

ROMANIA IN THE GAME OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION⁴⁸⁰

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Abstract: *The new geostrategic architecture and the redesign of geopolitical spaces have reopened the "Pandora's box" of Eastern Europe, crushed by political, ethno-confessional and territorial interests, giving free rein to the manifestation of incredible and unrealistic scenarios regarding the "new regional order". This space, former theater of war in the two world wars, remained a space of dispute between East and West, which reactivated the imperial claims of some state actors with interests for the states in the region. Currently, a new Cold War or the continuation of the old one is foreshadowed...*

The new options open to the "escaped" states from the communist camp were those of democracy and free will, after more than five decades of imposing ideologies foreign to the spirit of these nations.

The election of new strategic partners, after the torture of a communist dictatorship, led to the generation of essential policies on national interests, but not sufficiently understood by decision-makers in these Eastern European states, manifestations that "planted" distrust of social segments in the new values democratic and market economy. Indeed, revolutions and the "sleep of reason" have given birth to "monsters"... in all states...

Keywords: *EU, Russian Federation, Germany, NATO, Romania.*

1. EUROPE - A DIVERSIFIED AREA

Leaving the communist "corset" generated the rebirth of a nation's ideals, and the lack of political experience led to reorientations, some of them uninspired. These "elections" of some states, especially those generated by the disintegration of the USSR, led to states of collapse and led to security vulnerabilities, manifested by the emergence of local conflicts and frozen conflicts, with regional impact.

With the generation of the initial European construction, it was found that the European space, although unique, is diverse. This diversity is given by:

- central axis - consisting of component areas in Switzerland, Germany and Belgium;

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- integrated periphery - consisting of component areas of Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Austria;
- the dominant Southern periphery - consisting of areas belonging to Ireland, Portugal and Spain;
- peripheries in transition - consisting of Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, the former territory of East Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Croatia;
- the underpopulated Northern periphery comprising Scotland, Northern Ireland, areas of Ireland, areas of Sweden and areas of Finland;
- peripheries generated by globalization: areas in Italy, Corsica, Sicily, Greece, Rhodes, Cyprus;
- Schengen candidate countries: Romania and Bulgaria.

An important role for the European construction is played by the poles of attraction constituted by:

- metropolises with a global role, such as: Paris, London and Stockholm;
- major metropolises consisting of the capitals of European states, capitals and dynamic regions (according to the following map);
- decision-making centers for the EU - Strasbourg;
- the main European axes, on the West-East and South-North directions, which extend to the Eurasian space, the Middle East and North Africa.

Regarding the European role of Romania, it is determined by the following geopolitical aspects:

- it is a commercial and energy gateway to the Black Sea, in relation to the Asian space;
- is a security donor in the Black Sea and Eastern Europe area;
- is a member of the Eastern Partnership and can generate strategies for the future developments of the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan;
- is Turkey's economic impact partner, which it can support in joining the EU;
- regarding the Danube axis, it can generate strategies with Bulgaria, Hungary, Serbia, Austria and Germany, in order to activate trade and achieve connectivity on the Constanta - Rotterdam axis.

We talked about the important role of geographical space in geopolitical research. I would like to say, rightly, that the EU is a necessary construction, determined by the disposition of European states at the intersection of the geopolitical axes determined by the two great powers: Germany and Russia. The vast majority of European states are "fragile" constructions, which have been

disputed by the great empires that have manifested themselves, in different historical periods, in the European arena. The Central-South-Eastern European area is considered to be a space with a strategic security with many gaps, covered - to a large extent - after the accession to the Euratom Atlantic area. However, this area is vulnerable to the challenges posed by the fluidity of borders and the effects of frozen Eurasian conflicts, as new state constructions are unconsolidated and are often affected by Russia's Eurasian strategies and the evolution of external constraints on them.

Complex geopolitical contexts often hamper national strategies - insufficiently strong compared to those promoted on the Berlin-Moscow axis - cooperation between Eurasian state actors being superficial or even non-existent. Most of the time, the EU or CIS member states are stopped by the Germany-Russia relationship, the value of individual strategies generating divergent agendas that impose restrictions on individual national interests. These restrictions, imposed by the European poles of power on the Member States, diminish or even block the general interest in achieving a stable and prosperous area. The strategies of some EU member-states do not manifest themselves intensely in order to eliminate the blockages imposed by the German-Russian relationship and cannot generate a collective security of the Central-Eastern European region.

In this context, it is important to highlight the key role that the US plays in maintaining balance and the special relationship with the United Kingdom - as a member of the European Troika. At the same time, Franco-German relations and the security umbrella imposed by NATO partnerships, which stop - to some extent - Russia's interference in the EU's internal affairs, should not be neglected. We can rightly say that the privileged relations of the USA with some European states counterbalance the Franco-German strategies in the relations with Russia. However, the EU must understand that changes in the global balance of power, as well as the rise of emerging states - especially the People's Republic of China - call for a re-analysis of Euro-Atlantic collective security strategies in order to prevent East.

The new Europe is "obliged" to adapt as it goes to the internal challenges of adjacent regions as well as to global ones. These "derived" challenges, as a result of geopolitical and geostrategic transformations, which act on the national, zonal, regional and global security environment, require large-scale reconfigurations of the European Union, with discharges to the Central-Southeast European area.

Developments in this area represent a "target" for competitors of state and non-state actors (NGOs, TNCs, concern and global financial-banking organizations) for new institutional reconfigurations. The acceleration of these processes, above the level of adaptation of the states in this area, determines the appearance of vulnerabilities and risks, which exceed the forecasts of the

specialists. Among them are the threats and risks to national and, implicitly, regional security, which require the adaptation of the policies of regional and global actors according to the reaction of state actors.

2. WHAT DOES RUSSIA WANT?

The installation of Vladimir Putin, immediately after the collapse of Boris Yeltsin's policy, reawakened Russian imperial nostalgia and activated the dynamics of Russian strategies to return to the place he "rightfully has" at the great world chess table⁴⁸². Some tensions with the EU and NATO have been generated, in particular, by Russia's monopoly on energy resources in Europe. From this point of view, the Euro-Atlantic states are vulnerable to Russia, and Vladimir Putin sought to exploit this security breach by attracting Germany as the sole dialogue partner on this level.

Under the guise of ensuring energy security, Russia has concealed its political, economic and military dimensions. As Russia draws its main source of energy for the national budget from the export of energy resources to the EU and China - as the main beneficiaries - the Kremlin is aware that if it does not take the decisive step, now is the time, Russian imperial tendencies promoted by Eurasianism, the single Eurasian customs area, pan-Slavicism and pan-Orthodoxy will not find an end. At the same time, Russia will have to take advantage of the vulnerabilities of areas of strategic interest to the West, such as Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, the Baltic States or some areas of Central Asia, by activating political, diplomatic or military conflicts.

Russia's actions and Germany's silence have a well-defined cause: both state actors fear a major destabilization in the Eurasian space, in the event of other "orange revolutions" or "roses" in Tbilisi or other Euromaidans, such as the one in Kiev, in the former union republics holding energy resources.

On the other hand, Russia's confinement in its former sphere of influence - much diminished by Eurasian strategies and Chinese pressure - does not allow the Kremlin to occupy the Planetary Ocean and disturbs Vladimir Putin's 2025-2030 strategies. At the same time, there is a fear of a "spring" (typical of the Arab one), which would destabilize the interests of the Russian political-economic-oligarchic and military conglomerate⁴⁸³ within the BRICS and the Shanghai Treaty, with the main target being the Central Asian states. Although Russia "wants" the construction of a multipolar world, declaratively, the manifestations are rather the dethronement of the USA and the occupation of the hegemonic place.

While the EU is a postmodern regional player, a unique construction being completed on the world stage - as an entity that promotes democracy and

⁴⁸² Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, *Regions and powers*, pp. 356-364.

⁴⁸³ Vladimir Putin, *Prepared Remarks at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy*, 10 February 2007 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html>.

democratic freedoms and a free market - Russian neo-imperialism - triggered with the establishment of the Eurasian Customs Union - is grafted on the use of force in the promotion of external interests, which defies the principles promoted by the Euro-Atlantic states. Unfortunately, at the moment, the EU is not a fully coagulated structure, as Brussels is an advocate and decisions are often made at odds with the national strategies or ideologies of some political parties, with an impact within the European organization. On the other hand, the different strategic areas are fragmented by the interests of supranational economic or political structures. All this has been accounted for and exploited on important strategic relations by Russia, China and the USA. What is certain is that, even if these manifestations are present, the decisions taken by the EU have demonstrated the visible and real European identity.

Situations of cooperation or divergence between the EU and Russia in terms of energy strategy have been in constant swing, currently talking about a strong energy partnership between Russia and Germany and an ambiguous one between the other EU countries and Russia⁴⁸⁴.

Vladimir Putin's mandates gave him the necessary respite to develop an international impact policy, constantly crediting the vision that the CIS structure - as a close foreigner - is a priority for Moscow, and the Russian Federation is a great power and a unique player internationally. This position reawakened nineteenth-century Russian imperial ancestry and nationalism⁴⁸⁵.

Russia's energy strategy is tough for its partners and is the main "weapon" in holding Russian supremacy (only until 2025!), With Russia making special efforts to own transport infrastructure⁴⁸⁶. In this game, the Ukrainian space is vital in relations with Europe.

EU - Russia structural divergences (even if relations with the European Union remain a priority) do not affect Germany-Russia (GeRussia) special relations, but largely affect NATO interests, especially the Member States' energy network, which will involve military action, collective defense in accordance with the provisions of Article 5⁴⁸⁷.

3. WHAT ARE RUSSIA'S STRATEGIES?

Like Germany, Russia has secured its eastern and southern fronts, and is now seeking to impose itself militarily on the western front. In this sense, he consolidated his economic power by carrying out the North Stream project, he tried to assimilate NATO military equipment, through the favorable / unfavorable contract to France, regarding the acquisition of two Mistral class ships (which

⁴⁸⁴ Viatcheslav Mozorov, *Energy Dialogue*, p. 45.

⁴⁸⁵ Christian Thorum, *Explaining Change in Russian Foreign Policy: the Role of Ideas in Post Soviet Russia's Conduct Towards the West*, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, 2009.

⁴⁸⁶ Evert Faber van der Meulen, „Gas Supply and the EU - Russia Relations”, *Europe Asia Studies*, 61;5, 2009.

⁴⁸⁷ *Joint Report EU - Russia Energy Dialogue 2000-2010: Opportunities for our future Energy Partnership* (Bruxelles, Moscova: 2010), pp. 7-12.

would have transferred high technology to NATO potential enemy, at least declaratively), strengthened its power in the Black Sea (being a high risk factor for Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine) and the Baltic Sea (threatening the security of Poland, Ukraine, the Baltic States, Sweden and Finland), concluded a security partnership on the Black Sea (with Turkey and Ukraine - which he violated in relations with this state), strengthened the Eurasian Customs Union: all in order to return to the imperial borders! At the same time, Russia, through its new security strategy, has exposed its hostility towards the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty, considering the location of the elements of the anti-missile shield in Turkey, Romania and Poland as an act of hostility against it.

The actions of the Russian oligarchies inside the Euratom Atlantic security space, subtly coordinated by the Russian secret services, aim at removing the "siege of Russia" and reconfiguring European and American political conceptions. Yeltsin's Russia has lost strategic territories such as the Baltic States and Ukraine. In this regard, Russia wants to bring to power in these pro-Moscow governments - grafted against the background of mass dissatisfaction with the austerity measures adopted by the EU - to bring these areas in the sphere of interest of Moscow in order to clearly pursue the interests Russia's strategic goals.

By triggering the conflict in Ukraine, Russia wants to regain possession of "Kiev Russia" and control Ukraine's access to the Black Sea, perhaps even to integrate this state into Russian territory, of course after a democratic referendum in which the population will recognize its membership. Russia's strategies on the Black Sea are disturbed by the rise of Turkey and Romania, which is hampering Moscow's supremacy and the transformation of the Black Sea into a "Russian lake". Turkey's strategic interests are undermining Russia's actions and strategies vis-à-vis Syria, but Turkey may be vulnerable by influencing the Tatar population - located on the northern coast of the Turkish state - and the Kurdish population, which could destabilize Ankara. and would end the European path of this state. At the same time, Russia could strike in the fragile democracies of the Turkic-speaking states of Central Asia, in order to destroy the strategic partnerships of energy resources developed towards the Eurasian space. In this dangerous game, promoted by Russia, Moscow will take full advantage of the cooling of relations between Turkey and Israel and will seek to strengthen ties with Tehran. On the other hand, Russia may have a problem with the Turkish peoples inside Russia and here we refer to the Khazan and Crimea areas, from nearby abroad, respectively with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Azerbaijan having common strategies with Turkey, challenging Russia's influence in the areas South Caucasus, Caspian Sea and Central Asia). If Russia integrates the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave unilaterally, regardless of negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia could face opposition from Turkish-speaking populations that could lead to damage to the Eurasian pipeline supply.

To keep the area under pressure, Russia has drawn Armenia into Moscow's political sphere, and on the border with Georgia it is facing atypical developments - which are causing great discomfort to Moscow - over Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia and North Ossetia. Russia still has a long way to go to solve the problem of ethnic Russians in independent republics and frozen conflict areas.

Strategically, Russia has to counter the intrusions and strategies of the People's Republic of China in the European Union, but also in Siberia - where it seems that the phenomenon of Chinese migration has been out of control. Even though Russia and China are partners in the Shanghai Economic Cooperation Treaty, China has adopted US measures, having an "open but cautious" partnership with the US, as China is dependent on the principle of "domination and influence", while Russian expansion it has as its mentality "control by domination". In addition, we are dealing with the trend of global supremacy of both states, a supremacy that is antagonistic and generating tensions within the BRICS and the Shanghai Treaty.

China's private investment initiatives in Central and Southeast European countries are counteracting Russia's strategy to halt Euro-Atlantic expansion. From this point of view, the contradictions between Moscow and Beijing may be exacerbated, especially since the joint strategies and high-level visits between the US and China are viewed with caution by Russia, its strategies in the Eurasian space being perceived by Russian strategists as interference, in the sphere of Russian historical influence. However, China sees its interest and generates investment strategies with Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, the United Kingdom - with which it has an equal and indispensable partnership - and Germany - which is the main partner. In the next period, China will invest in the Republic of Moldova and some partnerships with Romania will materialize, which will bother Russia even more, which sees the interests of its sphere of influence dethroned by the interference of some states.

China, the EU and the US (which follow the balance of power model, but at a higher level than pure passivity) are disturbed by the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union - which is seen as an updated form of the USSR - and which will impose numerous trade restrictions. Russia's control report in the organization. In fact, Russia has not shied away from using force and putting pressure - and on some NATO and EU member states⁴⁸⁸ - in carrying out this controversial project by the international community. Russia's imposition of power relations in the former Soviet space is seen as a threat by the vast majority of independent states, which could inflame the Eurasian space, creating discomfort or even security problems for the EU and NATO⁴⁸⁹, especially for the Baltic States, Poland,

⁴⁸⁸ The Russian Federation "advocates a quantified strengthening of the mechanisms of interaction with the European Union, including the consistent formation of common spaces in the spheres of economy, domestic and international security, education, science, culture."

⁴⁸⁹ Assigning global functions to the North Atlantic Alliance is another subject of discontent and discord between the Kremlin and the West.

Romania, Turkey and Bulgaria. Although the EU is not prepared to face Russian aggression, growing pressure from a united Europe and the United States, with the tacit support of China - which will strengthen its position as a multipolar player - could lead to cracks in the Kremlin leader's policy and there is the possibility of witnessing Russia's political instability, for which "energy is a strategic asset."⁴⁹⁰ For us it is a consumer good, an economic necessity. So, we have an unequal relationship between Russia's energy interests and European energy policies." Here we are back to the "Anaconda Strategy" during the Cold War. In the new international context, generated by the Kremlin, are the conceptual theses of the Russian security strategy - which are based on fundamental interdependencies between the National Strategy of the Russian Federation - 2020⁴⁹¹ and the Concept of Socio-Economic Development of the Russian Federation⁴⁹² still viable? It is normal to ask this question, because these strategies⁴⁹³ had to materialize in a mobilizing factor of stability and not of instability!

In the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation - 2020, directions are provided, some with direct impact on the Romanian strategic space, such as:

- the existing security architecture at the global level does not provide equal guarantees to all nations - as can be seen, it is a direct attack on the USA - as a hegemonic state -, NATO and the states that make up this organization;
- Russia is facing an increased military threat from several directions, and one of the main external threats, in the Kremlin's view, is given by the attempt to expand NATO, which is thus getting closer and closer to Russia's borders;
- the deployment of foreign military contingents on the territories neighboring Russia or its allies, the development and use of missile defense systems, which undermine global stability and disrupt the strategic balance of power, the militarization of space and the deployment of strategic nuclear weapons are just as many reasons of concern to the politico-military elite of the Russian Federation;
- The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons, in response to an attack on it or its allies, carried out with nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, or in response to an aggression with the use of conventional weapons;

⁴⁹⁰ Rolf Fucks, director of the Heinrich Boll Foundation.

⁴⁹¹ N. Patrushev: *Russia's plans to advance the Alliance's military infrastructure to Russia's borders remain an unacceptable factor for relations with NATO.*

⁴⁹² According to the security vision, Russia will place greater emphasis on increasing the interaction of multilateral partnerships, such as: G8 (7 + 1), G20, RIC (Russia, India, China), BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). South), but also through the use of other non-formal international institutes.

⁴⁹³ "Strategic containment involves the development and systemic implementation of a complex of interdependent measures of a political, diplomatic, military, economic, informational, etc., aimed at preventing or mitigating the threats of destructive actions by the aggressor state (coalitions of states)".

- The Russian Federation could use precision weapons as a deterrent or send troops abroad to protect its national interests or those of its citizens, in accordance with the rules of international law, international agreements and applicable federal law;
- the main tasks of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation during a certain type of war are to repel any type of aggression that would target Russia and its allies, to defeat the aggressor and to force him to interrupt military actions;
- The Kremlin, through pressure from the OSCE, wants to implement the Russian initiative in the Common European Security Agreement;
- Vladimir Putin has publicly expressed, on countless occasions, the vision of the building of the Eurasian Empire - the Customs Union being a first step -, which should include all the territories lost by Tsarist Russia even after the dismantling of the USSR;
- through a joint dialogue with Germany, Russia has developed partnerships such as the EU - Russia Committee, which promotes the new European security architecture at ministerial level.

In the field of energy, Russia pursues an offensive policy, seeking to attract major Western concerns into its sphere of action. In this regard, it has signed partnerships between Gazprom and BP and Gasunie, in order to build branches of North Stream (which supplies Germany and already has interconnections with the Czech Republic and Slovakia) to the United Kingdom and the Netherlands (according to Stratfor analysis taken by Natural Gas Europe), the target being the energy-dependent states of Central and Northern Europe. From this point of view, Russia - in order to have energy supremacy in its relations with the EU - has to counteract the European projects developed with the Asian and North African states, as well as the US initiatives to implement American technologies on the European shale gas market. Simultaneously with these challenges, Russia wants to expand its oil and gas exports to East Asia, where the Chinese market is very attractive for Gazprom and Rosneft.

In this complex international and national context, we naturally ask ourselves what will be the politico-military evolution of the Russian Federation? How will international relations evolve and what will be Moscow's priorities in the coming years? Why these questions? Because the new trends are highlighted by:

- aggressive and brutal relations with "neighboring" states, in particular Poland, Romania, Turkey and the Republic of Moldova;
- restoring and increasing influence in areas of geopolitical importance, such as the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea and the Middle East, which are considered strategic for national security;

- the suppression of national movements in countries with a predominantly Muslim population (Tatarstan, Bashkiristan, Chechnya and the Kabardino-Balkan Republic, Ingushetia), which want the right to autonomy and independence from the Federation. We are no longer talking about military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine and Crimea;
- further, the Russian strategies failed to prevent the manifestations of the internal crises and the depreciation of the ruble, accentuated by the decrease of the price per barrel of oil; with all the efforts of the Kremlin, through the political and military strategies developed at the central and local levels, Moscow is unable to establish a rule of law;
- the "rebel" republics, which want to defederate the space of the Russian Federation, have received in response the imposition of alignment with the Eurasian Customs Union, in which a number of former USSR states have so far been attracted;
- although a quarter of a century has passed since the legal dissolution of the USSR, Russia has not given up maintaining military bases in Russian-speaking enclaves (considered Russian historical-traditional areas), in states that have gained independence, maintaining "constructions" unilaterally recognized (Transnistria, Abkhazia, Ossetia, etc.);
- Russia, by adopting "Putin-ism", is escalating geopolitical and geostrategic risk factors that may lead to the establishment of an authoritarian-dictatorial regime and the tendency to trigger military conflicts in the ex-Soviet space, which may have the effect of throwing global balance into a new "Cold War" type manifestation, but in other dimensions, because the Euro-Atlantic space has increased in size and economic and military capacity.

That is why Russia is seeking to make the EU link vulnerable, Russia will promote, in the future, strategies for "extracting" from the sphere of Euro-Atlantic influence some spaces - which it considers to belong de jure, after the Second World War - by promoting Moldovanism and belonging to the pan-Slavic spaces and pan-Orthodoxism, will continue the accusations against the American anti-missile shield, attracting in diplomatic, cultural, political and even military conflicts Turkey, Poland and Romania, creating conflicts or participating in them, in the areas bordering these states: Syria, Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Baltic States,

Russia will continue to ban international monitoring of exposed areas: Transnistria, Donetsk - Lugansk, Ossetia and Abkhazia, for the purpose of full control of conflict zones.

We must recognize that Russia is no longer the USSR, even if it has some reminiscences of a foreign policy approach.

Moscow should ask itself why relations with some states have cooled. It is their fault that they had, perhaps for the first time in history, the right to have their

own options not imposed by other powers or it is an error of the foreign policy of the elitist state towards the states in one of the geopolitical circles mentioned above. Can it still be an open and constructive dialogue with the neighbors when, behind the closed doors of the Kremlin, the dialogue takes on other forms of manifestation?

How many more "Euro-Maidans" are needed to understand the real role of dialogue in counterbalancing propaganda, manipulation and misinformation?

All these manifestations of mutual distrust have shown that Romania will have to find other reliable partners, which will be a real geopolitical and geostrategic support, even if it will pay special attention to the eastern neighbor.

Romania, as a Euro-Atlantic state, will have to have approaches in the context of the West's interest in Russia, which could resume cooperation with this state, given the role that Moscow plays in the international arena, because:

- Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, can exercise its right of "veto", thus blocking some actions with effects on regional, Euro-Atlantic and global security strategies;
- Russia, as a major player in the world market for energy resources - oil, gas, nuclear fuel, with the supremacy of transport infrastructure in the Eurasian space and investments in nuclear power plants in Europe and the Middle East - can intervene and block Western strategies in these areas;
- as a nuclear and military power - being a major exporter of conventional weapons - Russia will impose its views in international conflicts, often defying the agreements to which it is a party and intervening in areas it considers to be covered by Moscow;
- Russia will play an incisive role in creating and maintaining competing EU and NATO organizations, such as the already existing formats, BRICS, Shanghai Economic Cooperation Organization, Eurasian Economic Union, Asian Bank for Infrastructure and Investment, etc., which they will disturb Western strategies.

In the following, we will seek to decode the geostrategic aspects that led to the modification of the 2020 Strategy. In this sense, Russia's general priorities will have the following strategic directions, as follows:

- the national security of the Russian Federation will protect the Russian citizen and state against internal and external threats, in accordance with the human rights and constitutional freedoms of the citizens of the Russian Federation;
- special attention will be paid to creating the legal framework for decent quality of life and living standards;
- an important role in ensuring Russia's security will be to ensure the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, as well as the economic and social development of the Russian Federation;

- the national interests of the Russian Federation involve objective protection and sustainable development;
- The Russian Federation will pay close attention to national security threats that may affect national interests;
- all central national organizations, in collaboration with civil society, political formations, military structures, institutional ones, socio-economic organizations, as well as those in the fields of Intelligence, legal and information will develop measures to counter threats to national security and satisfaction of Russian national interests;
- the system of national security represents the sum of the objectives, necessary to be fulfilled, for the realization and implementation of the Kremlin's policy.

In the new regional and global geostrategic and geopolitical context, Russia relies on the following priority directions:

- Russian state policy on national security and socio-economic development will be necessary to contribute to the achievement of national strategic priorities and the effective protection of national interests, by creating a stable basis for expanding economic, political, military and spiritual potential, in order to determine to bring the Russian Federation back to the international arena of the polycentric world, which is currently taking shape;
- Russia will develop your military, political and diplomatic capabilities in order to ensure national sovereignty, independence and integrity;
- Moscow will be politically, militarily and diplomatically involved in resolving major international issues, as well as in resolving military conflicts, maintaining strategic stability in international relations;
- Russian strategies will promote the traditional spiritual and moral rebirth of Russia, militating for the consolidation of civil society in maintaining statehood, freedoms and independence. In this regard, special attention will be paid to interethnic relations, religious traditions and the promotion of patriotism;
- the strengthening of Russian policies will be based on new geostrategic threats with complex interdependencies, by actively promoting Moscow's dominance in world affairs, relaunching Russian foreign policy, independent of the United States and its allies, using economic, military and intelligence resources;
- Russia considers that the process of forming a new model of polycentric world order is accompanied by increasing global and regional instability;

- in international relations, Russia will use the policy of "force", developing and modernizing offensive weapons, creating and implementing new strategies to weaken the global security system, especially in the Eurasian geopolitical areas, Asia-Pacific and those in the vicinity close to Russia;

- Russia will promote strategies against NATO, as it considers the North Atlantic Organization to have global functions, which have affected Russian strategies - by continuing the process of enlargement near Russian borders -, actions that pose a threat to Russian national security;

- At the same time, Moscow considers that Western interventions in Europe, Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, the construction of the "missile shield" and the implementation of strategic systems and precision weapons, as well as the development of military facilities in space, significantly limit Russia's power;

- The new strategy presented by Vladimir Putin emphasizes the impossibility of European strategies to deal with migration flows from Africa and the Middle East;

- Russia will oppose Western strategies on the processes of Euro-Atlantic integration of states in the sphere of influence of the USSR and will create foci of instability, which will keep Eurasia in the sphere of influence of the Kremlin;

- Russia considers that the situation in Ukraine is a consequence of the unconstitutional "coup d'etat" of the EU and the USA, which "caused a deep rupture in Ukrainian society and the emergence of an armed conflict" on Russia's borders;

- the terrorist risk has increased as a result of the overthrow of legitimate political regimes, "causing internal instability and conflict" in regions such as the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, the Korean Peninsula, and "the emergence of a terrorist organization, self-proclaimed Islamic state, against the background double standards" that some geopolitical actors promote in the fight against terrorism.

Regarding "geo-Intelligence", the Russian Federation will have the following approaches:

- Virtual space and Intelligence will be key concerns for Russia's regional and global strategies for achieving geopolitical goals, including by manipulating public opinion and falsifying history;

- Russia will use new forms of illegal activities, especially with the use of information, communication and high technology, especially in the field of threats posed by "*uncontrolled and illegal migration, trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking and manifestations of organized crime*", specific to the type of hybrid warfare;

- economic manipulation through the use of financial, trade, economic instruments, in order to influence geopolitical issues and weaken the system of international economic relations, to create structural imbalances in the world economy and the global financial system, but also to exacerbate economic crises and large-scale financial adoption of new forms of information warfare, with new technologies.

In the areas of national interests and national strategic priorities, Russia will determine long-term strategies, adopting the following national strategic priorities:

- national defense;
- state and public security;
- improving the quality of life of Russian citizens;
- economic growth;
- science, technology and education;
- health care;
- culture;
- ecology of living and environmental management systems;
- strategic stability and equitable strategic partnership.

The national defense strategy will focus on the following levels:

- creating the conditions for achieving the strategic objectives of national defense, with a view to the socio-economic development necessary to promote military interests;

- Russia will make use of strategic deterrence and prevention of military conflicts, improve military organization, develop new forms and methods of conducting combat actions, establish new categories of military forces, create military formations for special actions, improve preparedness, mobilization and availability of civil defense forces;

- in order to discourage strategic and prevent military conflicts, political, technological, diplomatic, economic and intelligence strategies will be developed to ensure the defense of Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity;

- strategic deterrence and the prevention of military conflicts will make use of nuclear deterrence;

- early detection of existing and future military dangers and military threats, balanced development of force categories, increase of defense potential, endowment of military forces with new technologies, innovative development of the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation;

- Russia will adopt non-military, diplomatic methods and means, as well as the use of international legal instruments.

At the borders, Russia will build multifunctional complexes, equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and systems.

Russia will achieve strategic stability by promoting the following principles:

- involvement in maintaining the stability of the international legal system, preventing its fragmentation, relaxation and selective application, which would have the effect, in Moscow's view, of instability and conflict in international relations;
- interventions in international bodies for the revision of international treaties and agreements, as well as influencing these fora in concluding new agreements that meet Russia's national interests;
- although declaring itself to resume negotiations on the reduction of nuclear potential, Russia is promoting limited nuclear strikes against potential enemies in its defense strategy;
- although it promotes the strengthening of regional stability by participating in the process of reducing and limiting conventional armed forces, as well as the development and implementation of confidence-building measures in the military field, Russia considers the Euratom area to be the main enemy.

4. WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS ON ROMANIA?

Following the outbreak of the conflict with Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania were included by Moscow in the fighters of the "new cold war" because they openly expressed their opposition to Russia's current expansionist policy. Also in this context, Germany, France, Italy and Spain were considered by the Kremlin as "strategic partners" of Russia, and Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia and Portugal received the status of partners. "Friendly pragmatists." As we see Romania together with the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands and Sweden are considered "distant pragmatic partners" or hostile to Moscow.

From this point of view, in the bilateral relations Bucharest - Moscow, the following aspects should not be overlooked:

- annulment of the Ribentrop-Molotov Pact, requested countless times by Romanian diplomacy;
- restitution of the treasure;
- the interest related to the future of the Republic of Moldova and of the rights of the Romanian minority in the Russian Federation;
- the location of the anti-missile shield elements on the Romanian territory;

- promoting a negative image regarding the economic aspects and promoting in the Russian media an “economic collapse” in Romania, in order to attract pro-Russian Romanians from the Republic of Moldova;
- Bucharest's interpretation of relations with Moscow, following statements by Kremlin leaders;
- Romania's place and role as a result of the reset of EU relations with Russia;
- the Russian strategy to take advantage of the launch in the international environment of the “impression that its relations with one country or another are tense” (Vladimir Socor);
- Russia's concern to subordinate the EU energetically, through the promoted projects;
- the divergent interests between Romania and Russia on security in Eastern Europe, the lack of transparency and legitimacy in the management of frozen conflicts - especially in Transnistria;
- the distrust granted to Russia regarding the construction of a pragmatic relationship, although in the relations with Romania there are historical partnerships, which did not have subversive provisions;
- promoting in the Russian media an extreme anti-Romanian attitude;
- Russia sees in Romania a geopolitical and geostrategic actor whose importance is on the rise, which contradicts the Russian strategic interests for Eastern Europe and the states bordering the Black Sea, Bucharest being the closest ally for the Euro-Atlantic states;
- differences over the removal of Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan from Kremlin influence;
- Romania's tendency to stabilize and strengthen its relations with Poland and Turkey;
- Romania's promotion of energy projects that ignore Russia;
- low dependence on energy resources from the Russian Federation;
- countering the Russian-German strategies - which aim to increase Moscow's influence in the immediate vicinity of Romania's state borders - regarding the Transnistrian conflict and promoting a proactive policy on the place and role of the Republic of Moldova in the Euratom Atlantic area;
- Romania's opposition to the Russian strategy of federalization of the Republic of Moldova, which would make possible the rise to Chisinau of a pro-Russian government, of communist bill (after repeated elections, resignations and elections without a reasonable end).

With the deepening of the EU accession process, the process of settling European geopolitical theories and strategies has begun. In this context, United

Europe must be seen as a complex system, with zonal geopolitical mechanisms, which form the gears of the political-economic conglomerate - in the first instance - and the realization of the military - in the medium term.

Romania's situation in the German geosystem is beneficial for the future evolutions of our country and brings us very close to the strategies developed at V4 + and the Weimar Trilateral.

At the same time, Romania can be a generator of European and Euro-Atlantic strategies for the Balkan and Eurasian geosystems. The impact of the Romanian strategies within the Eurasian system can materialize through economic projects of impact in the field of energy resources, developed especially with the Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, especially on the dedicated AGRI projects and the gas pipeline that will follow the route Bulgaria - Romania - Hungary - Austria which can also be a starting point, when the geopolitical realities will allow, for the completion of the NABUCCO project, in its new form Turkish Stream.

At the same time, Romania can become part of the EU TAP project, which would interconnect Turkmenistan - Georgia - Azerbaijan - Bulgaria - Romania - Hungary and Austria.

Another project developed in the Eurasian geosystem would be TCP, which would interconnect, through the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, Azerbaijan and Turkey from Romania.

From an economic point of view, Romania and Turkey could relaunch the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Area and increase the importance of the port of Constanta within the Eurasian, Balkan and German geosystems by reactivating the Danube axis.

The trilateral formats have a very important role in ensuring the geostrategic security, the most important being the Poland-Romania-Turkey Trilateral.

CONCLUSIONS

In the current geopolitical context, relations with Romania may have the following developments:

- Russia will be incisive in its relations with Romania, in order to impose itself through strategies hostile to the Euratom Atlantic space, in order to counteract the promotion and support of EU and NATO strategies and projects for Eastern Europe;
- Russia will be involved in disturbing Romania in countering the hostile actions developed by Moscow, regarding the attraction of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in the Eurasian sphere of attraction;
- Russia will reduce the complexity of sustainable projects and political, economic and social initiatives in support of the Republic of Moldova, developed by Romania;

- through its actions, Moscow will get involved in the Black Sea region, in order to stop the energy projects developed by our country together with Turkey, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Georgia, in order to maintain the Russian monopoly in the Black Sea;
- through some Western and Russian trading companies, Russia will promote strategic projects on the Romanian market in order to maintain the Russian monopoly on the Romanian market;
- Russia will exert pressure on the political, economic, religious, cultural and social circles in Romania and some Eastern European states;
- Moscow will continue to promote a hostile propaganda to Romania, in order to denigrate the Euro-Atlantic reforms in Romania and to destabilize our state politically, economically and socially;
- Romania will have to be much more active, in the current geostrategic context, on the Ponto-Baltic isthmus, in order to counteract the military initiatives promoted by Moscow in the Black Sea region and the mouths of the Danube.

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