The organized crime, drug trafficking, espionage and other hostile intelligence risks related actions were also not forgotten. Although only two years before the Russian-Georgian conflict took place, we find only one line which identifies related to maintaining a high level of instability and insecurity in the Black Sea area as a risk. This hardly triggers hints at the state or non-state actors, hybrid instruments, the most clearly defined being the energy risks, the terrorist phenomenon and the *of non-state actors concerns oriented to influence the decision-making, including the political decision*, to the detriment of the state.

The simple way in which the risks and vulnerabilities of the state are listed, the empty theoretical formulations and the lack of a depth to detailed analysis of the systemic problems and geopolitical risks show a relative immaturity or an inability of the state structures to understand the pattern of hybrid economic, social, environmental or political aggression new types, which is no longer carried at borders but within the "home" of the aggressed party, by disguising the hostile aggressor as a partner, associate, ally or environmental activist. This incapacity for new types of aggression institutional understanding was a state's inexcusable relaxation consequence, by establishing a state-specific comfort under a new protection umbrella provided by a strong military alliance (NATO). What policy makers did not understand at the time of the strategy's development, and neither later, is that hybrid aggressions hide the hostile actor's real identity , the hybrid instruments being used by third parties and concealed in such a way that their actions copy the natural framework of events whose effects destabilize or harm the state. The anonymity

of the aggressor and the his actions' subversive character determine that the state should manage itself through its institutions when facing a hybrid war, since the lack of military instruments and a declaration of war deprive it of NATO reactive measures   .

However, with the publication of the *National Defence Strategy for 2015-2019* (Presidential Administration 2015-2019), one can still see a leap forward in the way it is conceived, even though similarly to its predecessors, it is full of gaps, generalities, hesitations, difficulties in its grasp or complicated forms, including a lack of views in places with acute lack of depth. As an element of novelty, in NCSD 2015-2019 we find the need to promote an extended national security concept for the first time, based on constitutional democracy and respect between the state and citizens. In this strategic document, the Romanian government, long cautious about military influence and malignant Russian politics, although it does not expressly identify the Russian Federation as a hostile actor, either in terms of risks or threats, nevertheless stresses the need to guarantee citizens' *"national character, sovereignty and independence"* and protect democracy and the rule of law. NCSD art. 55 indirectly refers to the Russian issue, among the listed threats on *"destabilizing actions in the eastern neighborhood which generate major challenges for the security of the Euro-Atlantic area"*. Regarding the risks, the expression is even more opaque, mentioning *"the regional instability that limits Romania's capacity to promote strategic interests, especially those regarding the Republic of Moldova European path support"*. It is not clear, however, whether the reluctance to individualize the Russian Federation as an aggressor state that manifests its hostile character in the vicinity of NATO's Eastern border was due to a certain diplomatic precaution due in particular to historical reminiscences transcendent in time, which geographically condemned Romania to remain permanently servant in a marginal society projected at the extremities of the west and the east. Regardless of the reticence, the subversive seizure of Crimea, using an ingenious and insidious hybrid arsenal just one year before the publication of the NCSD, forced the state institutions to update the risks and threats to it, by correlating them with the new dystopic tendencies shown by the Russian Federation.

The document mentions *"the need to support NATO collective defence guarantees"* as main interests, as well as *"EU consolidation and integration"*. In the absence of Russian economic or cultural influence, especially due to the obvious lack of a significant Russian minority in the country, Romanian state's strategic interests can help to guarantee robust Romanian support for the US and NATO military presence expansion in the Black Sea region, and the ability of the state to combat hybrid threats.

The 2015-2019 strategy analyzes the interests of the state aimed at ensuring national security and stability, viewed from the perspective of the following areas: *defence* - understood in the double normative quality, national defence and collective defence; *public order*; intelligence, counterintelligence and security activity; *education; health; economics; energy; financial; environmental; critical infrastructure.* It is, however, designed on an integrative and multidimensional approach, in which the defence dimension combines and balances each other with a number of other dimensions, such as: public order; intelligence, counterintelligence and security; diplomacy; crisis management; education, health and demography. The need to extend the concept of national security is motivated by the need to ensure convergence with the European security principles, developed in the European Security Strategy and the European Union Internal Security Strategy, and the national security objective is aimed at developing capabilities to combat asymmetric threats, admitting *"...the difficulty to delimitate classic risks and threats from asymmetric and hybrid ones."* (Presidential Administration 2015-2019, point 29, 11). It is worth noting the sincerity in which it is frankly and honestly recognized that the inter-institutional reaction in crisis situations is affected by the scarcity of resources and incoherence in the management of various types of risks. This vulnerability becomes even more important if we refer to the reduced interoperability capacity of the various state institutions that should act uniformly and synergistically in the event of asymmetric and hybrid threats.

Romania's other vulnerabilities against hybrid aggressions are also numerous: *the absorption of European funds, the use of public money, energy, critical infrastructure, agriculture, environmental protection, justice, health, education and scientific research, social polarization, the ability of central and local government to implement national and European public policies, corruption, degree of poverty, demographic decline, migration of specialized labor force, socio-economic disparities between regions and counties, fragility of the spirit and civic solidarity.* However, the following are accepted as main directions of action: *the development of the necessary capabilities to react to asymmetric and hybrid threats, the identification and countering of hybrid asymmetric actions, and the development of the security culture* (Presidential Administration 2015-2019, 18). Although the objective and direction of action related to hybrid warfare are correctly formulated, however, *Chapter III – Threats, Risks and Vulnerabilities* does not contain this concept, which accentuates the lack of NCSD correlation with geopolitical realities, especially with the tense situation in the Black Sea region, if we were to take into account the frozen conflicts (Transnistria, Abkhazia, Ossetia or Nagorno-Karabakh) or the two armed conflicts that took place in this region (Russo-Georgian in 2008, Russo-Ukrainian in 2014), until its publication. Moreover, NCSD seems to put all the weight of countering unconventional or hybrid threats on intelligence, counterintelligence and security structures and, to a far too small extent, on defence, without having the vision of a system that integrates viable, flexible, efficient and coherent, all specialized structures of force institutions in the country. This point highlights the fact that the term hybrid war, or just the concept of hybrid, was not fully understood at this time, even though the Russian Federation's manifestations of force in Ukraine up to 2014 were based exclusively on hybrid instrumentation.

It is important to bear in mind that NCSD 2015-2019 must be correlated with two other reference documents, with a specific character, namely Romania's Military Strategy and the White Charter of Defence. Thus, the programmatic document for the development of the Romanian Army, in the sense of countering hybrid operations, is the Romania's Military Strategy. Within its provisions, it is unequivocally stated that *"the current military environment most prominent feature is hybrid warfare, adopted by certain state actors",* as the direction of action being specified

"...the structural adaptation of the Romanian Army to ensure a united force, having the necessary capabilities for efficient fighting, together with the other institutions with responsibilities in the field of defence, both traditional and unconventional, hybrid warfare." (Romanian Government 2016). The directions of achieving a military bodysustainable transformation explicitly support the development of a countering hybrid warfare concept, the specific training material base development and modernization or the military education system conceptual, normative and curricular revitalization. However, when it comes to the C2 structure, the organization of the force structure, the development of military capabilities and staff policies, interoperability, endowment and provision of the necessary infrastructure to counter hybrid warfare, these areas are not found as measures in any of the three stages of prioritization of the Romanian Army reform on the Western system and adapted to NATO requirements.

The last major document referring to the risks and threats of non-conventional or hybrid type, but not the latter, is the *White Charter of Defence*, which presents the vision of the Ministry of National Defence on strengthening the operational capacity of the Romanian Army and developing the capabilities necessary to fulfill the assigned missions, resulting from the short-term strategic defence review process. It covers the period 2015-2019, as well as the medium-term guidelines until 2027. The White Charter of Defence states that *"The Romanian Army must be able (...) to plan and conduct a defence operation on the national territory to counter conventional, unconventional and/or hybrid aggressive actions, with the integrated use of all national power instruments, until the intervention of the main Allied forces."* (Ministry of National Defence 2017, 34). However, the quoted assertion does not include the ways in which the Romanian Army would respond following hybrid economic, cyber, informational or environmental aggressions. The lack of substance of the recommendations in the strategic document is indicative of the lack of understanding of the hybrid phenomenon, as a whole, respectively, the acceptance that at least hybrid aggressions do not necessarily involve a military component that requires an adequate response from the army. Moreover, the

chapter on risks and threats (Ministry of National Defence 2017, 14), states that they fall within the conventional and unconventional spectrum, but do not list, except perhaps tangentially[4] hybrid aggressions that could take advantage of the risks and vulnerabilities of the state. However, the White Paper lists the existence of a mix of unconventional and conventional components, and it is proposed to implement the inter-institutional pattern of national security as an innovative solution to counter them,, but also to develop specific capabilities, even at peacetime, such as surveillance and early warning systems, large units and units of psychological operations or cyber defence structures.

In terms of quantitative analysis, it is worth noting, however, that the term *hybrid* appears in the text of Romania's Military Strategy 15 times, compared to only 3 times in the White Charter of Defence, which seems to be as simplistic as it is overqualified and conformist.

From the analysis of NCSD 2015-2019 and the White Charter of Defence 2017, it can be concluded that there is a real mismatchbetween of the hybrid aggression theory theoretical support and the provision of the necessary capabilities to counter them, due mainly to the hybrid war phenomenon complete misunderstanding and the incomplete way of approaching it, by overcoming the military paradigm circumscribed to conflicts. The fact that the energy security related risks, critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, of public administrationweaknesses, or any other nature are not even listed, which may represent security breaches by which a hostile actor can penetrate the system using hybrid techniques and tools, it reflects the superficiality and lack of depth that are fueled by the optimism that Romania is defended from any aggression launched by any hostile actor. because it is a NATO Member. This way of addressing the issue reflects the major vulnerability of the moment, only a more efficient functioning of existing capabilitiescould be made if we relate them to modern wars, however insufficient and ineffective,n the absence of budget allocations for acquisitions or investments. The vulnerabilities generated by the lack of the national security legislative framework revision, outdated and full of

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[4] Cyber attacks are mentioned, the potential for use of biological, chemical or radiological means, as well as terrorism, but without including them in the category of hybrid instruments..

terminological confusions, even if it was a minor provision in the NCSD[5], were found even during the pandemic when it was necessary to establish the alert state. Thus, due to the fact that most of the goals of the strategy remained only to the status of simple aspirations, it can be concluded that the increased resilience of the state institutions summed up or materialized only in their increased resistance to change, to efficiency and modernization.

2020-2024 (Presidential Administration 2020) Country's National Defence Strategy represents an *upgrade* in terms of strategies, much better than the previous ones by successfully eliminating the uncertainties, which can only demonstrate the level of maturity that state institutions have reached, as well as a slight influence and Western inspiration (and NATO). However, it would be too early to decide on its effects on state's strategic institutions due to the fact that we are still halfway through its implementation. This strategic document unequivocally reflects the Romanian thinking level today, in strategic matters, being designed in an appropriate, balanced, coherent manner on a comprehensive and balanced background, without syncope and fully consensual. NCSD 2020-2024 highlights the professionalism and integrated activity exercised by several specialists, from all the institutions that were able to contribute to its design, the theoretical construction epistemological mechanism with an extremely clear and coherent. documented background.

First of all, it opens mentioning *"Russian Federation, aggressive behavior the Black Sea region militarization actions and hybrid type carried out by this state, which aim to maintain a tense climate and insecurity in the area close to our country",* which brings as a novelty the identification of a potential hostile state whose military and hybrid actions revolve around the extended Black Sea region. The NCSD also reiterates the state's confidence in its own forces and allies, as well as the security guarantees

provided by the partnership with NATO and the strategic one with the US. The strategy uses terms of great depth such as *continuity* and *stability* that express security and predictability in the ability to ensure the security of the Eastern flank of NATO and the EU border. Other terms such as *flexibility*, *resilience* and *adaptation* demonstrate, at least theoretically, the state's ability to cope with extreme or unforeseen phenomena that have the power to destabilize the state, such as the impact of the corona-virus pandemic on all of humanity.

NCSD 2020-2024 is based on the concept of extended security based on the five components of security: political, economic, military, social and environmental; three fundamental elements of security: the state, society and citizens; the new components of threats specific to modern wars: critical, cyber, energy and terrorism infrastructure that includes all of these; and not least, but of great significance, asymmetric and hybrid threats. It is clear that the strategic partnership with the US, NATO membership and the EU are being reconfirmed as pillars of foreign and security policy. The NCSD for 2020-2024 involves a new approach, proposing a management of national security issues with focus on integrated risk, threat and vulnerability management. This type of approach of the NCSD is dependent on the paradigm shift at the global level, taking into account the developments in the wider Black Sea region, the deterioration of relations between NATO and the Russian Federation, the proliferation of terrorism, hybrid and cyber threats, and other types of challenges. By the manner it was conceived, Romania has the opportunity to strengthen its strategic position at Euro-Atlantic level and its role as a stability vector and provider of national security in the Black Sea region. NCSD puts the citizen at the center of the actions of the institutions that guarantee national security, a form of guaranteeing the position of first beneficiary of the institutional construction, focusing on the protection of human rights, the rule of law and the safety of the population.

The structure of the strategy is intuitive, coherent, comprehensive and systematic, following the mandatory steps of designing such a document. It starts from the fundamental elements that define Romania as a state, going through the three pillars commitments and

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[5] Final Considerations, point 83 of NCSD 2015-2020, *"A necessary condition for the operationalization of the Strategy is the revision of the legislative framework in the field of national security, which takes into account, in addition to the deficiencies revealed over time, the new threats and the need to respect the rights and civil liberties. In order to achieve the objectives and achieve the directions of action assumed by this Strategy, the institutions with responsibilities in the respective fields will develop the strategies, programs and subsequent sectoral activity plans".*

guarantees description (NATO membership, EU and US strategic partnership), pronouncing the major objectives of the state (prosperity, security, identity, dignity, rule of law and human rights, values, principles, interests), assessment of the security environment, threats, risks, vulnerabilities and directions of action. The threats include the economic crisis caused by the pandemic, the strengthening of the military potential in Romania's neighborhood, the volatility of the regional security state, as well as the hybrid aggressions patterns: hostile influence actions in the public space, cyber attacks, and in energy marketsdistortions, interference and hostile foreign takeover of the national interest.economic operators

A current point of interest is the relation to the Russian Federation and its actions, the text of the current document being balanced but to the point; perhaps the most clearly formulated in the history of the National Defence Strategies. Without being directly and clearly defined as an enemy, adversary, hostile state actor or threat in everything, the Russian Federation possible aggressor nature is highlighted by its divergences with NATO, which Romania is part of Russia's strengthening of the offensive posture and its aggressive nature are highlighted, with an impact on the Black Sea region tension escalation potential.

However, in relation to the hybrid war, the strategy does not identify state's risks and vulnerabilities in relation to the new types of aggressionpatterns, especially those that are part of the Russian Federation hybrid arsenal, including identifying gaps and ways through which it can penetrate state institutions in order to undermine the partners' confidence in the capacity to support the obligations assumed by Romania, or through which it can create economic imbalances, social unrest, energy market destabilization and economic distortions. Although the hybrid concept is found throughout the strategy, it frequently takes on a general character, without being strictly applied to our society's specific character. Moreover, the integrated risks, threats and vulnerabilities management, mentioned in the last three editions of the strategy, remains a difficult desideratum to assume and reach by the state institutions, even if an integrated crisis management system is an effective and powerful

tool for countering hybrid aggressions, that can interfere with such an economic, energy, financial or pandemic crisis at some point. By revising them one notices that no strategy has followed the natural cycle required in their correct and applied development, by transposing national objectives into sectoral strategies, multi-annual strategic planning, identifying ways of implementing these objectives, implementing and evaluating results. Although theoretically comprehensive, no strategy has pursued the implementation of the objectives assumed by the previous ones, but it is limited to listing, the risks and threats to the state, in an increasingly complex and detailed way, without quantifying the measures ordered by the state institutions, through reduction strategies .

Conclusions

Through the status conferred by NATO membership, Romania is permanently concerned with ensuring security on NATO's Eastern flank, in the Black Sea region. In order to anticipate, mitigate or counter a potential hybrid conflict in all its aspects (doctrinally, institutionally, capabilities and human resources point of view), Romania must concentrate the all government ministries and agencies' effort, in the sense of fully covering the domains in which any aggression can be manifested, including hybrid type ones. Strengthening the administrative apparatus, professionalization and elimination of corruption, including the moral retraining of the political class are essential elements in disclosing the instruments and combating hybrid aggressions launched by various hostile actors. The transnationality and ubiquity of emerging threats requires immediate and urgent international cooperation to deal with them, automatically highlighting the need for interoperability. Moreover, it is not possible to achieve these objectives beyond an integrative approach to the security sector and especially without further reform within it. It should be understood that at least for Romania, hybrid aggressions are not aimed at conquering the state or some territories in it, but at altering the political decision and the administrative act, diminishing the capacities to respond to crises, increasing dependencies and alienating national resources, sabotage the development of infrastructure or the necessary capabilities to respond to such

aggressions, as well as weakening the partners' confidence in the state's capacity to cope with the assumed obligations.

In a hybrid war, the military capabilities effectiveness can be reduced to zero, as long as the aggressions included in this pattern manifest themselves in vectors and fields unrelated to military technique and art, especially by the lack of any military instrument to support aggression. This state means that no hostile action, even a proven one, can activate a NATO response, regardless of whether they have the potential to harm national security. National security can no longer be ensured at national level, effectively, precisely because of the threats transnational nature, while an international response is necessary. In order to protect the state from potential hybrid attacks or assaults, its force institutions must collaborate closely in the light of a harmonized vision, in a system that integrates viable, flexible, efficient and coherent all their specialized structures. Real-time information exchanges must be centralized, analyzed, synchronized and processed in a specialized command center organized as an integrated crisis management system, in order to anticipate, mitigate and counter the of hostile actors aggressions in all risk state areas: economic, environment, political, social or military.

The Romanian military, a basic pillar in ensuring and guaranteeing peace and national security, is the only one empowered and entitled to coordinate this command center, in close contact with military partners and allies, thus validating the hybrid aggressions hostile nature. In this respect, the effort will focus on the decision political level because national security policies are concerned with national defence capabilities management first of all, to define the forces and missions structure, deployment and combat engagement preparedness, to ensure their sustainability; only then would the security and defence strategies be outlined. Security policies must be implemented in such a way as to take into account the fact that, the following trends are manifested in the non-conventional areas development, from a diachronic point of view,: from simple to complex; from autonomous action to work in a common environment; from military to non-military; from conventional to non-conventional; from the primordial structure

of forces to the primordial effects obtained; from kinetic means to non-kinetic means, and from lethal effects to non-lethal effects.

Looked at from the National Defence Strategy (NCSD strategic level, asymmetric/hybrid vulnerabilities and military and non-military risks are identified, including those manifested in terrorist, psychological, economic, social, informational or cyber aggressions format, at least as seen from the NCSD 2020-2024. Romania had difficulties in developing institutional mechanisms, including military ones, to put into practice policies and strategies to counter these types of aggression. In practice, although it has introduced the hybrid aggression concept and its emerging risks in the strategies up to 2020 more or less indirectly,, the lack of measures to crystallize the proposed desiderata proves the decision-makers incapacity on particular policies, to understand that NATO does not defend the state from the state or non-state actors'hybrid and undeclared hostile actions. This delay may be justified by the lack of sufficient resources necessary to implement targeted measures to strengthen the administrative apparatus, including its digitalization and access to advanced technology, which has inherently led to an increase in the administration de-professionalization seen as a depreciation of the public actbut also as a politicians' competence, dedication and responsibility dilution. These shortcomings augmented security breaches that can allow for the hostile actors' covert and effective action of, directed against the strategic interests of the Romanian state. Certainly their subversive aggressions can also be stimulated by factors such as institutional vulnerability fueled by mediocrity, disinterest, bureaucracy or corruption. These systemic weaknesses may be considered a consequence of the same disinterest of decision-makers, but framed in the hybrid spectrum may fit into another scenario of the intentional and insistent undermining of the social and administrative fabric, by perverting the identity values of the state.

A suggestive example in this regard may be the fact that although in all strategies reference is made to the risks of energy dependence and state vulnerabilities in this field, the only measure ordered by the state institutions to eliminate this

dependence on Russian gas was only the closure of industrial capacities to reduce consumption (which generated dependencies on products derived from them, for example: chemical fertilizers) and not increasing production capacities while diversifying energy sources in friendly countries, which confirms the failure of defence strategies developed by 2020, with high chances of failure for the one from 2020-2024, at least for energy risks.

As a general conclusion, although emerging risks from hybrid aggression are mentioned in all defence strategies, the fact that much of the avenues of action aimed at reducing these risks and threats have remained at the stage of desideratum, while these risks materialize through the subversive actions of various hostile actors, with harmful effects on the state, aimed at altering the administrative act and political decisions, only confirms that we are in a full hybrid war that, although we describe it, we do not fully understand.

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CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE MEANING OF CHANGE IN THE LAND FORCES POST-SECONDARY MILITARY EDUCATION SYSTEM

Lt. Mioara (ȘERBAN) CULEA, PhD student*

The pandemic crisis has ironically and paradoxically demonstrated an incredible drive for change and the need for this, due to a continuous downgrade of the relations with the authorities and to the phenomenon of "telework" or "online schooling". Change makes sense, whether it is a naturally generated phenomenon or a consequence of human action. Caught between an objective and a subjective reality, the military education system has the power to produce qualitative mutations, through a new version, the intersubjective one, in which the emphasis falls on the importance of values and beliefs. These beliefs represented, beyond physical resources and throughout history, especially through the wars fought, the most important resource through which the leader obtained victory, based on the assumed strategy. Used as a research method, systematic observation created the context for a complex alchemy that confirmed the undesirable obligation of what produces meaning and created an algorithm of future reconstructions, based on changes in all three dimensions giving additional credit to intersubjective reality, through the given meaning.

Keywords: objective reality; subjective reality; intersubjective reality; traditions and values; premises of change; strategic management; educational resources; study programs.

Preliminary considerations on the meaning of change

In order to emphasize the importance of change in the military education system, we have outlined some ideas regarding the current environment and the transition to the future. Change is a constant that resides in the continuous adjustment of the present. The reorganization of military education is an inherent process, both at the system level (macro) and at the military education institutions level (micro).

At the macro level, the defence system should be based on and drive through a set of interdependent and interconnected systems, processes and facts. The implementation of its policies, strategies, objectives and plans must be determined and ensured through a clear and integrated set of processes. They should be continuously developed, managed and improved. Also, decisions should be based on reliable and real information about current and projected performance, process capability, expectations and experiences of those involved.

***The General Staff of the Land Forces**
e-mail: *smioara021@gmail.com*

At the micro level, the ideal setup relies on leaders who set and communicate a clear direction for the organization they lead. They establish the culture, values, ethics and leadership structure that give the organization its own identity and interest for the parties involved. Likewise, leaders must demonstrate the ability to adapt and realign the direction of the organization, in uncertain times.

The aim of the study is to systematically observe the need for change, with an emphasis on post-secondary military education, diagnosing both the need for change and the change itself through three types of realities: objective, subjective and intersubjective.

In this respect, the methods used in the evaluation of the real status of the organization providing post-secondary education, as required by the current educational system regulations, have focused on processing and interpreting data collected from the institutional programmatic documents, doubled by a systematic and external observation. From a systemic perspective, the evaluation:

• applied to the context, it aimed to identify the needs for change and the beneficiary/students acceptance level;

• applied to the inputs, it targeted an initial

status scan;

• applied to processes, it aimed at the activities practical performance;

• applied to outputs, it aimed at accounting for the results obtained (favorable or unfavorable reactions of the parties involved) in relation to the established objectives and the satisfaction of the identified needs.

What is important is that the military education modernization prospects are based on four important pillars, namely: strategic management, educational resources, study programs and quality management. In this sense, the expected results are intimately related to these.

Deep analysis of post-secondary military education – the premises of change

Change, as a process, makes sense. This sense is given on the premise that there are two kinds of realities: an impersonal or objective reality and a personal or subjective reality. With impersonal or objective reality, things exist independently of our feelings and beliefs. An example of an impersonal reality is gravity, which affects people who believe in it, as well as those who do not believe in it. From the perspective of the military education system, the objective reality is constructed from the representations that an organization providing education offers, in order to carry out military actions to fulfill the missions entrusted to the army. Instead, personal or subjective reality depends a lot on each individual's feelings and beliefs, on the confidence people have in themselves, but also in those around them, in the commander, in the weaponry, in the subunit's cohesion degree, in the satisfaction level and, last but not the least, in the military normativity barometer. An individual's perception of an aspect, context or person represents their own reality, a reality that is filtered and dictated by personal feelings and emotions. It is generally assumed that reality can be impersonal or objective, and personal or subjective. The paradigm by which the world is situated between black and white, between peace and war, between birth and death, between past and future, is resumed. It is not only Dante Alighieri who introduces Purgatory as the third state, interconnecting Hell with Paradise, but also the present as time perspective is interposed between past and future, as such is life, between birth and death, color between black and white, similar to the third level existence, i.e. the intersubjective reality, positioned between the objective and the subjective ones. All these depend on the communication process between several individuals, much more than on their feelings and beliefs. A very concrete example of such a reality is that of money. The fact that billions of people believe in their value makes them indispensable for various purchases. If they lost faith in what they represent, they would be nothing more than mere pieces of paper. The organization being a system structured by people's interaction to achieve common objectives (Vlăsceanu 2003, 19), the relationships established within ensure this third dimension of reality. Whether we are talking about groups built through spontaneous, flexible, informal relationships, or whether we are talking about clearly defined structures with rules, regulations, hierarchies of objectives, relationships of authority, responsibility or formal power, they can develop a network of meaning (Harari 2015, 131). The intersubjective reality created in the military system is the force built by the two synergistically related dimensions, which outlines a military exclusively intended mechanism . The common faith of the military in this force they themselves are building, enables them to overcome the barriers which war raises ever more ingenuously and subtly. The military organization is an institution where the activity is carried out as a team. Interpersonal reality arises on an objective reality fertile ground, where the individual cannot act under the personal emotion exclusive impulse, but under the collective, the group, the values, beliefs and meaning imprint which, they have decided to believe in, collectively.

One of the problems the military education system has is generated by the fact that training programs, are built in accordance with the professional qualification obtained at the end of it, common to civilian education for all the military education institutions, connected to a lack of military occupation national recognition. Alternatively, the need to carry out analytical programs "on services and specialties, corresponding to the occupations and qualifications specific to the Ministry of National Defence..." (Ministerul Educației 2022, 26) is stated and (re) affirmed in the Undergraduate Education Law - Educated Romania, amendment version.

Military post-secondary education ensures petty officers and non-commissioned officers' initial training, emphasizing the future military profile both in theory, through specific knowledge training programs and through practice, provided by the internships related to military training. The low efficiency of the study programs derives from inadequate correlation with the deploymet skills and with career evolution requirement on various stages. The fact that military personnel initial training is carried out through training programs belonging to civilian education professional qualifications, correlated with military training in services and specialty can be seen as the consequence of a system decline felt while satisfying beneficiaries' needs. The defence system thus feels the labor market and culture pressure but also the burden of the technical and technological progress, and seems to give up what it has specifically had so far: cohesion, symbols, own values and norms, traditions, interpersonal relationships. This leads to students becoming specialists before they are soldiers, defining their role in a narrow manner and being less available for common tasks specific to the system. We should also not ignore the relationship between intelligence and education that a school of thought produces in a different sense: "an educational experience that strives to teach us how to think, not just what we believe" (Adams 2020, 196). In the Romanian school and not only, no one knows everything, but knowing one field leads you to knowing all. In the organized body of knowledge that obviously constitutes culture, to know anything is to know how to look for anything and, above all, how to make use of what you have found. Education, the problem of learning and studying in general, is the interpretive key to all difficulties, constantly bringing up the question "who are the ones that learn, those who know, or those who do not know?" (Noica 2019, 225).

At the national level, Romania's Military Strategy 2021 aims to modernize the education system through "three fundamental directions: personalization and ensuring the educational process for all military pupils and students; the flexibility of the education system according to priorities and challenges; adaptability of the system to external changes and future trends. A major priority is the reorganization of the initial and continuous

training system for teachers, including those in higher education, in order to increase their training for theoretical, but especially methodological and practical-applicative assessment, for a better connection with the operational unit needs and of the operating environment reality" (Ministerul Apărării Naționale 2021, 17).

The resilience of the military education system is based on two lines of action:

• updating current training programs in order to develop transversal skills, including notions of creative education, as well as skills oriented towards structural and digital transition;

• the modernization of the educational infrastructure and the related endowment, in correlation with the force structure present and future needs and the challenges of the action environments, in order to ensure participation in a quality, modern educational process (Ministerul Apărării Naționale 2021, 26).

These projections are made with considerable effort at all educational levels, from strategic to quality management, the process involving complex and long-lasting actions.

In his article "War, the army and experimental psychology" published in Revue Militaire Suisse no. 1/1943 Henri Francois Tecos stated   that "the army is nothing more than a complex group of war workers, in other words, a gathering of people who have a special job to perform, using special tools, following certain rules and methods. No other human activity is more complicated, more dangerous, more exciting especially, than battle" (Tecos 1943).

The objective reality

Through the professional qualifications it Currently teaches, the post-secondary military school offers graduates both an occupation in the civilian environment and a position that they can fit through the degree they implicitly obtain upon graduating from the school. This reality enhances a labor force category that can migrate from the military to the civilian environment any time, on the one hand it raises doubt about the congruence between the skills required by employers and the results offered by the post-secondary military school.

A current military post-secondary education thorough analysis brings forward the need for an

education and training system that can be labor market and objective reality correlated. To reduce the discrepancies between labor market demand and educational supply, strategic intervention is needed around the four pillars: strategic management, educational resources, study programs and quality management.

At the strategic management level and in the current context, the center of gravity requires a carefully designed projection both in terms of the institution's human and material capital, by meeting all the requirements needed to obtain professional qualifications in the civilian environment, and in terms of specific capital the military environment, which provides them with the necessary capabilities to obtain the petty officer or non-commissioned officer certificate in the chosen service and specialty. The certificate is based on the of strategic targets establishment for the strategic development project timeframe, with a feasible approach for each operational plan that implements the target fulfillment as well as the educational institution internal organization, the effective functioning of the internal communication system/external with the main actors-direct beneficiaries of education, as well as indirect ones, from parents to other institutions and organizations with a role in designing and providing the educational offer.

An all level general fundamental premises cover:

- a school and student (direct educational services beneficiary) interaction, based on each party understanding role, essential for offering an educational program, going through the recruitment process in an assumed and conscious manner, regarding the knowledge of the training programs scope and consequences in case of not passing the graduation exam;

- school philosophy and objectives, identified and developed in cooperation, clearly stated and mutually accepted, which ensures the educational activity and professional orientation course in order to satisfy the direct educational services beneficiaries changing needs, i.e. students' needs;

- school educational priorities seen as the nucleus around which all aspects of the educational programs are articulated (which provides all students with opportunities for intellectual, personal and social, moral and civic, physical development).

At the level of educational, human and material resources, the material assets development for carrying out the educational process requires two courses of action: both the provision of the educational infrastructure and the endowment related to the professional qualifications for which the school is accredited, as well as the provision of military equipment corresponding to weapons and military specialties assimilated by the training programs for the ongoing professional qualifications. In this context, the endowment requires the provision of sub-assemblies, parts, kits, measuring and control devices necessary to carry out the work of disassembly, assembly, adjustments, maintenance, in appropriate quantities, so that the students can work practically, as well as the rehabilitation/modernization and development of the school infrastructure along with the training and logistics base by supplying it with military technology, equipment, apparatus and materials similar to those pertaining to the operationalized units. It is also necessary to develop the information infrastructure, to simulate and solve some computer based instruction specific processes/phenomena. This year, the Ministry of Education issued an order (No. 3497) that settles the standards for equipping secondary education units with technological equipment. This way, the digital/virtual educational activities quality will be ensured, including the list of technological equipment and the minimum technical specifications.

In terms of human resources, the aim is to develop the teaching staff and military instructors' methodical and specialized skills, to stimulate teaching staff''s improvement by obtaining teaching degrees, in-depth studies, the acquisition of new professional skills through various formal, non-formal and informal training, so as to accumulate a minimum of 90 transferable professional credits for each consecutive five-year interval, considered from the date of employment. It is true that there is a need for'' increased teacher accountability for results, but also greater support for those teachers, including through decent wages, training, equipment, teaching materials, etc.'' (Iosifescu 2022).

In the same vein, an important target is to increase or maintain the general training level for staff and subunits in order to fulfill the basic

mission of the institution, the execution of the internal service and the fulfillment of legal tasks and intervention in different situations. For this purpose, it is necessary to organize and carry out the training of the forces in order to improve the level of training of the personnel and subunits for the fulfillment of their missions, in peacetime, in crisis situations and in war, respectively the provision of security and the security of the institution's objectives, the creation and maintenance of the communications system and the provision of logistical support (supply transport and maintenance of military equipment, armaments and equipment).This should be done rhythmically, on hierarchical levels, Also, participation in activities and actions, missions, exchanges of experience with NATO partners, in order to acquire detailed knowledge about and use the standard operating procedures, their implementation in analytical programs, are much needed.

Moreover, it is extremely important to train teachers and instructors in terms of the help that students need to understand, from the first days after dressing the military uniform, what the rules and principles of military life mean, the reason behind the requirements, the need of unity of action, of cohesion and solidarity, the distinct value that order and discipline have. In the current context, discipline must be based on conscience, on understanding duties, confidence in oneself and in the team; the feeling of safety and balance that is amplified where there is order, where everyone fulfills their assumed tasks.

The of post-secondary education institution programs support the petty officers' initial training with some professional qualifications that are equivalent to the civilian environment, such as: mechanic petty officer, inorganic chemical technology petty officer, machinery and construction equipment mechanic petty officer. Also, for the one-year post-secondary studies program - the non-commissioned officers' initial training - the educational institutions are accredited for professional qualifications equivalent to the civilian environment, such as: instructor-car technician, mechanical technologist technician, land cadaster technician-topographer, road and bridge technician.

At the European level, there is a major interest in the military education, starting from the project to standardize the military instructors continuous training. As an example, the DEEP NATO military education enhancement program (Defence Education Enhancement Program/ DEEP, NCO Instructor Development Reference Curriculum) prioritizes a curriculum development dedicated to non-commissioned officers military education for three types of courses, addressed to the military instructors: Basic Instructor Course (BIC), Advance Instructor Course (AIC), Master Instructor Program (MIP) (Bălășoiu 2022).

At the quality management level, the use of self-evaluation results is ensured both for operation and development optimization of the organization providing education, as well as for the evaluation activities periodic performance, on the extent to which the objective reality offered by the institution is in agreement with the students' subjective reality, by creating a community that submits to an intersubjective reality. Change produces an easy-to-decipher algorithm of this size, being a methodical series of procedures for problem-solving and decision-making, not a calculation in itself, like strategic management, but a method. The only condition in deciphering the algorithms is that those responsible for this field use their own judgment matrix according to the impact on emotions, subjective, personal reality. In this way, it becomes an assumed domain, an organizational strategy of relational cultures. It follows from the objective reality of the educational environment described from the perspective of the four pillars that there are factors that influence the correlation of skills requirements with the learning outcomes offered, while at the management level efforts are supported to provide quality programs and human resources.

Subjective reality

For the classical Greeks, the notion of soul would have been the equivalent of the modern notion of subjectivity. The Stoics were interested, among many philosophical aspects, in individual lives which they considered "fragments detached from the soul of the world" (Marcus 2018, 27). Seduced by the statement that "every being has an irreducible, inexplicable originality, through the simple composition of pre-existing things or principles" (Marcus 2018, 11) we can argue in favor of recognizing the self as a subjective reality,

identity and individual value.

Subjective reality is built by directly collecting the students as direct beneficiaries' personal reality, an aspect related to values and beliefs which allows the configuration of an individual, own, personal map, but also through the educational institution feedback, received directly, through the admission competition existence or non-existence, as well as indirectly, received from beneficiaries (units where graduates occupy the first position). Consequently, the subjective reality is each beneficiary's personal perception, whether we are talking about the student, or the one who uses the student's skills, compared to the four pillars previously presented.

Thus, in terms of strategic management, the leader develops the mission, vision and values of the organization by developing and promoting the personal example of the values, ethics and public responsibilities that support culture, but also through the active involvement of the direct beneficiaries of education, in shaping it, ensuring that there is cohesion, interconnectivity between the values of the organizational culture and their own, although, at first glance, there seems to be an action which is independent of the students – beneficiaries.

Regarding educational resources, whether it is human or material, informational, the subjective reality is shaped by interacting with the direct educational beneficiaries, by participating in meetings, understanding and responding to needs and expectations. It is essential to recognize them individually, for their contribution to the improvement of educational resources, for their loyalty, etc. Knowledge and communication are elements that contribute to identifying, understanding and anticipating the both parties' needs and expectations.

In the approach regarding the short-term and long-term analysis of the data regarding the effects of completing the training programs given the current educational offer, it is necessary to assess the degree of satisfaction and to follow the professional path that will allow the outline of a reality as maybe obvious. Thus, the revision of the educational offer is required, essentially based on the feedback received from the beneficiaries and the benchmarking used to optimize the educational offer. The process of revising the curriculum for post-secondary education, under all methodological aspects, of developing and approving professional

training standards, represents a complex, rigorous and very expensive process, especially from the time resource viewpoint. Through the education plan and school programs the written curriculum is based on the professional training standard. It is designed on modules, determined by the structure of the competence units. Each competence unit in the professional training standard corresponds to a module. Practical training is ensured by the contents and number of hours in the specialized modules and is included in the didactic of the specialized teacher. It is also necessary to expand the practical training supported by the need for in service training and the military majoring for which the graduate is trained.

Consequently, change at this level cannot be achieved without rigorous analysis to determine the impact, effects, risks and, why not, critical success factors.

Quality management, as any organization ubiquitous process, has a role in establishing the mechanism for personal perception evaluation for each beneficiary, regarding the institutional trategic management, the educational resources and training programs.

Intersubjective reality

The military organization is an institution that manages, develops and exploits its full potential at the team level, implicitly and constantly encouraged interaction. The meaning given by this phrase is constructed by several individuals who weave together a common network of beliefs, who share the same vision, consolidate their beliefs into a network of meaning. Beyond the objective reality, which is palpable and real, through the entire arsenal that defines it, the defence system also has a special mechanism for the construction of spiritual weapons, which, personally, I consider extremely important, valuable and which outlines the core of this ingenious and complex mechanism that is the military. Ideas, experiences, crowd feelings, hinder each other, synchronize with each other or suffocate under the avalanche of new information and impressions that the group provokes. But when they manage to balance and to get structured, to gain relief and personality, they acquire style and architectural unity. They build an intersubjective reality that becomes indestructible.

Research methodology

The issue of this research, in addition to the certainty of the contemporary value it holds, is also closely correlated with the current context of the security environment, the war in Ukraine and the confirmation of the need for specialists who can ensure combat power, for the military personnel capable of countering any type of risks and aggressions directed at the Romanian sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In the research process we used the method of systematic observation, a method of direct exploration of reality. The transformation of military educational structures, through the creation of a specific physiognomy, the recognition of military occupation and the introduction of military qualifications is a variable that deserves special attention granted Investigating the relationship between objective and subjective reality leads to the highlighting of a phenomenon that generates issues on a series of determining factors worth inventorying and investigating.

The purpose of using this research method was to see the observed subjects' perception on the norms and values that led them go through the military post-secondary study program, to contextualize the observed events in order to correctly understand, to describe the observed persons in order to understand what is happening in the educational institution, to provide a research design that allows an open inquiry into the unpredictable or unforeseen aspects.

The observation focused on the specific aspects of post-secondary military school, on the current context of completing a study program that combines general and specialized military training with a professional qualification that will allow easy integration into the civilian labor market. From the type of observer's viewpoint, we chose the option of being a present and uninvolved observer, for a short timeframe.

A first question emerged in relation to the reason for choosing a military career: did the students access the training programs of the post-secondary military school because of the safety and stability offered by the military environment or because of the subjective reality that agrees with the values and beliefs of the organization providing the education?

A second question focused on the particularities of the subjects included in the study group: are students from military colleges more focused and interested in subjects specific to the military environment, do they adapt to their contents more easily due to the culture and organizational values accumulated during previous studies than students from the civilian environment?

The basic argument sustained is that all eight subjects, graduates of the military college, wanted to put on the military uniform and perfect their skills in this profession since they were 14 years old. On the other hand, those from the civilian environment are more attracted to civilian subjects, they adapt harder to the rigors and requirements of subjects specific to the military environment, being, at least at the time of observation, more curious than dedicated, more driven by the fear of coercive measures than proactive. Most of them argue that the degree they get upon graduation gives them enough skills to practice a job in civilian life if they are not satisfied with what their job in the military system would give them. From our point of view, the military system, the organization itself, needs a human resource dedicated to the profession, a professional human resource, and why not, even proud of its personal contribution to the development of the organization which it is part of within the military system.

The target group is represented by students from different categories: from military colleges and from high schools and civilian schools, males aged 18-30. We chose this group of people to ascertain the influence of the early military environment in the construction of intersubjective reality. In table no.1 there is the distribution of subjects in relation to age, whose average value from the experimental group, is 66.6%, as well as the particularities related to gender, ethnicity, religion, level of education.

Also, the observation was carried out on the post-secondary military school premises, during the theoretical classes, but also during an instruction session. The observation was made between 06-07.06.2022.

Analyzing the responses, classified into the four communication styles, according to the appendix, one concludes that the subjects are characterized by action-oriented and people-oriented communication styles, and to a lesser extent by ideas-oriented and process-oriented styles. The defining component in such a

Table no.1

Age	Gender	Religion	Ethnicity	Education	Status
12: 18 - 20 years	16: male	17: orthodox	18: Romanian	15: High school with baccalaureate	0: Married
15: 20 - 25 years	2: female	0: reformed	0: other	2: Higher education in progress	18: Single
1: 25 - 30 years		0: roman - catholic		1: Higher education completed with a bachelor degree	
		1: catholic			

distribution is the military occupation itself, which, by its specificity, requires certain traits and qualities.

This results from analyzing their behavior and way of communication during the activity. A first finding is that they are sensitive to the attitude of their superior towards them. Whether it is a compliment or a negative remark, it influences their state and mode of action or inaction. The superior's attitude towards his subordinates, his personal example, the methods he uses in the training and education process have a special impact on the students.

A second finding highlights the typology of the subjects, i.e. the students from a military college, respectively the six subjects from the study group, react differently to requests compared to those from the civilian environment. We noticed that they organize themselves immediately, they have a drive for reaction, they are good performers, but also good teammates.

Another finding, corroborating the first two, is that the other subjects regulate their behavior according to the group, in situations where actions, commands are constituted this way, but also by their own subjective reality. The students' behavior is outer regulated on the one hand, through requirements, commands, orders, or inner regulated, through the beliefs and values they associated themselves with. Where the system of own beliefs and values and the way in which one practically behaves there is a close unity, and at the same time, the requirements system is

fully respected through conduct, the result is an execution oriented integration, with a very high percentage. From this point of view, two situations arose: two subjects were identified, which proved that there is no correlation between the military life behavior and norms; the rest of the subjects responded appropriately to the entire range of requests.

Hence, two other situations derive: **1)** the two subjects who proved an inconsistent behavior with the regulatory requirements, prove a subjective reality that does not correspond to the system organizational culture and that, over time, cannot contribute to an intersubjective reality achievement, based on the whole values and beliefs gear. Subjects can respond positively to requests in line with their obligations, but integration and engagement in activities is supported by the sanctioning system, not by their own convictions; **2)** the behavior of the subjects that agree with the official requirements is generated by self-regulation exercised by one's own conscience, by personal beliefs regarding the necessity and use of various norms and regulations.

Another observation that stands out is the importance of the pedagogue, since nothing influences more the individuals than the way in which all activities are organized, managed and carried out, whether it is a training session, an exercise, a cultural-artistic activity. Also, motivation was the basis of the students' choice, on the one hand, a choice assumed by the congruence between their own reality (subjective) and the military school reality, in general (objective), in a

percentage of 33% with the rest of the percentage given by the choice generated by safety and stability. The interaction of the group leads to a transfer of personality. Thus, the personality of the group is built from different subjective realities, which leads to the intersubjective reality that gives contour to the values and character traits in real, day-to-day behavior, creating an image of what the NCO profile represents / i.e. the petty officers.

Systematic observation allowed me to monitor students' behaviors in an environment that has become almost familiar, both in the conduct of a classroom activity and in the conduct of specialized military training. The collection of the data provided by the subjects in the two situations allowed us to outline and reconfirm the need for genuine human resources, which, through training programs, acquire the skills necessary for a military occupation, starting from the duties and attributions of the position. This leads to the idea of a vocational qualification that provides general and military-specific skills.

Research results

Each individual, constantly identifies himself with a group or a community through his own inner universe. A subjective identity construction begins with personal research, but also with external representations sortings for which one expressses his consent, only for the comprehensive ones. Awareness and recognition of a subjective reality is the first condition to achieve attachment to a team or community. This occurs at the confluence of the impressions transmitted from the outside and the involuntary experiences that arise inside. Subjective reality, through its qualities: benevolence, freedom, resistance to pain, simplicity, seriousness, greatness of soul, are an individual's strength, his imprint. It thus follows that "values are rooted, indisputably, in the particular needs of everyone" (Papadima 2021, 40). If objective reality is constructed from things external to us, they are neither good nor bad, they are in one position or another according to their influence on us. Thus, an entity that chooses a professional path in accordance with its subjective reality, results in the achievement of a vocational occupation if there are congruent own values and institutional values that correspond to it. Moreover, if the interpersonal relationships lead to the creation of groups and communities, then the foundations of intersubjective reality are laid.

The study carried out at educational institutions level supports the fact that the perception sensed at the military educational institutions management level, as well as at departments level, is a predictor of an evolution potential. In this sense, the subjective reality outlined at a personal level by each actor involved in the transformation process, has an essential role through the implicit obligation to support the project beyond it, taking into account, the objective reality, ultimately contributing to revitalization of the military education system, through the function held. Both those involved at the leadership level and those who contribute practically to its development build an intersubjective reality, becoming spiritual creators, using a personalized matrix according to personal emotions, beliefs and filters potential that become a common project.

It is confirmed that a confrontation between the level of strategic management and the need for change leads to the identification of the objective, an impartial reality that can be extremely rigorous and difficult. This is mainly due a mechanism responsible in the expected change. The transition from current professional qualifications to military ones requires, a rigorous analysis and a strategic design that highlights the stages of the process especially through the prism of the effects, first of all. Considering the range of the project, in addition to the responsibility held by the organization providing education, through the process of creating and proposing professional training standards, as well as the entire approach regarding the accreditation of new training programs, a great responsibility also rests with the coordinating structures that have duties in the process of obtaining approvals and reconfiguring the elements of legislation in the field.

Belief in the same values leads people to associate, to collaborate in the form of a community or force that harmonizes actions and leads to a privileged way of life. Therefore, each individual must practice their duties consciously, in the field of professional life, perform what they must, considering the moral good as an absolute value.

Conclusions

The change, viewed from the military education system modernization perspective was

analyzed in terms of the effects it implies, not only regarding the legislative dimension, curriculum architecture, resources of all types, but also the challenge to recognize the subjective realities of all the training and education process actors, to value them and support the of military values and belief-centered intersubjective reality development, given to the post-secondary military school organizational culture. Beyond the achievement of goals, mutual support, resources and knowledge, the importance of the elements that lead to the construction of a solid relationship, based on mutual trust, respect and honesty, constitute invaluable resources. Teamwork and breaking down barriers, making each employee responsible for the services provided, loyalty primarily to the institution, but also to the beneficiaries, valuing innovation, all these indicate that such an approach leads to an increase in the quality of education, as a model that it can only be adopted voluntarily, at an individual and organizational level, never being about the quality of someone else's education, but about the quality of one's own activity.

In this sense, the post-secondary military school develops general requirements that can make a difference between organizations: the development of an own organizational culture, investment in people, the existence of policies and strategies, plans regarding the quality of education, clear knowledge of roles and responsibilities, as well as of responsibilities as long as long-term planning. Progress, development, optimization must be seen as a permanent process, therefore understood dynamically and not statically. This is consonant with the evolution of societies in recent decades: change has become permanent, increasingly rapid and unpredictable. School is seen as a stable place where human values are preserved and new generations, the role of cultural transmission being to ensure cultural continuity or to configure and assume one's own organizational culture. But throughout the world it has become evident between what the school supports and conveys and what the individual or nation needs to survive in a changing society. As such, the adaptation of the philosophy of educational institutions to new realities is increasingly strong. This process is based not only on the implicit need, derived from the inherent obligation to change, as an uncontrollable force in manageable challenges, but also underpins other causes. The pandemic led, surprisingly and painfully, to changes that led the individual and society to restart all previous beliefs and customs. Agility and adaptability are just two of the qualities that must be woven into the fabric of any organization so that it changes naturally and freely.

Very important in this process are communication about the need for change, the impact and benefits brought to the organization, and supporting and encouraging those involved in the change process by actually participating in it. From this perspective, moving to the provision of exclusively military training programs, by going through the process of recognizing military occupation and related professional qualifications, it all responds to the needs identified in the answers received with the first question. Thus, a collective project is created, mandatorily accompanied by rigorous planning, resources and research.

The results of the endeavour demonstrate the fact that reality cannot be entirely known and it is not singular, confirming the existence of at least two realities, the objective and the subjective one. Vital, however, especially for the military education system, is the one developed through individuals and the intersubjective reality interactions. This is the social reality representation, which makes the transition from quantitative methods studying a pose real nature to qualitative methods for studying the constructed reality relational character, from a reality neutral observer to an involved one, to the relationship that the known world builds with those who accumulate knowledge about it, and especially about science, as a social process or relational activity. Let us not forget that structure, technique and patterns are not the enemies of creativity, but they are its source and foundation.

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ANNEX

Target group observation sheet

Date: ...

Subject codes:

Experiment start time:

experiment End time :

Familiarization stage:

Identify the behavior:

What does the subject do?

Clarify your communication style:

How does the subject respond?

Measure the purpose:

How does the subject argue his motivation?

How did the subject choose the military career?

The temporal horizon	Before the experiment	During the experiment	After the experiment
Duration of interventions			
Interruptions			
Categorical statements			
Authoritative tone			

Target group Systematic observation grid

Communication style of subjects	Characteristics of styles of communication	Subject 1	Subject 2	Subject 3	Subject....	Subject 18
Action-oriented style	The subject talks about results, goals, moving forward, achievements, change, decisions					
	The subject is direct, determined, jumps from one idea to another, energetic					
Process-centered style	The subject talks about facts, planning, experiments, details					
	The subject is logical, unemotional, patient, cautious					
People-centered style	The subject talks about people, feelings, beliefs, values, hopes, relationships					
	The subject is spontaneous, empathetic, emotional, sensitive, understanding					
Style centered on ideas	The subject talks about opportunities, news, nuanced projects, potential					
	The subject is creative, full of ideas, difficult to understand, unrealistic, annoying					

THE INFLUENCE OF CULTURE IN CHINA'S POLITICS. THE CHINESE PERSPECTIVE ON THE CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES

Diana-Elena VEREȘ, Ph.D. student[*]

In the past few decades soft power has become, , the most commonly used foreign term on the Asian continent and has received special attention both from specialists in International Relations and from the representatives of the Chinese Communist Party. Stepping into the third millennium, China shows a tendency of reconfiguration for its position and role in relation to the other great powers of the world, and adopts the soft power strategy, which is adapted to assert itself globally. For almost two decades in which the concept of soft power has been studied and attempts to adapt it to the country's values have been made, China concludes that its tradition, culture, history and philosophy can be an advantage in creating links with the other countries from Asia as well as those outside the Asian continent.

In this regard, the Chinese government is allocating a generous amount of money for the establishment of Chinese language, culture and literature centers, named Confucius Institute around the world, starting with Asia. At present, China argues that their role is particularly important, as these centers, built on the model of English, French, or Spanish language centers, are not only aimed at the Chinese-speaking public, but are an intermediary between China and the host country, in order to establish cooperative relations, presenting Chinese culture, history and civilization and attracting as many sympathizers as possible.

The article presents, describes and analyzes the structure and operation of the Confucius Institutes from a Chinese perspective, and illustrates the relationship between China's soft power policy and their operating program, as exposed by Chinese sources as well.

Keywords: China; soft power; Confucianism; Confucius Institutes.

Confucius, Confucianism and Confucius Institutes

Confucius is known as the greatest Chinese thinker in history and the founder of the school of thought that bears his name. During his lifetime, he tried to introduce his philosophical ideas into the country's political practice, but was unable to do so, so he withdrew from public life and devoted his life to writing. The central idea Confucian philosophy spins around is the importance of the group in building a harmonious society, an alignment with the Chinese government's new tendency to open up to the world by replacing socialist ideas with a system centered on Confucian principles (Li 2006, 583).

In the twentieth century last decades, with the economic liberation led by Deng Xiaoping and the gradual opening of China to the West, signs began to suggest that traditional Chinese culture remained, even during the Maoist period, deeply imprinted in the consciousness of the Chinese people. On the cultural front, it was during this period, from the 1980s onwards, that the cultural fever phenomenon began to emerge, a phenomenon bearing its name from the intellectuals` increased interest for all the aspects on Chinese culture and history (Billioud and Thoraval 2007, 5).

Thus, from this post-Maoist period, a message of tolerance towards Confucianism was conveyed by the government. At this stage, Confucian ideas went through a neutral period, i.e. they were neither promoted nor banned, as was the case during the Maoist period. One proof of this is the participation of Gu Mu, vice-premier of that period, in a symposium dedicated to Confucius, who presented Confucianism as the crystallization of Chinese national culture (Billioud and Thoraval 2007, 6).

Since the 1990s, the attitude of both the government and the population has been increasingly open to Confucian values. Thus, China is reintroducing the Confucian notion of harmony. Harmony, the foundation of classical Chinese society, is once again being brought to the attention of Chinese leaders, who are proposing to

Babeș-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca
e-mail: *elenadianaveres@gmail.com*

rebuild a harmonious society. In the 2006 Cultural Development Plan, Confucian terms such as harmony, filial piety and peace have increasingly found their way into Chinese discourse (Rošker 2013, 4).

Since 2014 onward, China's new leader has been laying the foundations for a new socialism with Chinese characteristics, which means a renewal of Chinese society through the prism of traditional culture. Basically, Xi Jinping sees the future effectiveness of the party as dependent on the level of growing interest in the country's millennia-old culture. Thus, he even states the following: A nation's culture is a unique feature that distinguishes one nation from another (Xi 2018, 2).

At the same time, Xi urges the promotion of the cultural spirit that has stood the test of time and is of great value today. Thus, the return to Confucianism has been gradual, initially readopting cultural values, and now these values are making their presence felt in the political sphere of the country's governance.

Now, in the 21st century, the Chinese people have been increasingly confronted with an incompatibility between the ideas forwarded by Marxism and the innovation brought about by the contemporary period, to which, in their desire for development and evolution, they have had to find solutions to adapt. In other words, contemporary society brings evolution, but leaves an increasingly unmanageable moral vacuum in the Chinese consciousness. The solution to fill this gap is to return to the Confucian moral values that were suppressed and denied in the immediate aftermath of the communist regime in China, as they were seen as the main obstacle between the Chinese people and modernization (Liu 2011, 195).

China makes great efforts to present itself, to make itself known and to have a dialogue with its Asian neighbors and countries in the rest of the world, realizing that socialist ideology could be a factor of mistrust in terms of freedom of speech. As a result, it draws on its millennia-old culture, the cultural symbols which China has identified itself with, the most important element being Confucian philosophy and, implicitly, its founder, Confucius.

Today, his name is borne by several hundred educational centers called Confucius Institutes. These are not centers that propagate Confucian ideas and have no close connection with this Chinese personality but have only borrowed his name, associating the Institutes with a Chinese symbol that relates to its millennial history. The Confucius Institutes are centers for teaching Chinese language to non-Chinese audiences. They were established with the support of the Chinese government and have been present since 2004 on all continents (Hughes 2014, 52).

The Institutes operate in collaboration with foreign universities in major cities around the world and aim to promote understanding of China, language and culture, as presented on Hanban official website, an educational institution affiliated to the Chinese Ministry of Education under which all Confucius Institutes are located (Pan 2013, 26).

Chronologically, the first Confucius Institute was set in 2004 in Seoul, South Korea. Four years later, in 2008 there were already 292 Confucius Institutes and classes in various schools in 78 countries. In 2011, there were other 473 Confucius Institutes in 104 countries. Today, there are 579 Confucius Institutes around the world, with the largest number in Europe (Hanban 2019). According to Hanban website, the opening of another 500 such Institutes will be approved by the end of 2020, with the aim of making China known for what it is, a movement called the *Confucius Revolution.*

There are various ways in which Hanban is working together to establish a Confucius Institute. Usually, the partner universities provide the location and all the facilities, while the Chinese side provides the teaching staff, course materials and various other ancillary materials especially designed for foreign students. Of course, given that the number of Confucius Institutes is constantly increasing, the main problem Hanban faces is to provide the necessary number of specialized teachers, which amounts to about 100,000 people per year (Pan 2013, 29). In this regard, China has also developed a volunteer program in which young Chinese students or graduates from the course of teaching Chinese as a foreign language can be engaged in this project and receive permission to contribute to the promotion of Chinese culture and language anywhere in the world.

The activities of the Confucius Institute, according to Hanban, are as follows: assisting students from all fields in learning Chinese

language, training Chinese language instructors and providing materials for teaching language and culture, organizing HSK Chinese language certificate, informing about Chinese culture, economy and society, conducting research on contemporary China and promoting open activities to encourage foreigners to get involved in learning about China (Liu 2011, 195). In recent years, with China's opening up to the West, with the development of the economy and due to its growing presence around the world, interest in the Chinese language has been on the rise, here of course there are different factors, each individual having their own motivation.

Currently, about 2,500 universities around the world provide courses in Chinese language, literature, culture and there are about forty million students registered for Chinese language courses at university level. In addition to these, several million others study in non-academic settings, in language centers, online or at Confucius Institutes (Meng 2012, 182).

Confucius Institutes from the Chinese perspective

In China, a five-year plan was designed with reference to the educational side, initiated and supported by the Chinese government and emphasizes the importance of promoting the Chinese language study abroad (Zaharna 2014, 9-10). This is due to China's confidence in its own potential and diplomacy, making use of language and culture to subsequently establish economic relations.

Thus, the Confucius Institutes have seen a great deal of promotion in this five-year project, as the main tool through which China can achieve its goal. In 2007, a Confucius Institutes office was established in Beijing to improve the organization of the other Institutes abroad. Spatially, Confucius Institutes can be found around Asia, in Europe, Australia and North America.

All the countries where China has approved their establishment are countries of great importance in terms of potential economic development relations and are relevant to both China's projects and diplomatic work. Thus, we can see the large, growing number of Institutes in Europe, but if we look at the economic side of the collaborations between China and the target

countries, we can conclude that this is not at all surprising. As far as Asia is concerned, the large number of Confucius Institutes reflects the leading position China is assuming vis-à-vis its East Asian neighbors and the promotion of a harmonious development policy together with other countries.

The rationale behind the establishment of the Institutes is China's desire to restore its national image and counter the theory that it is a threat to the countries with which it has built ties. The Institutes, a particularly important tool of Chinese soft power, help build relations and partnerships with the target country, promoting a friendly, non-threatening image of China. China's stake for so-called peaceful development is to establish partnerships and promote a new, attractive image through culture, with the Confucius Institutes at its core (Zaharna 2014, 195).

Through the Institutes, China sends messages of harmony, willingness and initiative to create a good international environment conducive to shared development. In order to show as much transparency as possible and with the aim of promoting its millennial culture, a suite of important elements relevant to Chinese culture such as Chinese New Year, Tea Ceremony, Confucius' birthday are exported from the domestic level and presented internationally within the Institutes and with the help of Chinese teachers, who are true ambassadors of Chinese culture, responsible for the relations between the target country and China.

From the Chinese perspective, the ultimate goal of the Institutes is to serve as a development platform for establishing stable, strong international relations and to facilitate interaction between countries at the diplomatic level, with Chinese government representatives believing that in dealing with different areas, the only way to know commonalities and identify inconsistencies is through communication. In other words, initial differences can lead to cooperation and friendly relations between China and the rest of the countries (Hong and Lin 2011, 38).

Sun Ya Pan, a professor in the Department of Social Sciences in Hong Kong, identifies and expounds the three approaches of cultural diplomacy reflected in the Confucius Institutes operation mechanism, which confirms China's plan to recognize the potential Chinese language teaching has in establishing international relations,

increasing foreign investment and not the least, increasing the soft power influence in relation to the target country.

Thus, it was since 1980 that Hanban has been concerned with developing different ways of teaching Chinese abroad, and until 2000 it operated as an agency providing such services. Since 2004, Hanban has been supported by the government and has expanded its scope to incorporate all elements of cultural diplomacy to support China's efforts to increase its soft power. The dynamic growth in the number of Institutes, the cooperative relationships established at universities around the world, and China's growing popularity among people on the rest of the continents reflect the fact that China's soft power is also growing.

The three diplomatic approaches (Pan 2013, 196) that can be found in the Confucius Institutes' agenda of activities are as follows:

1. To promote China's culture, tradition and foreign policy among local communities, these activities being closely conditioned by good cooperative relations between representatives of the Institutes and those of affiliated universities. Thus, China is present through teachers and volunteers in various activities taking place in shopping centers, parks, entertainment venues, with demonstrations of calligraphy, film screenings, traditional Chinese painting, music, film screenings, traditional cuisine, etc.

2. Establishing contacts with political representatives, intellectuals, business partners in the context of cultural events, with the aim of preparing the ground for the subsequent establishment of possible business relations. To this end, China has invited leadership representatives from the countries with successful Institute initiatives on official visits, to attend sports competitions and film launches, considering that friendship leaves no room for competition.

3. The Institutes' final method of action targets the general public, people who have nothing in common with China, from children to the elderly, with the aim of spreading the Chinese tradition and forming a positive opinion among the masses. Thus, representatives of Confucius Institutes organize entertainment and cultural activities, intercultural festivals in each target country and get in touch with as many people as possible, striving to attend activities targeting audiences of all ages, as often as

possible. In this vein, Hanban representatives claim that Confucius Institutes' main objective is not to exercise soft power, but to enable the world to understand Chinese culture and civilization and to make this possible through teaching Chinese (Tao and Wang 2018, 13).

Challenges to the harmonious development through culture

China is making great efforts to increase the number of Confucius Institutes in the world, but it faces various difficulties, the main problem being target countries` skepticism towards China's intentions and the inability to collaborate due to significant political differences. In this respect, China is wrapping its socialism in Confucian values, seeking to give new meaning to this philosophy in order to use it as a link between the democratic society outside China and, at the same time, to avoid infringement on the socialist values existing within the country.

China is accused by some of its more skeptical partners of using these Institutes for political control. Despite this, professors at the Institutes, including Xu Lin, say that the Institutes' courses discuss language and culture, not issues of political ideology (Tao and Wang 2018, 16).

The goals of China's actions regarding the Confucius Institutes were not achieved due to the discrepancy between the large number of Institutes opened in a relatively short time and the inability to send enough competent teaching staff to cover the courses scheduled in them, which put quantity over quality and showed a lack of professionalism. Also, domestic support from the Chinese people for this far-reaching action by the Chinese government was minimal, as Chinese education tried to assimilate modern Western ideas which it adapted to its own system (Meng 2012, 17). The Westernization of the Chinese education system leads to an incongruity between the image foreigners have on Chinese values, including Confucianism, and the actual values prevalent in Chinese society.

Another issue that raises problems in fulfilling the mission of the Confucius Institutes is their future plans, with specialists presenting the hypothesis that foreign language teaching, in this case – Chinese, is not sustainable for the of cooperative relations establishment at the economic level. Even in this regard, China is proposing the establishment

of a Confucius Institutes research Centre which will take into account the developments of all the Institutes and gradually introduce other programmers related to Chinese language teaching.

Among these institutes' operating rules, there is a ban on the Confucius Institutes taking part in activities that are not in line with their mission, which has left room for interpretation by sceptics. With all openness, sensitive topics related to China's politics, human rights, Taiwan, Tibet, Falun Gong, Hong Kong, are often politely avoided.

However, the reasons why universities accept these partnerships are due to several factors: to benefit from the annual financial support received from China, to broaden their educational offer and also because of the lack of alternatives to provide courses in Chinese culture, language and civilization. There are a number of China's partners who have overlooked the restrictions imposed on the Confucius Institute, due to their dependence on Chinese financial support and also out of a desire to avoid offending the ideological beliefs of their Chinese partners (Meng 2012, 37).

Role and activity of Confucius Institutes in Romania

There are currently four Confucius Institutes in Romania, as follows: Sibiu (2007), Cluj (2009), Brasov (2012) and Bucharest (2013), and in addition to these, two other Confucius classes opened in Deva and Constanta, Confucius classes operating in collaboration with high schools in these cities and addressing students from highschool environment (Tomozei 2018, 1). According to the cooperation agreement between the Office of International Relations for the Study of the Chinese Language (Hanban) and "Lucian Blaga" University of Sibiu, the purpose of establishing the Confucius Institute is to strengthen cooperation between Romania and China, to support and promote the development of Chinese language studies and to enhance mutual understanding between the Romanian and Chinese peoples. In addition to their mission of promoting and propagating Chinese culture, language and civilization, they also had the role of supplementing the teaching staff of the Chinese language and literature sections of the Faculties of Foreign Languages and Literatures, facilitating dialogue between Chinese and Romanian officials and organizing

various activities aimed at promoting the Chinese language, such as organizing trips, summer camps, taking the exam for the Chinese language certificate, etc. (Confucius Institute Agreement 2019, 1).

Among the tasks of the Confucius Institutes is the preparation for the HSK (hanyu shui ping kaoshi) exams, whereby students receive a Hanban-recognised Chinese language certificate that serves as a passport for the admission process for students applying to study at partner universities in China. Also, primary and secondary school students can choose to prepare and take the YCT (Youth Chinese Test). The Confucius Institutes also offer a number of scholarships to study in China to learners who perform very well in Chinese language courses and organize a summer school program, where learners can visit China for two weeks with Chinese teachers (Hubbert 2014, 33).

Another relevant activity in which the Confucius Institutes participate in partnership with the Chinese Embassy is the Chinese Bridge competition, (hanyu qiao), where learners, representing Confucius Institutes from each country, participate in a competition where they showcase their knowledge of Chinese language, culture, civilization and art. The winners of the national stage qualify for the international stage, which takes place annually in China (Hubbert 2014, 33).

At the same time, it was also possible to notice an openness on the part of the local authorities who took part in the various activities organized by the Confucius Institutes in Romania, but in the case of these institutes, being opened relatively recently, we cannot speak of a major influence in rethinking the relationship between the two countries, as the good cooperation between the Romanian public and the Institute is largely due to the already existing Romanian-Chinese relations. The only concrete result that could be observed in the activities of these institutes is the support of students in the process of learning Chinese language and the familiarization of the foreign public with the elements of Chinese culture. However, the presence of Chinese teachers is of great help to the universities, which is proved by the increasing number of students in the Departments of Asian Languages and Literatures as well as at the pre-university level (Wang 2016, 36).

Conclusions

China's new openness to the West is intended to send a message of goodwill, to make itself known and thus to establish cooperative international relations with a view to economic development. To this end, the Chinese government is using the soft power instruments at its disposal: millennia-old culture, civilization, philosophy and the Chinese language, and is banking on the fact that anything different from the West will appeal primarily to the civilian population. According to this plan, China believes it will succeed in holding a dialogue with democratic countries, establishing close economic relations and partnerships, distracting the public from the shortcomings left behind by a communist-style government and emphasizing the positive elements in the country's culture.

From the information presented in the article, it can be concluded that China's image is currently positioned between two extremes: The first, which is represented by its positive and benevolent attitude, its desire to conquer with its charm, relying on its thousands of years of history, culture and philosophy, and proposing itself as a model of society that has endured over millennia, and the second, rather skeptical perspective of some Western countries that associate the Confucius Institutes with the Trojan horse, considering them as extensions of the Chinese government in the space outside China.

On the other hand, we cannot exclude the real situation, at least at the national level, that their number and status as relatively new Cultural Centers has not allowed them to exert too much influence to be considered valuable instruments of soft power politics. It is true that in the rest of Europe and beyond, the number of these Institutes is significant, which may raise questions and attract skepticism from analysts. This could indeed motivate the decision of foreign universities to stop collaborating with Hanban and suspend the work of the Confucius Institutes.

As it is already known, the effects of soft power are not visible in a short time, and it is necessary to form an objective view before labelling them as a threat or a harmless means of gaining easier access to Chinese language, culture and civilization, a thorough analysis conducted over a long period of time, a possible establishment of an Institutes research Centre operating independently of Hanban, and empowered to refute or confirm any assumptions about the Confucius Institutes and the usefulness of their actions, is needed.

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ȘTEFAN FĂLCOIANU AND THE SUPERIOR SCHOOL OF WAR

Laura-Rodica HÎMPĂ, Ph.D. *

This article aims to present Ștefan Fălcoianu`s personality and vast activity, (June 6, 1835 - January 22, 1905) a research based on the Fălcoianu Family Fund original documents from the Romanian ,National Archives in Bucharest. The documentary fund dates from 1836-1944 and was taken from the Ilfov Archives Branch. The documents contain information about the Fălcoianu family`s genealogy, on General Ștefan Ioniță Fălcoianu`s activity. The preserved correspondence reflects Stefan Fălcoianu's ties with personalities of the time: Constantin Barozzi[1], Octav George Lecca[2] and the Belgian general Henri Alexis Brialmont[3].

Keywords: Ștefan Fălcoianu; Superior School of War; "Carol I" National Defence University; Romanian military education.

I. Ștefan Fălcoianu. Biography

A descendant of a boyar family with medieval roots in Wallachia, Ștefan I. Fălcoianu graduated from Bucharest Soldier's School in 1856, when he was assigned to the 3rd Infantry Regiment, as a second lieutenant platoon commander. The name of the family comes from the land they had possessed since the XVI century in Fălcoiu district, Romanați county (Olt). After his years of service, the ruler Alexandru Ioan Cuza sent him to France to attend the General Staff courses in Paris (1860-1862), where he also graduated from the General Staff Imperial School. During his studies he was promoted to first lieutenant (20 February 1860), then captain (6 June 1862). After completing his military studies, he was assigned to French Army`s General Staff. During this time he also attended the Polytechnic School in Paris (1862-1864).

On his return to the country, he filled various positions as professor at the Military School of Officers, assistant to the head of the Artillery Establishment Directorate, Chief of Staff of the 1st Territorial Military Division, Chief of Cabinet of the Minister of War, Chief of the General Staff (5 April - 23 May 1884; 13 January 1886 - 18 June 1894), Minister of War (23 June 1884 - 12 January 1886). During this time, he was graduallly promoted to general (major in 1865, lieutenant colonel in 1868, colonel in 1877, brigadier general in 1883, major general in 1892).

Retired on 17 June 1870 (when he was already a lieutenant colonel), he returned to work on 23 August 1870 and received the 4th Line Regiment Command (1870-1871). Between 1871-1877 he was again placed in reserve, while he worked in the civil administration as a Ministry of Public Works secretary general and then as a telegraph and post office general director. On April 8, 1877, he was again called to duty with a colonel rank and served as a Central War Administration director general, with the War of Independence outburst.

After the military mission in Grivița 2 failed on October 7/19 1877, the Romanian troops` leadership in the Balkans was reorganized, and Ștefan Fălcoianu was entrusted as the Army of Operations Chief of Staff (October 8/20, 1877). The 4th Divisions were replaced by the 2nd while artillery bombardment and position

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[1] Constantin Barozzi (1833-1921), general and politician, honorary member of the Romanian Academy, director of the Army Geographic Service, chief of the General Staff (1895–1898), founded the military geodetic service in Romania, which is why the Geospatial Intelligence Agency of Defence bears the name "Division General Constantin Barozzi" (AIGA).

[2] Octav George Lecca (1881-1969), Romanian historian and writer, cavalry officer in World War I, conservative politician.

[3] Henri Alexis Brialmont (1821-1903), General and Engineer of Belgian origin, known for his influence on the fortification plans of Bucharest.

*"Carol I" National Defence University
e-mail: l.himpa@gmail.com

corrections were carried out. The plan Ștefan Fălcoianu designed involved uninterrupted artillery firefighting on the enemy. Ottoman troops attempted to break through the circle of investment with a forceful exit on 28 November/10 December 1877. General Alexandru Cernat, the Army of Operations Commander, ordered the resistance in positions and, subsequently, the assault of the 2nd Infantry Division, which managed to penetrate Grivița fort and advance in depth. The attack, in concentric directions against the fortified positions at Opanez, was personally led by Ștefan Fălcoianu, thus managing to push the accompanying artillery as close as possible to the enemy strongholds. With the conquest of Grivița 2, Bukov and Opanez, the Turkish army, led by Osman Pasha, was defeated.

After the conquest of Plevna, at the Poradim War Council (November 30/December 12, 1877), King Carol I, Tsar Alexander II, Grand Duke Nicholas, General Alexandru Cernat and Colonel Ștefan Fălcoianu decided that the Romanian campaign troops should eliminate the Ottoman garrisons in western Bulgaria (Vidin-Belogradcik area), and the Russian troops would carry out the offensive towards Constantinople. Under these conditions, the Army of Operations was reorganized, General Alexandru Cernat took command of the troops in the area of operations as head of the Grand General Headquarters, and Colonel Ștefan Fălcoianu was appointed head of the Grand General Headquarters. The main objective, however, was the conquest of Vidin due to the resistance positions provided with forts, ditches and artillery positions and with the centers of resistance advanced position. In order to be neutralized, a semicircular formation with flanks on the Danube was made, divided into three sectors and framed by 15,000 infantrymen and 2,000 cavalrymen, with 84 guns arranged on the right bank of the Danube and 54 guns placed on the left bank. Because of the unfortunate experiences of the past, frontal assault tactics applied at Pleven, were avoided Ștefan Fălcoianu's proposals within the January 9/21 and January 11/23, 1878 War Councils, related to occupying the enemy's resistance centers were approved and thus, applied on Vidin fortress outer defenceline (Tagargik, Belarada, Rainovcea, Smârdan, Inova, Kapitanovcea, Novoselo). On 11/23 January

1878 Vidin was permanently blocked, the Balkan Mountains front south collapsed, and Mehmet Izzet Pasha declared the surrender of his troops on 13/25 February 1878 (12,0000 men). Peace, however, was far away (the Peace Treaty of San Stefano was signed on February 19/March 3, 1878), the political-diplomatic relations remaining tense between Romania and Tsarist Russia in the first half of 1878. This imposed the maintenance of the troops under arms and the composition of a new defence device on the Olt line.

Following the Peace Congress in Berlin, in the summer of 1878 (Service of the Central Historical National Archives 1878, 1-22) where Ștefan Fălcoianu attended as a military delegate, the Russian army evacuated the country and initiated the demobilization and the reorganization of the Romanian army, the military commands, following the accumulated experiences in the war and under pressure from the great Western European powers.

Ștefan Fălcoianu had an important role in this regard, directly contributing to law elaboration and application on the of military commands organization in 1882, increasing the number of permanent active troops in the army, the passage of reserve troops (militias to the large units and units formed since peace time). He contributed to drafting and applying the law on the military administration in 1883 (thus separating the military planning and leadership, the administration belonging entirely to the Ministry of War). Four corps were established to replace the territorial military between 1882-1884. The measures were taken to make infantry and cavalry permanent (in 1889, 1891 and 1893), initiating the works for the Focșani–Nămoloasa–Galați as well as Bucharest region fortification, the establishment of the Superior Council of the Army (July 10, 1878), consisting of the Minister of War, the Chief of the General Staff, the General Inspectors, commanders of the main fortified positions, the General Secretariat of the Ministry of War (advisory body for military administration and legislation). He also contributed to establishing the General Staff Advisory Committee in 1883 and the Infantry and Cavalry advisory committees (1884-1888), the Artillery (1888), he also created the positions of inspectors general of the Artillery (1883), of

Genius (1887), Cavalry (1889) and others (Oroian and Nicolescu 2001).

II: Ştefan Fălcoianu and the Superior School of War

Established by High Royal Decree, no. 2073 of August 8, 1889, the Superior School of War represented the first Romanian military higher education institution, currently known as "Carol I" National Defence University.

The debut was modest, in the autumn of 1889, in several halls of the General Staff, which was then operating on Ştirbei Vodă Street, in Bucharest.

The prestigious institution founder and organizer was adjutant general Ştefan I. Fălcoianu, chief of the General Staff, an officer who was among the first Bucharest Military School of Officers graduates (April 7, 1854-April 7, 1856).

The Superior School of War emergence debut came in a context in which the need for of senior military personnel training was seen as a national priority. Until 1889, high-ranking officers were sent to study in the major European capitals, to renowned military universities (Turin, Brussels, Paris, Berlin, Vienna)[4] (The Superior School of War 1939, 376). This way of education provided elitist training through direct contact with European civilisation and culture.

The establishment of the Superior School of War, as an intermediary and trainer of the Romanian Army doctrine constituted a necessity brought by the General Staff existence, on November 12, 1859, regulated by no. 83 High Order of the Day, signed by Alexandru Ioan Cuza. The officers who made up this body were recruited from among foreign war schools graduates who "possessed special military knowledge acquired through systematic studies" (Ardeleanu 1994, 5), but without having a Romanian military thinking of their own.

Founder of modern Romania, King Carol I had in mind to turn Bucharest into the capital region with administrative institutions, court houses, churches, cinemas, the Central University

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[4] From 1919 to 1939, 49 Romanian officers were sent to study the great art of war in Paris and 8 officers in Turin. At the same balance of scientific activity was emphasized the vast Romanian military literature "materialized through profound studies and material improvements of all kinds".

Library "Carol I", high schools: "Matei Basarab", "Mihai Viteazul", "Gheorghe Şincai", "Spiru Haret", "Sfântul Sava", "Titu Maiorescu", the Library of the Romanian Academy, the House of State Monopolies, the Council of Ministers, the Palace of the Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Justice, Agronomic Institute, Royal Palace, Patriarchate Palace etc. (Scurtu 2008, 24).

Among King Carol I`s achievements one also counts the Superior School of War (Annex 1). In the founding law first article, the purpose of the institution was established: the training of staff officers and the spreading of high military knowledge in the army. The courses lasted two years and the conditions that the candidates had to meet, listed in article five, were as follows: to have held the rank of lieutenant, to have worked "for at least two years in effective troop service, to have had proper conduct in all respects, to be healthy and have a good physical constitution". A military doctor had to endorse the application referring to "the physical constitution of the candidate, especially sight and hearing".

After 1919, given the situation created by the new alliances concluded after the War of Unification, Romania's collaboration was limited to the Higher Schools of War in Turin and Paris. It is also officially recognized that Romania took over the French army doctrine after the UnificationWar (1914-1916).

From the evolution of the General Staff, from the initial forms to nowadays, conception and doctrinal training complex structure, all dominated by a specific national character, a decisive step was also the emergence from the Superior School of War, which left its mark on high-ranking officers education, while encouraging cooperation with other armies, research and innovation, all leading to the maximization of the operative capacity, and thus to the efficiency of the entire army.

Thus, the purpose of the prestigious Romanian military higher education institution was kept alive and achieved, served with devotion and high feelings of patriotism, both by the Romanian Army superior officers that formed, as well as by Romanian culture important names that made up the teaching staff, starting from Nicolae Alevra (organization and mobilization of the army), Alexandru Averescu (applied tactics), Ion Popovici (military and maritime

history), Mihail Boteanu (communications and fortifications), Scarlat Panaitescu (topography and fortifications), Radu R. Rosetti (tactics), David Praporgescu (tactics and notions of naval tactics), Bogdan Petriceicu Hasdeu (Romanian military art), Nicolae Iorga (general history), Ioan Găvănescu (military psychology), Zamfir Arbore (Russian and Bulgarian), Aurel Popovici (German), Grigore Alexandrescu, Simion Mehedinţi, Dimitrie Gusti, Henri H. Stahl, Dimitrie Caracostea etc. (Pascu 1988, 145).

The need for modernization, improvement and alignment with the requirements of the time led to a permanent expansion of student officers` fields of training, arting from the Superior School of War inauguration speech delivered by its founder, General Ștefan Fălcoianu in November 1889, according to which "The need to create a Superior School of War was much felt and persistently requested by the General Staff of the Army. (...) We will put all our efforts in fulfilling this duty with the most vivid interest; we will comply with orders, and we are sure that we will get the support contest of our most enlightened comrades, and thus, we hope that together we will all make this important institution give the fruits that the Army expects of it" (Fălcoianu 1889, 764-765).

There have been name changes and transformations, and the aforementioned words have accomplished their true meaning year after year.

Portrait of Ștefan Fălcoianu.
Engraving by Nicolae Grigorescu,
Library of the Romanian Academy

National Defence University "Carol I".
Engraving by Eugen Ilina, The Union of Plastic Artists of Romania

ANNEXES

No. 2073 HIGH ROYAL DECREE/8 August 1889 (Army Monitor 1889, 891-894) ESTABLISHING THE SUPERIOR SCHOOL OF WAR.

CAROL I,

By the grace of God and national will, king of Romania, to all present and future, good health!

In view of Article 4 of the law on March 1883, on the staff service, on the report of our Minister Secretary of State at the War Department no. 14.498, we have decreed and decree:

Article 1. A Higher School of War is established affiliated to the General Staff, with the purpose to train staff officers.

Article 2. The recruitment of student officers for this school will be done according to the law, through a competition between lieutenants and captains of all services, who will have had at least two years of effective troop service, with good conduct and a healthy physical constitution.

Article 3. The number of students to be admitted now, for the beginning, will be ten. Student officers will be detached from their original units and will wear the uniform of their service.

Article 4. The entrance exam will be written, oral and practical. It will consist of four tests: the written test, composed of two compositions, one of which is in French or German, the oral test on the subjects in the admission curriculum, the practical test consisting in applying the   recognition   drawing board on the field and the riding test.

Article 5. The subjects of the competition will be as follows: military legislation and administration, military art and history, artillery, fortification, geography, topography, infantry, cavalry and artillery regulations.

Article 6. The school's courses will last for   two years. They will start every year on 1st of November and end on 1st of June next year, from 1st June to 1st October, students will perform exercises on the ground, such as topographical works, Staff trips, border trips and participation in the annual maneuvers. (...)

THE FIRST RULES OF THE SUPERIOR SCHOOL OF WAR SINCE 1889 (The Superior School of War 1939, 37-39)

PART I
ORGANIZATION, EDUCATION, DISCIPLINE, HYGIENE
CHAPTER I
PURPOSE OF THE SCHOOL

Article 1. The Superior School of War aims to train staff officers and to spread high military knowledge in the army.

Article 2. This School is established in connection to the General Staff.

The Chief of the General Staff has superior supervision both over the school's progress and over the exams in general.

Article 3. The School's courses last for two years and start every year on November 1st and end on June 1st of the following year, and from July 1st to November 1st, students are on the field exclusively, for topographical work, Staff trips, border trips and participation in annual maneuvers. (...)

ADJUTANT GENERAL ŞTEFAN I. FĂLCOIANU OBITUARY
(June 6, 1835 - January 22, 1905) (SANIC) (Military Romania 1904)

With the death of adjutant general Stefan I. Fălcoianu, the country lost another enlightened, patriotic son, and one of the most capable army generals, who took part in Romania`s military rebirth.

General Ştefan I. Fălcoianu`s military and public career is among the most brilliant ones, due to his work power, his vast erudition, superior intelligence, special education, his firm and energetic character.

On April 7, 1854 he joined the Military School, and on April 7, 1856 he was promoted to the rank of second lieutenant in the 3rd Line Infantry Regiment, being part of the first Military School promotion, which included the first army generals whose names will resist the country's independence history.

Later on, in 1859, he was sent abroad, in 1860 he was admitted to the General Staff School in Paris, which he graduated with great success in December 1862, remaining attached to the General Staff of the French army until 1864, the year in which he returned to the country with the rank of captain.

On September 4, 1865, he was promoted major to the Staff Corps on September 26, 1868, lieutenant colonel in the same corps, while he also served as a First Division Chief of Staff.

On January 17, 1869, he retired, and in August of the same year, he was recalled to work at the 4th Line Regiment.

On August 16, 1872, he retired again by the withdrawal of his position. Between 1870 and 1877 he filled the Ministry of Public Works secretary general position as well as that of the Telegraphs and Post General Director. Moreover, he was elected as a member of the Romanian Academy in 1876.

On April 6, 1877, recalled to service, he was promoted to the rank of colonel, as a director general for the Central Administration of War.

On 20 October 1877 he was appointed as an army Chief of Staff and took part in the operations around Plevna and those around Vidin. Later, he was appointed as a Government representative for the European Commission and then as a member of the Army Superior Council Permanent Commission.

On April 20, 1880, on the occasion of the Railway State`s regain, he was appointed as a Railways General Director.

On 10 March 1883 (he was) promoted to brigadier general.

On April 15, 1883, he was appointed as a Chief of the General Staff of the Army and military schools General Inspector.

On 10 May 1892 he was promoted to major general, and on 8 June 1894 he resigned from the army.

He was a senator for several times, a president of the Polytechnic Society, a member of the Geographical Society, etc.

He received an inordinate number of medals, as follows: the Star of Romania as a commander, the Crown of Great Romania as an officer, the Hohenzolern cl. (class) II, Osmanie cl. III, with the medal Bene-merenti cl. I, The Golden Military Virtue-Defenders of Independence and Russian Commemorative, with the honorary signs of gold and silver for 18 and 25 years of service, as well as the Cross of the Danube Crossing.

By the regulation of no. 2291High Decree, awarded October 10, 1876, he was granted the distinction of wearing the royal initial adjutant insignia.

This is General Ştefan Ioan Fălcoianu`s state of service, military and civilian, a clear evidence of the fact that this late leader, so deeply regretted, endowed with superior organizational and conduct

qualities, contributed to setting the foundation for of our army glory and laying the grounds, to a special extent, not only for the organization but also for other state institutions, which he was called upon to be led by those who knew how to appreciate general Fălcoianu's vast scientific knowledge, as well as his exceptional energy. In particular, as a Railway General manager, he unified this important service and improved administration, performing a monumental work in this area as well.

The part, played by General Fălcoianu in the demanding position as an active army Chief of Staff, his role in the operations around Plevna – where he carried out in advance the preparations that the Turks were doing, for performing the breach on November 28 and announced the Allied army in time as well as (for the role) in the operations around Vidin, is known to all officers and Romanians who studied the Romanian army military deeds in the war for independence. This will always be carved in the national history. Who else could have been better entrusted with the difficult task of compiling the "History of the 1877-78 Campaign "but this historical character?

This work of great merit is the expression of the perfect work and special capacity which our late leader was endowed with. All of this professor `s Higher School of War students who had the happiness to listen to the description of the war events directly from the source, will never be able to forget how much enthusiasm and devotion he placed in performing his patriotic and national duties.

On the occasion of Dobrogea Delimitation of, he brought great services to the country in drawing the border from Bulgaria.

He was also used in the most important and sensitive missions abroad, which he accomplished with great tact and intelligence, bringing great and real benefits to the country.

Convinced of the command staffs`importance he worked relentlessly on the development of this service in which he saw the future of the army, and organized the Superior School of War in 1889, devoting an incredible amount of work and boundless benevolence, which made this high institution of culture the hotbed gathering the ranks of military intelligence, characters, and wills. Under his direction the first promotion of Superior School of War graduate officers came out .

The main factor that gave the army the necessary momentum to start off on the progress path in which it still is nowadays,was adjutant general Ștefan Fălcoianu who inspired his prodigious activity, in military and public life, by a characteristic note that can be described by will, work, patriotism, superior qualities that he knew how to plant in the mind and heart of his subordinates, through his intelligence, character, education and superior qualities. His works and deeds are undeniable testimonials to the love for this tireless fighter military life, a representative of the Romanian spirit. Those who were fortunate to serve under his comamnd knew how great his mind and heart were, how endless his love and how much work he spent for the good of the army, how much he contributed to raising the prestige of the epaulette and the morale of the troops.

Founder of the Military Romania magazine, for which he has always shown the most special solicitude, sending its direction on the most appropriate and good path, he was the stem that gave rise to the next generations who had no other desire than to follow his great deeds good example.

All the soldiers` deep gratitude and the eternal memory that the Romanian Army will hold will undoubtedly make this great Romanian soldier's soul rest in peace.

ANNEX 4

(Service of the Central Historical National Archives – SANIC, Fălcoianu Family Fund, file 4, tab 23)

(Service of the Central Historical National Archives – SANIC, Fălcoianu Family Fund, file 4, tab 27)

(PHOTO: Laura Hîmpă, 12.08.2022)

The life-size statue of Mrs. Alexandrina Fălcoianu (9.11.1848-3.10.1870), offered to eternity in the
Bellu cemetery in Bucharest by the French sculptor Antoine-Augustin Préault (1809-1879).
Born Bascoveanu, the young wife died at the age of only 22, following complications at birth.

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ECONOMIC DETERMINATIONS OF THE HYBRID WAR WHICH FOLLOWED THE FORCED DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF ROMANIA

Ilie-Răsvan DUMITRU, Ph.D. candidate*

The deindustrialization process of Romania, applied methodically and persistently after the 90s, seems not to be part of the natural path towards industry 4.0, but rather to be a systematic process of planned destruction and erasure of the post-December industry, on a new Valev Plan system conceived in the secret laboratories of the artisans of the new world configuration. The insistence with which there was a systematic and planned demolition of most of the large industrial capacities and platforms betrays obscure interests that can no longer be placed under the umbrella of classifying them as obsolete or non-performing, but rather as inconvenient for foreign markets and foreign capitals. To better understand the mechanisms that acted in order to reset Romania and return it to the status of a semi-agrarian colony, exporting raw materials, natural resources and cheap labor, materialized by the destruction of the heavy, petrochemical, food and car manufacturing industry, we will need to analyze in depth the essence of the manifestation framework of the processes that support globalism as an ideology and globalization as a supra-state and neo-colonialist policy of the great international power centers.

Keywords: hybrid warfare; deindustrialization; state actors; corporations; economic assassins.

Industry has always been very important to economic development, becoming in many countries, including Romania, a secular obsession and the only one able to separate it from its ancient status as a colony of the great powers. Industry was seen as progress and an indispensable support of economic growth, through superior processing of resources and raw materials, multiplying their value, increasing the productivity of labor and production factors, on account of the exploitation of knowledge and creative intelligence of human capital including through the acquisition and improvement of new knowledge. A short historical review of industrialization shows us that the economic development of the world's societies and states went through a series of stages, which followed one after the other, from the stone, bronze and iron ages to what we currently call the industrial revolution. Since the industrial revolution concept emerged, four industrial revolutions have been identified and described, the last one being that of ICT information technologies and artificial intelligence that humanity is going through today. All industrial revolutions were differentiated and

delimited, especially by the type of energy used and the succession of generations of technologies, from those based on the physical effort of humans to the mechanical, electrical, electro-technical, chemical, biological and IT ones. Specific about these industrial revolutions is the fact that the one that followed was based on the infrastructure, technology and specialized work of the previous one, the new technology that occurred being built on the foundation of the previous one. Except for the latest industrial revolution that no longer requires the same volume of specialized labor nor the same industrial infrastructure, being more service-oriented and A.I.-based production and ITC, the other three industrial revolutions did not require a massive process of deindustrialization, but an intense upgrading process of the obsolete technologies. Thus, the deindustrialization process of Romania, applied methodically and persistently after the 1990s, does not represent a direct step towards the fourth industrial revolution, but rather seems to be a systematic process of planned destruction and erasure of the industry from before the 1990s, on a new *Valev Plan system*. The events after the 1990s point out the fact that in no communist state in the former Soviet sphere of influence was there such an insistence on the demolition of all industrial capacities and their

The Ministry of Finance
e-mail: *dumitrurasvan@yahoo.com*

effective deletion from the economic map of the states, as it happened in Romania. The persistence with which the systematic and planned destruction of large industrial capacities and platforms was done betrays obscure interests that can no longer be placed under the umbrella of classifying them as obsolete or non-performing, but rather as inconvenient for foreign markets and capitals. Basically, the fall of the communist bloc was by far an inevitable process due to the inefficiency of the planned and centralized economic system that did not allow for natural adjustment due to liberalism and the levers of the market economy, but seen in retrospect takes on all the forms of a hybrid war, aimed at monopolising the markets and the resources of vulnerable states, weakened by the investment effort imprinted by the socialist policy. The socialist political system with Chinese characteristics, successfully promoted by the Chinese People's Republic, demonstrated us that one could go from socialism to capitalism and in no other way than by destroying and resetting a country's industry.

In order to better understand the mechanisms that acted with the aim of resetting Romania and bringing it back to the status of a semi-agrarian colony, exporting raw materials, natural resources and cheap labor, realized through the destruction of the heavy, petrochemical, food and car manufacturing industry, it will be necessary to analyze the framework of the processes that support globalism as an ideology and globalization as a policy of the great international power centers. Viewed as politics, globalization does not mean only interconnection and interdependence between all the states of the world, including the close links between international markets. Globalism represents a supra-state policy of current international capitalism, the difference between it and modern colonialism of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century being only the instruments used, the goal and the means remaining the same. Transnationals and international corporations, seen as an instrument of globalism, itself viewed as a new form of colonialism that represents nothing more than an economic dimension of a subversive form of soft-power hybrid war, represent today the spearhead of capitalist power centers. They are extremely active in promoting their own transnational corporations,

to achieve the political objectives of enslaving, subjugating and cheaply extracting the resources of peripheral states. In fact, the acquisition of weak or underdeveloped states' natural resources and product markets has remained the basic policy of the power centers that hold technological supremacy and much of the world's industrial infrastructure. From this point of view, we can include the whole set of hybrid aggressions to which Romania was subjected after 1980 and especially after 1990, in order to enslave it through the systematic destruction of the industrial and agricultural infrastructure, with the obvious aim of diminishing the economic potential. The enormous potential of selling Western products in an impoverished market thirsty for the need for new generation goods, and against a global overproduction crisis, represented a contemporary *El Dorado* for all the international corporations that capitalized at an unprecedented pace due to the indebtedness of the population and the Romanian state, after 1989.

The lack of currency necessary to purchase modern technology, as well as the Western boycott regarding the transfer of new technology, led Romania to have a technology from the 70s and a paid staff that remained at its qualification level at the end of the 8th decade. Nonetheless, its infrastructure only required an upgrade for its relaunch after 1990, especially against Romania's opening to new markets. The fact that there was a specialized and skilled manpower, even if it was specialized on old technology, there was a fairly developed infrastructure present in industrial platforms employing thousands or tens of thousands of workers, there was a solid energy infrastructure, and a centralized energy market that could provide the necessary consumption for these industrial giants, only requires vision, understanding, nationalist spirit and support from the new leaders (actually the 3-4 echelon of the old communist leaders), for the economic relaunch of the factories, on the background of the opening to new commercial markets in the West. Thus, an economy centered on industrial production, like the one before 1989, had a few important elements: energy, infrastructure, technology and specialized manpower. The hardest part in developing an economy, namely the development of integrated industrial platforms, had been secured in the

last 50 years. Romania had managed to become independent both energetically and to ensure consumption needs from domestic production, through the construction of a set of power plants (hydro and thermal), combined, mining operations, factories, research institutes, food and agricultural enterprises. A large part of these can no longer be found on the desert map of Romania's economy, the national industry having a similar fate to Carthage, which was wiped off the face of the earth after the Third Punic War (149-146 BC). We should remember that in the 2.102 industrial units operating in 1989, a labor force of 4.169 million employees was qualified out of the total of 10.94 million existing in the economy, in a population of 23.151,000 inhabitants.

(industry, construction, trade and market services), the average per company being 24 employees, respectively a branch of 1.386 million out of a total of 4.12 million employees per economy (37.6% of the total employed population in 1989). The planned closure of industrial capacities, generically called deindustrialization, removed from production an important mass of specialized and qualified labor force, which in order to survive had to take the path of exodus, this migration phenomenon being the great demographic problem of Romania in the 20th century. In the history of the last 100 years, this represents the third great exodus of the demographic pool of modern Romania, the first two being the unfortunate consequence of the great world wars and the demographic catastrophe

Table no. 1
PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION EMPLOYED IN THE ECONOMY[1]

Years	Total population[2]	Population employed in the economy[3]	Population employed in industry	
			Employees	% in total pop. employed
1950	15.872.624	8.377.200	1.000.700	12,0
1960	18.403.414	9.537.700	1.440.200	15,1
1970	20.252.541	9.875.000	2.276.800	23,0
1980	22.201.387	10.350.100	3.678.700	35,5
1985	22.724.836	10.586.100	3.927.800	37,1
1989	23.151.564	10.945.700	4.169.000	38,1

According to statistical yearbooks, in 1991 the number of companies decreased to 1.712 industrial enterprises employing 3.052 million people, returning to an average of 1.783 employees per company. In 2017, the statistical bulletin records 47.084 industrial companies in which only 1.259 million employees were still employed, respectively an average of 27 employees per company. In 2014, 53.865 companies were active in the industry for which the average annual number of employees was 1.372 million. At the end of 2018, the industry sector registered 57.756 enterprises, respectively 10.5% of the total number of active enterprises in the economic field

after 1948, when in Stalinist Romania an extensive process of demographic cleansing began: class, ethnicity or political affiliation. According to the 2019 annual activity report of the Ministry for Romanians Abroad (Ministry for Romanian Abroad 2019), it is estimated that approximately 9.7 million Romanian speakers live outside the country's borders, of which 5.6 million Romanian citizens are in the Diaspora. Thus, in 2007 alone, over half a million Romanian (National Institute of Statistics 2016) citizens emigrated, most of them young people up to 35 years old (National Institute of Statistics 2018), educated, professional, specialized and qualified in various trades, ready to work and willing to make great efforts to adapt to a new society. Basically, the labor force exodus, mostly qualified and in which the state invested a lot, included the best of Romania, from a

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[1] Source: data collected and compiled from the Statistical Yearbooks of Romania, 1970-1989.
[2] https://insse.ro/cms/files/pdf/ro/cap2.pdf
[3] Statistical Yearbook of Romania, 1990, pp. 102-103

demographic point of view. These specialist, skilled and productive people no longer found themselves in a country ruled by a political class incapable of identifying viable solutions to meet their basic needs. One of the first causes of this massive labor migration was the poverty that covered Romania after the 90s, against the forced deindustrialization through the intentional closing of most productive capacities, on the basis of an apparently new *Valev* plan. Essentially, factors such as the lack of jobs, rampant inflation, the strategic myopia of the country's leaders, which, through the policy taken, led to the impoverishment of the population, caused the exodus of the active manpower, between 1990-2000. After joining the European Union, the exodus was not only for a better life, but for the desire to live in a country that respects its citizens. Many left from a country where imposture, corruption and lack of vision of the political class that had taken control of it, managed to drive out more than half of the active and skilled labor capital specialized in the economy before 1990. Despite this exodus, one of the largest peacetime exodus in the history of the world, Romania continued and continues to educate labor force for other states with public money, which for the West represents an advantage and a financial relief from their budget allocated to education. Thus, Romania lost not only the human asset, but also all the amounts invested in their qualification as well as the enormous potential that could be invested in the state's economy. In the period 2013-2018, the percentage of GDP financing of the entire education system, in relation to the legal commitments from the annual execution account, recorded a minimum percentage of 2.57% of GDP for the year 2018 (National Institute of Statistics 2007-2019) (2.21% of rectified GDP for 2018 and 5.4% EU average) and a maximum percentage of 3.16% of GDP for 2015 (the EU average being 4.90% in 2015), being on the last place among the EU states. All this investment in youth education will never be recovered as long as the younger generation is unable to work in an economy that does not offer viable jobs, based more on consumption and less on production. In a study by the Romanian Academy - National Institute of Economic Research – *Demographic decline and the future of the Romanian population* (National Institute of Economic Research 2007), it is estimated that if the same negative trend is maintained after 1989, in 2050 the Romanian population will decrease to 16 million inhabitants, the population aged over 60 years being only 39%.

In 1989, Romania's economy used all the energy that the country produced at that time, even if most of the technologies used were outdated, which led to high production costs and in some areas even affected the quality of the final product. But in a market where the cost of energy was not liberalized, the high production costs were not essential. Only quality represented an impediment, as the goods produced were not competitive in a fiercely competitive market. Romania really had an energy-intensive industry: steel, metallurgy, extractive industry, chemistry, petrochemicals, glass, and so on. They were high energy consumers. But an intensive process of upgrading the Romanian industry would have transformed Romania, from the point of view of production capacity, into a China of Europe. In fact, the upgrading process was in full development at the end of the 80s, but it was proceeding slowly due to the financial effort required to pay off external debts and investments in new production capacities. Dissonant was the fact that although the degree of production capacities use did not exceed 80% towards the end of the 80s, the construction of industrial facilities was in full expansion. Thus, in 1989 the Romanian economy was engaged in works on 21.400 investment objectives, which required a financial effort of USD 311.8 billion, which far exceeded their financing capacity. In 1989 alone, additional funds amounting to $104.4 billion were needed to bring the goals started to full operation. The works on all these objectives have been stopped since 1990, without a logical justification and without a strategy for their conservation, being subjected to intentional destruction and thus condemned to disappear. Considered to be the pride of the golden age, the industry before 1989 was anathematized by former prime minister Petre Roman (ZF Live 2021), as a pile of scrap metal, and thus largely erased from the country's map. The former prime minister's statement, as if it had been dictated based on foreign agendas, gave free rein to the destruction and recycling of an industry for which many generations of Romanians were sacrificed. As an example, if in 1987, Romania achieved the performance of producing 14.96 million tons of steel, surpassing many countries with a tradition in

this field (Worldsteel Association 2020), it ended up producing only 9.8 million tons in 1990 and approximately 3 million tons in 2013. Instead, a deindustrialization (destruction of industry) indicator is given by the trade in scrap metal. Thus, Romania ends up having a 65.2% share of scrap metal in the total steel produced of 13.4 million tons, related to the period 2010-2013.

The sites where, until 1990, millions of skilled and specialized workers performed their activity, reveal today a Bacovian picture, similar to the bombing of Dresden or Stalingrad. Thus, piles of buildings destroyed as after intense bombings, stripped of iron, copper, aluminum, bricks or any other material that could be exploited, are what remained after the grotesque process of forced deindustrialization of the national economy, as it seems to have been thought in the secret laboratories of the modern colonialism followers. In the most fortunate case, where the industrial platforms, built by the labor of the ancestors, presented real estate potential, being located in urban areas, the sites of the factories and plants were occupied by malls, offices of foreign corporations, commercial or residential complexes.

No matter how we look at it, the overnight disappearance of so many industrial capacities, through their effective destruction, cannot simply be the result of the transition from a centralized to a competitive market-based economy, but rather shows a lack of vision and the interference of some external factors that wanted a Romania that would not generate competition and that would once again become a country exporting raw materials. Realistically, even in the event of a conventional conflict, several wars would have been necessary to destroy the entire industry in Romania so thoroughly and systematically. Instead, in a hybrid war, only the appropriate lever needs to be pulled, and the rest of the destruction process will be completed by the country's own population. It is clear that someone wanted Romania not to become an emerging regional economy even if it is true we will never be able to identify the real enemy of the Romanian state. Exactly as in the perceptions of the great military strategist Sun Tzu, in the experiment called Romania, the hostile actors used their own enslaved political class. When the

[4] Source: Data collected from the Statistical Yearbook of Romania, 1990-2015.

new political leadership, emerging from under the cloak of the defunct communist party, moved to the privatization process, through various subversive methods, it was not the economy that was privatized, but its infrastructure, and not with the aim of resuming production on competitive lines, but with the aim to dismantle it and recycle it into components. The instruments used demonstrated that Romania was the guinea pig on which various economic bombs with immediate or delayed effect were experimented. In fact, a great part of the industry that presented economic potential was either destroyed or was transferred to the property of the neo-communist political class that took power after 1989, on the grounds that the new nomenclature had to be stimulated to complete the destruction process of the country's economy. Exceptionally, there were also situations where production continued, although this was not the stake of survival, but the infrastructure, the land, the amount of iron, the stocks of materials and products existing in warehouses, but not in documents, etc. Thus, many industrial platforms were privatized at low prices, which had warehouses full of goods, subsequently capitalized without the benefits that could help the modernization effort. The lack of vision of the political leaders was seen in the way they thought about reforming the Romanian industry. Instead of maintaining three of the four important elements that underpin an economy (industrial infrastructure, specialized labor and energy sources), replacing only technology, the domestic gray eminences decided to strictly privatize the infrastructure for purely financial interests and destroy the rest. In fact, the seeds of destruction lay in the way Romania's large industrial platforms were designed. In a planned and centralized economy, it was normal for the industry to be integrated and interconnected with other capacities, both horizontally and vertically. Thus, industrial platforms such as Oltchim, RAFO, Săvinești and others operated in an integrated system with many other industrial capacities, throughout the production flow. The privatization of a single capacity, without integrating the entire technological flow, was the original solution for the bankruptcy of the entire system, exactly on the principle of the domino effect. For example, RAFO Onești was an industrial capacity that was not profitable in the situation where it would have

been limited to the sale of the gasoline and diesel produced. But together with the UTON mechanical plant and the CAROM petrochemical plant, which took over the derived products, transforming them into raw materials to obtain superior products with high added value, it allowed a substantial profit to be obtained at the final end of the integrated production flow. The privatization of only one of the capacities led to the blocking and bankruptcy of the other two, which were deprived of the raw materials or capabilities of the sold one. Similar situations can be found in all industrial platforms and factories that did not survive the privatization experiments (for example, the closure of the Arpechim platform that produced raw material for the petrochemical giant Oltchim). To exemplify the way in which the economic assassins financed by the transnational corporations that had entered into competition with the domestic ones acted, the events and facts regarding the intentional destruction of the Săvinești Industrial Platform (PROTV 2020), the Brașov Tractor Plant (DIGI24 2014a), the Aro Campulung Muscel Plant (DIGI24 2014b) and the almost successful attempt to destroy the Oltchim industrial platform with the direct support of the Austrian OMV company, granted to external competitors infiltrated in the shareholding of the company. The process of destroying these industrial platforms is representative for the entire Romanian industry destroyed after 1990, the means and instruments being identical in all 1.205 of the 2.100 large enterprises that are no longer found on the country's economic map.

Thus, the fact that Romania represented an experiment for various interested actors can also be seen from the fact that all these "privatizations" failed one after the other, because the economic assassins disguised as "investors" quickly understood that the most productive assets of the factory were the goods from the warehouses, the iron from the foundation and the land below it, most of the industrial platforms being located in urban areas. Moreover, the great international corporations, which had always perceived the Romanian industry as a true commercial competitor, had every interest in closing these capacities, using various instruments that are limited to hybrid wars. Thus, after 2000, a triad made up of economic mercenaries (directors, union leaders and local politicians) knowingly

or unknowingly in the service of Romania's economic assassins, mortgaged the liquidation of the buildings and the sale of the land to the "real estate developers" who were and are, basically, the financiers of this process of destructuring and destroying the Romanian economy. The pride of the golden age represented by the factories and plants built with the effort of our forefathers, was replaced by malls, residential complexes or offices, as an ironic sign of the new post-integration doctrine: the engine of the market economy is consumption. Such "disappearances" of industrial platforms had consequences both in the economy (industrial branches disappeared, which caused Romania to turn from a large producer into a large importer either for raw materials or for finished products), as well as in the social environment: the depopulation of many cities, the exodus of a huge number of people, with professional training, with manpower, with appropriate, specialized knowledge. All this in less than 20 years. It is certain that the level of destruction suffered by Romania after 1989, the extent and value of the damage recorded, the massive exodus of specialized and qualified labor force, would have required several classic wars. In Romania's case, it only took two to three decades of soft hybrid war, in which various instruments were applied, from economic to political, diplomatic, social and environmental ones. This war, Romania fell victim to, is not a war between states, but a war with unseen, non-state, extremely flexible, mobile and volatile actors. Most of the time it is really hard to call it a war if we imagine that everything is maybe a world politics in which Romania has nothing to say, if we did not have the scale of the disaster in front of us (an industry wiped off the face of the earth, an enslaved political class, a weak economy, a highly indebted country, an agriculture sold as a package, and the largest population exodus in peacetime, and so on). And as in an unseen but felt war, there are left behind villages without inhabitants, uncultivated or fruitful lands for foreigners, a few old people, disappointed, demotivated and discouraged, who wait for no one. Economically speaking, in all cases it was about concerted attacks to remove the product from the market (by cannibalization) or eliminate (by abolishing) production capacities. The destruction or closure of the main urban employers not only forced the early retirement of a part of the

qualified active manpower, but also left without the possibility of specialization and employment of the new generation of industrial high school graduates and, above all, the rural youth, who stormed the cities after 1990. By 1989, much of the manpower was training and specializing on the job, with businesses and factories becoming "nurseries" of specialized manpower. The closure of these production capacities removed from the scheme the most effective form of technical and professional schooling, high schools and vocational schools being forced, in turn, to rethink their curriculum. All the former employees who became newly unemployed, were poured into the system of public services - mainly administrative - of the state (so oversized) and, to a lesser extent, to the small trade that was developing in the era. But the real outlet for this poorly qualified mass came after 2002 - in this case after the liberalization of European circulation for Romanians. Since then, we have been constantly witnessing an exodus - symmetrical to that of urbanization - which has the effect, on the one hand, of decreasing social pressure in Romania (a benefit from the state's perspective), on the other hand, the progressive disappearance of the active age segment from the country's economy. Thus, Romania witnessed the largest population migration in peacetime, without precedent in the entire history of humanity. Finally, the collapse of education into a bureaucratic formalism has led to an acute lack of skills and specialization in highly profitable fields. To a certain extent, Romania's industry has recovered, but - most of the time - as a scrap industry, which mainly values cheap labor, union disorganization and government corruption, as well as the low claims of a population that does not have the means to combine consumption with quality.

As a sad conclusion, the summary of the last 30 years shows us that the entire economy has been scrapped and the manpower has been thrown into unemployment. How was such an error possible? How was it possible to destroy everything that the Romanian people built with hard work and great sacrifices, in almost half a century? There can be many answers, all valid (incompetence, indolence, primitivism, corruption, thirst for wealth, lack of strategic vision, lack of patriotism, enslavement, and so on). But, looking in retrospect and analyzing, in part, each destroyed strategic

industrial objective, the process takes the shape of a hybrid war which a large part of the country's economy fell victim to and in which a whole arsenal of economic, political, financial and social instruments were used.

I believe that the main causes of the collapse/destruction of large industrial platforms are the following:
- lack of vision and superficiality in dealing with phenomena that deviate from the natural course of things, with the potential to affect strategic areas of the state;
- lack of a national strategy for both privatization and administration of national assets, after the Revolution;
- the controlled disinterest of the state, as the owner, combined with the private interest of some groups oriented towards obtaining profit at the expense of the state;
- poor privatization legislation, which was more oriented towards the destruction and not towards the efficiency of production capacities;
- obscure, subversive, insidious and destruction-oriented interests, which led to the disappearance of thousands of billions of dollars from Romanian capital and all the effort and suffering of the predecessors;
- the controlled interest of various groups within the country that acted in the interest of foreigners, not of their own country;
- the lack of interest and the controlled disinterest of the institutions that had to defend the properties that had belonged to the state and the assets (goods) that were in stock at the time of the alienation of the enterprises;
- legislation created specifically to be able to evade responsibility or not to hold accountable, in any way, those involved in the theft or destruction of Romanian capital;
- the haste with which enterprises that operated well and had a market, were included on privatization lists for no reason (for example, Petrom, Rompetrol). These were the perfect targets for the foreign competition, much more skilled and perfected in strategies of undermining and economic cannibalization, which directly or through interposed companies bought the ownership right after which, immediately, they proceeded to stop the activity, dismantle the installations, transport them to the competitor's

country of origin (see the case of Săvinești, SIDERCA Călărași, Mechel Târgoviște, ARO, Tractorul, and so on), and after this process the end was unmistakable: the scrap metal hunters very quickly finished the erasure action (both physically and in writing) of a uncomfortable competitor (see the Săvinești case);

- in all cases, the companies whose post-1989 route we analyzed were the flagships in the industrial sector, large production and research centers in the field, their development was led with western concerns as a model.

In an interview given to TVR (Romanian Television) by the former executive director of the UN for the Global Sustainability Index, Prof. Dr. Călin Georgescu, on May 22, 2018 within the "*Questions and Responsibilities*" (active news 2018) show, he confirms that Romania was and still is the victim of obscure interests, aimed at undermining the production capacities of the state, interests supported by the levers and instruments of the new type of hybrid war. A similar theory is also addressed by the economist Ilie Șerbănescu in the volume *Current colonialism and its colony Romania*, which states that Romania is nothing more than "*a poor colony on the periphery of Europe*" (Șerbănescu 2018b). Professor Dumitru Mazilu, PhD believes that the impoverishment of Romania through the liquidation of the national industry, the decapitalization of Romanian companies, the alienation of factories at low prices, the alienation of agricultural land, taking over the resources by multinationals, the imposition of obedient individuals enslaved to obscure foreign interests to the leadership of the country, represents a deliberate process, orchestrated by the new colonial empires (Mazilu 2013, 9). Due to a political class that is enslaved, corrupt, incompetent or with private agendas, which has found itself all these years, supported and protected by economic assassins in the service of the world of corporations, Romania missed the chance of economic development based on strategic thinking, prosperity and a better life. Approximately 82% of the capital no longer belongs to Romanians, as well as 40% of the total agricultural land, so that our prosperity is a desideratum at the mercy of others (Șerbănescu 2018a, 266). Meanwhile, those who rule Romania's destinies from the shadows have seized the remaining 18%, thus ensuring

their own prosperity. The political class's lack of long-term vision and strategy forces Romanians to accept being made lazy and stupid in their own country (in other words, unproductive). With this lie, Romanians are kept captive and poor in their own country. Poverty drove away almost 5 million people from Romania, half of the active manpower. They migrated to other states to convince themselves that they are neither lazy nor stupid and that they can make an honest profit on their effort and knowledge.

The destruction of the Romanian economy was not only the merit of a mediocre, corrupt, unpatriotic and professionally outdated political class. It is very serious that the disaster happened under the supervision and with the blessing of those who were supposed to watch out that it would not happen. If the destruction of the economy is accompanied by the loss of control over national natural resources: energy, oil, ores, water, wood, etc., along with the loss of the banking system, the insurance market, public utility services and retail sales, we will be aware of the seriousness of the situation of total dependence in which Romania has reached. Not only are we kept in poverty, but the policy of destroying the economy and indebting the population also eliminated any chance of Romania's exit from corporate neo-colonialism.

Conclusions and proposals

Analyzing the defining elements of the economic domination imposed by the Ottoman rule (1450-1821) or the SovRom ticks (1945-1956), we can observe certain similarities and patterns that fit into a matrix that transcends time and whose imprint we also find in the evolution of Romania after 1989, equally vital and devouring for the national economy. A brief historical retrospective only certifies part of the causes of the effects we see today, namely that in order to achieve some political goals, at certain stages vital for the course and development of the Romanian state, the interests of the leaders connected to cross-party interests, at the expense of the country's economic interests. We cannot understand the reasons that were the basis of some decisions that effectively stopped the democratic course and the economic development of the country, but we can analyze the effects of these decisions in the current context of the economic level reached by Romania. From the

point of view of the analyzed topic, we can analyze the patterns of these economic aggressions to which Romania was subjected, in order to identify them in the hostile actions of some state or non-state actors directed, currently, against the stability and security of the Romanian state. These economic slippages can be superimposed on the patterns identified in the financial pressures imposed by the Ottoman rule, Soviet domination or Western deindustrialization, which fit perfectly in a true hybrid war which Romania has constantly been subjected to, in the last half century. The hybrid war conducted by the great powers was shaped by the socio-political configuration of the time periods in which it occurred. Thus, in the Ottoman Empire we find an open war, in the Soviet one a subversive war, and the period after 1989 presents us with a hidden and insidious war, with a complete arsenal of techniques and methods folded on the new technologies and peculiarities of contemporary society, at the limit of detectability and without revealing the identity of hostile actors. The common pattern of all these aggressions is related to the pursued goal which was and always is profit. In this type of war, the structural vulnerabilities of the state and the weaknesses of its leading or decision-making factors are speculated. Thus, the Ottoman Empire took advantage of the desire for power and enrichment of the Romanian rulers, the Soviet one took advantage of the structuring of the new power and the obedience of the political factors of the communist party born prematurely and with malformations, and the current hostile actors of the Romanian state took advantage and are still taking advantage of both weaknesses that we find much more nuanced, more diversified and more meaningful than in the past. The new type of hybrid war conducted by actors that are hostile to Romania takes advantage of these vulnerabilities of the Romanian state to achieve its goals. A complete and efficient network of state institutions, which puts the national interest above group or personal ones, would not allow the appearance of security breaches that could be speculated on by hostile actors. By hostile actors we do not necessarily mean the state ones, but most often we meet companies, societies or investment funds that act as real enemies, the effects of their aggressive policies being comparable, often, to those of a conventional war.

In the current geopolitical context, in which the Russian Federation is perceived as the main hostile actor in the Black Sea area, we must understand how it could affect the security of the Romanian state, taking into account the patterns and vulnerabilities we find in our history. Structural, political or social peculiarities, which are found in the coastal states of the Black Sea and which are intensively speculated by the Russian Federation, are not found, except in small part, in Romania. The Latin and Western spirit of the Romanian people, the lack of a Russian minority, an economy that is not linked to the Russian economy, are characteristics that cannot facilitate a toxic influence of the Russian Federation that would seek to affect the stability and security of the state. But we find other vulnerabilities and weaknesses, which are specific to the Romanian state, due to past influences of the domination of the great powers over us, a fact that led to the modification of mentalities and the adoption of non-compliant habits, which represent real security breaches in the current context of threats which hovers in the Black Sea region. Corruption, clientelism and group interests are largely inherited from traditional society, where power was conferred on whoever offered the most. Thus, the leadership was appointed or endorsed by spheres of influence outside the country. Private agendas were prioritized over the state interest which did not offer the same material satisfaction, and the great mass of the population represented only possibly a maneuvering mass. We identify these patterns even today, the alteration of the state from within, generating too much vulnerability and weakness to oppose private interests outside the country. In this sense, we are currently witnessing a permanent assault on state institutions and public companies, launched by non-state actors who mainly aim to obtain revenues or benefits that exceed contractual agreements or economic alliances. This is done with the direct or indirect support of public officials or the political environment in which representatives of international bodies also participate. Many times, in order to achieve their goals, non-state organizations ensure the support of the diplomacy of the countries of origin or interested, ambassadors or diplomats becoming a means of persuasion when other instruments of corruption or blackmail prove ineffective. The support is given for the

mutual satisfaction of interests, often the profits of non-state actors financing the public campaigns of political entities in the countries of origin or guaranteeing the occupation of key positions in the governing structures of the states. Although the term economic assassin seems a little theatrical, it is as perhaps current if we consider the army of economists, lawyers, managers and lobbyists employed by international companies, who speculate on any vacuum or legislative loophole, to maximize profits. At a higher level, the human arsenal of these companies includes divisions specialized in corrupting officials or decision-makers, including influencing their actions through various techniques and methods that are at the limit of detectability, but extremely effective in a society based on interdependence, interconnection and social networks. Access to the social network database, in an increasingly interconnected and media-exposed society, represents the most effective hybrid tool in the arsenal of hostile actors. Access to these databases, fueled by the very desire to be human, which includes the intimate details of individuals who may at a given moment occupy important positions in the management of public institutions, companies or political parties, represents an instrument of influence, which through intimidation, exposure or corruption, may allow the achievement of the goals pursued by a hostile actor, at the expense of a state or a company.

Although this type of aggression against the state, completely different from classic military aggression, aims to obtain immediate or long-term financial or economic advantages, it indirectly aims to influence the collective mind, demoralize the population, demotivate public employees, make public capacities vulnerable and weak. Classical means of defence, especially those involving the armed forces, are ineffective in the face of new strategies involving disinformation, public manipulation, concealment or cyber-attacks. In the new type of warfare, classical military troops are effectively replaced by civilians. Hybrid warfare is conducted between economists, legal experts, lawyers, analysts, sociologists or managers, and military art is successfully replaced by communication, informational, cyber, economic or legislative art. In the new type of war, bioterrorism is replaced by infoterrorism, infoepidemic affecting the mind of a population more effectively than an epidemic, infecting the population through media sources or social networks being faster, more efficient and without the risk of attracting sanctions from other states.

The Infodemic Triangle consists of three main elements that completely change the perception of the truth: disinformation, manipulation and concealment. Thus, the first victim of the hybrid war is the truth. The redundancy of the flow of information changes the perception of it, so that instead of shedding light on some events it generates confusion and chaos. In an ocean of bits, even if you identify the source of disinformation, it is almost impossible to unequivocally establish the identity of the enemy.

The new type of hidden war involves changing the value system of a population, by affecting its reference systems, for example influencing culture, traditions, ethical and moral norms. Thus, sabotaging the stability of a state is no longer a spontaneous activity, but a long-term procedure, carried out over 2-3 generations, which mainly involves knowing and affecting the collective mind by changing the value system, these becoming the basis for conquering a state. A generation that no longer has a cult of history and traditions, no longer values national and territorial identity, the desire and motivation to fight for its values being eliminated. Thus, in order to destroy the infrastructure of a state, it is no longer necessary to bomb it, it can be sabotaged through a set of instruments that include environmental protection activities, economic and legislative artifices hidden in contractual clauses, corrupting leaders, hiring incompetent individuals as useful idiots and so on. Civil society, through environmental organizations or foundations, also plays an important but immoral role in supporting the interests of non-state actors, supporting their attack on state institutions and companies through intense lobbying and manipulation of public opinion. State organizations stand behind the actions of non-state actors, not publicly displaying their true interest except through diplomats at most. The interests of state actors are diverse, from sabotaging certain government projects or initiatives to protect their own economy, to taking control over resources, utilities, infrastructure or certain branches of the economy. Practically, war 4.0 has taken the form of a corporate neo-colonialism, with states being the real beneficiaries of the battles won by the non-state

actors they support. Under the generous umbrella of democracy and market economy, interests are often hidden, which affect the development, stability and direction of a state. Generation 4+ war no longer involves the taking over of the government or administration of a state by another aggressor state, but the promotion of obedient, corruptible, mediocre or leaders easy to manipulate (officials, commanders, decision makers). It is much more effective and less expensive to destabilize a state by creating chaos and disorganization (economic, social, political or legislative) than by occupying it militarily. In war 4.0, information is the enemy's new ammunition, and modern weapons are represented by the Internet, mass media, and social networks. By manipulating information to the detriment of a state, through misinformation and manipulation, the population becomes the enemy of its own nation. The vulnerability of a state occurs on several levels: political, social, institutional, economic and environmental, affecting one level automatically destabilizing the other levels as well.

The theory of the expansion of the living space (present in the World War 1 + World War 2 doctrine) through the expansion of the states outside the borders, is replaced by a new theory of the expansion of the living space without the involvement of the borders, but only by seizing new consumer markets or seizing the resources of the states that do not have the capacity to protect them. A vulnerable state ends up being like a fortress with weakened defence walls, without sources of supply or water, with inefficient soldiers, poorly armed or trained, unmotivated and demoralized, susceptible to the offers of the enemy, without understanding the importance and role of a fortress and ever liable to allow the enemy to penetrate it.

The triangle of weaknesses of corruption, incompetence, and ignorance spices up the new kind of non-kinetic warfare. Although the interests against the state originate from outside national borders, the problem lies within the borders. A war of this kind is successfully conducted in a vulnerable state, in which ineffective institutions operate, are led or in which corrupt officials operate. The non-kinetic proxy forces of the enemies of the state (which do not use conventional means) end up, through manipulation, misinformation, coercion or corruption, becoming their own officials or dignitaries of the attacked state. Non-

state actors acting against state interests are corporations, companies, foundations, civil or environmental organizations and law firms. The fact that institutions are not professional anymore in conjunction with a permissive or laconic legislation, creates security breaches and a favorable environment to the launch hybrid aggressions, facilitating the emergence of aggressors whose actions are directed towards obtaining large profits (through a continuation of the policy with hybrid means) lead to a vulnerability of the state.

In conclusion, the current type of hybrid warfare takes advantage of the loopholes of the weak state, which becomes a victim of its own indifference to the health of the political environment, public or private. Corruption, incompetence and disinterest, create security breaches heavily speculated by non-state or state actors. In this type of war, caution and skepticism are the most effective shields, because military allies are not necessarily economic allies, and corporations, companies or civilian organizations become proxy forces through the tolerance shown by some states in various economic alliances, to satisfy their own interest without being visible. A responsible state must define and consolidate, on solid and healthy bases, including a system of values and ethical and moral norms, the triangle of responsibilities formed by the political environment, that of public employees and the civil one. Although the military is an important pillar of defence and deterrence of any aggressive and hostile intentions, weapons become useless in front of the tools used in a hybrid war. Thus, an important emphasis, in addition to the army, must be placed on the efficiency and professionalism of the intelligence services, which through their activities can prevent various hostile aggressions directed against the strategic areas of the state. In addition to strengthening the intelligence services, the state must direct its attention to strengthening the administrative apparatus, based on criteria of performance, meritocracy and professionalism. A robust, efficient and professional administrative apparatus will provide not only quality services, but also the additional protection needed to counter potential economic or other aggressions launched by various hostile actors. Another tool to counteract these types of aggressions is the establishment of national priorities based on long-

term strategies, aimed at both the administrative consolidation and the economic development of the country. It is vital that Romania be part of as many economic partnerships as possible, which will thus support the economic environment by softening the possible aggressive tendencies of transnational companies and corporations.

Perhaps, last but not least, a responsible and correct political class should give less importance to the immunities conferred by political positions and dignities, so as to hold accountable and correct in time any slippages that some dignitaries may have on the background of the interference of external and foreign factors of national interest.

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THE IMPLICATIONS "GLOBAL OBJECTIVES" IMPLEMENTATION HAS ON ROMANIA'S ECONOMIC SECURITY

Nicuşor COJAN, Ph.D. Candidate*

The 2030 United Nations Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted on September 25, 2015, promotes the balance among the three sustainable development dimensions – economic, social and environmental and establishes a global framework for achieving sustainable development by 2030, having 17 sustainable development (SDGs) objectives and 169 related targets. The European Union, together with its member states, has committed to implementing these goals at EU level, as well as at other non-EU countries, most in need of support. Romania joined the leaders of the 192 UN member states at the Development Summit, adopting the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, a universal development global action program. In this context, Romania's 2030 National Strategy for Sustainable Development was drawn up and approved by the Government on November 9, 2018, and Romania's economic security issues were included in 2020 National Defence Strategy.

Keywords: Agenda 2030; sustainable development objectives; economic security.

Introduction

The United Nations document "*Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*" was adopted at the UN Sustainable Development Summit on September 25, 2015 (United Nations 2015). With the new Agenda, the European Union and its member states are asked to work towards achieving 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030 the latest. The EU is fully committed to being a leader in the SDGs implementation, according to its communication "*Next steps for a sustainable European future*" (European Commission 2016). As the European Commission itself has indicated, "*ultimately, sustainable development is a governance issue*" (European Commission 2016).

The plan of this paper is structured as follows: (i) the description of the UN 2030 Agenda and the Broad Sustainable Development Goals, (ii) the European context sustainable development (iii) the 2030 Agenda implementation in Romania (iv) Romanian economic security from a sustainable development perspective.

***Ministry of National Defence**
e-mail: *nicusor.cojan@yahoo.com*

The 2030 Agenda and the 17 sustainable development goals

The first United Nations congress that addressed the environment and development issue was organized in Rio, in 1992. The debates aimed at reducing the economic weight in order to preserve the global biophysical balance, conditional on maintaining social well-being.

The Rio Declaration (United Nations 1992) and Agenda 21 highlighted analysis and action areas driven by the desire to develop the balance between environmental protection and social benefit, as follows: the global assets protection, the natural resources exploitation, economic growth, human communities management and the quality of life (United Nations 1992).

The 2000 Millennium Summit ratified *The Millennium Declaration*, the first international framework document to combat poverty, hunger, disease and inequality worldwide. In order to achieve the aspirations of the Declaration, eight specific development objectives were defined – reducing extreme poverty and hunger, achieving universal access to primary education, promoting gender equality and women emancipation, reducing infant mortality, improving maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability and creating a global partnership for development – known as

the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 21 targets and 60 indicators, with 2015 as a deadline (United Nations 2000).

The 2012 Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development produced *The Future We Want*, a document which recorded the progress towards achieving the MDGs and moved towards setting the the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals Agenda. This document is a recognition of how important the three dimensions of sustainable development – social, economic and environmental are (United Nations 2012).

as access to energy, resilience. infrastructure, sustainable use of oceans and inclusive economic growth (United Nations 2014). Sustainability and security are given an important place alongside the traditional poverty reduction goals that were already part of the MDGs. Considering the rather ambitious agenda, with 17 sustainable development goals, supported by 169 targets, the aspects related to the SDGs implementation and financing will be quite complex, both for developed and developing countries (Kamphof, Spitz and Boonstoppel 2015).

Figure no. 1 *Sustainable development goals* (European Commission 2021)

The 17 SDGs contained in the new UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development - Transforming our world (see Figure 1) are interrelated, aiming to eradicate poverty, address climate change and reduce inequality, and require action both in the EU and its Member States as well as in the developing countries. The SDGs must complete the agenda started by the Millennium Development Goals and leave no one behind.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is a fundamentally modified version of the sustainable development conceptual framework and is structured around three main pillars as defined in the Brundtland Commission Report (1987) (United Nations 1987):

➢ *social equity*;
➢ *economic growth;*
➢ *environment.*

Compared to the MDGs (2001-2015), the "*2030 Agenda*" (2016-2030) is a "*universal*" agenda for different actors around the world and pays attention to global public goods such

The sustainable development european context

Within the EU, the concept of sustainable development has been integrated into *The Strategy for an Extended Europe* since 2006 (Council of the EU 2006), in a unified and coherent strategic vision, with the general objective of continuously improving present and future generations' quality of life for, for the creation of sustainable communities, able to manage and use resources efficiently and harness economy's ecological and social innovation potential, with a view to ensuring prosperity, environmental protection and social cohesion.

To maintain EU's sustainable development, the Europe 2020 Strategy (EUROPA 2020 n.d.) was developed in 2010 based on three basic pillars: smart growth, sustainable growth and inclusion. According to the document, these pillars should generate interventions in research, innovation and education, in the reduction of carbon emissions by increasing energy efficiency and the use of recyclable resources, as well as in reduced

poverty by increasing population employment rate.

More than a year after the adoption of the *UN 2030 Agenda*, the European Commission presented its implementation strategy in the "*Next steps for a sustainable European future*" communication, on November 22, 2016 (European Commission 2016) and published it together with the *Renewed European Consensus on Development* (European Commission 2018). Later on, the European Union Council adopted the document entitled *Council Conclusions on a Comprehensive Approach to Accelerate the Implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – A Stronger Reconstruction after the Crisis Caused by the*

the progress made in the EU and around the world.

According to the aforementioned conclusions, the Commission will prepare a comprehensive and voluntary EU level SDGs internal and external implementation review at, in cooperation with the European External Action Service (EEAS),with a view to examining the UN High Level Political Forum framework from within by 2023.

The European Union development objectives were prioritized and structured on six major directions of action, as can be seen in figure no. 2. The European Commission focused on actions that will lead to concrete progress in the areas of sustainable development objectives.

Figure no. 2 *The European Commission sustainable development Priorities* (European Commission n.d.)

COVID-19 Pandemic (European Union Council 2021), on 22 June 2021, reaffirming that the EU and its Member States strongly support the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals, which continue to guide their actions, both internally and externally, for a more thorough rebuilding. It is also recognized that the COVID-19 pandemic threatens progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and that it has caused reversals in some of

Since the economic field in the context of European Union, sustainable development is the subject of this paper, one can notice that seven of the 17 SDGs are covered, namely:

➢ *SDG 1 No poverty* – Eradication of poverty in all its forms and in any context.

➢ *SDG 3 Health and well-being* – Ensuring a healthy life and promoting well-being for all, at any age.

➢ *SDG 4 Quality education* – Guaranteeing

quality education and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for all.

To these 4 other sustainable development objectives are added to address targets in the following areas: gender equality, employment and labor specialization – generators of economic growth, investment in innovation, infrastructure and sustainable industrialization, as well as reducing inequalities within and between member countries.

Implementation of the 2030 Agenda in Romania

At the national level, the first strategic document that addressed the of sustainable development issue was adopted in 1999. It was based on increasing the of the population well-being in relation to the natural resources rational use, ensuring environmental protection.

In November 2008, the government approved *Romania's National Strategy for Sustainable Development Horizons 2013-2020-2030.* The document validated its content, proving to be truly relevant in addressing national realities by offering relevant recovery solutions from the financial and economic crisis, felt since 2009.

Later, after the adoption of the 2030 Agenda, the Government of Romania approved the National Strategy for 2030 Romania's Sustainable Development, dated November 9, 2018 (Romanian Government 2018), in which a competitive and sustainable national economy development is proposed as the main objective. This, according to the document, provisions can be achieved by creating and developing a entrepreneurship and optimism culture centered on scientific research and innovation. In the *National Strategy for the Sustainable Development of Romania 2030,* several targets were identified and analyzed for each of the sustainable development objectives adopted through the 2030 Agenda.

In the following lines, we will make a very brief analysis of two (because of the lack of space) of the SDGs aimed at the economic field, respectively our country level implementation way of.

➢ *SDG 1 No poverty* **– Eradication of poverty in all its forms and in any context.**

"*No poverty*", the first objective of the 2030 Agenda reiterates the fact that social protection measures are fundamental for the prevention and reduction of poverty throughout the life cycle.

Although the Government developed a national strategy on social inclusion and poverty reduction in 2015, and that included policies and significant actions that had to be carried out over 5 years, current statistics show that this situation still represented a major problem in Romania at the end of the implementation period. This fact is demonstrated by a series of negative aspects faced by a large part of Romanian citizens in terms of income.

Thus, according to Eurostat, the our countrywork value was "*8.1 euro/hour*" in 2020 (Invest Romania 2022), being more than 3 times lower than the EU average with a value of 28.5 euro/hour, "*and poverty in work*"[1] it is almost twice as high in Romania, with almost 15% above the EU average of 8% (Pop 2019, 6-9): this : this remains at high levels, according to the data.

During the "*2015-2019 period, percentages exceeding 23.5% of the total resident population were at risk of poverty*" (Statista 2022), this means that approximately 4.5 million people were, at risk of poverty, in terms of income.

The broad poverty spectrum generates combined effects that influence human development essential factors such as unequal access to education, health care, inclusion, life expectancy and many other services, which, together with the intergenerational poverty transmission, prevent Romanian disadvantaged children or families to reach their full potential.

➢ *SDG 8 Decent work and economic growth* **– Promoting sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all**

Given the specifics of the era in which we live, defined by the increasingly advanced globalization phenomenon in which states, corporations, banking, commercial, political systems, etc. are interconnected, we pose the problem of (identifying) the exemplification of a country's economic sustainability, knowing that the UN has been promoting international economic cooperation for over 20 years, but still quite a few

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[1] In-work poverty refers to a situation where families with at least one person in paid work have a household income that keeps them below the officially recognized poverty line.

countries are marked by poverty and have poor rehabilitation prospects.

Economic sustainability refers to practices that support a constant growth rate of "*total national GDP of at least 2% per year*" (Jones 2016, 2), a percentage that does not seem to have a negative impact on the social, environmental and cultural aspects of the community. Economic sustainability in its essence involves the conservation of resources, and the concept is used to define and explain the value that resources have today but also their possible value in the future.

It is obvious that Romania cannot develop economically outside the global context marked by the current neoliberal economy that sees competition as the human relations,defining characteristic but it must make sustained efforts at the state level, so that the country's national interests always come first place on his agenda in relations with the whole world.

In Romania, "*June 21, 2021 represented the date when it consumed its quota of resources*" (Ambasada sustenabilității în România 2021) generously offered by the geographical area available to the country for that year. The current neoliberal economy will lead to sustainable increases in temperature, food shortages, mass migration and sooner or later ecosystem collapse. Romania must take into account all these aspects regarding the future and find alternatives for economic development in full balance with social development and environmental protection.

Romania's energy, agri-food, natural and anthropogenic tourism potential can ensure the fulfillment of the country's sustainable development goals and provide security for future generations.

Romania's economic security from a sustainable development perspective

The economic field of sustainable development, this time from the perspective of economic security, is also addressed in the *National Defence Strategy of June 30, 2020* (Romanian Parliament 2020).

The achievement of country's sustainable development is closely related to the state of its economic security. From an economic perspective, we believe that sustainable development today is determined by the economic management models'

efficiency and rationality as well as by their economic growth.

Economic security, usually defined as one of the main national security interests, together with the protection of citizens and the state (sovereignty and integrity) must thus be examined as inextricably linked to the social and environmental dimension.

There are different types and models of economic growth in scientific research: intensive, extensive, zero, "*green*", sustainable growth, and there is a concept of "*steady-state economy*" in ecology (Center for the Advancement of the Steady State Economy 2021). The national economy sustainability is also determined by the state of its security, that is, by the level of protection that the state provides against the external and internal negative factors' influence. This sphere, however, requires a certain system, which requires monitoring and evaluation.

The country's "*economic system*" (ro.economy-pedia.com n.d.) stability is determined by its most important property – its integrity. Changing any element of the system affects others, leading to a change in the entire system.

Some of the economic national security main risks and the effects arising, in a sustainable development context we identified are those presented in Table no.1. For this, we considered the current international economic context, the domestic economic situation, the "*public administration*" (Ministry of Development, Public Works and Administration 2014, 33, 51, 68), deficient aspects and the criminalization high level and "*corruption in the economic sphere*" (Preda 2020, 64).

Considering the economic security risks that we identified as affecting sustainable development, we can thus speak, about the country's economic security understood as a resources, markets, enterprises and workplaces protection system etc. but also in terms of the national strategic assets preservation i.e. some strategic importance sectors such as: critical infrastructures; energy resources; military industry and information technology. We can also include here the elements related to demography, natural resources, education, etc.

In this sense, the Ministry of National Defence through the *White Paper of Defence 2021* mentions that "the recent years *economic developments and the European level financial difficulties*

have highlighted the need for rethinking the way resources are allocated, but especially used, efficiency being the main criterion" (Ministry of National Defence 2021).

Conclusions

The relationship between sustainability and national security is a special one, aimed at streamlining and coordinating the institutions and communities collective actions in order to achieve a common goal using available resources in a systematic and reasonable manner and operating in a socially responsible manner.

Economy cannot be separated from society, it is an integral part of it, but the fact that economy is only a part of a society is an aspect that has

largely been forgotten in our country. Economics and economic thought should not rule society, but rather support society in its goals.

At the country level, an economically sustainable system must be able to produce goods and services continuously, maintain manageable levels of public and external debt and avoid dependence on external resources as much as possible.

Following the analyses made, we can conclude that (i) *at the national level there are concerns and policies for fulfilling the of sustainable development objectives, which, however, ensure a low level of results and (ii) the relationship sustainable development – national security represents the expression of unity between security*

Table no. 1
RISKS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON ROMANIA'S SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Risks related to the economic security dimension	Effects	
	Economic	**Social**
- Undermining some branches of the national economy	- Increasing economic dependence and the impossibility of countering or overcoming some crises; - Increasing business risk for Romanian entrepreneurs.	- Worsening living conditions; - The increase in unemployment; - The impossibility of solving some social situations.
- Proliferation of the underground economy	- Decrease in the economic state;power; - Reduction of budget sources; -Deterioration of the economic balance.	- Increasing the degree of social insecurity; - Crime, underworld.
- Damage to some strategic importance sectors (energy industry; defense industry)	- The decrease in economic potential and the possibility of a useful transition from the peace economy to the war economy; - Increasing dependence on the armaments industry of other states; - The deterioration of the condition of the Romanian manufacturer of high-performance weapons.	- Decrease in the number of jobs; - Social insecurity, feeling of national insecurity.
- Property insecurity; - Devaluation of the national currency; - The weakening of the banking system; - Increase in public debt; - Distrust of the population in the banking system; - Unrealistic and inappropriate economic policies to the circumstances and trends of the moment.	- Economic insecurity; - Decrease in production; - Inflation, serious economic effects; - Decrease in economic potential.	- Increasing the degree of individual, collective and social insecurity; - Social instability; - Decrease in purchasing power; - The increase in unemployment.
- Blocking external credits; - Blocking access to scarce sources of raw materials for the national economy; - Blocking access to modern technologies.	- Impeding the process of upgrading and implementing some national development programs; - Decrease in the efficiency of the economy.	- The increase in unemployment; - Increasing emigration; - Increasing insecurity; - Social movements.
- Decrease in sales markets	- Crisis of overproduction; - Negative trade balance; - Economic insecurity.	- Lowering the standard of living; - Unemployment; - Emigration; - Social insecurity.
- Economic globalization on a national background incapable of adaptation; - Tendency regionalization; - Economic non-integration in the EU; - Smuggling, illegal traffic of goods.	- Bankruptcy of companies that cannot cope; - Increasing the degree of economic dependence; - Loss of national control over resources.	- Increasing social risk; - Personal, collective and national insecurity; - Degradation of the value system; - Emigration; - Negative, nihilistic psychology.
SDGs affected: 1: No poverty; 3: Health and well-being: 4: Quality education; 8: Decent work and economic growth; 9: Industry, innovation and infrastructure; 12: Responsible consumption and production		

policy, economy, social environment and ecology.

The COVID-19 (2020) pandemic has amplified the already existing vulnerabilities and risks, it has also created new ones, with a major economic, strategic and security impact in the coming years, followed by the by the Ukraine conflict generated risks (2022).

The EU Recovery Mechanism and related National Recovery and Resilience Plans (NRRPs) must contribute to a just transition for the EU's Resource and Energy Intensive Industries.

The COVID-19 pandemic was followed by a new crisis, generated by the conflict in Ukraine with effects on economic security. It was on March 24, 2022, that The European Economic and Social Committee adopted the Resolution "*The war in Ukraine and its economic, social and ecological impact*" (European Economic and Social Committee 2022b), stating that the war and the sanctions applied will have a socioeconomic impact on the member states and neighboring countries, and that the EU must be ready to take them on.

In the of the European Union C 152 Official Journal dated April 6, 2022 (European Economic and Social Committee 2022a), we find a series of the European Economic and Social Committee opinions on to sustainable development and economic security related topics, including: "*Measures beyond GDP for a successful recovery and a sustainable EU economy and resilience*" and "*Aligning the strategies and activities of food businesses with the Sustainable Development Goals for a sustainable recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic*", both on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions -– *The strategy for financing the transition to a sustainable economy*".

Romania is facing much more sophisticated and complex new threats, and the Black Sea region has acquired new strategic values, with the Crimean Peninsula turning into a real force projection platform, thousands of kilometers away, to the east and south of the Mediterranean Sea, following its annexation in 2014.

The emphasis layid on a for long-term access competition for resources (energy, water, food, rare metals, etc.), in parallel with the suppliers competition intensification for some markets control, led to an increase of states economic interdependence.

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