STRUCTURING RESILIENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

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Resilience is a dimension with a pronounced multidisciplinary character covering a wide range of areas of society, which gives it a fluid profile and difficult to fit into a conceptual-functional typology. The interest in resilience is undoubtedly one of the trends of the current decade, however precursory elements are found throughout history in the most diverse forms of manifestation. As in the case of other dimensions explored in recent years from the perspective of European cooperation in the field of security and defence, resilience was quickly integrated into the steps carried out under the auspices of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), becoming one of the key objectives of the European Union’s external action toolkit and, last but not least, of the operational commitments carried out globally by this organization. The contribution of the EU Global Security Strategy (EUGS) in designing resilience as a central element of the European security and defence cooperation agenda was defining. The main direction promoted by the EUGS was to strengthen resilience aspects in external action, while taking a structured approach to exploring options for strengthening internal resilience. Subsequently, the outbreak of the war in Ukraine as a result of Russia’s aggression additionally valued the strategic significance of states’ resilience and, subsequently, the importance of the EU’s contribution in this direction.

This study is aiming to bring into light the way in which CSDP answers to the challenge of consolidating the resilience. In this vein, the methodological approach that was implemented responded the multidisciplinary character of this topic. In order to consolidate the comprehensive character of the present study, a historical perspective has been used that correlates the evolution of resilience in EU context with the development of various CSDP instruments. In this sense, an important

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direction of research is represented by the interaction between resilience and EU’s external action and how the EU response to crisis situations has evolved. To a similar extent, this paper approached the resilience from the perspective of internal security of European Union, especially in the context of the war in Ukraine. A special note is made on how the latest EU strategic document (Strategic Compass) placed resilience as being one of the strategic objectives of CSDP. Given all of these aspects, the main conclusions of the article are emphasising the importance of adequate calibration of national approach in generating resilience, not only in the conceptual area but also on the practical aspects such as capabilities and resources required by a strong resilience. At the same time, a special attention is given to how the partnership and external interaction, especially between EU and NATO, are tailored to enhance and complement the national contributions in the field of resilience.

**Keywords:** CSDP; resilience; EUGS; Strategic Compass; PESCO; EDF; EPF.

**Introduction**

Although resilience is one of the concepts widely circulated in recent years, precedents for its use at EU level date back to 2012, when the European Commission adopted the Communication on resilience (COM(2012)586). It was based on the experience of food crises in Africa in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Consequently, the European Commission’s approach was directed towards managing this type of vulnerability by strengthening resilience through the optimisation of its own external action to support developing states. Although it can be seen as a one-off issue, the Communication provided the framework for defining the parameters of the EU’s overall positioning towards resilience issues. Thus, this moment is linked to the emergence of the first definition, agreed at EU level, of resilience referring to “the capacity of an individual, family, community, country or region to cope, adapt and recover quickly from trials or shocks” (p. 5).

The implementation of a response formula for the two dimensions – the capacity to withstand shocks and the ability to recover – could only be achieved through a multidisciplinary strategy meant to reduce the risks of crises, doubled by the adaptation of internal mechanisms in different geographical perimeters. From this perspective, strengthening resilience was placed, as an actionable area, at the intersection of humanitarian and development assistance. The time perspective associated with this approach envisaged a long-term commitment to building resilience, structured on the basis of the bottom-up approach. Basically, it was envisaged to empower the entire set of policies and instruments from which a state benefited, thus strengthening resilience as an integrated approach of them. The generic structure of the EU’s response to building resilience included:
- crisis anticipation and risk assessment, with a focus on reducing vulnerabilities at local and institutional level to enable them to be better prepared to mitigate negative effects, as well as to structure an effective response to incidents having natural causes;
- prevention and preparedness aimed at structural, long-term/sustainable approach to the causes that determine the threats to the resilience and, subsequently, states’ vulnerabilities; this also resulted in the priority given to integration;
- strengthen the crisis response, where major attention was paid to inter-regional coordination and the external assistance process. It was also considered the importance of defining strategic priorities in strengthening immediate/short-term resilience (early recovery), as well as in a longer temporal situation. Given the overall profile of the EU’s commitment, it was envisaged to connect European policies, especially the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), for crisis situations that could mark the conditions for implementing the cooperation agenda with the affected states.

The principles and courses of action submitted by the European Commission have been politically validated by the Conclusions adopted at EU Council level on resilience (Council Conclusions on resilience, 2013). The Council’s approach gave additional political input to the EU’s approach to resilience, stressing the importance of linking policy dialogue with development and humanitarian processes/initiatives. Building on the milestones of the Commission Communication, the EU took into consideration a wide range of situations which helped to consolidate resilience, such as: conflicts, insecurity, weak democratic governance, economic shocks, natural accidents, climate change. Thus, the conceptual platform submitted by the Commission as regards the principles underpinning the EU approach was formalized (GAERC, 2013, pg. 3-4) starting from the following principles:
- the primary responsibility of governments in developing resilience;
- convergence of vision between the different national actors involved, as well as between EU and Member States;
- medium and long-term approaches to humanitarian and development planning; deepening bilateral and multilateral cooperation in implementing the resilience-building agenda;
- promoting an active approach to specific aspects of conflict situations, in particular as regards the humanitarian, development and policy dialogue dimensions;
- the need to invest in local capacity, while developing regional potential and constant dialogue with different local entities;
- commitment to long-term development of resilience;
- ensuring the implementation of the gender perspective;
- focused approach to vulnerabilities;
− supporting sustainable solutions among the refugee population;
− promoting transparency and efficiency in implementing resilience, including from the perspective of developing measurement tools.

The implementation of these principles was to be achieved through an Action Plan that outlines the features of EU approach in terms of the central role of states in implementing measures regarding: strengthening resilience, topics of interest – civilian population; promoting the action matrix bringing together coherence – complementarity – coordination – continuity. Under these conceptual auspices, the advanced priorities for the EU’s contribution in support of other states were the following: EU support for the development and implementation of national and regional approaches to resilience, internal capacity and partnership; innovation, learning and advice; resilience support methodology and tools (Action Plan for Resilience, 2013).

2. Strategic Approach to Resilience

Undoubtedly, the Commission’s Communication and its political validation were the cornerstones of structuring EU’s approach to resilience. Already at this stage, however, the focus on addressing resilience in the context of EU’s external action in relation to partner states is distinguished. The premise of this approach was that developments in the immediate vicinity of the EU were likely to generate disruptive effects on the security of Member States. Thus, it became an immediate need to strengthen the EU’s support capacity, especially when the capacity of most states in the immediate vicinity was particularly fragile to face major challenges to their own stability.

At the same time, the ownership of the European Commission, at this stage, outlined specific features characterized by standardization of support formulas and having a pronounced economic character. From this perspective, the Commission’s Communication is a specialized and initial element in the comprehensive definition of resilience at EU level. In June 2016, the defining moment was represented by the adoption of the Global Strategy of the European Union (EUGS). At its level, resilience was one of the main elements promoted in association with the EU’s global profile in the area of security and defence. The EUGS also offers a bivalent perspective on resilience, centered both on the internal component, at EU level, and on the external action of the European body (EUGS 2016, p. 4).

In this respect, strengthening resilience in the European context has added extra valences to the existing framework at the time of the EUGS emergence. The dominant note of how this objective was designed concerned both the dimension of democratic values and principles, as well as the security note in which instruments and policies developed at EU level would be used to build resilience (e.g., cybersecurity and
countering hybrid threats). From the perspective of external interaction, resilience was projected as one of the priorities of the EU’s external action, focusing on the dimension of the two vicinities and approaching both state and societal level. Within this framework, EU will support the different courses of action by focusing efforts and support for these states in key areas (governmental, economic, climate, energy). The EUGS also advances a new interpretation of resilience as a concept extended from the individual to society as a whole. The existing conditionality between security – prosperity and democracy – resilience is the essence of this approach in which the EU must promote and invest sustainably in the resilience of states and societies. The geographical perspective is extensive, including states “from Central Asia to the south of Central Africa” (EUGS, 2016, p. 23). At the same time, the concrete ways to promote this objective cover a wide range of formulas, including both the criteria associated with the enlargement process and the cooperation policy within the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), as well as adapted policies aimed at responding to deficits and the critical situation at local level, such as: fight against terrorism, corruption, organized crime and the protection of human rights. To these are added the local ownership in terms of justice reform, security and defence sector, respectively the construction of relevant capacities at state level. In this context, CSDP is individualized as an instrument with the potential to deliver tangible results in terms of partner states’ capacity to ensure the necessary security conditions for the deployment of assistance programs on the ground.

Within the level of ambition promoted by the EUGS as reflecting the EU’s global profile in the area of security and defence, resilience has been a substantial component associated with partner capacity building. The separate note refers to the systematic approach of this area for states that are in the process of recovery in a post-conflict context or of increased instability. This includes the role of CSDP to provide assistance and expertise to strengthen partner states’ national capacities and to provide expertise and assistance in countering hybrid threats, including cybersecurity, strategic communication and border security. Also, responding to the bivalent internal-external perspective, the issue of resilience is also addressed in correlation with the EU’s internal potential to face security challenges and risks, especially in terms of protection of critical networks and infrastructure, supply chain security, promotion of technological endowment and investments in defence (Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, p. 3).

The structured and, equally, comprehensive vision promoted at EU level through the Global Strategy and its implementation plan placed the issue of resilience on strategic coordinates. One of the facets that the EUGS promoted undoubtedly concerned the security and defence dimension of the resilience-building effort. This approach encompassed both the operational dimension and the launch of concrete capability initiatives and projects. At the same time, concern about the security aspects
of resilience was manifested in the context of the security environment degradation following the Russian invasion and occupation of the Crimean Peninsula. On these coordinates, EU’s efforts in the field of resilience were advanced in a much broader manner than before, including the options through which European cooperation in the field of security and defence could respond to these concerns, both internally and externally.

The EUGS’s course of action on the importance of resilience in the context of EU external action was deepened in a new Communication adopted in June 2017. The characteristic of the new approach was to promote an integrated approach. Under the auspices of new political directions and structured as a long-term commitment. Without excluding the practical dimension of cooperation with partner states, the deepening of the bipolar perspective was envisaged, the internal dimension of resilience being addressed more carefully, in a complementary manner with external action approaches.

It can be argued on an attempt to extend the conceptual framework for reporting the EU to the issue of resilience. Practically, it concerns another phase of the evolutionary process that was initiated in 2012 when the Commission Communication, based on a particular evolution in the field of food security, placed resilience in a context relatively limited to the capacity to withstand shocks. Contrary to this approach, EUGS has projected a more comprehensive perspective, extending the issue of resilience to society as a whole, with obvious political vocations linked to democratic rights and foundations. In the context of the realities determined by the emergence of the EUGS and, subsequently, of the adoption of an EU level of ambition in the field of security and defence, the new Communication also aimed to adjust the conceptual framework – practically to the new realities generated by the EU’s profile as a global actor. Thus, we can talk about the reassessment of resilience as a foreign and security policy instrument, as well as an essential parameter for calibrating the efforts of Member States and the Union to strengthen the stability and security of their own area. On these coordinates, resilience becomes a strategic priority structured, thus, on all levels and much closer to the capacity of adequate functioning of the state.

In terms of internal resilience, it can be advanced the idea of designing it as a deterrent formula, meant to prevent coercive or aggressive actions from the external environment. Within this perspective, EU’s capacity to anticipate and, subsequently, initiate proactive political and operational actions was a priority direction (JOIN(2017)21 final, p. 15). In order to achieve the EU’s capacity to optimally manage the challenges to internal resilience, concrete dimensions of action were envisaged to:

− Resilience against hybrid threats – with priority in strengthening critical infrastructure protection, diversifying energy sources and developing defence capabilities. The potential for connection between Member States was to be one
of the strategic priorities of this area, contributing to deepening integration and interconnection at EU level;

− Cybersecurity – through internal reinforcement of communication services and networks within the EU as well as EU external support to the UN, including cross-border cooperation;

− Strategic communication – focused on increasing the resilience of EU population to disinformation, as well as increasing EU’s capacity to manage the challenges of this area on geographical coordinates;

− Countering terrorism and violent extremism – in addition to domestic aspects of detecting, preventing and exterminate terrorist organizations and sources of funding, partnership development and bilateral dialogue were envisaged;

− Strengthen the security of critical transport infrastructure – including in terms of developing interaction and cooperation with non-EU states to reduce the threat in this area. From an internal perspective, internal capacity development, strategic awareness, IT tools are considered; increasing the role of the police and judiciary;

− Cooperation between EU and other multinational organizations.

3. Strategic Compass and a New Perspective on Resilience

The adoption of this document is also placed in the context created by the European Union Global Strategy aimed at developing more ambitious European cooperation in the field of security and defence. On this line of action, the first discussions regarding the rationale for adopting a new strategic level document converged towards giving particular importance to the issue of resilience identified as one of the main directions of action that European cooperation had to pursue. As is known, the Strategic Compass was adopted at the Foreign Affairs Council meeting on March 21st, 2022. The peculiarity of the moment was accentuated by the fact that it took place less than a month after the launch of Russian aggression against Ukraine. The impact of aggression would be reflected intensely in terms of valuing the importance of resilience, both in terms of external action and in terms of internal capacity at Member State level to face security challenges to their resilience.

Unlike other documents and approaches used at European level in the development of this area, the Strategic Compass places resilience much closer to the internal security of the European Union. Clearly, this course of action derives from the dramatic acuity of the war in Ukraine and a relatively insufficient level of coagulation of some options to ensure internal security at European level. Equally, the perspective advanced by the Compass in terms of promoting resilience can be regarded as an upper stage in the development of the European agenda, structured by deepening the directions of action generated by the EUGS, while adapting the EU’s level of ambition in crisis management to the realities generated by the war in Ukraine.
In terms of continuity with advanced elements through the EUGS, the resilience approach at Strategic Compass level provides concrete directions for implementation, as is the case with the development of tools to combat cyber and hybrid threats. Capacity building at European level is also envisaged in terms of resilience in managing interference and manipulation. The dominant note projected by the new document is strongly anchored in the idea of internal capacity building in these areas, with emphasis on developing the potential for anticipation and early warning on the imminence of aggressive actions. Equally, the functional parameters of the envisaged toolkit target both the conceptual dimension and the capacity to identify, deter and defend actions in the cyber and hybrid domains, profiled in an integrated matrix, supported by an efficient communication system. The relationship of these objectives with the operational dimension of the EU developed under the CSDP aegis was likely to provide novelty elements that the Strategic Compass brought in the context of European cooperation in the field.

Based on the need to coagulate a concrete action profile in the field of resilience, the creation of that type of relevant capabilities was envisaged to strengthen the posture of operational commitments regarding hybrid and cyber threats. The empowerment of initiatives developed in the field of capabilities such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) represented a concrete dimension through which the field of resilience was translated to the level of practical cooperation projects with the participation of Member States (Strategic Compass, 2022, p. 22). At the same time, addressing the operational development potential in cyber and hybrid management was also reflected in the development of specialized teams that could be engaged in support of Member States.

The internal dimension of resilience has been placed in a higher matrix in terms of ambition juxtaposed to the EU’s global security profile. The main element concerned the objective of ensuring the Union’s access to strategic areas (maritime – air – space), resilience being seen from the perspective of strengthening the capacity to promote EU interests at global level. The disclaimer of these objectives aimed at adapted implementation, including both a component to complement the conceptual-doctrinal framework and concrete aspects of implementation in an institutional context shared between the European Commission and EU Council. The space policy, with direct applicability in the field of security and defence, represents one of the distinct directions advanced by the Strategic Compass, both from the perspective of situational monitoring, the development of necessary capabilities, and reaction potential (Strategic Compass, 2022, p. 24).

On March 10\textsuperscript{th}, 2023, building on the priorities advanced through the Compass, the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy presented a Communication on the EU Space Strategy in the area of security and defence. At this level, the issue of resilience was seen as a priority in terms of ensuring EU access to the spatial dimension. Thus, resilience translates into achieving the autonomous capacity of the European Union to act autonomously and, subsequently, to ensure the protection of its own facilities and capabilities. The connection of this approach with the security and defence dimension is validated by promoting an active posture across the entire set of space systems and services developed by the EU (JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence, p. 7). It should be mentioned that this approach represents a premiere for the European Union, being the first strategic vision on the use of space, including through direct applicability in the field of security and defense. The priority given to resilience is also found at the level of integrating the functionalities foreseen for the space approach, together with those related to cyber and hybrid dimensions, within a matrix for managing asymmetric challenges and threats (JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence, p. 9).

Equally, the dimension of partnerships and relations with third states that the Strategic Compass addresses in the context of developing resilience cannot be excluded from discussion. Together with the operational arm of CSDP, it is the building block of external resilience that includes elements associated with cooperation between the EU and partner states in the two neighborhoods. Basically, the Strategic Compass represents a new opportunity to explicitly reconfirm the interest in continuing EU’s commitment in supporting and developing the resilience of partner states. The operationalization of this objective mainly concerns the tools developed in the context of external action and, subsequently, CSDP. On the same coordinates of the manifest interest in deepening cooperation in the field of resilience is placed the capitalization of the partnership formulas developed by the EU in relation to other international organizations. As with other aspects, the provisions of the two EU-NATO Declarations, adopted in 2016 and 2018, were milestones on how to deepen cooperation in the field of resilience. On these coordinates, the framework provided by the two documents included a consistent set of actions and cooperation projects in the cyber, hybrid, CBRN resilience, exercise coordination, strategic communication as well as in terms of harmonizing the approaches of the two organizations in strengthening the resilience of partner states. The focus on the resilience component of EU-NATO cooperation was one of the elements advanced through the Third Declaration signed by both organizations in January 2023 (EU-NATO Declaration, 2023).
4. Dimensions of Resilience Implementation in the Context of European Security and Defence Cooperation

Building on the milestones advanced in the Commission’s 2017 Communication, four components were envisaged for the external dimension covering and applicability of CSDP to be included in the external action to:

− improving analytical capacity and disseminating risk analysis at national and regional level, as well as interaction at Council level to ensure policy dialogue and programming of assistance;
− introduction of a dynamic system for monitoring external pressures and faster political and diplomatic response;
− mainstreaming resilience in external action planning and financing;
− development of international and practical resilience policy (Strategic Approach to Resilience, 2017, p. 5).

At the same time, the strategic paradigm agreed by the EUGS regarding the applicability of the concept of resilience in a “the whole of society” approach is completed by the dimension of basic functionalities and mechanisms of state functioning. From this perspective, the contribution of external action and subsequent CSDP was intended to ensure a resilient environment in EU’s vicinity while contributing to overall resilience within the Union (JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s external action). In this regard, the role of European cooperation in security and defence can be seen as backdating the formalization interval of EU’s priorities in the field of resilience. Thus, elements associated with support to neighborhood states for resilience building can be identified in terms of mandates set for crisis management missions and operations that the EU will carry out from 2003.

They also cover both military and civilian commitments. Even if for the period prior to adoption of the EUGS, resilience was not explicitly mentioned as one of the main goals, the objectives of the missions and operations carried out between 2003 and 2017 support the strengthening of the resilience of EU-supported states. The most relevant dimension in this direction is support for security sector reform. This element is also common to the commitments in the Western Balkans, launched in the context of restoring the security climate after the outbreak of conflicts in the former Yugoslav area. On these coordinates is placed the Civilian Police Mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM BiH) (2002/210/CFSP), respectively the Althea military mission deployed since December 2004 in the same geographical perimeter and, last but not least, the missions in North Macedonia. Subsequently, the typology for structuring support to state institutions in the EU’s neighborhoods has diversified substantially, including complex formulas of assistance to the armed forces and
police in an extended context of the security sector reform process, as in the case of missions in Africa (Central African Republic, DR Congo, Sahel - Mali and Niger, Somalia, Mozambique). On these coordinates, there are also a series of missions targeting niche/specialized support on the reform component of the legal system and in the field of human rights (Georgia, Iraq, North Macedonia).

The importance of resilience in connection with EU’s operational commitments in crisis management has benefited from an additional validation in the security context affected by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. In view of the marked degradation in the security environment in Europe, the focus on resilience in terms of how EU can contribute to strengthening the capacity of partner states has gained significant emphasis. In terms of EU-led operational commitments, this approach is best reflected in the context of the Partnership Mission launched by the EU to the Republic of Moldova at the end of April 2023. The main objective of this operational approach aims to strengthen the resilience of the security sector of this state in the field of crisis management and the capacity to combat hybrid threats, including cyber security and combating manipulation and external interference. The inventory of measures envisaged covers a wide range of possibilities for implementing EU support, ranging from identifying support needs in different areas to advising on the development of the security sector conceptual framework (2023/855).

In addition to the operational agenda, the implementation of resilience in the CSDP context is also manifested through the instruments developed in recent years, building on the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. It was mentioned earlier capitalizing on the potential of cooperation formulas in the field of capabilities as an option to optimize operational commitments, to which is added the possibility of using financing instruments to support the reform processes of the armed forces in partner states. This is the context in which is placed the European Peace Facility (EPF), an instrument created in March 2021 as part of the process of reconfiguring external action instruments in support of the objectives of the EU Global Strategy. Obviously, the main direction aimed at streamlining the support provided by the European Union to partner states in both geographical neighborhoods. The distinctive character of the EPF is given precisely by the emphasis placed on defence issues, a trend set by the Treaty of Lisbon and, subsequently, by the EUGS. According to the functional parameters associated with the defence dimension at EU level, the EPF was structured on two components/pillars aimed at ensuring common costs related to military operations (pillar I), respectively financing assistance measures for the armed forces of partner states (pillar II).

At the level of the objectives set for the functioning of the EPF, the resilience of the states receiving EU support was one of the priorities in terms of strengthening their military and defence capabilities ((CFSP) 2021/509, p. 46). Resilience is also approached from a broad perspective through the possibility for the EPF to support the
actions of regional and international organizations in the field of crisis management. The main way of implementing support is through assistance measures proposed by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in cooperation with Member States and approved by the EU Council. The principles envisaged for defining these assistance measures shall cover:

- their consistency with the policies and objectives of EU’s external action to strengthen peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security;
- compliance with EU law, EU policies and strategies and UN Security Council resolutions;
- compliance with the obligations of the Union and its members, in particular human rights and relevant legislation;
- taking into account the specific character of Member States’ defence policy and not running counter to the security and defence interests of the Union and the Member States. Beyond the operating reasons behind the EPF, this new instrument contributed to a much closer rapprochement between European defence cooperation and the dimension of EU external action. At the same time, the financing opportunity that EPF offers to partner states is a premiere in terms of predictability of financial support in the defence field. However, the EPF was built on the formal framework provided by the EU Treaty for regulating European defence cooperation, according to which such expenditure cannot be borne by the EU budget. From this perspective, the EPF budget was built outside the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, targeting a total financial envelope for the two pillars of EUR 5 billion, staggered for the mentioned period.

The assistance measures adopted by the EU between 2021 and 2022 targeted a number of states such as Somalia, Mali, Niger, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in support of African Union peacekeeping missions. Also, in the context of the war in Ukraine, triggered by Russia’s aggression, the European Peace Facility is the main instrument through which the EU provides assistance to the Ukrainian armed forces, its level currently reaching approximately EUR 4.6 billion.

Conclusions

Although resilience is a relatively recent emergence in the landscape of European security and defence cooperation, within a short time it has become one of the essential milestones on the Common Security and Defence Policy agenda. This approach tends to be strengthened both conceptually and in reporting on practical steps to develop capabilities and allocate resources that match the focus on resilience.

As can be seen, the manner of deepening resilience in the context of CSDP is highly multidisciplinary, where both operational aspects and elements associated with
the capability agenda are found. In this equation, we cannot discuss a distinct path to resilience, the option taken at the European level being to associate this conceptual paradigm to the operating framework and objectives pursued in the context of CSDP. The approach within these parameters also explains the absence of a distinct level of ambition to ensure resilience in a security and defence context. However, the positive impact of corroborating resilience with the security and defence cooperation agenda cannot be overlooked, which contributes to strengthening the relevance of cooperation programs with different partners and third states and, subsequently, to substantial progress. In the same paradigm is positioned how resilience is reflected at the level of cooperation formulas developed by the European Union in relation to other international organizations. EU-NATO interaction is one of the courses of action with substantial development potential, all the more relevant from the perspective of strengthening convergence between these organizations.

Obviously, the emphasis placed on the external dimension of resilience is also dictated by the profile of European cooperation in the field of security and defence, whose directions of manifestation are, according to the provisions of the EU Treaty, exclusively external to the geographical space covered by the European Union. However, the realities of the security environment, culminating in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, bring to attention the importance of addressing resilience from the perspective of internal security and defence of the European Union. This trend has already gained consistency through the development of relevant EU tools in areas such as cyber defence, hybrid threats and space security, with significant interest from Member States to move in this direction.

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