

ROMANIA'S DEFENCE CAPACITY, BETWEEN THE PROFESSIONAL ARMED FORCES AND THE TERRITORIAL FORCES

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Abstract: *Defense planning is a particularly important topic, which implies an analysis of the international situation, a realistic assessment of its own national security system, which involves medium- and long-term decisions. The allocation of resources should follow the defense policy established following a strategic analysis process, after the strategic objectives and level of ambition have been established. The construction of military capabilities is complex, is carried out over time and requires the allocation of financial resources and a predictable and coherent human resource policy. Discontinuous reforms, or the alteration of decisions with opportunistic, conjuncture solutions, adversely affect future programs and produce waste of financial and material resources, as well as social convulsions in human resources. The structure of forces on which the state's defense capacity is built must be increasingly professional to have a timely and effective responsiveness, and the resilience capacity for national defense should be based on the mental and armed resilience of the population in the case of temporary occupation of the national territory. Membership of NATO and the European Union increases resilience through the commitments of the two organizations to support the restoration of Romania's territorial integrity in the event of military aggression.*

The increasingly technologically evolved human society requires a rethinking of the national mobilization system, both in terms of human resources and in terms of the involvement of the resources of the national economy. Maintaining the functioning of critical infrastructure, operationalizing industrial facilities and maintaining the capacity to provide the material and financial resources needed for the war effort are particularly important, and the workforce in these areas cannot be made available to complement military structures. Law enforcement and civil emergency forces will be engaged in the specific missions of each of them but may form bases of resistance in the case of national occupation. Participation in NATO and EU force structures must be in line with the force structure designed for national needs, renegotiated, realistically, in the medium and long term, with sustainable promises corresponding to common standards. Allocating a 2% defense budget is not the single and sufficient solution to achieving a credible and sustainable defense capability. Difficult, socially and politically impact corrective measures are needed, but any delay will produce increasing imbalances.

Keywords: *Defense planning, national defense, NATO, Romania, European Union.*

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Defense planning, especially national defense capacity, is a delicate subject, difficult to discuss openly in many states, objectively and pragmatically, even in quite new NATO members from Eastern Europe. This results in inefficient expenditure, a continuous ambiguous state in assessing real operational capacity, opportunistic and often harmful commitments, and decisions. These weaknesses were revealed on several occasions by Professor Thomas-Durell Young in articles and analyses, some public, others less so³.

In a discussion with the American professor, prior to his article on capability⁴ planning, we looked at the circumstances and the main causes that negatively affected the efficient use of defense resources, citing both mentalities paying tribute to the education and personal development of leaders in the post-communist period, both political and military, but also quite large deficiencies in understanding the problem of national defense in a pragmatic context, on the "cost-effectiveness" model. The simplicity of Professor Young's arguments and their logic made my statement exceedingly difficult, but I was encouraged by his examples of similar situations in several states of the former communist bloc.

It is difficult to explain that, after decades in which the "five-year plans" had become scarecrows, but also opportunities for the exaltation of communism, after it had become a practice the lie of inflated results ("production per hectare", "five-year in four and a half years"), any discussion of multiannual planning is a dangerous subject. At the very least, it should be avoided in some communist states, especially in Romania, where any negative reporting meant loss of office, while the "swelling" of the results was the practice encouraged to obtain favorable assessments.

The entry into NATO was preceded by an objective assessment made by a group of experts from CUBIC (an organization backed by the US government), within the limits of access to certain information or the accuracy of that made available by the Romanian authorities. That assessment, or rather, those assessments, because studies have been made at the level of each service, even at the level of branches or mission needs, still exist in the archives and include clear recommendations for reconfiguring the organizational architecture and laying down the military bases needed for a minimum of credible and effective response.

Romania is a relatively young state on the world map, supported by the great Western powers, to counter the expansion of the Tsarist Empire, while the Ottoman Empire broke up in the second part of the 19th century. The wars in which

³ Thomas-Durell Young, *Anatomy of Post-Communist European Defense Institutions: The Mirage of Military Modernity*, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017,

Thomas-Durell Young, "Mission Command: Strategic Implications—Legacy Concepts: A Sociology of Command in Central and Eastern Europe," *Parameters*, 47, No. 1 (Spring 2017): 31–42, <https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3345.pdf>.

⁴ Thomas-Durell Young, *Capabilities-Based "Confusion": Why Capabilities-Based Planning Systems Struggle*, *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol. 33, No. 1, March 2021, 95–118, <https://doi.org/10.22883/kjda.2021.33.1.005>

he subsequently participated, including the two world conflagrations, demonstrated the dependence of the Romanian state on the military support of other states, its own inability to defend itself or promote its interests. In fact, Romania's strategic interests have a relatively modest level of ambition, at the level of territorial integrity of a space populated by Romanians, in a unitary state, with declared independence, in which to manifest itself sovereign. Economic capacity, financial resources have not enabled the achievement of a significant military power that can deter any threat.

Status of NATO membership has been including participation in NATO's planning process, which involved taking on targets, which meant task force packages for certain missions, with a certain level of readiness, among one to six months. Apparently, simple obligations, since from what we had to contribute to the 'common basket' with a slice, established during a negotiation. After a far too generous offer, years followed in which the evaluation standards were discovered, the requirements for each package, the moment of truth being concrete in additional funds necessary to achieve the minimum requirements. Although these objectives had been significantly reduced even before the time of acceptance into the Alliance, the differences in approach and the superficiality with which the structure of the armed forces was built more prepared to contribute to the national economy, in particular heavy and unskilled work, became apparent. Morally worn-out equipment, many of them made on or under Soviet license, were hardly accepted by Allied planners (military forces of the other Member States) solely for temporary political reasons. The rationale was to familiarize ourselves with the process, to know our limitations and to build our new defense capacity in accordance with the NATO evaluation requirements already established.

It follows that a first step for future acquisitions was being taken, the operational requirements and technical specifications had a solid basis, namely the evaluation criteria. Moreover, it also seemed truly clear the number of equipment, derived from the objectives set. Here came the first reverse interpretation, in the logic of establishing the hypothesis with the result of the conclusion. The committed packages of forces were no longer part of a structure already set up for their own defense needs, they had become the main defense planning objectives at national level, without considering their need in a Strategic Defense Analysis.

The cut of the defense budget started in 2006 by around 30% from the previous budget (from 2.38 to 1.6), reaching as far as 1.3 of GDP at the end of the economic crisis of 2008-2012, while increasing its obligations for participation in abroad missions, called into question the obligations undertaken for NATO's packages of forces. Since 2011, 'force targets' have been transformed into 'capability targets', in substance the planning and evaluation standards being the same. Perhaps less lenient. Details of these forces cannot be presented in this paper because they are NATO classified information. For the same reasons, the results

of the evaluations carried out by the Alliance cannot be presented. What can be said is that these "capability targets" were maintained, for the most part, although the technique was changing, units were being disbanded, and some obligations had no corresponding in existence. Many of them have had and still have deadlines in the future and have even been postponed several times due to the lack of any major purchase of military equipment for a period of about 10 years, due to the reduced budget allocated. As Romania's contribution to Afghanistan was relatively high in terms of number of people, the results of the evaluations and the further postponement were accepted, even though the comments submitted were stinging.

The defense capacity of a country consists mainly of its armed forces, constituted in structures organized, equipped, equipped and trained for military action, of a violent nature (lethal), by the use of force, including their associated structures, supporting the main missions. In order to defend the country in the event of war, its territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty, the Romanian state has determined that all human, material and financial resources will be mobilized so that any aggression will be rejected. National defense capacity has been, and unfortunately, there is still a problem that only the Ministry of National Defense must solve. But there were also more difficult times, when the Ministry of Finance had a greater involvement, between 2006 and 2014, when the defense budget saw the dramatic cuts mentioned above. Although Romania had committed to purchase the necessary equipment to achieve the negotiated objectives, no major equipment was possible, except for C-27 SPARTAN transport aircraft and Piranha 3 transporters. The enlightening moment was when, at the Inter-Ministerial Council set up for military procurement, an undersecretary of the Ministry of Finance asked "how much would it cost us if the Air Police bought it from NATO?" That was all he understood from our membership in NATO.

After the end of the ISAF mission, with the reduction of forces in Afghanistan, but also amid the pressure of increasing the defense budget allocations of all NATO states to a minimum of 2% of GDP, the pressure to achieve the capability targets has become greater, especially as we have entered the deadlines due to many of them. Events in Ukraine, especially the Russian Federation's invasion of Crimea, have prompted NATO to adopt measures to re-ensure allies at the Eastern flank of the Alliance, followed by deterrence measures. In this context, Romania decided to advance an objective from the package of forces but requested support to operationalize a division multinational command. On the same time, other obligations followed the same path, postponed to another deadline.

In 2020, the long-awaited event, namely the Strategic Defense Analysis, was produced, a process initiated and validated at the level of National Defense Council. Although this process was carried out strictly at the level of the MoD,

involving some think tanks only in the first part, that of assessing the security environment and possible developments over the next 20 years. Moreover, the whole process was carried out in a serious constraint, that of the new National Defense Strategy of the country, developed by another collective. If a ten-year military modernization plan, previously approved by the same NDC, is added, confidence in the effectiveness of this analysis process decreases significantly. Distrust is accentuated by the lack of any revision of major procurement proposals previously submitted to Parliament and the Endowment Plan already approved by the same NDC. The presence of NATO planners for the renegotiation of "capability targets" earlier this year went unnoticed, with no surprises, the same approach, without any reference to the Strategic Defense Analysis process.

The main milestones for planning a sustainable defense capability should be, in the context of the above:

- Firstly, Romania does not have the capacity to defend itself against an aggression by a neighboring state with a higher military capacity (this state exists and high-level relations are blocked). Romania cannot defend itself in the face of aggression by two smaller states, with territorial claims towards Romania or even in the face of a single smaller state, supported by a regional power;
- Romania is part of the largest Political-Military Alliance, which provides security guarantees against an aggression by the Russian Federation, but also exposes it, as part of this Alliance, in the context of an open conflict between NATO and the Russian Federation;
- Romania is at a sufficiently short distance from the Russian Federation and can be hit with nuclear or conventional-laden missiles;
- Russian aviation can hit any target in Romania;
- Russian ships can block all sea routes of interest to Romania in the Black Sea, as well as all ports, in a relatively short time;
- Special forces of the Russian Federation can act in a short time in the area of the capital and ports on the Black Sea;
- Any kind of troop invasion is only possible from neighbors with territorial claims.

Romania must be able to react to the first air and missile strikes, as well as to attacks by special forces. Surveillance and research must enable any threat to be identified in the initial phase so that it can react. Since the use of the most advanced technologies in an armed confrontation is already a rule, anticipated by Bismarck, it is expected that in a confrontation with another state/alliance, high-precision drones, missiles and bombs, electromagnetic actions, cyber-attacks, at the same time as psychological attacks and diplomatic actions of denigration and prosecution of Romania. Therefore, Romania must have the capabilities with

which to counter these possible threats, even if the risk level of state aggression is quite low now.

The level of ambition can be limited to defending against aggression and limiting losses, without pursuing defeat of the enemy, when there is a strategic partnership with the US. Hence the military structures that Romania must carry out to have the necessary capabilities. Are they the same as the existing ones? What is the real operational capability of the current force structure? In the White Charter of Defense 2021 it was established that "in order to carry out the established missions and the level of ambition" the structure of forces for Romania's defense must have an "adequate response capacity, in line with plans drawn up at national and NATO level*", which meet a number of 11 specific requirements.

** According to the level of combat capability, armed forces are organized into: forces ready for permanent action; high-level combat forces; low-level combat capability forces, ready for action after the completion/mobilization of the combat capacity has been increased; structures to be constituted for mobilization, intended for the generation/regeneration of forces, as well as for the implementation of the system of armed resistance on the national territory.*

Are the funds sufficient to achieve the new capabilities and maintain their operational capacity? Supplements may be necessary, in which direction? If they can be formed with less funds and contributions to joint projects of NATO or the EU, would it be right to maintain the current distribution of funds?

Does Romania aim for the ability to carry out preventive strikes when the attack / aggression is imminent? (just like Israel). At no point in its history did Romania have the military capability to defeat its enemy, except in 1919, when it was possible to take offensive actions to impose its will on the enemy, but the circumstances were favorable to these actions.

This is not apparent from the existing planning documents, and the funds needed for such a defense capability are huge given the possible opponents. In the White Charter of Defense 2021⁵, the Prime Minister says that the document "took into account the conclusions resulting from the conduct of the *Strategic Defense Analysis*, being conceived in a new strategic paradigm, different from that of the last 20 years", the new paradigm starts from "the premise that in order to be effective we must be aware that the Armed Forces are being built in modernity, information, knowledge and new technologies"⁶.

The waiver, the suspension of compulsory military service, has led to several disputes and continues to be the subject of discussion. The subject is still widely debated in several states, and the return to compulsory traineeship, even though for a period under the year has already been approved in some countries, including Germany.

⁵ *The White Charter of Defence, 11.05.2021*, Official Monitor, Part I No. 499 of 13 May 2021, p.3.

⁶ *Ibidem.*

What are the advantages of a mandatory minimum military traineeship? Firstly, the mass preparation of most men (in Israel and women) to carry out military actions, i.e., to use lethal weaponry effectively and appropriate tactics and procedures specific to defense missions. The living regime in this traineeship involves discipline, organized training, teamwork, proper nutrition, exercise and, last but not least, patriotic education.

Another advantage is the establishment of a reserve, a trained, able and registered human resource so that it can be relatively quickly reactivated for the basic missions, the defense of the country.

Also, a fact not to be neglected is to maintain a strong link between the Armed Forces and civil society, to maintain in the collective mind the institution's membership in the society which supports and defends it.

All these advantages, the question arises "why was this traineeship dropped?" The answer could be given by stating a few disadvantages, which can be seen as arguments for the professionalization of the Armed Forces. The evolution of technology makes it necessary to prepare staff for the use of modern equipment (according to the new paradigm, referred to in the White Charter 21), training that takes a long time and, above all, costs a lot. It is ineffective to give up the newly prepared staff to resume the process with others, which you will give up after another cycle. If we also add the fact that skills are necessary for the correct operation, which are formed over time, but which are lost relatively quickly if the activity is interrupted, we can infer that professionalism is preferable to superficial knowledge and the safety risks are lower. Another argument would be that of too large a number, of an oversized capacity with high support costs.

It could be inferred that the suspension of compulsory military service also led to a significant reduction in military structures and a new philosophy on the organization of the force structure. For the most part, these transformations were achieved, especially after 2007, with the approval of the Army Transformation Strategy. Many military units were disbanded, many facilities were made redundant, which constituted the necessary infrastructure for the operation of these units. The reduction of military structures meant, in a first reaction, the reduction of the defense budget, then the budget was reduced to reduce the structures. An increasingly dangerous game, which has affected national defense capacity to an alarming level, and this danger was explained in the National Defense Council of the country in 2012, being approved by an Operational Capacity Restoration Plan, starting in 2013.

The particularly important process of the Strategic Defense Analysis probably identified all the problems faced by the Armed Forces and identified solutions for the coming years. We can say that the current level of security, the highest for the Romanian state of all time, will last at least another four years and can be guaranteed until beyond 2030. After that, could be a very good time for a sustainable and efficient building of national defense capacity.

The financial resources are known, there is a minimum predictability, given the existence of the political agreement accepted by most political forces in the current Parliament, allocating 2% of GDP for defense, at the request of the President of Romania. Endowment programs are already approved for the next 10 years, and threats and risks have been carefully considered by military planners, in consultation with key think tanks with national security concerns.

Most likely, the new force structure, thought of as "Armed Forces 2024" or the future "Armed Forces 2040" will be different from hybrid structures specific to the period prior to the Analysis. Maintaining in the paradigm of "professional structure" involves the formation of operational military entities from peacetime structures, excluding completion with reservists (inefficient and too old concept), with sufficient framing to be able to respond to a high level of reaction appropriate to the security situation in the region. This structure probably has all the resources provided for the modernization of the equipment necessary for the mission and infrastructure, as well as those necessary for the training of personnel and maintenance of equipment. Of course, the remaining resources available will be directed to the mobilization cores, where territorial forces will be formed, which will be able to act as deep-sea resistance forces, in the unlikely situation at this time of invasion of national territory. These forces could be provided as a complementary structure, for the situation of aggression on Romania, their formation and training for the use of individual infantry armaments being possible in a relatively short period of up to six months.

Of course, the problem of mobilizing all the resources in the event of war is much more complex, but the Strategic Defense Analysis will identify solutions for modernizing the system, for its efficiency and sustainability. The complexity of possible aggressive actions, cyber vulnerabilities, critical infrastructure vulnerabilities make appropriate approaches to these situations necessary, maintaining and complementing personnel acting in these areas with non-firearms.

Compulsory military service could therefore be reactivated for a shorter period, in which most of the above-mentioned advantages, but at lower costs, are used for missions that can be performed by the reserve soldiers. This will also solve the problem of "volunteer reservists", more effectively than with the solutions so far.

However, a more effective solution could be to return to the principles and rules originally established for professional soldiers and gradations. The first condition would be to limit the maximum age as an active military for this category of military to 35 years, and to remain above this age in the category of reservists (a solution for the establishment of the operational reserve), or as an instructor, by passing into the category of non-commissioners, according to their selection and training process.

Mobilization, in the military sense, is a complex process of transforming a society to make a special effort, in a difficult situation, 'the state of mobilization is the totality of extraordinary measures which can be put in place, principally, in the political, economic, social, administrative, diplomatic, diplomatic, legal and military fields, planned and prepared in peacetime, as well as the actions carried out to implement them, according to the law, at the emergence or immunity of a serious threat which may affect the sovereignty, independence and unity of the State, the territorial integrity of the country and constitutional democracy'⁷.

The entry into NATO generated a change/update of the national defense laws, so that new laws were approved, *Law No. 446/2006 on the preparation of the population for defense*, *Law No. 346/2006 on the organization and functioning of the Ministry of National Defense*, as well as *Law No. 355/2009 on the regime of partial or total mobilization of the armed forces and the state of war*. However, changes to the status of military personnel⁸ and, in particular, to the status of soldiers and volunteer officers⁹ have created an impossible situation, in which a force structure built on the principle of completion of mobilization does not have the minimum reserve prepared to be integrated into this structure.

The principles from which the law was drafted were established only by a few military personnel with experience in the field, specialized in the workplace, in the compartments, offices, wards or mobilization services, experience achieved by the application of laws, regulations and orders written long before, adapted and made-up, so as to correspond to the new situation, i.e. membership of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Reality is not in accordance with the law, arguments:

Compulsory military service is suspended¹⁰ from 1 January 2007 and the operational reserve comprises only reservists. In reality, the states of organization at war are not enduring, as reservist soldiers from active service no longer exist. Successive changes to the status of soldiers and volunteer officers increased the maximum age for that service from 35 to 50 years.

Although the law states that "when declaring mobilization and the state of war or at the establishment of a state of siege, the performance of military service as a military officer within or concentrated/mobilized reservist becomes mandatory for men between the ages of 20 and 35 who meet the criteria to perform

⁷ *Law No. 355/2009 on the regime of the state of partial or total mobilization of the armed forces and the state of war*, Official Monitor, Part I no. 805 of 25 November 2009, art.1, apud <https://lege5.ro/Gratuit/gezdsojsgy/legea-nr-355-2009-privind-regimul-starii-de-mobilizare-partiala-sau-totala-a-fortelor-armate-si-al-starii-de-razboi>, accessed on 3rd May 2021.

⁸ *Law No. 80/1995 on the status of military personnel*, published in the Official Monitor, Part I No 155 of 20 July 1995, <https://lege5.ro/Gratuit/g44tsoi/legea-nr-80-1995-privind-statutul-cadrelor-militare>.

⁹ *Law No. 384/2006 on the status of soldiers and volunteer officers*, published in the Official Gazette, Part I No 868 of 24 October 2006, in force from 23 December 2006, being partially replaced by Law 270/2015, apud <https://lege5.ro/Gratuit/geydamjqga/legea-nr-384-2006-privind-statutul-soldatilor-si-gradatilor-profesionisti>.

¹⁰ *Law No. 446/2006 on the preparation of the population for defence*, <http://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliiDocumentAfis/77597>.

military service.", the mobilization records include those who have been active and retired (invoking Law 80/1990)¹¹.

It is not taken into account that many services for the institutions of the Armed Forces are outsourced, and in a war situation it is necessary to operate them at maximum parameters, in compliance with military regulations, not contracts for the provision of services.

Is it not clear the order of priorities for mobilization: the functioning of critical infrastructure, the transition of the economy to war production, with well-established goals, products and quantities in peacetime, the achievement of a defense capability adapted to the threat or simply the completion of staffed units, according to some organizational states?

The general reserve consists of incorporable who are largely not in the country. However, its training involves material and human resources, from infrastructure, specially constituted units (limited number, not most units), land and training ranges with a high level of protection against air strikes, equipment, and materials in sufficient stocks, updated and properly stored. Any comparison with the real situation can be dangerous.

Training of personnel to operate the current means of combat requires a relatively long time, plus tactical training, from group to battalion level (equivalent). Some weapons require a minimum of two years (pilots, divers, paratroopers, aircraft and helicopter mechanics, launch system operators, unmanned vehicle operators on board, computer scientists, air traffic controllers. The six months are insufficient, and it would be dangerous to bring under-prepared forces to fight.

If the first priority would be "the establishment of military structures", then there is a danger that some critical infrastructures inoperable, certain public services or even defense would be compromised, which would dangerously disrupt the entire social life, a danger as great as a direct blow from the potential enemy.

The priority of operationalizing the reception bases of allied forces and facilitating their transport are not envisaged, although Romania is part of a NATO Contingency Plan.

The construction of military structures is not correlated with available or available military technology and equipment.

The missions of law enforcement, police and emergency personnel are not clearly defined. To what extent can law enforcement be transferred for defensive kinetic missions under the conditions of hybrid warfare or total warfare?

Hospitals and public health facilities should be strictly regulated so as not to create confusion. Simply including them in the mobilization plans, without being established by law, can lead to dramatic situations.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, Article 3, paragraph 1 shall be replaced by the following: (5).

Mobilization is no longer just about "taking the gun in your hand". Resistance formations may be organized for situations of strategic surprise (Lithuanian model), but this requires a different model of resource organization and even training of reservists.

The change in increasing the age limit for volunteering in active service to 50 has brought the greatest prejudice to the possibility of generating a credible reserve. At the same time isolated the Army from the rest of society, professionalization becoming a risk, insufficiently analyzed and controlled. Subsequently, under the military pensions law approved in 2015, the possibility of reducing the age limit for soldiers became null and void, with the right to a military pension. Therefore, a simple modification of a number had a negative effect on the entire defense capability. The voluntary reservist's law could not correct the situation, on the contrary, it made it even stranger. Thus, staff who opt to become a volunteer reservist must go through an instructional program (insufficiently substantiated), after which they will benefit from rights that those who have retired and are in the same situation in the mobilization states do not have.

Clarification of the objectives, missions and the organization of the active structure accordingly should be linked to the real possibilities for mobilization. Establishing a sustainable level of ambition with a capacity to respond to the real situation and with all the resources correctly assigned should help transform the military and prioritize resources. Whereas in the White Charter the government declares that "The ultimate goal is to strengthen the defense and deterrence posture, by developing those types of forces and capabilities that will allow us to fight back against any possible aggressor, regardless of the size of its force, in a manner that will make aggression against us too costly to be tried"¹².

The same defense planning document states that "in order to carry out its missions, the Romanian Army needs predictability and credibility. In this respect, the Romanian Army will size its structure of forces according to the level of ambition", which induces us the idea of a revision of the structure of forces in the sense of the ideas and principles stated, moreover, is mentioned a "program on the transformation of the Romanian Armed Forces until 2040 (Armed Forces 2040)¹³", which confirms our assumption.

A starting point could be the "Plan for the restoration of the operational capacity of the Romanian Armed Forces, approved by the NDC in 2013", but the drafting of new laws, including the status of military personnel, should involve generals and admirals, highly experienced officers at both national and international level, and "specialists" should contribute only to debates, by simulating and correcting projects to ensure their viability and efficiency.

¹² *The White Charter of Defence, op.cit.*, p. 3.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 25.

The verification of the functionality of the defense system shall begin with the active forces, in the order of reaction time, sized to the possible threat, continued from close to close to the level of action as "armed resistance" as a last mission.

Forces with high reaction capacity should be rotated in order to maintain this level of reaction for a maximum of one year. Forces for other missions (collective defense, peacekeeping or peace enforcing) should consist of forces other than those established for the defense of the country, with immediate reaction (24 hours).

The capacity of HNS' (Host Nation Support) is very important, should be achieved from peacetime and sustained to war. All necessary VJTF transport facilities must be properly identified, maintained and defended.

One document to leave could be the draft *Statute of Military Personnel*- a document submitted to parliamentary committees as early as 2017. For its approval, the constitutional court should be sought to accept professional soldiers as part of military personnel, thus solving other problems concerning this category of military personnel, not foreseen by those who drafted the Constitution, nor to its amendment.

The structure of forces must be reformed, with the establishment of viable units, consisting of peacetime and territorial units, to be formed to form armed resistance, provided only with cores for mobilization and training. The active structure requires specialization and training appropriate to new challenges, with the use of increasingly efficient equipment, in an environment that is increasingly difficult to protect, involving certified and authorized personnel, to follow continuous training programs. The level of ambition set out in White Charter 21 is extremely high and quite unclear. It is not sufficiently explicit what is the level of structure that must be ready to fight for the rejection of an aggression and which is the level which must act for "resilience" in the situation of enemy occupation of part of the national territory, territorial forces, capable of carrying out the resistance movement. Maintaining a force structure with insufficient framing, with the hope of completing by mobilization is not in line with the paradigm established by the Prime Minister.

The digitization of all economic capabilities, their integration into a single record-keeping system could enable the record, planning and efficient use of all available resources, as well as the necessary procurement, depending on the needs of the defense mission.

Mobilization in the workplace of those who maintain critical infrastructure should be a priority of the mobilization system, just as greater involvement by the Ministry of National Defense in defining critical infrastructure. The critical infrastructure that it should aim at is not only in the field of defense, but also in the other areas of social life, since in a war situation any syncope in social life, any deficiency can seriously affect the morale of the population.

In a symmetrical approach, any element of the defense capacity can be used in a civil crisis, in an emergency situation, if the equipment is useful and the personnel are prepared to use them, as the defense resources are national assets and must be used to save the life of the population and protect its assets.

Of course, effective reform also requires a less popular measure, difficult to implement, but without which the Armed Forces will not be able to maintain the necessary level of reaction. This measure involves reducing the age limit for lower-grade militiamen, especially soldiers and grads, to a maximum of 35 years. Over this age, if they opt to continue their work in the Armed Forces, they could undergo training instructors, petty officers or military masters (technical petty officers) and move into the category of petty officers. This could largely maintain the advantages of the compulsory traineeship. Of course, military activity will be reflected in pension rights when they reach retirement age.

Harnessing the opportunities of this period effectively represents the unique opportunity to build a credible and sustainable defense capability capable of giving Romania a secure, stable state position in the region, respected, and appreciated.

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