MOTIVES, MECHANISMS AND MAP OF FAR-RIGHT RADICALISATION IN EUROPE.
MYTHS AND SOCIOLOGICAL CONFIRMATIONS

Iulian CHIFU, PhD,
Professor, "Carol I" National Defence University,
President, Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Center, Bucharest, Romania.
E-mail: keafuyul@gmail.com

Cosmin GRIGORE, PhD Candidate,
National School of Political and Administrative Studies (SNSPA),
Junior Researcher at Center for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning, Bucharest, Romania.
E-mail: grigore.cosmin@yahoo.com

Abstract: There is a full resurgence of populist, nationalist, right-wing extremist parties at the forefront of European and world politics. These are not mere labels, and the differences between the various approaches within this political family are crucial. We have reviewed the different components of ideologies in the radical right space and the links with populism, conservatism, nationalism, anti-system or anti-elite, globalist, neo-liberalism approaches, including parliamentary representation and democratic governance, making a mirror of radicalization. We have also delved into the causes of the historical emergence and proliferation of these trends, and have looked at sociological studies that reveal the qualitative content and characteristics of the favourite targets of these trends. The study shows that the dominant criteria are technology, algorithms and message amplifiers as well as the lack of responsibility, and frustration that bring these trends to the fore, and not necessarily the obvious quantitative indicators such as investment in and level of education, economic development, or qualitative ones such as indiscriminate access to opinions in the guise of information and lack of critical thinking.

Keywords: populism; political extremism; radicalisation; anti-system; illiberalism.

Introduction and Methodologies

This paper aims to identify the mapping of far-right populist movements in the current political spectrum and to determine the mechanisms that have led to the amplification of their support in the contemporary world. We are then interested, on the basis of extensive sociological studies at the European Union level, particularly in France, Italy, Austria, Hungary - chosen for the specific characteristics of the relevant governments and parties in the spectrum under study - in the economic and educational component characteristic of the regions that predominantly support these systems, together with the individual features of the politics of these states and the impact of European policies considered neo-progressive on them.

The methodology used is that of an encyclopaedic and comparative study of the concepts and nuances of the partisan options of different ideologies, as well as the identification of the criteria that create the nuances of the approaches and the affinities with the classical conservative, nationalist or anti-system movements. Comparative study of the policies and failures of the individual states concerned together with sociological studies of the impact and support for the European policies in question are also integrated into the qualitative analysis we conduct.

The findings imply that support for far-right parties is stronger in areas with lower education spending and poorer educational outcomes (PISA tests) but also dependence on government policies that have sparked backlash and protest voting, including recourse to irrationality in elections. Naturally, here again we find the impact of social media and technological tools to target every citizen of any country connected to social media networks and the (excessive, not infrequently abusive) use of personal data that allows for targeted selection and empowerment.

1. Populism, Extremism, Radicalism, Conservatism Nationalism. A Conundrum of Concepts on the Right Wing of the Political Spectrum

Populism - populisms

The political space that is alternatively labelled (possibly radical) right-wing populism, neo-conservatism, right-wing extremism, illiberalism/liberal democracy, radical right-wing nationalism, authoritarian, anti-system, right-wing, authoritarian parties, is in fact a highly heterogeneous family of political movements. Populism is the characteristic of all these movements, announcing that they are anti-system (in the sense of being against the power scaffolding, not necessarily the democratic system they use, primarily the elective democracy component), claiming to represent the People, whom they understand and better bring their preferences into political decision-making (Colantone and Stanig 2019). However, the movements are heterogeneous, from left to right, and the economic component ranges from egalitarianism and fighting inequalities to redistribution, economic nationalism and libertarianism.

Thus, Betz divides right-wing radicalism, obviously populist, into libertarianism and national-authoritarianism (Betz 1993), while van Beyme introduces the characteristics of right-wing populism as volatility, unpredictability, anti-elitism, institutional contestation, politicization and the creation of multiple "Us" versus "Them" rifts, as well as a high degree of opportunism (Beyme 2019) (especially adaptation to current developments in the state and the concrete policies that are adopted and applied), with the risk of inconsistency and incoherence.

Betz also makes the matrix of the distinctions between right-wing populism and conservatism, noting that the latter is, on the contrary, stable, with firm values, elitist, with respect for institutions – it even strengthens, reinforces, centralizes them, is concerned with the integration and solidity of society and the state, and has a solid spiritual foundation as well (Beyme 2019). It is no coincidence that today's populist-conservative movements claim to be neo-conservative and to be bearers of a form of "true democracy" (Crook, Pakulski and Waters 1992), claiming to save classical, traditional, established conservatism.

For Mudde, populism is not a focused and decanted ideology, but merely a method based on the opposition between the "pure people", superior, endowed with absolutely positive elements, and the "corrupt elites", without a coherent agenda or programme (Mudde 2004). Three elements would be defining: the anti-system stance, challenging the structures of representative democracy; authoritarianism, which challenges the principles of liberalism, especially the protection of minority rights, and prefers representation by charismatic leaders, respectively government by referendum and plebiscite; and nationalism/nativism which is anti-cosmopolitan, against internationalism and multilateralism, with autarchic tendencies (Inglehart, Ronald and Norris 2016). Bonikowski also sees populism as more of a discursive framework, in which multiple ideologies fit (Bonikowski 2016).

Populism questions the model of parliamentary representation, based on a lack of representativeness and the failure of traditional governmental action, while the struggle with the elite or the powerful (but for right-wing populism not the rich) introduces the crisis of parliamentarism (Tribe 1987) and introduces the theme of the crisis of parliamentary democracy, i.e. it challenges the independence and mutual control of the powers in the state, opting for the absolute pre-eminence of the untrammelled executive power, on the basis of the vote which would give it absolute legitimacy.

This is where the theme of the liberal democrats' encroachment on the sovereignty of the people through the institutional mechanisms of liberal democracy emerges (Gandesha 2018) and the idea and labelling of sovereigntist parties. Which believe, at the extreme, that they do not even need democratic institutions that mediate the relationship with the people, and that the charismatic leader voted in can only govern directly with the people - the model of inter-war authoritarianism, fascism and Stalinism alike. Moreover, populism has two distinct directions of action, economic - with components of economic nationalism and autarchic isolationism, with centralised economic etatism; and cultural - the battle between so-called conservative and progressive values. Populism arises from the economic insecurity of large classes and the erosion of traditional cultural values in the context of globalization (Anderson 2016).

Neo-conservatism, anti-system positions, break with rationality

Populism is therefore the most widespread and common feature of this category of parties, but, as we have seen, not all populist parties are right-wing, and not all right-wing populism is radical, let alone extremist. Added to this is the neo-conservative characteristic, which means that the main attack and dispute is precisely with the classic conservative parties, in the mould of the Christian Democratic International and the European People's Party or the European Conservative Parties, which retain their liberal-democratic characteristics.

Nationalism is inherently part of the economic dimension and traditionalist approaches in the economic and cultural dimension. The anti-system approach challenges the institutions and the elite, favouring the assumption of representation of the people and the promotion of a so-called "true democracy", which replaces professional, reasoned and rational choices with numbers, voting, majorities (Jörke and Selk 2015) (Laclau 2006). That is why rational discussions with the political representatives of extreme forms or with their voters and supporters are not possible.

2. Radical Right, Far Right, Illiberalism

The radical right is seen as criticizing the established order, especially liberal democracy, and the system of checks and balances between the different powers in the state, which is seen as a defiance of the will of the majority. Here again we find extreme formulations of nationalisms and nativisms that are fundamentally anti-immigration, anti-integration and xenophobic, exclusivist and primordialist towards the natives, while radical right-wing populism challenges liberal pluralism, promotes authoritarianism and the model of the strong, charismatic (and absolute) leader and rejects elitism (Golder 2016). Even within the radical right there are divergences on the elements of categorization and separation of the extreme right from the radical right, where this distinction is made (Rydgren 2007), with very fine lines or even confusion at the borders between the various concepts.

Thus, the radical right would be market-based economically but relatively economically conservative, if not embracing even economic nationalism and traditionalism domestically, isolationist and protectionist in international trade; globalization must be fought by compensating the losers or, alternatively, returning to the status quo; the technological polarization of jobs is leading to new splits in right-wing approaches - from libertarianism disinterested in the consequences, to nationalist-authoritarianism imposing rules and bottlenecks on the labour market along nationalist autochthonist lines; automation and robotization have different impacts and create different reactions (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018); Economic crises, not the number or arrival of new immigrants, characterize the migration frontline (Dustmann, Vasiljeva and Damm 2019), which is, however, as much a subject as the associated criminality (sometimes even terrorism).

One particular theme in the space of right-wing radicalism concerns illiberal democracy. The novelty in the sub-typology of right-wing populist authoritarian populist approaches is the introduction of the concept which assumes universal suffrage, free elections, but not independent

judiciary and rule of law, but a subordination of the judiciary to the political and executive component. Neo-conservatism is part of the concept, as is nationalism and autochthonism, including economic nationalism and de facto protectionism, even though, formally, these currents may accept the free market economy. Voting and not law has primacy, the number and not the quality of arguments. The formulas, to be found especially in Hungary, where it has been publicly assumed, have over time, in Russia or China, turned into forms of state capitalism, political authoritarianism and pseudo-market economics and ordoliberalism (Zakaria 2008).

As far as the far-right is concerned, only a minority of populists can be identified as right-wing extremists, the immediate visible characteristics being fascist slogans - even the Nazi salute in public - extreme approaches from the radical right space, ignoring or even rejecting constitutional rules, rejecting the rules of democratic representation to the point of anarchism or totalitarianism (depending on the branch towards libertarianism versus authoritarian nationalism) (Colantone and Stanig 2019). Right-wing extremism, however, generally rejects the terrorist method, unlike the populist extreme left, which may use it, as it characteristically addresses "anti-American", "anti-Semitic" and "anti-Islamic" positions as part of its challenge to minorities and external, "globalist" and "imposed" elements. Representative democracy and parliaments are completely rejected, as are the so-called 'democratic methods' (Backes 2007).

Another theme of the debate is the relationship of the radical right, especially the extreme right, with the idea of revolution. Thus, radical right-wing movements are rarely revolutionary (Beyme 2019), but they insist on promoting the criticism of elites and exclusion from the decision-making area, including through ritualistic struggle with formulas of "parallel states"/ deep states, made up of professional civil servants, which would block the radical changes they want, operating by counterposing visible professional influences and scientific explanations, along the lines of the battle of the "people" with the elites. It cultivates discontent with the discontent at the bottom of society for life chances and marginal socio-political posturing versus the liberal theory of the role of the individual in the economy (Betz 1993) and wants to bring about profound socio-economic and socio-cultural changes through revolutionary formulas that mostly stop at the climate of anxiety and resentment, or revenge, created in cyberspace, but also through actions to accelerate social fragmentation.

We also need to discuss here the relationship between the radical and extremist right and the European Union. Here the approaches are in the sphere of the relationship of ideologies with anti-European versus Eurosceptic approaches. The approach touches NATO as well (Biscop 2018). For the most part, right-wing extremists have firmly rejected the idea of the European Union and the associated construct, operating under the slogan "Europe Yes, EU No", but right-wing radicals have preferred to situate themselves in the space of Euroscepticism and the Europe of Nations model, without rejecting the advantages and positive elements of the European Union for their own states. Especially when they are net EU-funded states, but rejecting the "progressive policies" imposed by Brussels, which accompany the implementation funds, especially those related to the environment, global warming, equal opportunities and integration of minorities of all kinds, immigration or the independence of justice. And the post-communist left-wing parties in Central and Eastern Europe also identify themselves as Eurosceptic.

3. Categorization of the European Radical Populist Right

We considered all the elements introduced by the different classifications of populism, right-wing radicalism and extreme right, with reference to the subtypes of democratic illiberalism and neo-conservatism or political and economic nationalism/autochthonism, in order to make our own separation of the integrated criteria that could represent a system of radicalization thresholds, namely the move towards the populist extreme right (Rydgren 2007).

We have thus introduced and propose a model with nine radicalization thresholds that define the radical right and the far right. First, we have placed extremism within the radical right at the threshold of the capacity for rational dialogue, respect for the democratic system as a basic rule, respect for the Constitution in force and non-damage to national security, respectively tolerance versus violence as the major threshold of transition from radicalism to extremism. Under these conditions, right-wing extremism is virtually illegal and sanctioned or punishable in established liberal democracies, while right-wing radicalism is legal, included in the current political system and allows for rational dialogue and the use of arguments in the debate on public policies.


Extremism

P9. Violence and revolutionary change would be the highest level of the threshold system to right-wing extremism.

P8. Failure to respect the Constitution and the institutional system.

P7. Pre-eminence/acceptance of external imposition of the changed leader or political system (in fact an anti-Sovereignism).

P6. Authoritarianism and destruction of the democratic system, democratic relativisation, illiberal democracy.

P5. The non-recognition of universal human rights is the next step.

P4. Pre-eminence of liberal democratic system change over concern for national security.

P3. Intolerance and non-acceptance of diversity.

P2. The fetishisation of elections and the clamour of free speech absolutism as the only acceptable democratic thesis.

P1. Challenging NATO, EU, international institutions and undermining them.

Radicalism

Figure no. 1: Radicalization thresholds from radical right to extremism.
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4. Motivations and Causes of the Far-Right Vote

We also looked into the causes of this political radicalization and the mechanisms, but also the vulnerable individuals targeted by these ideologies. Thus, fundamentally, the flight to the extreme is driven by deep dissatisfaction with one's own fate, catalysed protest voting, the rejection of any moderate conventional political options, voting against all and challenging the democratic system as a whole, as a result of its effects on the individual fate of the dissatisfied (Chifu and Simons 2023).

If contestation is always legitimate and in any concrete policy, there are supporters and opponents, bringing together of all losers under the fold of the contestation of the liberal-democratic system is the novelty of the radical right movements. The protest vote (Betz 1993) is also mostly justified, against the background of interpreting one's own fate at the expense of some of the European policies considered extreme, ideologized and neo-progressive left-wing, leaving many people behind through social and economic marginalisation. The same approach is also aimed at

failed national policies, the lack of justice and the status of apparent impunity of those at the centre of power, as well as the ostentatious accumulation of wealth in public office.

Subsidiarily, there is a relativization of good and evil, a blurring of boundaries and axiological relativization between tolerance/violence; humanism/cynicism; decency/histrionics (scandal, visibility); moderation/extremism, isolationism and power politics versus multilateralism (Beyme 2019). This is how the moderate centre of the political spectrum and the established, traditional parties are attacked from the positions of radicalism and extremism on the left and the right alike.

The main reason identified is the shift from the welfare state and the neo-liberal social contract to a post-industrial individualised capitalism (Betz 1993), according to Betz. The global economic crisis of 2008 and the sovereign debt crisis in Europe in 2009 were another trigger and amplifier of protest and contestation options for traditional parties (Greenspan 2008). Pandemic and containment policies, seen as infringements of individual rights and forced vaccination versus free choice continued the trend (Chifu and Șaranuță 2020), and, subsequently, costly policies to combat global warming on energy prices and economic efficiency, seen as the effect of an ideologized neo-progressive, left-wing political approach. And this has amplified the flight to the extremes, predominantly to the far right.

The processes generated by new technologies, such as digitisation, social media and global internet access, have reinforced the context in which these choices have spread and amplified (Chifu and Savu, The impact of Technology on Human Being, Society and Politics 2020). Add to this increased access to higher education, information over-abundance, the disintegration of political subcultures and traditional loyalties (Beyme 2019). Dissatisfaction with politics in general, growing cynicism towards traditional parties and declining confidence in the ability of the political class to solve the most pressing problems have added to this trend.

The degree of dissatisfaction has been further aggravated by the division of job space into low-paid, entry-level jobs and more flexible ones, in terms of hours and higher specialisation, sometimes unique (Esping-Andersen 1990), towards the expansion of services, especially technical, social and management services. The welfare state has also shifted, in the social chapter, from the distribution of resources to specialised public services (Coupland 1991), and the bifurcation of the labour market between attractive and in-demand jobs and low-level jobs has led to McDonaldization (Ritzer 1993) of the dissatisfied majority.

The advantages gained through better education and higher qualifications - salaries, status, autonomy in work - have unfortunately not favoured the free market, lower taxes and reduced state intervention (Crook, Pakulski and Waters 1992) that it has produced, because it has created a class of losers who have become fattened and who challenge the very system that has led to this situation of unequal access to opportunities (Hage and Powers 1992). And on top of it all, there was the confrontation with a certain feeling and system of "moralising" (Jan-Werner Müller 2015), whereby the market and social life are considered altered through excessive references to moderate political approaches and the sanctioning of radical ones, which bring together the discontented, another form of blaming, labelling and demeaning, this time in imagological terms, the losers of the post-capitalist liberal democratic system.

5. Sociological Study: The Sources of the Far-Right in France, Italy, Hungary, Austria

In the following, we have used statistical data from Eurostat and various qualitative and regional studies for the four countries concerned - France, Italy, Hungary and Austria. The results at the level of Europe's regions emphasize both the qualitative elements of the duration and solidity of democracy in support of the populist parties' area, and the state of the economies and development, i.e. the status of states net payers or net recipients of European funds (Figure no. 1). Along the same lines we find the correlation of investment in education with voting in the populist spectrum (Figure no. 2) as well as with PISA tests (Figure no. 3); a relevant indicator for adaptability to the highly skilled and well-paid job category with flexible and highly demanded programmes.

A dissonance is seen in the last place in tertiary attainment in Eastern Europe even though investment in education is not the lowest, possibly explained by the absorption of high school graduates from here by better ranked universities in the West and the retention of high school graduates from here in better paid jobs in the West, a result of brain-drain. Just as the aberrations between the danger of social exclusion and per capita income and the inclination to vote to the extreme appear in Figures 4 and 5, which do not explain the inclination more in the rich West and Eastern Europe on this basis and correlation. This is where the weight of history, but also the speed of technological change in the West, plays the most important role, as does, we estimate, the habit of a very good living in the West, which has comparatively faded over the last 15-20 years.

At a granular level, the investment in *social media*, especially to consolidate and promote nationalist and populist discourse, in areas of the virtual public identifiable as losers, dissatisfied, frustrated, is obvious. All the more so when the exploitation of algorithms is coupled with an external intention to interfere and create exploitable societal divisions. From misinformation and amplification of societal divides through online platforms, to financial or strategic support for particular parties and political leaders, election meddling and altering the integrity of elections, the examples are manifold since 2016 and the individual reports conclusive.

The country-by-country analysis highlights the qualitative dimension and the elements of exploitation of vulnerabilities in European and national policies, which are of interest to stimulate anti-system sentiment and distrust of democratic institutions. Although the impact of these factors is difficult to quantify, integrating them into future research could provide a broader perspective on the interplay between internal and external factors in the process of political radicalization.

These results demonstrate the value of education as a preventive measure against political radicalization, as well as technological literacy and an understanding of the mechanisms of information warfare, including the increasingly common psychological operations required to correctly receive the aggression of these currents in cyberspace. The need for public policies that give high priority to education spending as a long-term tactic are convergent with the direct separation of the aggressive and violent components, the currents that assume revolutionary and profoundly anti-democratic views from the broad mass of voters who are disaffected on various issues and the need to engage, dialogue and understand them, avoiding the vindictive and hateful policies that are polarizing, divisive and self-destructive.

Situation at EU Level. The Populist Wave is Getting Stronger
In recent years, the populist wave has been gaining more and more traction in the domestic politics of European countries. While countries such as Hungary and Poland already had a history of populism and nationalism through Fidesz and PiS parties respectively, recently more and more countries have seen an increase in support for anti-EU, anti-system and sometimes even anti-NATO parties. For a better understanding of the whole situation we preferred to divide the EU Member States into regions: South (yellow), West (green), North (blue) and East (orange).

Figure no. 2: Percentage obtained by nationalist and populist parties in the last parliamentary elections (Politico 2025)


**Figure no. 3:** Percentage of GDP invested in education in EU countries (Eurostat 2024)

**Figure no. 4:** Percentage of population with tertiary education (Statista 2024)

Figure no. 5: Risk of poverty and social exclusion (Eurostat 2024)


Figure no. 6: Average annual income of citizens in EU Member States *(Eurostat 2025)*

Case of France

In the 2024 Parliamentary elections, the RN (Rassemblement National) party, co-founded in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen and which had in its incipient membership former members of the SS (Chrisafis 2024), obtained 32,05% of the total votes in the French parliamentary elections (Ministère de l'Intérieur 2024). The fundamental anti-elitist, people-centred characteristics of populism serve as the foundation for today's FN. The party's long-time leader and more radical supporters have been toppled as part of this "normalisation", which has also seen a shift from anti-Semitism to an anti-immigration and Islamophobic stance and from economic liberalism to a policy of protecting the French people against globalisation. The FN programme is based on anti-EU nationalism and anti-elitism (Greven 2016).

Voter dissatisfaction with traditional politics and economic volatility have been the main drivers behind the rise of populist parties over the past decade. France experienced its worst economic recession since the end of the Second World War as a result of the 2008 global financial crisis. In order to reduce the state deficit, both the right and the left have implemented highly unpopular austerity measures. Concerns about immigration caused by Islamic terrorism have been exacerbated since 2015 by the evolving refugee crisis in the EU. More generally, populist mobilization against the political establishment and the European Union has benefited from public dissatisfaction with the EU's crisis management (Ivaldi 2018).

Case of Italy

In 2022 parliamentary elections were held in Italy. They were won by Fratelli d'Italia, a right-wing populist party, with 28,8% of the total votes cast (Politico 2025). An unprecedented number of refugees and migrants have arrived in Europe as a result of the "2015 refugee crisis". Most of these people were fleeing social instability in North Africa and the Middle East, as well as war and terror in Syria. Around 3.5 million people sought asylum in EU-28 countries between 2014 and 2017, an important share in Italy, left alone to deal with migrants. Pressure is still present in several important entry points such as Italy and Greece. Between 2014 and 2017, there was minimal variation in the number of arrivals in Italy, but in 2018, there was a significant decrease. An average of 150,000 people were rescued annually at sea after being smuggled by traffickers from North Africa to Italian shores between 2014 and 2017. (Campo, Giunti and Mendola 2024)

Case of Hungary

In the 2022 parliamentary elections in Hungary, the Fidesz party won 54,1% of the total vote, defeating and shocking the opposition parties that had allied themselves against Viktor Orbán. Fidesz has used the social unrest and economic inequality generated by Hungary's post-communist economy's transition to a free-market economy to strengthen its main support base (Adam 2024).

Case of Austria

In the 2024 parliamentary elections, the FPÖ (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*) party won 28.8% of the vote (Politico 2025), winning the election and giving European politics a shock. According to the FPÖ's election manifesto, entitled "Fortress Austria", the party advocates strict border controls, the suspension of asylum rights through emergency laws and the "remigration of uninvited foreigners" to create a more "homogenous" society (Yahyai 2025).

In 2015, what was to become known as the refugee crisis began, when unprecedented numbers of refugees fled wars in their home countries and entered Europe. Austria tried to limit the entry of refugees, while Germany allowed asylum seekers into the country. Although the European Union has considerable authority over asylum policy, both Germany and Austria have taken measures that contravene EU rules. Instead of requiring migrants to return to their original point of entry, Germany has delayed implementation of the Dublin agreement, allowing them to apply for asylum in Germany. On the other hand, Austria has used the discretionary power of the agreement to reinstate border restrictions in times of crisis, a unique measure among Schengen governments (Hayes and Dudek 2019).

At the same time, one very important fact in Austrian history should not be overlooked. After the end of the Second World War, Austria was confronted with what was called the "victim myth". Due to significant variations in denazification, Austria and Germany developed quite different national identities. Instead of taking responsibility for the Nazi regime in Austria, the Allied-backed government focused on the idea that Austrians suffered under the Nazi regime and were not as complicit in the regime's crimes as German citizens. (Hayes and Dudek 2019)

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