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TRUMP'S SECOND TERM AND U.S. – CHINA RIVALRY: GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

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***Abstract**: In the current context, Thucydides Trap could become a significant factor in the U.S. diplomacy toward China. Moreover, trade tensions and the technological war may escalate into a new form of geopolitical competition, particularly in light of Donald Trump's announcement concerning the possible annexation of Greenland and control over the Panama Canal.*

The purpose of this paper is to explore how the annexation of Greenland and the Panama Canal could shape a new geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China. This evolving dynamic heightens the risk of conflict between the two countries, potentially surpassing the tensions witnessed during the final years of Trump's previous administration. The analysis is conducted in a descriptive manner, making use of various qualitative research methods.

***Keywords**: economic decoupling; Thucydides Trap; U.S.-China strategic rivalry; Arctic governance; transatlantic relationship.*

1. Preliminary Considerations

The re-election of Donald Trump as the 47th President of the United States has the potential to reshape the trajectory of U.S.-China competition. In this context, Graham Allison's concept – Thucydides Trap, provides a useful framework for understanding the evolving dynamics between the U.S. and China (Graham Allison, 2015). Furthermore, a new form of economic conflict may emerge in the coming years, distinct from the previous Trade War by taking on a more explicitly geopolitical dimension rather than remaining strictly economic. Within this framework, the potential annexation of Greenland and control over the Panama Canal could be viewed as part of a regional strategy for the Pacific Ocean's trade routes and also for the North Pole's future trading route. Such actions could heighten the risk of conflict between the two nations beyond the levels observed during the final years of Trump's previous administration (White House, 2025).

Given these developments, this paper seeks to analyse the geopolitical, economic, and technological implications of Trump's re-election on U.S.-China competition, with particular attention to its effect on Arctic dialogue and the Panama Chanel. Future U.S.-China relations could be influenced by Donald Trump's statements regarding the annexation of Greenland and the Panama Channel, which may be interpreted as attempts to contain China's trading routes. This study argues that a second Trump administration would likely intensify the militarization of economic competition, as the U.S. seeks to dominate strategic chokepoints (e.g., Panama Canal) and resource-rich regions (e.g., the Arctic) thereby directly challenging China's global connectivity ambitions.

This paper seeks to deepen understanding to how renewed U.S.-China tensions under Trump could fracture international consensus, strain transatlantic relations, and exacerbate vulnerabilities in Arctic dialogue.

This paper employs a qualitative analysis utilising historical analogies (Thucydides Trap) and case studies (e.g., Greenland, Panama Canal) to contextualize strategic shifts. Policy analysis – drawing on Trump-era policy documents, online news sources, speeches, and bipartisan legislative trends – helps project potential second-term priorities and Arctic resource competition amid escalating U.S.-China tensions.

This trajectory poses a risk of fragmenting the EU's stance, compelling member states to balance between U.S. security guarantees and economic interdependence with China. Moreover, Arctic governance, reliant on U.S.-Russia-China cooperation, could further erode as geopolitical rivalry overshadows climate priorities. Ultimately, the paper underscores the necessity for adaptive multilateral frameworks to manage systemic instability in an era of intensified great-power competition.

2. Destined for Conflict? The Challenge of Power Transitions

Graham Allison likened the relationship between the U.S. and China to that of Athens and Sparta during the Peloponnesian Wars and used the concept of the "Thucydides Trap". According to Allison, any power system tends to include two main actors: a rising power that challenges the existing order, and a dominant hegemon that seeks to preserve the status-quo. In this context, structural tensions create systemic pressure that can drive the two powers towards conflict, as the rising power aspires to replace the current hegemon (Allison 2017, 29).

This was the case during Peloponnesian Wars between Sparta and Athens, when the two regional powers went to war to protect their regional alliances and maintain their prestige. In their case, the conflict was triggered by a war between two of their respective regional allies - Corinth and Corcyra. Both Athens and Sparta recognized that supporting their ally could shift the regional balance of power in their favour. Ultimately, in order to maintain their power and prestige, both powers chose to engage in direct conflict. This situation made the regional system very fragile in front of an external power, and so, the system of the city states in the Ancient Greece was conquered by the Macedonian Kingdom from the north (Allison, 2017, 35-37).

To support his concept, Graham Allison analysed 15 historical cases in which the Thucydides Trap appeared to be at play. In four of these cases, the conflict between the two powers managed to maintain peaceful relations, in the remaining cases, conflict ultimately broke out between them (Allison, 2017, 41, 244). Based on this analysis, Graham Allison frames the U.S.-China relationship as a modern example of the Thucydides Trap, where China resembles pre-World War I Germany and the United States playing a role similar to that of the United Kingdom (Allison, 2017, 72, 76-78).

The contemporary relationship between the United States and China is defined by strategic rivalry, which could quickly escalate into broader geopolitical competition, particularly if the U.S. were to gain control of the Greenland and the Panama Chanel. While not yet direct military adversaries, tensions continue to rise as China challenges the U.S.-led global order.

Historically, power transitions have often led to conflict, as rising states seek to reshape the international system and established hegemons strive to preserve their dominance. In the U.S.-China, economic competition has been central, particularly in areas such as trade, technological innovation, and global supply chains. The trade war initiated during Donald Trump's first term marked a turning point in bilateral relations, introducing a more confrontational approach. While the Biden administration maintained several of these economic policies, a second Trump presidency is expected to further intensify the economic conflict, through additional tariffs and policies aimed at curbing China's technological and industrial growth (China Briefing, 2025).

Beyond trade, geopolitical considerations are also becoming more prominent in the U.S.-China competition. Strategic regions such as the Indo-Pacific, the Arctic, and critical maritime chokepoints, including the Panama Canal, have become key areas where both Washington and Beijing seek to assert their influence. Additionally, discussions surrounding Greenland's strategic significance reflect broader U.S. concerns about China's expanding global presence (Jiajia, Haiyang, 2024).

While competition remains the dominant dynamic, the risk of escalation is a persistent concern. Historical precedents suggest that, without careful management, power transitions of this kind can lead to open conflict. The evolving direction policies of U.S.-policy - particularly under the second Trump administration - may shift the nature of the rivalry from one focused on economic and technological competition to a more overt geopolitical confrontation.

3. The U.S. – China Trade War

The trade war between the United States and China begun in 2018 when the U.S. imposed its first tariffs on Chinese imports, specifically targeting solar panels and washing machines under President Donald Trump's administration. This measure was implemented to safeguard the American solar panel industry and support Whirlpool, a leading domestic appliance manufacturer in the United States (Reuters, 2018). In response, China introduced retaliatory tariffs ranging from 15% to 25% on a range of American goods, including aluminium, automobiles, aircraft, fruits, soybeans, and pipelines (Buckley, 2018). These actions marked the beginning of what became known as the U.S.-China Trade War.

This type of economic conflict is not unprecedented, as a similar dynamic emerged between the United Kingdom and Ireland following the latter's independence (Murgescu, 2010, 288-289). Similarly, the United States and China have engaged in this conflict primarily because their rivalry is not rooted in military or political competition, unlike the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR).

Unlike the USSR, China does not position itself as a political competitor, as its primary focus is not exporting its political system abroad (Xuetong, 2019, 203-204). This distinction presents China with significant challenges in building a global political alliance system, unlike the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Enescu, 2023). Moreover, economic competition escalated into a technological rivalry in 2019 when the Trump administration imposed restrictions on the use of Huawei's 5G technology. Consequently, countries such as Romania and Poland implemented national legislation to prevent Chinese companies from investing in or developing their domestic 5G networks (CNBC 2019).

In analysing this situation, Chris Miller argued that the Trump administration was more focused on the trade war than on technological competition (Miller, 2024). However, for China, semiconductors remain the most critical foreign technology. Miller further suggests that Beijing refrained from directly supporting Huawei against U.S. sanctions to preserve its future access to American technologies (Carolus, 2020).

The trade war and technological rivalry temporarily paused in 2020 when the two powers reached an economic protocol. Under this agreement, China committed to respecting intellectual property rights, technology transfer regulations, financial services, exchange rate policies, and transparency, while also expanding trade (Covington & Burling LLP, 2020).

This agreement was part of the United States strategy to curb China's economic rise, which, in recent years, had relied on unethical practices to acquire foreign technologies developed in Europe and the U.S. However, in 2020, the Trump administration was replaced by the Biden administration, which initially continued the trade war with China. As part of this ongoing strategy, in 2022, the new administration added two Chinese semiconductor companies to the Entity List, aiming to restrict China's access to U.S. technologies needed for developing its own semiconductor industry (Alep & Freifeld, 2022).

These sanctions prompted China to accelerate the acquisition of Western technologies to advance its next generation of semiconductors in the months leading up to the ban (Bloomberg, 2024).

In response, China also increased domestic investments in the development of next-generation semiconductors by establishing the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund (Tianlei, 2019), commonly known as Big Fund, alongside regional technological funds such as the Shanghai

Integrated Circuit Industry Fund (Bei, Ang & Jia, 2023). Meanwhile, the ongoing conflict between China and Taiwan has posed significant challenges to the United States in developing a new generation of semiconductors. This is primarily due to Taiwan's status as a region claimed by mainland China, and in 2022, China conducted one of its largest military exercises around Taiwan in response to the visit of former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi (Zhen, 2022). This heightened military tension raised concerns in Washington about the growing strategic vulnerability of relying heavily on semiconductors produced by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), particularly in light of the escalating tensions between China and Taiwan. To mitigate this risk and enhance greater technological self-sufficiency, the United States took steps to establish semiconductor manufacturing capabilities, including the construction of a new semiconductor factory aimed at reducing dependence on foreign supply chains and bolstering national security by securing a more reliable domestic production of critical technologies (Shepardson, 2025).

In a similar vein, the competition for access to rare-earth elements between the two powers has introduced a new dimension to the technological rivalry. China has focused on securing these critical resources from Africa, offering infrastructure investments in exchange, while the United States has turned to Ukraine, providing military support against Russian aggression in return for access to these vital materials (Harmash, 2025).

This competition is as significant as the race for semiconductors, particularly for China, as control over rare-earth elements will play a crucial role in the development of the next 6G technological revolution. Currently, China holds an advantage, primarily due to the rapid expansion of its electric vehicle industry, which surpasses the development of the Western electric vehicle sector. Nevertheless, the Trump administration expressed a strong interest in blocking China's progress in this area, aiming to preserve U.S. dominance in emerging technologies.

The Trump administration's declarations regarding the annexation of Greenland and control over the Panama Chanel will likely transform this rivalry from an economic and technological competition into a more geoeconomic one, as part of a future geopolitical competition. As a result, U.S.-China competition will evolve into a more geopolitically driven contest. In this new phase, the race for resources and economic alliances will become more important than the ideological battle between democracy and communism that defined the Cold War. Both the U.S. and China will focus on expanding their economic and technological influence to secure a larger share of the global market.

4. Towards a New Thucydides Trap

The emerging competition between the United States and China is increasingly shifting from an economic and technological rivalry to a more pronounced geopolitical competition. This transformation is largely driven by President Donald Trump's statements regarding Greenland and the Panama Canal, which could block two critical trade routes for China - the Northern Sea Route and the most direct passage between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans (Aikman, 2025). The Northern Sea Route is especially important for China, as it would reduce transport time between China and Europe from 21000 km via the Suez Canal route to 13000 km. Even though this route is often blocked by ice and much of it is used by Russia, Moscow has shown interest in using icebreakers in order to transform it into a viable trading route (Singh, 2023). This would also help Russia develop its northern regions by creating a network of ports around the North Pole. Whereas the Panama Channel provides the shortest route connecting the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean, compared to the historical route around Cape Horn.

By potentially restricting these vital trade routes, Washington signals a more assertive approach in the ongoing U.S.-China competition, indicating that Trump is prepared to instigate a new form of conflict with China.

China's current position is reminiscent of Japan in the 1980s, when Japan became the world's second-largest economic power, and U.S. debt to Japan began to grow (Paul Kennedy, 2011, 412-

413). The United States is determined not to repeat this historical scenario and is focused on halting China’s rise. In this context, control over Greenland would provide the U.S. with significant strategic leverage over trade in the Arctic and the access to regional resources. Furthermore, control of the Panama Canal would grant U.S. ships free passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, unlike the current situation where they must pay tolls (Lilieholm, Oppmann, Ordonez, Lemos, Danaher & Hansler, 2025).

On the other hand, China would be forced to pay tolls for passage through the Canal, potentially diminishing its influence over this key trade route. This would increase the cost of Chinese goods and already led Panama authorities to withdraw from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Sarah Camacho, 2025). Meanwhile, the imposition of higher tariffs on Chinese goods has caused U.S. consumers to reconsider their purchasing habits on platforms such as Shein and Temu, further undermining China’s trade advantage (Soo, 2025).

At the same time, the Trump administration appears eager to bring the war in Ukraine to a resolution, with the goal of aiming to reallocate resources from Europe to Asia and reposition Russia in a way that could exert more pressure on China. In this scenario, Russia could paradoxically become one of the unexpected beneficiaries of the current international system, despite the severe economic and technological setbacks it has suffered following its invasion of Ukraine. Should Russia manage to secure its occupied territories in Ukraine and reintegrate into the international financial and trade systems - after its expulsion from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) in 2022 – it might potentially attract the return of Western companies. This shift comes as the United States increasingly perceives China, rather than Russia, as the primary challenger to the existing international order.

Unlike Russia, China has not initiated a military campaign to seize Taiwan. However, the likelihood of such an action could rise if China’s economic power declines and domestic living standards deteriorate. Despite this, this scenario remains improbable for now, particularly if China continues prioritising economic and technological competition and strives to preserve its global economic influence rather than engaging in direct conflict. As such, while the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan cannot be dismissed, it remains low under current conditions.

In parallel, the United States has shown increasing interest in weakening the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South-Africa), largely due to its expanding membership and the prospect of it becoming a significant economic and technological rival to the U.S. Currently, BRICS accounts for 37.3% of global GDP (Gross Domestic Product) based on purchasing power parity (PPP) and includes three major oil producers - Russia, Iran, and Indonesia (World Economic Forum, 2024).

The expansion of BRICS from five to eleven members may lead Washington to increasingly perceive it as a distinct economic bloc independent of U.S. influence, despite continued reliance on the U.S. dollar in trade. In the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has advocated for the use of national currencies in BRICS trade, primarily because it can no longer make payments in U.S. dollars (Soldatkin & Bryanski, 2024). Similarly, BRICS has suggested the creation of a new international currency that would reduce dependence on the U.S. dollar (Sullivan, 2023).

This trend could place the U.S. in a situation reminiscent of the Cold War, when the USSR sought to create an alternative economic system by exporting the communist revolution globally. However, unlike the ideological unity of the Cold War era, today’s BRICS members encompass a diverse range of political regimes, from democratic nations such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, and South Africa to authoritarian regimes like Russia, Iran, and China. Nevertheless, the greatest threat to U.S. economic interests may come BRICS ‘s potential to evolve into an autonomous economic bloc capable of operating outside the U.S. dollar-dominated global financial world.

5. The Arctic

The Arctic is rapidly emerging as a key geopolitical hotspot of the 21st century. Climate change and melting of Arctic ice have opened new opportunities, intensifying competition among major global powers over the region's governance and resources (Brimmer, 2023).

Historically, the Arctic has been a strategic focal point, especially during the Cold War. Its location offers critical advantages for military positioning and surveillance. With ice coverage now in significant decline, the Arctic has become increasingly accessible, prompting nations to reassess its strategic value. New maritime routes such as the Northern Sea Route promise to reduce shipping times between major markets, thereby boosting global trade efficiency (Werffeli, 2024).

Often viewed as one of the last unclaimed frontiers, the Arctic has gained substantial geopolitical and economic relevance due to its vast untapped natural resources, emerging trade routes, and environmental changes.

As global interest in the region intensifies this analysis explores how both powers navigate Arctic governance, economic opportunities, and security concerns, shaping the broader geopolitical landscape of the region.

The Arctic region has emerged as a key area of geopolitical, economic, and environmental significance in international relations (EEAS, 2021). The accelerated melting of Arctic ice due to climate change presents both opportunities and challenges, ranging from resource exploitation to military security and indigenous rights. This chapter examines the Arctic Dialogue through the lens of international relations theories, exploring the roles of key actors, institutional mechanisms, and future trajectories.

The Arctic is a zone of strategic competition among major powers, particularly Russia, the United States, and China (Pechko, 2025). The region's vast natural resources and newly accessible maritime routes make it a target for both military and economic expansion. Russia has significantly enhanced its Arctic military capabilities, while the United States and NATO have stepped up their strategic engagement in response (Boulègue&Co, 2024). China, though a non-Arctic state, is seeking influence through economic and scientific investments as part of its "Polar Silk Road" initiative (Lamazhapov, Stensdal & Heggelund, 2023).

Several key states have sovereign territories in the Arctic region – Russia, the U.S., Canada, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland – and play leading roles in the region's governance. Russia claims the largest share of the Arctic and has heavily invested in infrastructure and military capabilities. Although the U.S. has traditionally lagged in Arctic engagement, it has recently increased its presence due to strategic concerns (Brimmer, 2023).

In addition to Arctic states, non-Arctic States such as China, the European Union member states, Japan, and South Korea have expressed strong interest in Arctic affairs, primarily through scientific research, economic investment, and diplomatic engagement. China, self-declared a "near-Arctic state", seeks access to Arctic resources and shipping routes while advocating for a multilateral governance approach (Bouffard & Co, 2024).

The study *Arctic Narratives and Political Values: Arctic States, China, NATO, and the EU* (2024) offers a comprehensive analysis of how key geopolitical actors frame their identities, interests, and governance strategies in the Arctic. The research builds on prior studies from 2018 and 2020 and expands its focus to include the European Union alongside Arctic Council member states, China, and NATO.

The European Union's (EU) Role: the EU has played an increasing role in Arctic governance (Degeorges, 2013), advocating for environmental protection, sustainable development, and scientific cooperation. As an observer in the Arctic Council, the EU advocates for stronger regulations on Arctic resource exploitation. Through initiatives such as the EU Arctic Policy, the bloc supports indigenous rights and climate action while promoting economic interests in the region. Strategically, the EU's engagement is also shaped by its ties to Denmark and Greenland, and by broader concerns over Russian and Chinese influence in the Arctic (Durkee, 2018, Graceffo, 2024).

What is Arctic Governance?

Arctic governance refers to a complex and evolving system that balances the rights and responsibilities of Arctic nations with the interests of the global community. It aims to promote sustainable development, environmental stewardship, and peaceful cooperation in a region undergoing rapid environmental and geopolitical changes (Long, 2018).

It refers to the framework of international agreements, institutions, and legal mechanisms that regulate activities and address challenges in the Arctic region. This governance structure is primarily based on the sovereign rights and jurisdictions of the eight Arctic nations: Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. It also considers the interests of non-Arctic states and non-state actors, all in accordance with relevant international treaties and laws (Long, 2018).

A central institution in this framework is the Arctic Council, established in 1996. The Council focuses on promoting sustainable development and environmental protection but explicitly excludes military and security issues from its mandate. The council operates by consensus and includes not only the eight Arctic states but also six Permanent Participants representing Arctic Indigenous Peoples, ensuring their voices are integral to decision-making processes (The Arctic Council 2025).

In addition to the Arctic Council, several international agreements play significant roles in shaping Arctic governance. One of the most important is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which provides a legal framework for maritime activities, it covers issues such as the division of maritime resources, navigation rights, and pollution regulation. UNCLOS is crucial for managing the Arctic's maritime spaces and resolving disputes that may arise over territorial claims and resource exploitation (Long, 2018).

Arctic governance is a complex and dynamic system that seeks to balance the rights and responsibilities of Arctic nations with the broader interests of the global community. Its overarching goals are to promote sustainable development, environmental stewardship, and foster peaceful cooperation in a region undergoing rapid environmental and geopolitical changes (Long, 2018).

Why an Arctic Dialogue?

Dialogue remains a critical pillar of Arctic stability, providing a channel for cooperation even amid rising geopolitical tensions. Multilateral forums such as the Arctic Council, and the EU-Russia initiatives, help balance economic, security, and environmental interests. These platforms support policy coordination and conflict prevention, ensuring governance remains inclusive and effective. However, diverging strategic priorities among Arctic and non-Arctic states continue to shape the region's competitive landscape. Future research should examine how Arctic dialogue can mitigate tensions, and advance long-term sustainable development (Pauls, Deutsches Arktisbüro, 2023, Marinova & Gricius, 2024).

Key Themes in Arctic Dialogue that pose a Threat under the Thucydides Trap:

- *Geopolitical Competition*

The Arctic has become an arena for geopolitical manoeuvring, particularly between Russia and NATO. Russia has reopened Soviet-era military bases and developed Arctic-capable military forces. In response, the U.S. and its NATO allies have responded with increased naval patrols and military exercises in the region. The EU aligns closely with NATO in countering Russian influence, while it also seeks to regulate economic activity in the Arctic through legal frameworks (Evers, 2021).

- *Economic and Environmental Stakes*

The Arctic contains vast untapped reserves of oil, gas, and rare earth minerals, attracting investment from energy corporations and states. However, climate change and environmental degradation pose significant challenges. Striking a balance between economic development and environmental sustainability remains a contentious issue in Arctic governance (Long, 2018).

- *The United States and Greenland*

Greenland has attracted renewed interest from the U.S. due to its strategic location and resource potential. In 2019, the Trump administration proposed purchasing Greenland from Denmark, highlighting concerns over Chinese and Russian activities in the Arctic. Although Denmark rejected the proposal, the U.S. has since increased its diplomatic and economic engagement with Greenland, including investments in infrastructure and natural resources exploration. Meanwhile, the EU opposes any unilateral actions that could destabilize Arctic governance and prefers a multilateral approach that includes Greenland's autonomy and indigenous representation (The Arctic Council, 2025, EEAS, 2021).

- *Legal and Institutional Challenges*

Despite the growing importance of the Arctic, the region lacks a comprehensive governance framework. While UNCLOS provides guidelines for territorial claims, disputes persist, such as the Lomonosov Ridge contention between Russia and Canada. The Arctic Council promotes dialogue but lacks enforcement mechanisms, leading to concerns about the effectiveness of current international legal frameworks (Bergmann & Co, 2023).

In order to prevent a possible Thucydides Trap in the Arctic region there has been identified the future trends in Arctic governance. The Arctic's evolving geopolitical landscape reflects the dynamics of Thucydides' Trap, with the U.S. as the dominant power facing challenges from a rising China and a resurgent Russia. The region's vast resources, new trade routes, and growing military importance are intensifying this strategic competition, increasing the risk of conflict (Bergmann & Co, 2023).

The United States' relatively limited strategic response to these developments has created a vacuum that both China and Russia have sought to fill (Fouche, 2024). Their increasing presence and strategic manoeuvre could further erode U.S. influence, increasing the risk of confrontation. According to the Thucydides Trap framework, such dynamics, where emerging powers threaten the status-quo, heighten the potential for conflict (Fouche, 2024).

Therefore, the Arctic presents a potential strategic threat under the Thucydides Trap framework. The competing interests and military posturing of China and Russia, combined with the United States' strategic hesitation, create a precarious balance that could lead to increased tensions or conflict. The Arctic's emerging significance as a geopolitical and economic frontier further amplifies these risks, making it a potential flashpoint in great power competition.

Conclusions

The current changes in the global geopolitical order are among the most dramatic in the past three decades. Trump's second term as president of the U.S. is expected to be filled with controversial decisions, a more assertive foreign policy, and a significant reshaping of the international arena.

The U.S. appears to be turning a new page in its strategic approach, pursuing territorial expansion, as evidenced by its claims in the Panama Canal and Greenland, while also forging new strategic alliances and interests.

Trump's engagement with Greenland and Panama signals a return to classical geopolitics, shifting the focus from predominantly technological and economic considerations toward direct geopolitical competition. This approach is intended to counter China's global expansion. This dynamic brings Thucydides' Trap back into focus, drawing it closer to the U.S. sphere of influence, intensifying competition, and paving the way for new strategic developments and outcomes.

As Thucydides' Trap is redefined in the current political environment, it highlights the U.S.-China rivalry. Given China's ambitions to control Arctic trade routes and its willingness to partner with the Russian Federation to achieve this, the U.S. must adopt a more proactive stance in the region and redefine its existing partnerships.

The Arctic region holds great potential, both in terms of resources and strategic importance. While it has a well-defined governance structure, it lacks mechanisms to protect it from unforeseeable future challenges.

Owning territories is one way to secure control over trade routes, or being part of an alliance with member states in the region. Based on Thucydides' Trap, China's growing presence in the Arctic poses a significant threat to U.S. hegemony in the region.

Therefore, it is expected that the U.S. will increase its presenceand engagement in the Arctic region in the near future. At the same time, China is likely to adopt a more assertive posture, heightening competition and further challenging the U.S. strategic position in the region.

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